A miracle, as a broad definition, is an act of God that “transgresses the laws of nature” (David Hume), an act that seems to defy all rational. For many this offers strong evidence for the existence of God, as these inexplicable events must have a cause, that of a transcendent, metaphysical being. However, for others, most notably David Hume, miracles are a logical impossibility, an oxymoron if you will. He tried to prove, through a priori and a posterior reasoning that miracles, because of their metaphysical origin, cannot be what people claim them to be (intervention by God). Problems with the law of nature to language problems with the way miracles are experienced and reported provide ammunition for those that agree with the assumption in the title. By defining what miracles are and then exploring the criticisms and counter criticisms for these definitions we should arrive at a conclusion as to whether miracles, in the sense they are defined, are possible.

Brian Davis proposed that there were two different types of miracles, the essential difference being the varying degree of possible divine intervention that can be attributed to the event. Strong Miracles are events that can only be attributed to God – he is intervening in the world to change the course of history. This may be, as Hume suggested, a “transgression of the laws of nature by a particular violation of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent”. However, Humey boy took issue with strong miracles, citing an a priori criticism, ie one that criticises using deductive reasoning alone. Hume, an empiricist, believed that “a wise man proportions his beliefs to he evidence”, meaning that unless one can physically verify evidence a statement cannot be true. As experience tells us that natural laws hold firm, ie they are universal constants otherwise they could not be natural laws, then it is reasonable to conclude that the reports of reports of miracles are not, nor cannot be true as they would go against the laws science has established and set down. From Hume’s perspective, we must therefore conclude that miracles prove themselves false.
However, there are many problems with Hume’s criticisms. Primarily, universal natural laws are based on generalisations or assumptions, any credible scientist would accept this. They are corrigible, or our best understanding of the universe at the time and are therefore subject to change. For example, the atom was thought to resemble a plumb pudding (sphere of positive charge interspaced with negative charge) between 1904 and 1909, when it was proved false, and the basic model that exists today was established. Science therefore evolves, demonstrating the laws of nature (which we quantify and therefore impose, as we do not ascribe nature itself with a state of sentience, needed for self regulation) are not a constant. Even well established laws (such as gravity) cannot be fixed, as they are not tautological. Secondly, if one has faith in one’s life then one will consider St Thomas Aquinas’ ideas on the pursuit of perfection. He stipulated, with his faith as a basis, that as God is omnipotent there must be laws greater than Natural Laws, primarily Eternal Law, or the principles by which God controls the universe. Seeing as we can only know “reflections” of this eternal law we can only have a “partial and approximate understanding of the laws which govern the universe” . Not only does this reinforce the ideas of corrigible natural laws it also highlights that there may be forces that transcend natural laws, and are therefore ineffable, rendering empiricism a flawed concept, as it cannot reveal the entirety of the universe to us. Finally, we must consider the actual definitions used by Hume. One may consider it possible to believe that Hume simply gave his definition of miracles, knowing full well that it conflicted with his views as an empiricist, and therefore simply wished to disprove miracles, without taking into account other definitions of miracles, which shall now be explored. Hume does therefore not provide a satisfactory a priori explanation as to why miracles, by their definition, cannot exist.

Brian Davis postulated that miracles could alternatively be categorised as ‘weak’, ie an action that has been interpreted as God acting in the world and given religious significance, such as R.F Holland’s well documented train example, where a train driver suffered a heart attack, causing the emergency brakes to be deployed, bringing the train to a stop inches away from a terrified toddler. Holland called this a “coincidence (that) can be taken as a sign and called a miracle”, as we naturally read significance into an event, even if the event is devoid of this significance. St Thomas Aquinas would also agree with this type of miracle, as it is something “done by God that nature could do, but that God did without using the laws of nature”. As these events take place within the confines of natural laws, Hume’s a priori argument does not apply, for there are no natural laws to transgress. However, as miracles can now be classified as a ‘coincidence’, something explicable by scientific laws, Hume’s a posterior arguments against miracles now becomes relevant, as they can explain away why people attach ‘significance’ to supposedly miraculous events.
Firstly, Hume argues that all throughout human history there cannot be found a “sufficient number of men” of good sense that have verified that a miracle has taken place, as, he argues “miracles are observed chiefly among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors”. His observation, that learned people will not or cannot verify the existence of miracles, whereas instances of miracles tend to be recorded by barbarous people, who are unable to offer an explanation for supposedly miraculous events (such as thunder), tries to prove that all miracles are simply a relative interpretation of how people understand the world. Either they are gossip and conjecture by overexcited people (which by no means removes the validity of accounts), or we view God as “The God of the Gaps”, created to elucidate natural phenomenon, a view expressed by man philosopher such as Durkheim. However, as man’s understanding has progressed, these gaps have been filled in, reinforcing Max Planck’s view that “faith in miracles must yield ground, before the steady and firm advance of science”. However, this view is highly flawed, as Hume does not quantify what a reasonable body of learned men is or what constitutes a barbarous nation. This is further challenged by Richard Swinburne’s Principles of Credulity and Testimony. His Principle of Credulity states that all other things being equal (‘cet par’) the world is probably as we experience it. Therefore, events with religious significance must generally have religious significance, although this is entirely contingent on one’s faith. The Principle of Testimony states that all other things being equal we should believe other’s reports (ie barbarous people) of empirical events. In both cases the view expressed within the theory is the norm within society, non believes simply choose to make a special exception in the case of miracles as they naturally have an agenda to disprove and dismiss them. Furthermore, despite the modern advancement of science, faith in miracles remains strong, as it is faith; a belief in something without empirical verification. The notion that faith should yield ground is therefore laudable.
One may expand Hume’s criticisms of barbarous nations to his fourth a posteriori argument against miracles – that as there are so many reports of miracles from worldwide religions (and supposedly barbarous people) they annihilate each other. William James countered this, arguing that the beginnings of religious worship arose out of a need to express the numinous aspect of religious experiences, including miracles. The actual name the church gives itself is merely a secondary consideration. Therefore, instead of dismissing reports of miracles from different faiths as contradictory, the similarities of the experience, such as the numinous feeling one experiences, or indeed the fact that the actual miraculous event, worldwide, would be branded a miracle, should be noted and Hume’s argument should therefore be dismissed. Hence we cannot accept Hume’s a posteriori criticisms to prove that there is an intrinsic problem with miracles, as the arguments themselves are based on highly subjective a posteriori reasoning. However, we may also consider a fundamental flaw in the language used to describe religious experiences, which would mean that it would be impossible for them to be true events, both strong and weak.

A.J Ayer’s Verification Principle which, like Hume’s theories, is grounded in empiricism, states that the putative proposition being tested, to be a meaningful synthetic statement (ie one based on empirical verification), must be practically verifiable, ie can be tested in reality, or verifiable in principle, meaning that it must be possible to test the veracity of a statement. As miracles have a transcendental cause, one would postulate that their cause is beyond verification, as we have no way of accessing this cause (unless one believes in eschatological verification, ie verification after death, which for many, does not provide a satisfactory answer as they cannot verify anything six feet under). Furthermore, Ayer devised two degrees of verification for synthetic putative propositions. A proposition is strongly verifiable if it can be verified conclusively by observation and experience and a proposition can be show to be weakly verifiable if it can be shown to be probably true by observation; beyond any reasonable doubt. As miracles cannot be verified practically or in principle, it would be impossible to prove their cause at all and certainly not beyond any reasonable doubt. Faith cannot provide the level of proof required to verify these statements, and seeing as religious statements about miracles are not analytical, ie tautological, we may conclude that, as a result of the “the long shift of meaning” (John Hick – difference between normal and religious language, as God transcends normal language), miracles as a metaphysical event are, by definition, an impossibility.
One possible way to dismiss the criticisms of Ayer’s Verification Principle is to dismiss the use of cognitive language, ie language that is meaningful only if it tell us something about the world (which is of course the limit to empirical verification and therefore of the Verification Principle and Hume’s theories). Throughout this essay faith has been cited as something that requires no empirical validation to give the statements made meaning; suggesting that when one speaks of religious phenomenon one uses non cognitive language, which can be meaningful even if it does not refer to our world. If one takes this to be true, then miracles, as a metaphysical event, can happen, as the cause is assumed on grounds of faith.

For a non believer, miracles are of course a logical impossibility, for as the person rejects the notion of God, they reject the idea of a metaphysical cause, a cornerstone of many definitions of miracles, including Aquinas’ and Hume’s. However, for a person of faith, they are unlikely to find the a priori and a posteriori challenges of Hume satisfactory, (which would prove flawed to a non believer). Nor would they accept the challenges of Ayer’s Verification Principle, as this assumes that religious language uses cognitive language, which is an assumption only a non believer could make (as they do not posses the faith to make the leap to accept non cognitive language). Hence through non cognitive language believers reject the work of empiricists. It should be noted that if miracles were proved false, believers would be forced to question their faith. This would include the existence, potency and benevolence of God, and Christians would have to re evaluate a fundamental cornerstone of their religion (that of the miracles of Jesus, which proved he was The Messiah). However, because of the nature of faith and the rejection of empiricism these concerns are never realised, so believers can categorically say that miracles; be they strong or weak, as a metaphysical event, can happen.