One Million Dead for Naught The involvement of U.S. military forces in the Vietnam Conflict was neither justifiable nor demonstrative of sound judgment by the American government. Many books, magazines, and other forms of commentary on the Vietnam War have surfaced in the half century since the war’s end. Historian and author Stanley Karnow suggests that such publications generally attempt to make sense of the horrific “war that nobody won” (Karnow 9). It is a subject that will continue endlessly to divide historians and others as they attempt to draw lessons from the conflict that might then be used to justify, condemn, or promote America’s involvement in modern day Vietnams. Because of the magnitude of complexities surrounding the war, some may find it difficult to formulate an unwavering opinion about the war’s causes and effects. According to Robert McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, mankind has often struggled to find solutions to even simple problems related to the unification of values and ideologies spanning diverse cultures (McNamara 323). In order to fairly judge why the American government put our troops in the jungles, swamps, and fields of Vietnam, one might first closely examine why our government claims to have committed our troops to Vietnam. One of the reasons most adamantly advanced by our government to justify a full scale assault on the Vietcong of North Vietnam was an incident that is said to have occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin boarders Vietnam and was used by the South Vietnamese, as well as the U.S. and the North Vietnamese, as a means to patrol large areas of coastal Vietnam without having to negotiate the unforgiving terrain of the jungles. It was also commonly used to transport goods being imported or exported. The