Marijuana Legalization:
The War on Drugs and Criminal Law
Howard R. Burke
Strayer University

Abstract This research will point out that the United States’ current policy on drug prohibition, the so called “War on Drugs,” is ineffective. The current draconian prohibition policies against drug consumption may actually increase their use. As well, contrary to claims made by current drug policy supporters, increased drug enforcement can reduce public safety and compound the individual and social costs of drug use. The U.S. drug policy, born over a hundred years ago, has gone through several transformations becoming more voracious with each new invocation. The War on Drugs is an expensive and failed concept which has incorporated racism in its administration, increased crime rates, imposed harsh sentences for nonviolent offenses, facilitated police corruption and aggressively eroded civil liberties.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION Introduction to the Problem Background of the Study Statement of the Problem Purpose of the Research Research Questions Significance of the Research Assumptions and Limitations Organization of the Remainder of the Study

LITERATURE REVIEW

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law
INTRODUCTION
The United States has conducted a long experiment of drug prohibition. The prohibition of marijuana and other illicit drugs has only increased their use, abuse and availability to children. The drug war has served to increase crime rates and rampant corruption among law enforcement officials. Federal expenditures on drug prohibition enforcement are a drain on the American economy and takes money that could be allocated to other resources. Current drug prohibition laws are helping to create enormous case backlog. This has been achieved through record numbers of arrests for nonviolent offenses, their unequal application among whites and nonwhites as well as their conflict with state laws that allow for the use of medical marijuana. The legalization of marijuana would alleviate all of these concerns.
BACKGROUND
For most of the United States’ history (and indeed the world’s history) drugs were available and legal. For millennia narcotic substances such as cannabis, coca, opium and peyote have been used for medicinal, nutritional, social and spiritual purposes. In the 1800’s marijuana, being sold as hemp, was legal in most states. It was widely cultivated for use as clothes, rope, sails for ships and medicine. At the turn of the century, American citizens could legally purchase cocaine, heroin and morphine over the counter from nearly any pharmacy. The United States’ movement toward drug prohibition was not predicated by a crisis of drug usage or abuse. Drug use in America was on the decline by the early 1900s. [Courtwright, 1982] The demand for narcotics control was generated by a zealous group of Protestant Missionaries in the aftermath of America’s colonial venture in the Philippines following the Spanish-American War.
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law America’s acquisition of the Philippine Islands was one of several significant events in America’s history which would usher in the creation of strict drug prohibition laws. During the time that the United States acquired the Philippines there was adamant support of the legal opium trade by a considerable subpopulation of opium smokers who were non-native Chinese. When the Spanish ruled the Philippines a substantial amount of the government’s revenues were generated from taxes on the opium trade. The trade was run by state licensed opium monopolists. The United States assumed control and Governor William Howard Taft and the Philippines Commission quickly proposed a revival of the Spanish tax farming system. [Martin, 1996] The proposal was nearly passed before its momentum was halted by an all-out campaign by prohibitionist missionaries. The outraged missionaries were adamantly opposed to the idea of the United States furthering the evils of the opium trade. Over 2,000 telegraphic petitions were dispatched to prominent prohibition supporters imploring President Roosevelt to halt the opium taxation system. On March 3, 1905, the U.S. Congress passed an act intended to revise and amend the tariff laws of the Philippine Islands. This was the first federal anti-narcotics law. Aimed at bringing about an end to opium commerce in the Philippines, the act would mark the first step in a decade-long campaign that would culminate in the enactment of national narcotics prohibition through the Harrison Act of 1914. [Gierenger, 2005] The act would implement the policy of “progressive prohibition.” This empowered the colonial Philippine government to exercise strict control of the importation and sale of opium. The prohibition plan had a deadline of March 1, 1908. It would make the

Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law importation and sale of opium in any form illegal except by the Philippine government and for medicinal purposes only. Before the 1905 opium prohibition law had taken effect in the Philippines Bishop Charles Brent sought to expand its sphere of influence. He would write letters imploring President Roosevelt to call an international conference that would ultimately add U.S support to anti-opium efforts in China. President Roosevelt would agree with Bishop Brent, seeing a golden opportunity to curry favor with the Chinese government. A future conference would be scheduled in Shanghai. [Richard, 1996] Three State Department appointed commissioners would represent the United States. The three representatives included Bishop Charles Brent, Dr. Hamilton Wright and Dr. Charles Tenney. Dr. Wright, a budding “narcocrat,” was adamant and vocal. He would later become one of the leading architects of national drug prohibition. Dr. Tenney was both an ex-missionary and an anti-opium advocate. In 1906, three years before the conference was to take place, the U.S. Congress would adopt the American Pharmaceutical Association’s proposed model pharmacy bill in the District of Columbia. This bill would outlaw the sales of cocaine and opiates except by prescription, and then further restricting those prescriptions to addicts. Progressive Era reform was spreading like wildfire and many states would follow the example set in Washington, D.C. California’s legislature, under pressure from the state board of pharmacy, amended the state’s poison act in 1907 to include prohibition of non-medical sales of opium and cocaine. [Terry, 1970] Launching an aggressive campaign, the California state board of pharmacy, would utilize many techniques that were later adopted by drug
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law enforcement agencies and are still in use even until present day. Their tactics included: using informants, employing undercover agents, entrapping pharmacists into illegal sales, launching sweeps of Chinatown opium dens, seizing contraband in highly publicized raids, and pushing legislation to criminalize users and outlaw paraphernalia. [Geirenger, 2005] In February 1909, the Shanghai Opium Commission convened with representatives from Britain, China, other powers with Far East interests and the United States. During the convention the major powers agreed that the opium trade should be limited. Although a broad consensus was reached by government representatives the assertions of the convention lacked treaty authority.
The United States Congress would subsequently create the Opium Exclusion Act which completely prohibited the importation and smoking opium in the U.S. This was a landmark piece of legislation that would openly demonstrate American cooperation with efforts to destroy the opium trade. The Opium Exclusion Act took place on April, 1909. This act would later be considered the true beginning of national drug prohibition. With Dr. Wright at the helm of the national drug prohibition the movement increased its speed. The State Department would press for another international conference at the Hague, beginning in 1911 and ending in 1912. This time the U.S. delegates attending the conference would include Bishop Brent, Dr. Hamilton Wright, and Henry Finger, who was integral in engineering the California Board of Pharmacy’s anti-drug crusade. Following this meeting, the Hague Convention was signed January 23, 1912. All signatories were then committed to restrictions against opium and cocaine. It

Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law should be noted that during the drafting of the document both Wright and Finger pushed to have cannabis included as well, but garnered no support. In the two years following the Hague Convention, the U.S. Congress would go on to pass the Harrison Act. The Harrison Act was signed by President Woodrow Wilson on December 17, 1914 and subsequently became effective March 1, 1915. Although cannabis would not be included in the federal law, as Wright and Finger had hoped, it was outlawed by many jurisdictions such as Massachusetts [1911], California [1913], and
New York City [1914], et al. [Incidiari, 1986] This legislation unambiguously restricted of all forms of opium as well as cocaine to prescription use only. The federal government, recognizing its own lack of constitutional authority to regulate non-interstate drug use, adopted a tax scheme which would allow for the regulation of drug transactions.
STATEMENT of the PROBLEM Ever increasing drug prohibition legislation would pave the way for the expansion and stricter guidelines of future legislation. In 1922, the Federal Import and Export Act (also known as the Jones-Miller Act) would be passed. It further increased the penalties and restrictions on the import and expert of opium and coca. The Uniform State Narcotic Act, which was first drafted in 1925, would be passed in its fifth and final version in 1932. It was a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. [Inglis, 1975] The act came about following arguments that there should be put in place special safeguards and uniform regulation of narcotic drug trafficking in all of the states. The Harrison Act was created as a measure to address revenues produced through the importation and sale of narcotics. The Uniform State Narcotic Act would grant states
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law the ability to exercise police power with regard to both the seizure of drugs used in illicit trade and those persons involved in such employ. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics would use its influence to recommend adoption of the act for that purpose. With the advent of the Uniform Narcotics Act all states had some regulation of cannabis by the mid 1930s. [Taylor, 1969] Headed by Harry J. Anslinger, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics increased its scrutiny of the use of cannabis as well as other drugs in an ongoing effort to outlaw all drugs. Anslinger would go on to claim that marijuana caused people to act irrational, commit violent crimes and engage in overt sexual behavior. [Musto, 1999] As part of his efforts to further the prohibition movement, Anslinger would produce propaganda films promoting his views on marijuana and talk frequently with the press. In 1936, yet another convention was organized with the intention of creating more prohibitive drug laws. That year, the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (also known as the 1936 Trafficking Convention) would be held in Geneva. In keeping with tradition at such conventions, the U.S. representative, Anslinger, was the most pressing with regard to expanded and sharpening the current prohibition laws. [Lowes, 1966] Anslinger pushed, vehemently, to have the treaty make all activities related to distribution, cultivation, manufacture and use of opium, coca (as well as its derivatives) and marijuana for non-scientific and non-medicinal purposes a criminal offense. Up until this point in prohibition history, such conventions enjoyed widespread support.

Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law Many countries would oppose Anslinger’s criminalization ideas on the basis of being too broad. Article 2 of the Convention called upon signatory countries to use their national criminal law systems to severely punish by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty, acts which are directly related to drug trafficking. [Chatterjee, 1988]
The U.S. considered the convention too weak. Citing lack of attention to confiscation of trafficking profits, extradition and extraterritoriality, the U.S. refused to sign the treaty. [Gilmore, 1991] After the 1936 Trafficking Convention, prohibitive drug laws would meet with growing resistance. In 1937 the Marihuana Tax Act was a federal law that made the transfer or possession of marijuana illegal throughout the United States. The Act imposed an expensive excise tax on marijuana not used for industrial or medical uses. This drew the ire of the American Medical Association. The AMA would oppose the implementation of the act because it meant imposing a tax on physicians prescribing marijuana, retail pharmacists that sold marijuana and marijuana which was cultivated or manufactured for medicinal use. [McAllister, 2000] The American Medical Association would go on to suggest that, instead of enacting the Marihuana Tax Act, marijuana be added to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act. Others would later point out that the United States’ Congress decision to pass the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act was based on hearings, reports and to a large extent testimony derived from articles in newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst. Hearst had considerable financial interests in the timber industry, which was responsible for manufacturing his newsprint. The possibility of using hemp (marijuana) to make paper
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law could have posed a threat to his profits, and would therefore make playing a role in the criminalization of cannabis especially lucrative to him. [Herer, 1985]
Mayor of New York, Fiorello LaGuardia, strongly opposed the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act. In 1944 he would create the LaGuardia Commission to research Harry J.Anslinger’s earlier claims of addiction, madness and overt sexuality. The findings of the Commission were in direct contrast to Anslinger’s reports. Mandatory sentencing laws were first introduced in 1952 and 1956. When Congress passed the Boggs Act in 1952 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 it sought to increase punishment for first time marijuana possession offenses. With the passing of the acts, penalties for a first time marijuana possession offense included a minimum of two to ten years with a fine up to twenty thousand dollars. [William III, 1989] The United States Congress would repeal mandatory penalties for marijuana offenses in 1970. In 1968, the enforcement of drug prohibition would be given a boost through multi-agency reorganization at the federal level. The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare subsidiary Bureau of Drug Abuse Control and the United States Department of Treasury subsidiary Bureau of Narcotics merged to create the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as a United States Department of Justice subsidiary. [Mitchell, 1990] Shortly after this, yet another piece of drug prohibition legislation would be introduced. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (Oct. 27, 1970), also known as the Controlled Substances Act. The law would quickly become the legal foundation for the federal government’s fight against the abuse of drugs and alcohol. It would consolidate numerous laws which regulated the manufacture and distribution of narcotics, stimulants,
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law anabolic steroids, depressants and hallucinogens as well as the chemicals used in the illicit production of controlled substances. [Pilon, 2000] The Controlled Substances Act would require the entire pharmaceutical industry to maintain both strict record keeping and physical security for certain types of drugs. Further, controlled substances were divided into five classes or schedules ranked by their potential for medicinal value, potential for addiction or abuse, and finally, accepted safety under medical supervision. [Boaz, 1990] Any substances listed as Schedule I were considered to have a high potential for abuse, a lack of accepted safety, and no accredited medical use. Those substances listed in schedules II through V, were considered to have a decreased potential for abuse. A substance’s classification would also dictate its method of control. [Lynch, 2000] In 1973, Congress accepted President Nixon’s “Reorganization Plan Number Two.” In it, the President proposed the creation of a single federal agency that would be charged with the enforcement of federal drug laws. The result became evident with the merging of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement to create the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). [Wisotsky, 1990] Finally, during the Reagan Administration, America was witness to the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The act created the Sentencing Commission, which in turn created mandatory sentencing guidelines. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 would expand on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. It would serve to reinstate mandatory prison sentences, including large scale marijuana distribution and create a “three strikes” law. In practice, this meant
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law that one could receive a mandatory life sentence for repeat drug offenses or receive the death penalty if you were convicted as a “drug kingpin” [Meier, 1994] PURPOSE of the RESEARCH The research contained herein is for the purpose of illuminating the fallacies in the logic of drug prohibition supporters. Those who support the Controlled Substances Act and strict sentencing guidelines assert that the laws are effective in reducing crime and drug use and abuse. Currently, the federal government strictly regulates drugs through the Controlled Substances Act, which has traditionally refused to recognize the difference between the recreational and medical use of marijuana. By federal law, marijuana is classified as a schedule I drug. Under the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana is treated like heroin and cocaine. It is considered a controlled substance which is highly addictive and has no medicinal value. Some of the ramifications of the act become immediately apparent. Physicians are not allowed to “prescribe” marijuana for medical use, though; under the First Amendment they can “recommend” its use. [Dupont, 1995] The Drug Enforcement Administration, which is charged with enforcing all drug laws, has taken a great interest in both medical marijuana patients and caregivers. Their interest would be considered even more intense with regard to large cultivation and distribution operations. The DEA is currently allowed to arrest people for the use of medical marijuana. Within the past few years hundreds of people have been the target of federal enforcement actions. A large percentage of these actions would result in arrests or seizure of property under civil asset forfeiture laws. [Green, 1998] In many pending and past cases, the DEA and U.S. Attorney’s office have used exaggerated plan numbers,
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law informants who happily trade “testimony” for jail time and inflammatory rhetoric as justification for enforcing federal laws against medical marijuana patients and caregivers in California as well as other states. The punishment for the violation of federal marijuana laws is usually very steep although the rule of law is not always applied equally to everyone. RESEARCH QUESTIONS What is the current state of federal sentencing laws? There exist two types of federal sentencing laws: mandatory sentencing laws, enacted by Congress and sentencing guidelines, enacted by the United States Sentencing Commission. This was explored in United States v. Booker (2005) when the Supreme Court ruled that federal sentencing guidelines are advisory and no longer mandatory. What is the future of federal sentencing laws? Although the Supreme Court issued a repeal of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines, many federal judges will continue to give great deference to the guidelines.[] The current mandatory minimum sentences take into account not only the amount of marijuana but past convictions as well.
What are the effects of the increased attention placed on low-level drug offenders? After 30 years of aggressively pursuing marijuana users, arrests have grown at a rapid rate while use patterns only slightly fluctuate, remaining near the same level. During the 1990’s there was a 113% increase in marijuana arrests. Of these arrests, nearly all of them were for possession. Decades of drug prohibition have driven down the cost of marijuana and other illicit substances while inversely increasing their purity, perceived
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law availability and potency. [medscape] Former United States Attorney John Ashcroft supported the drug enforcement policy of that era, stating “Federal law enforcement is targeted effectively at convicting major drug traffickers and punishing them with longer lockups in prison.” SIGNIFICANCE of the RESEARCH The research is important because it highlights several key issues with regard to the United States’ long-standing policies and how they might be addressed. The data extrapolated from the Drug Enforcement Agency’s arrest record would seem to indicate that our nation’s premier drug enforcement agency was not intent on stopping the inflow of drugs into the country or capture of major drug traffickers. The information that was obtained from those records would demonstrate a growing problem of corruption among police officials and racial disparities in those persons arrested for minor drug offenses. During the 1990’s law enforcement had become almost solely focused on low-level marijuana offenders. This approach would emphasize the use of police officers to stop and frisk pedestrians under the assumption that such encounters would deter people from carrying contraband. Former New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir would remark, in defense of the strategy, “Our plan is to attack it on all levels. We’re not just going after the major traffickers; we’re gonna harass the little guys on a daily basis.”[] This hard-nosed approach had a disproportionate impact on the African American community. According to data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health for 2002, approximately 74% of regular marijuana users (those who have used marijuana within the past month) are non-Hispanic whites and only 14% are
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law black. The rates are similar to life time use patterns as well, where 76% of users are white and 11% are black. Theses figures contrast sharply with arrest rates. While blacks make up approximately 14% of marijuana users in the general population, they are 30% of those arrested for marijuana violations. Enforcement policy decisions are one potential explanatory factor for the disparity in arrest by race. A Maryland study on marijuana enforcement observed that police officers knew where to go if they wished to make an easy arrest, and suggested they could do so whenever they wished in certain neighborhoods. Research by criminologist Alfred Blumstein supports this point, observing that disproportionate arrest rates are due to more a “more dense police presence where blacks reside.” []
The current drug policy has also had a significant impact on the law enforcement community as well. As the growth of marijuana arrests has grown, so have the substantial costs to law enforcement. Since, 1991, the domestic law enforcement component of the federal drug control budget has increased from $4.6 billion to $9.5 billion in 2002. The number climbs to $72.4 billion when both the foreign and domestic law enforcement budgets are taken into account for 2001. $2.1 billion of that is spent on marijuana arrests. Of that amount, approximately 4430 million is spent on marijuana trafficking and $1.7 billion is being spent on arrests for possession of marijuana. [] Aside from the ever-increasing cost, one significant consequence of these tactics has been the reduction of law enforcement attention to other, more egregious, criminal behavior. Drug crimes receive more attention from police than other crimes. As a result of the shift in the 1990s toward more aggressive policing of marijuana, law enforcement resources may have been siphoned away from certain crimes. Economists Rasmussen and Benson suggest that
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law there are institutional incentives in place that encourage the pursuit of drug crimes. Since law enforcement agencies are permitted to seize all or a portion of property obtained from a drug investigation, administrators dedicate more resources to drug enforcement. Our national drug enforcement policy has served to gridlock the American legal system. This is due, in large part, to a conflict between state and federal laws. One of the more recent examples of this was in Gonzales v. Raich (2005), where the United States Supreme Court held that the federal government has the unmitigated constitutional authority to prohibit marijuana for all purposes. The Court’s decision meant that federal law enforcement officials may prosecute medical marijuana patients in states that protect medical marijuana use under state law and even in instances where the patient has grown their own medicine. This in turn, would lead to the arrests of patients who were using medical marijuana legally under state laws, but in violation under federal statutes. What the Raich decision did not do was invalidate the medical marijuana laws of California or any other medical marijuana state. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court did not declare any of the existing medical marijuana state laws unconstitutional. Detractors of the decision claim that it gives the federal government more power than it is granted in the Constitution. Further, the decision seems to disregard the Constitutional right of state sovereignty and the ability of each state to determine which initiatives it will take to address drug prohibition. Other examples of conflict between state and federal laws include: People v. Tilehkooh (2003), where the court found that courts “long ago recognized that state courts do not enforce the federal criminal statutes…federal criminal law is cognizable as such only in the federal courts.”[] In 2006, the California Attorney

Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law
General Bill Lockyer dismissed the entire federal against marijuana prohibition by stating “It is not the province of state courts to enforce federal laws.” ASSUMPTIONS and LIMITATIONS America’s current War on Drugs policy employs many people. This list includes: police officers, attorneys, judges, correctional officers and those who construct private prisons. In order to address the issues with the U.S. drug prohibition laws, a lot of people would have to be put out of work. There is a great deal of legislation that has been introduced since the beginning of drug prohibition in this country. Laws which have been enacted and in use for a great length of time can sometimes be difficult to repeal. This is especially true if the attitudes that were prevalent at the time of its inception are even more intractable today. LITERATURE REVIEW In An After Prohibition: An Adult Approach to Drug Policies in the 21st Century, Timothy Lynch expressed several ideas concerning the federal government’s reach exceeding its grasp concerning all laws but drug prohibition laws specifically. Among his concerns was the idea that if a problem occurred in more than one state the federal government might deem it a proper subject for federal policy. This idea would seem to be echoed by James A Inciardi in The Drug Legalization Debate. It would take Lynch’s concept a bit further and suggest that a states’ sovereignty should be given deference by the federal government and allow states to implement iniatives which would regulate the sale and use of marijuana. Exporting the War on Drugs by Richard H. Friman, only briefly discussed federally imposed sentencing guidelines upon individual states. He did plumb the topic of political influence and the ability of United States
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law federal government to help create similar drug prohibition policies in other countries throughout the world. William Gilmore would also discuss the United States’ foreign policy with respect to drug trafficking. In Combating International Drugs Trafficking: The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, he first outlines, then fleshes out the United States’ presence at conventions which would determine future drug prohibition policies in various countries. He also details the successes and challenges that face the implementation of a strategy designed to combat a problem which seemingly has no end. In A Guide to the International Drugs Convenventions, author S.K Chatterjee travels over some of the same informational terrain as Gilmore. Although the research here focused more on the number of International Drug Conventions, its attendants and the ramifications of those meetings. Author Kryzytof Krajewski, would also examine the drug conventions and show various key points with regard to the inherent strictness of international drug policy in How flexible are the United Nations Drug Conventions? Several authors would paint a picture of America’s political atmosphere leading up to the drug prohibition conventions. One of those authors was David T. Courtwright. In Dark Paradise: Opiate Addiction in America before 1940 he clearly details the relaxed attitude of opium use in that part of America’s history. Opiates were both available and affordable. In his book he lays the groundwork for explaining why instituting any law that would restrict the use of opiates would be challenging. Martin Booth very similarly brought pre-drug convention America to task in Opium: A History. One of the differences between his research and Courtwright’s was that Booth traced the migration of opium from the other side the world to America. He also discussed the impact of opium on the various cultures that it touched and how different cultures varied in their use of opiates. As with Booth’s research, both David F. Musto in The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control and Kenneth Meier in The Politics of Sin: Drugs,
Marijuana Legalization: The War on Drugs and Criminal Law
Alcohol and Public Policy examined the attitudes present in American culture that helped usher in the age of drug prohibition. Some of these attitudes included racial stereotypes of Chinese and Mexican immigrants. In Timothy A. Hickman’s Drugs, Race American Culture: Orientalism in the Turn-of-the Century Discourse of Narcotic Addcition he explains Chinese immigrants’ ritualistic use of opium and the hate-filled attitudes its use would inspire in Americans after prohibition had begun. Some of these ideas have carried forward to the present administration of U.S. drug policy. Both authors discuss to varying degrees the socioeconomic and psychological effects drug prohibition laws had on minorities in early America and today. Ralph M. Susman and Lenore R. Kupperstein in Drugs and Social Policy pointed out the disparities in arrests between blacks and whites and showed the affect of racist drug laws on the social structure of minority families. William O. Walker III, in Drug Control in the Americas discussed at great length the influx of Mexicans into America after 1910. In his research he showed how the Mexican immigrants’ recreational use of cannabis changed the landscape of marijuana usage in America. The immigrants also drew the ire of the public and were stereotyped as lazy and dangerous. Consideration of foreign culture and navigating away from stereotypes while administering foreign drug policies was one of the topics discussed in Luiz R. Simmons and Abdul A. Said’s Drugs, Politics and Diplomacy .