Mergers and Acquisitions, Case Study: JP Morgan Chase &Co
Oulu Business School 2013
1
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 2 2 HISTORY AND THE M&A PROCESS ............................................................................................. 3 2.1 History .......................................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 The M&A process ......................................................................................................................... 3 3 MOTIVES OF M&A ........................................................................................................................... 5 3.1 Challenges and human side during the merger process ................................................................ 6 3.2 Strategy used by JP Morgan Chase in solving some challenges ................................................... 7 3.3 The success factor of JP Morgan Chase Merger ........................................................................... 8 4 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................ 10 References ............................................................................................................................................. 11
2
1 INTRODUCTION The term mergers & acquisitions has been increasingly investigated in the literature in the last two decades, which is always acronym M&A, it comprises of buying, selling and combining of diverse firms and organizations, this is always embarked on in order to grow and obtain a larger market share by assisting and financing the acquired firm or organization (Appelbaum et al., 2007) in response to the rise M&A activities as well as the increasing complexity of such transactions themselves (Gaughan, 2002). With the purpose of setting an M&A context for this report, we will explore M&A activities in terms of its definition and classification, motives, process, and later moving on to highlight the success factor in JPMorgan Chase & Co mergers over time. Numerous corporations around the globe have been considering M&A strategies to realize cost synergies against increased competition, pricing pressures, gaps in product mix and asset concentration. As the number of M&A transactions increases, M&A advisory firms such as those in the global investment banking industry benefit from this upward trend. In accordance to Datamonitor (2007), the global investment banking and brokerage industry generated total revenues of US$57.5 billion in 2005, in which US$19 billion was from M&A segment. Generally, several firms that are interested in M&A projects simply acquire help from external specialists in dealing with the transaction as they expect greater benefits from the advice of the advisory firms. Moreover, it is not common for companies, particularly small to medium ones, to maintain an in-house M&A department with adequate expertise for this multi-disciplinary exercise due to their irregular engagement in such transactions (DiGeorgio, 2002). Though huge companies create in-house financial and corporate development departments, they tend to employ the advisory services to make use of the advantages of their valuable contact network, effective use of client personnel, and their expertise to close the transactions (Graham and Hamilton, 1998). Weinberg and Blank (1979) express merger as an arrangement in which the assets of two companies become bestowed in or under the control of one firm (which in some cases, it may or may not be one of the original two companies), which has all or substantively all, the shareholders of the two companies. Charles A. Scharf (1971) expresses the word acquisition as every transaction in which a buyer procures all or part of the assets and business of a seller or part of stock or other securities of the seller, where the transaction is concluded between a eager buyer and an eager seller, meaning that, a seller whose management decides to the acquisition and helps negotiate its terms. Nevertheless, there exist few types of acquisition. The main two types of acquisition which are extensively practised in most businesses are asset acquisition and stock acquisition. The term asset acquisition is an acquisition in which the buyer acquires all or a part of the assets and business of the seller, pursuant to a contract entered into between the buyer and seller. In divergence, a stock acquisition is an acquisition in which all or a part of the outstanding stock of the seller is acquired from the stockholders of the seller. A takeover occurs only when the
3
control of the company of the seller goes to the buyer. For this study, the words acquisition and takeover carry the same meaning since the criterion is that the acquiring companies should have acquired at least 51 per cent of the outstanding shares of the target companies. 2 HISTORY AND THE M&A PROCESS 2.1 History J.P. Morgan is known as one of the leading merger and acquisition advisory firms nowadays, taking a top spot in many of the rankings for this sector. The firm’s in-depth expertise extends to a wide range of strategic M&A transactions, including asset purchases and dispositions, restructurings and reorganizations. With its strong relationships with many of the leading financial sponsors groups, J.P. Morgan is also able to help clients gain access to today’s emergent pool of private equity financings. The M&A business is a complex component sustaining the firm's global integrated model and prominent financing franchise. J.P. Morgan’s committed corporate defence team likewise has substantial expertise and experience in providing corporate defence advisory services to clients in public and private situations. In December 31, 2000, the merge of Chase Manhattan Corporation and the J.P. Morgan & Company incorporated was completed. The finalised name for the company J.P. Morgan Chase and Company expresses the harmony in the union among the two firms, both of which has taken an enormous role in global finance. In layman terms, the wholesale business operates globally under the J.P. Morgan name. Their clients comprise the world’s most prominent corporations, wealthy personalities, institutional investors and governments. In J.P. Morgan, the retail finance services franchise functions under the chase brand. Their customer sums up to about thirty millions individuals and small medium enterprises around the United States. (jpmorganchase.com) 2.2 The M&A process The acquisition process has been known as a vital aspect to take into consideration in order to form a successful acquisition (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b). The process perception stresses that the acquisition process is an element, in addition to strategic and organisational fit, that affects the outcome. Some scholars stress the integration aspect of the process as being more vital for the outcome (Marks, 1982; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1987; 1991; Shrivastava, 1986). Shrivastava states that “virtually half to two thirds of all mergers simply do not work, and one third of all merger failures are as a result of faulty integration” (1986:66). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) define the entire acquisition process starting from the first decision to conduct an acquisition throughout the integration. They asserted that every each step in the process is important for the outcome of the acquisition and that major differences between acquisition success and failure lie in understanding and better managing the processes by which acquisition decisions are made and by which they are integrated (1991:3). In January 14, 2004 a press release was published that JP Morgan Chase and Bank One had agreed to merge in a strategic business combination, establishing the second largest banking franchise in the United States, which is based on core deposit. The merge is expected to
4
possess an asset worth of $1.1 trillion, a solid capital base, more than 2,300 branches in about seventeen states and top-tier positions in retail banking and lending, credit cards, investment banking, asset management, private banking, treasury and securities services, middle-market, and private equity.” With earnings contributions that are balanced out between retail and 31 wholesale banking, the combined company is expected to be “well-positioned to achieve strong and stable financial performance and increase shareholder value through its balanced business mix, greater scale, and enhanced efficiencies and competitiveness.” (JP Morgan Chase press release archives) The merge agreement, which was solidly approved by the boards of directors of both companies, provided for a stock for- stock merger in which “1.32 shares of JP Morgan Chase common stock would be exchanged, on a tax-free basis, for each share of Bank One common stock.” Based on JP Morgan Chase's closing price of $39.22 on Wednesday, January 14, 2004, the transaction had a value of “approximately $51.77 for each share of Bank One common stock, and created an enterprise with a combined market capitalization of approximately $130 billion.” (jpmorganchase.com) Numerous researchers have stressed the fact that managers working in an acquired company incline to leave the company after the acquisition. It is recommended that different management styles between the two merging partners lead to a high level of uneasiness among managers in the acquiring firm (Datta, 1991). These managers may react defensively by adhering to their own beliefs and approaches in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty and to preserve their identity, something that can be deduced as resistance from their side. Mirvis and Marks (1986) established that target management often turns into crisis management as a reaction to the acquisition and as a manifestation of the merger syndrome (Marks & Mirvis, 1985). To manage the situation, the target management centralise the decision-making and start to make decisions in an authoritative mode. They tend to reduce their accessibility for employees and colleagues and lessen the flow of communication. A motive for this reaction could be that the managers sense a loss of independence in their company (Marks & Mirvis, 1985) and want to reassure themselves of some sort of control. Another thing increasing the managers’ stress after a merger is the insecurity of job loss due to either idleness or simply not fitting into the parent company’s organisational structure, which in turn may cause an increased turnover. Ivancevich and Stewart (1989) take a diverse methodology to management turnover. As an alternative of trying to establish why managers leave, they make suggestions how to stop them from leaving. Rather, they suggest management appraisal as one solution to diminish management turnover. They contend that if the acquired management is not effectively and fairly appraised, they tend to leave the company to avoid uncertainty, the risk of getting a job at lower level, or the risk of getting laid off. Walter (1985) also deliberates managerial turnover in acquired companies. He argues that if acquisitions are best understood as indicators of corporate control, it would lead to increased control over the acquired company from the acquiring company. The control can take the
5
form of, for example, increased reporting, acquiring managers transferred to the target company that limit the acquired management’s action. The limitations of managers’ freedom cause the most talented and self-directing managers, those most needed and wanted by the acquiring management, to leave, according to Walter. Control does not have to make people uneasy however. In a study of the total population of a merger, Graves (1981) stated that “in times of anxiety, employees may actually welcome strong central control because it crystallizes a need to impute coherence to what is essentially a destabilization of their social process” (p. 112). Nevertheless, Graves asserts, too much control is impeding. As an alternative he suggests that the top management shall come to terms with the need to let people in the acquired company do things their own way. In JP Morgan case, the united company was headed by William B. Harrison, as the chairman and chief executive officer, and by James Dimon, as the president and chief operating officer, with Dimon who succeeded Harrison as CEO in 2006 and Harrison continuing to serve as the chairman. The merged company is identified as JP Morgan Chase & Co. And it continued to trade on the New York Stock Exchange, under the symbol JPM, and its corporate headquarters will still be located in New York. The JP Morgan brand is continuously used for the wholesale business; and the combined company will continue to use both brands (JP Morgan Chase and Bank One) in their corresponding markets and products. (jpmorganchase.com) 3 MOTIVES OF M&A Firms embark on M&As for diverse reasons. Bradley and associates (1988), Seth (1990a) and Seth, Song and Pettit (2000) proposed that a main driver of M&As is the exploitation of synergies between the value chains of the firms involved. These synergies may occur from diverse reasons, as Scherer and Ross (1990) progress, such as exercising monopoly power in an industry (Porter,9 1985), decrease competition (Bradley et al., 1988), lessening dependency on a set of consumers (Chatterjee, 1986) or to increase prices for consumers (Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 2001), achieve effectiveness through cost reductions and benefit from economies of scale (Homburg & Bucerius, 2006) or through an effective coordination of resources (Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990). Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) expressed that M&As are a vehicle for overcoming the shortcomings of financial markets and reducing the cost of capital. Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1990) and Cartwright and Cooper (1999) researched into M&As as a manner to restructure poorly managed companies experiencing difficulties and Barney (1986, 1991) proposed that M&As are modes for accessing or controlling a valuable resources, not imitable and indispensable to achieve a competitive advantage. The added value gotten from synergies would be, therefore, greater operational efficiency and increasing market power (Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Seth, 1990a). A vital motivation core M&As is supported in the managerialism theory, according to which managers choose to start operations of M&As to make best use of their own utility at the expense of the shareholders (Jasen, 1988; Seth et al., 2000; Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). In other occasions, it appears that managers of the acquiring firm blunder in assessing the value of the acquired company, but choose to continue the deal, assuming that the value is correct (Roll, 1986)
6
Looking deeper into the motives behind the merger between JP Morgan Chase and Bank One, one could realize that it makes sense on multiple levels. Being the dominant bank in Chicago, Bank One opened up to JP Morgan Chase a retail banking market, to which JP Morgan Chase would not have been exposed to otherwise. As indicated in the press release, JP Morgan Chase added over 2000 branches and client exposure in areas in which it had not been as well known before; that is, a solid presence in the credit card business, and branches in the Chicago area. By merging with Bank One, JP Morgan Chase acquired more market share and covered additional ground on the map of the United States with its presence. (innercitypress.org) As known in the financial industry, Citigroup it the biggest competitor of JP Morgan Chase. After the merger, JP Morgan Chase with Bank One has more bigger and better chance at beating its competition. Merging with Bank One, has given JP Morgan Chase access to a new and much more expanded market without JP Morgan Chase’s having to specialize and spend its valuable assets in order to penetrate a new market, establish itself, build new branches, attract clients, and then compete with Bank One in the Chicago area. Instead of performing all of the steps above, JP Morgan Chase made the more valuable and financially sound choice of simply acquiring Bank One, which already has the expertise and the reputation in the area of retail banking. (innercitypress.org) 3.1 Challenges and human side during the merger process It is not advisable to conclusively assert that acquisitions have a great effect and create a lot of stress on managers and employees, mainly during integration. The usual responses discussed in acquisition literatures are uncertainty, ambiguity, anxiety, etc., such reactions was mentioned in Buono and Bowditch’s (1989) combination phases. Similarly, Ivancevich, Schweiger, and Power (1987) summarise diverse uncertainties stating they affect the organisational members. The first uncertainty, they highlighted, is the main event that is ongoing, the acquisition, which the employees have slight control over. Secondly, employees recognize an uncertainty about their future because they are unaware on the objectives of the acquisition. Thirdly, they may experience changes in jobs, work, and family relationships that affect their lives. Additionally, Ivancevich et al. highlighted that each employee cognitively assesses and interprets an acquisition; consequently perceptions of what is occurring during the acquisition vary from person to person. They mentioned that some people may perceive the situation as a threat while others may see it as an opportunity. This would hence mean that the opinion of the outcome of the acquisition differs between persons Buono and Bowditch (1989) oppose, stating that the outcome of the acquisition is determined by employees’ combination expectations. To these authors, outcome does not only refer to the financial performance but likewise employees’ reactions and attitudes to the acquisition. In most cases, employee expectations are to some point based on pre-merger information that comes through the rumour mill, from top management announcements, or other information channels. Marks (1982) suggest that it is how the acquisition is implemented and managed, for instance in planning and communication, which define the employees’ attitudes and consecutively the acquisition outcome.
7
Diverse authors expressed that managers may react quite differently from other organisational members to the acquisition (e.g., Marks & Mirvis, 1985, Mirvis & Marks, 1986, Walsh, 1988). Marks and Mirvis (1985) define these reactions to the acquisition “the merger syndrome.” They define the merger syndrome as something occurring to executives through “a combination of uncertainty and the probability of change, both favourable and unfavourable, that creates stress and, finally, affects perceptions and judgements, interpersonal relationships and the dynamics of the combination itself” (p. 50). If the syndrome is not managed, Marks and Mirvis suggest it may result to poor financial and overall acquisition performance. Even if one is working as a manager or an employee in the acquired company, it is probable that the acquisition causes stress. Sinetar (1981) points out that this stress happens as the acquisition unsettles the everyday life conditions and provides a feeling of uncertainty for all individuals concerned. M&A process is not only difficult and complex, but it is likewise challenging for people in all kinds of businesses in both companies. Mergers take a toll on senior managers, in whose hands lie, the fate of their company and the fate of all the people who work in that company. Similarly, unquestionably, the notion of mergers is alarming and sensitive for the people not involved in the senior management team (and for multi business corporations, these people include anyone from vice presidents to assistants), owing to their fear of job loss, or a projected possible shift in their position within the company. JP Morgan vice president made his retirement known on June 3, 2004. From the time when the purchase of Bank One had now been reasonably complete, Donald Layton, a JP Morgan Chase and Company vice chairman and one of the three members of the bank’s office of the chairman decided to retire in pursuit of other opportunities. In the process these resignations, the deliberations around them become very divisive, especially since in Layton’s case his role was not substituted by another senior figure, but ignored, supported by the fact that now, the finance, risk management and technology divisions report directly to James Dimon, without the need of a middle figure. Confidently, Donald Layton’s task in the company was vital, but to cut costs, the firm decided to follow the strategy of division’s direct reporting to higher officials, which in no way reflects on the professional capabilities of Layton. (nyt.com) 3.2 Strategy used by JP Morgan Chase in solving some challenges Most researchers suggested that open communication between the companies and within the acquired company is an efficient way to minimise ambiguity during the acquisition process. Schweiger and DeNisi (1991) suggested it is not the changes after acquisitions that are stressful to the employees; but rather the uncertainty about the future. In a case nothing is communicated about the future, the employees’ struggles with great uncertainty, and they will search for answers to their questions by some means, even if there is no communication from the management (Napier et al., 1989). In a situation whereby the employees seek their own answers, it usually results to rumours and other informal communication (Sinetar, 1981; Mirvis & Marks, 1986). Nonetheless, rumours are probable to have the consequence of adding to the anxiety rather than reducing it. Left to rumours, employees often create worstcase scenarios, which can in turn create an obsession with the acquisition and its effect on their lives (Marks & Mirvis, 1985). Marks (1982) suggest that most post-merger problems
8
develop from the insufficient information and these problems could be escaped by communicating with acquired personnel during the whole merger process. In JP Morgan Chase merger process, daily internal newsletters came out to all of the employees of JP Morgan Chase so as to inform every one of the new steps being taken by senior management towards the completion of the merger with Bank One, and at the same time to inform the staff of the senior management’s visions into the future for both corporations. This action is a very effective step on the part of senior management, not only because it keeps the merger on track and well organized, but more importantly, it reduces the anxiety and rumours spreading among the employees. This action makes the people aware that senior management thinks of them during the merger, and would take them into consideration when making various decisions on the merger. Additionally, a discussion board was created on JP Morgan Chase’s website, in order for anyone internal to the firm to be able to ask questions, or to voice any worries as regard to the merger. 3.3 The success factor of JP Morgan Chase Merger According to Hayward (2002) who expresses that while people undertaking mergers and acquisitions have a great opportunity to learn from their experience, they rarely do. This researcher discovers that firms who have small losses in prior acquisitions are inspired to learn from their performance and outperform on following acquisitions. Alternatively, firms that have had great success or great failure find it tough to learn from that experience. On the other hand, Hayward (2002) discovers that acquisition experience is not adequate to create greater acquisition performance; nonetheless, firms are more successful when they acquire companies that are in a moderately similar business. This researcher likewise discovers that acquirers, who make acquisitions one after another in quick succession, do not outperform companies that acquire rarely. Hayward (2002) expresses that the best results come from those firms who take a break in their acquisition process to let the lessons learnt from acquisitions to be processed, meaning, a break stretched enough for management to combine key lessons, but not so long that those lessons are gone. According to Guest et al. (2004) expressed that having a successful first merger is an analyst of declining performance in successive acquisitions. This is different to Hayward (2002), who establishes that acquirers who have an unsuccessful first merger learn from their errors and develop their successive performance. Although these acquirers do learn from their errors, they never moderately catch up with the organisations successful in their first acquisition. Guest et al. (2004) made a conclusive remark that if your first merger does not succeed, it is not valuable pursuing future mergers. Generally, the body of literature on the expediency of prior experience in undertaking M&As has revealed diverse results. Surfing through the history of JP Morgan, one would realize that the firm has been involved in earlier merger processes that have shaped it to be JP Morgan Chase & Co today.
9
In 1991, Manufacturers Hanover Corp. merged with Chemical Banking Corp., under the name of Chemical Banking Corp., then the second-largest banking institution in the United States. In 1995, First Chicago Corp. merged with NBD Bancorp., forming First Chicago NBD, the largest banking institution based in the Midwest. In 1996, The Chase Manhattan Corp. merged with Chemical Banking Corp., under the name of The Chase Manhattan Corp., creating what was then the largest bank holding company in the United States. In 1998, Banc One Corp. merged with First Chicago NBD, under the name of Bank One Corp. After a subsequent merger, Bank One became the largest financial services firm in the Midwest, the fourth-largest bank in the U. S. and the world's largest Visa credit card issuer. In 2000, J.P. Morgan & Co. Incorporated merged with The Chase Manhattan Corp., effectively combining four of the largest and oldest money centre banking institutions in New York City (J.P. Morgan, Chase, Chemical and Manufacturers Hanover) into one firm under the name of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. In 2004, Bank One Corp. merged with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. The New York Times said the merger "would realign the competitive landscape for banks" by uniting the investment and commercial banking skills of J.P. Morgan Chase with the consumer banking strengths of Bank One. In 2008, JPMorgan Chase & Co. acquired The Bear Stearns Companies Inc., strengthening its capabilities across a broad range of businesses, including prime brokerage, cash clearing and energy trading globally. Also in 2008, JPMorgan Chase & Co. acquired the deposits, assets and certain liabilities of Washington Mutual's banking operations. This acquisition expanded Chase's consumer branch network into California, Florida and Washington State and created the nation's second-largest branch network — with locations reaching 42% of the U.S. population. In 2010, J.P. Morgan acquired full ownership of its U.K. joint venture, J.P. Morgan Cazenove, one of Britain's premier investment banks. (jpmorganchase.com) One would conclusive assert that the major reason for the success of JP Morgan Chase & Co in this findings would be the wealth of experiences gathered from each merger process they had undergone. Subsequently, this would make me arrive to a fact that previous merger experience can elude several paths of errors in new a merger and acquisition process of a firm.
10
4 CONCLUSIONS Most acquisition scholars are focused on finding out why acquisitions so often fail, or how to achieve successful acquisition performance. This report was able to show how important and essential efficient communication is needed during the merger process; it likewise indicated how that past experience in merger and acquisition can be a fuel for success in subsequent mergers event or activity. In order to restate on the fact, I have to say that the main economic argument for declining a merger move is that mergers and acquisitions add to the risk of monopolies, mainly because in the case of monopolies, consumers is always exploited and resources become mismanaged if these mergers make major entry barriers restricting competition, which can possibly lead to market failure and a deterioration in economic welfare. As a case in question, JP Morgan Chase is a impeccable example of how a smart strategic move can make substantial improvements to a company’s performance. Subsequently after the “merger” between Bank One and JP Morgan Chase, the latter company’s market share, revenues, and net income all rose to remarkable heights, marking the initial success of the acquisition.
11
References Appelbaum, S.H., Lefrancois, F., Tonna, R., and Shapiro, B.T., 2007. Mergers 101 (part two): training managers for culture, stress, and change challenges. Industrial and Commercial Training, 39 (4), 191-200. Bao, J., and Edmans, A., 2007. How Should Acquirers Select Advisors? Persistence in Investment Bank Performance [online]. EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=952935 [Accessed 14 February, 2013]. Buono, A.F., & Bowditch, J.L. 1989. The human side of mergers and acquisitions. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass. Bradley, M., Desai, A. & Kim, E. 1988. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 21 (1): p.3-40. Brouthers, K. & Brouthers, L. 2000. Acquisition or greenfield start-up? Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 89-97 Chandler, A. 1962. Strategy and Structure. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press. Chatterjee, S. & Lubatkin, M. 1990. Corporate mergers, stockholder diversification, and changes in systematic risk. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 255-268. Chatterjee, S. 1986. Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisition on merging and rival firms. Strategic Management Journal, 7: 199-139. Chatterjee, S. & Lubatkin, M. 1990. Corporate mergers, stockholder diversification, and changes in systematic risk. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 255-268. Datamonitor, 2013. Foreningssparbanken SWOT analysis [online]. Available at:http://proxy.ub.umu.se:2057/ehost/detail?vid=11&hid=13&sid=37c7c02e-f4ac-4cdf-869c72002e70f04d%40SRCSM1 [Accessed 30 January 2013]. Datta, D.K. 1991. Organizational fit and acquisition performance: Effects of post-acquisition integration. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 281-297. DiGeorgio, R. M., 2002. Making mergers and acquisitions work: What we know and don’t know – Part I. Journal of Change Management, 3 (2), 134-128. Gaughan, P. A., 2002. Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate restructuring. 3rd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc Guest, P., Cosh, A., Hughes, A. and Conn, R. L. 2004. Why Must All Good Things Come to an End? The Performance Of Multiple Acquirers. Academy of Management Proceedings, Academy of Management Best Conference Paper 2004. S1-S5.
12
Graves, D. 1981. Individual reactions to a merger of two small firms of brokers in the reinsurance industry: A total population survey. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 89-113.http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312504112906/d8k.htm Grant, R. 1991. The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: Implications for strategy formulation. California Management Review, 33: 114–134 Hambrick, D. & Cannella, A. 2004. CEOs who have COOs: Contingency analysis of an unexplored structural form. Strategic Management Journal, 25 (10): 859-979. Haspeslagh, C., & Jemison, B. 1987. Acquisitions: Myths and reality. Sloan Management Review, Winter, pp. 53-58. Haspeslagh, C., & Jemison, B. 1991. Managing acquisitions. Creating value through corporate renewal, New York: The Free Press. Hayward, M. 2002. When Do Firms Learn From Their Acquisition Experience? Evidence From 1990-1995. Strategic Management Journal, 23 (1): 21-40. Hitt, M., Ireland, D. & Harrison, J. 2001. Mergers and acquisitions: A value creating or value destroying strategy?, In Hitt, M., Freeman, R. & Harrison, J. (Eds.) Handbook of Strategic Management: 384-408, Oxford: Blackwell Business
Homburg, C. & Bucerius, M. 2006. Is speed of integration really a success factor of mergers and acquisitions? An analysis of the role of internal and external relatedness. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 347-367. Ivancevich, J.M., & Stewart, K.A. 1989. Appraising management talent in acquired organizations: A four-tiered recommendation. Human Resource Planning, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 141-154. Jasen, M. 1988. Takeovers: Their causes and consequences. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2: 21-48. Jemison, D.B., & Sitkin, S.B. 1986b. Corporate acquisitions: A process perspective. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 145-163. JP Morgan Chase, Bank One complete merger,accessed 9 Februaury 2013, http://in.news.yahoo.com/040701/137/2ept3.html JP Morgan Chase,accessed 9 Februaury 2013,http://www.solutionstrategies.net/JPMorganChase.htm JP Morgan Chase: Earnings releases,accessed 9 Februaury 2013, http://www.shareholder.com/JPMorganChase/earningsDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=139326
13
JP Morgan Chase,accessed 13 Februaury,2013 http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/jpmorgan-history.htm Marks, M.L. 1982. Merging human resources: A review of current research. Mergers & Acquisitions, Vol. 17, pp. 38-44. Marks, M.L., & Mirvis, P. 1985. Merger syndrome: Stress and uncertainty (part 1). Mergers & Acquisitions, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 50-55. Marks, M.L., & Mirvis, P. 1986. The merger syndrome. Psychology Today, Vol. 20, No. 10, pp. 36-42. Napier, N.K., Simmons, G., & Stratton, K. 1989. Communication during a merger: The experience of two banks. Human Resource Planning, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 105-122. New York Times, 2004 Archives http://www.nyt.com [Accessed 30 January 2013]. Porter, M. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance. New York: Free Press. Ross, S ., Westerfield, R. & Jaffe, J. 1998. Corporate finance. New York: McGraw-Hill. Russo, A., and Perrini, F., 2006. The Real Cost of M&A Advice. European Management Journal, 24 (1), 49-58. Roll, R. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 59 (2): 197216. Seth, A. 1990b. Sources of value creation in acquisitions: An empirical investigation. Strategic Management Journal, 11 (6): 431-446. Seth, A. 1990a. Value creation in acquisitions: A reexamination of performance issues. Strategic Management Journal, 11 (2): 99-115. Seth, A., Song, K. & Pettit, R. 2000. Synergy, managerialism or hubris? An empirical examination of motives for foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 31 (3): 387-405. Sinetar, M. 1981. Mergers, morale and productivity. Personnel Journal, Vol. 60. November, pp. 863-867. Singh, H. & Montgomery, C. 1987. Corporate acquisitions strategies and economic performance. Strategic Management Journal, 8: 377-386. Schweiger, D.M., & DeNisi, A.S. 1991. Communication with employees following a merger: A longitudinal field experiment. Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 110 135.
14
Schweiger, D.M., Ivancevich, J.M., & Power, F.R. 1987. Executive actions for managing human resources before and after acquisition. Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 127-138. Shrivastava, P. 1986. Post-merger integration. Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 65-76. Sudarsanam, P. S., 1995. The Essence of Merger and Acquisitions. Great Britain: Prentice Hall. The J.P. Morgan Chase Watch - from Inner City Press & Fair Finance Watch, accessed 9 Februaury 2013, http://www.innercitypress.org/jpmchase.html Walter, G.A. 1985. Culture collisions in mergers and acquisitions. In P.J. Frost, L.F. Moore, M.R. Louis, C.C. Lundberg, & J. Martin (Eds.), Organizational culture. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications. Weignberg and Blank (1979). Takeovers and mergers. (4th ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell. Scharf, C.A. (1971). Acquisitions, mergers, sales and takeovers. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc.
