...Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia H. Ibrahim* School of Management, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia haslindar@usm.my F.A. Samad Faculty of Business and Accountancy, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia mfazilah@um.edu.my Received June 2009 We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non family firms. *To whom all correspondence should be addressed. Introduction The family-controlled firm or family ownership is the most common form of business organization in the world. A various stream of literature explains that family ownership is central in most countries. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) studied the 20 largest publicly traded companies in the richest 27 countries worldwide and found most companies are private and the ownership of listed...
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...Changing ownership and its impact on Firm performance: A detailed pre and post crisis study on Indian firms Several studies are available establishing relationship between firm performance and ownership structure and the results are mixed. Several authors have found significant relationship while others have not found any significant relationships. In Indian context also, there are several studies which propagates to have both kind of results. The way literature is linking the owner ship with performance has always been via addressing the agency (outsiders and insiders) problem, board structure, size, leverage etc. but, literature is sparse to identify these variables as moderating the relationship between ownership and firm performance. The purpose of this study is to establish and study the relationship between ownership and performance in Indian context. Considering following points, I recommend a framework to study the changing ownership and firm performance under the premise that agency costs and information asymmetry acts as moderating variable, which increases/decreases performance when ownership changes. * In India, it is confirmed by several authors that concentrated and complex ownership structure is found which creates problem of heterogeneity and opacity. * India has agency type 2 problems; few studies are available addressing type 2 problem and variables to measure this. * Opacity and complexity creates Information asymmetry and tunneling respectively...
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...Corporate Governance Quality and Firm Value in Brazil Dr. Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira, University of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil Dr. Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros, Mackenzie Presbiterian University, Sao Paulo, Brazil Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveiraa School of Economics, Management and Accounting of University of São Paulo (FEA/USP) Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barrosb Mackenzie Presbiterian University July, 2006 a Professor of Finance and Accounting at School of Economics, Management and Accounting of University of São Paulo (FEA/USP). Tel: (+55) 11 5054-1888. e-mail: alexfea@usp.br (contact author). b Professor of Finance at Mackenzie Presbiterian University. Tel: (+55) 11 3871-2689. e-mail: lucasayres2002@gmail.com. Corporate Governance Quality and Firm Value in Brazil Abstract This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance quality on market value of 154 Brazilian listed companies in 2002. In order to obtain a proxy for corporate governance quality, a broad governance index was built. The investigation was carried out through different econometric approaches in increasing order of complexity, including multiple regressions by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), instrumental variables approach and systems of simultaneous equations. The results obtained in all econometric approaches show a positive and significant influence of corporate governance quality on firm’s market value. OLS results with market value variables Tobin’s Q and PBV multiple...
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...Business, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA b Graduate School of Business, Fordham University, New York, NY 10023, USA c Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA d Carroll School of Management, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167, USA Received 22 May 2000; accepted 16 May 2001 Abstract This paper examines whether shareholder value-maximizing corporate governance mechanisms assist in reducing the managerial incentive to enter value-destroying bank acquisitions. We find that diversifying bank acquisitions earn significantly negative announcement period abnormal returns (AR) for bidder banks whereas focusing acquisitions earn zero AR. We then find that corporate governance variables (such as CEO share and option ownership and a smaller board size) in the bidding bank are less effective in diversifying acquisitions than in focusing acquisitions. These results are robust to the inclusion of the usual control variables. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G21; G34 Keywords: Banks; Bank acquisitions; Corporate governance 1. Introduction Several empirical studies have documented a negative relation between firm performance and the level of diversification in a firm’s lines of business in the 1980s (see Corresponding authors. Address: Carroll School of Management, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167, USA. Tel.: +1-618-453-2459; fax: +1-618-453-7961. Tel.: +1-617-552-3944 (H. Tehranian). E-mail address:...
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...Chapter 01 Introduction to Corporate Finance Multiple Choice Questions 1. Which one of the following terms is defined as the management of a firm's long-term investments? A. working capital management B. financial allocation C. agency cost analysis D. capital budgeting E. capital structure 2. Which one of the following terms is defined as the mixture of a firm's debt and equity financing? A. working capital management B. cash management C. cost analysis D. capital budgeting E. capital structure 3. Which one of the following is defined as a firm's short-term assets and its short-term liabilities? A. working capital B. debt C. investment capital D. net capital E. capital structure 4. A business owned by a solitary individual who has unlimited liability for its debt is called a: A. corporation. B. sole proprietorship. C. general partnership. D. limited partnership. E. limited liability company. 5. A business formed by two or more individuals who each have unlimited liability for all of the firm's business debts is called a: A. corporation. B. sole proprietorship. C. general partnership. D. limited partnership. E. limited liability company. 6. A business partner whose potential financial loss in the partnership will not exceed his or her investment in that partnership is called a: A. generally partner. B. sole proprietor. C. limited partner. D. corporate shareholder. E. zero partner. ...
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...147-150 2011 Impact of Ownership Concentration on the operating Performance of Pakistani Firms Author Waseem Anwar Center for Excellence in Research, Department of Management Sciences COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan. Email: wasyhcc@yahoo.com This study investigates the Impact of Ownership Concentration on the operating performance of Pakistani firms. Sample of 50 non-financial firms is selected from KSE-100 index of Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. Descriptive analysis shows that there is an immense level of ownership concentration in Pakistani firms. Regression analysis suggested that there is a significant positive correlation among ownership concentration and firm’s operating performance. Naila Tabassum Center for Excellence in Research, Department of Management Sciences COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan. E-mail: naila058@yahoo.com Key Words: Ownership Concentration, Operating Performance Introduction In this research, we scrutinize the affect of ownership structure on company performance. The relationship between ownership structure and performance has always been the area under discussion in the literature of corporate finance. The discussion on this area was started with the thesis of Berle and Means (1932). They argued that defuse ownership is inversely correlated with performance of a company. Most of the earlier studies found a positive relation among ownership concentration and firm’s performance...
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...between Capital Structure and Ownership Structure: A Comparative Study of Textile and Non Textile Manufacturing Firms Muhammad Arslan* M.Phil (Management Sciences) Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan, PO box 44000, E-8, Islamabad, Pakistan Email: MuhammadArslan73@gmail.com Rashid Zaman M.Phil (Management Sciences), Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan Email: Rashidzamantanoli@gmail.com Abstract The current study explores the impact of ownership structure on capital structure in textile sector and rest of the manufacturing sectors (non-textile) in Pakistan using regression analysis with fixed effect model. As textile sector is the largest manufacturing sector in Pakistan and having diversified financial characteristics, however, there exists a gap whether textile sector’s ownership and capital structure relationship matches with other manufacturing sectors or not. Current study tries to fill this gap. The results indicate that in textile sector, no significant relationship exists between ownership concentration and capital structure whereas a significant negative relationship is found between these two variables in case of non-textile firms in Pakistan. However, institutional ownership variable was found to be non-significant in both textile and non-textile sectors. Other control variables were found to have the results as hypothesized. Period of study used in this study is 2006-2009 and sample comprises of KSE listed firms. Keywords: Ownership concentration, capital structure...
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...Economics-Prilep, Republic of Macedonia. E-mail: meribb@yahoo.com Received: September 19, 2014 Accepted: November 4, 2014 Online Published: December 20, 2014 doi:10.5539/ijbm.v10n1p204 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v10n1p204 Abstract As the corporative company type emerged, the two functions of ownership and management are separated. In the companies with a large number of employees the managers are the ones that manage the capital in the best interest of the shareholders. In this type of companies, conflict of interest may occur between the managers and the shareholders. Having more information about the work of the company, managers may use it in making decisions for their own benefit, which on the other hand cannot be as beneficial for the shareholders. Conflict of interest between managers and shareholders leads to so-called agency problem. There are different ways by which shareholders can control the operations of management. Some of the measures that can be used to resolve and prevent this problem are subject of analysis in this paper. Keywords: management, ownership, shareholders, conflict of interest, asymmetrical information, corporate governance 1. Introduction It has long been known that in the large companies the interest of the managers may be different from the shareholders profit maximization goal. In these companies mangers are appointed by the shareholders to make decisions and act within their interests. Lasher (2008) says that...
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...A Framework for IT Governance in Small Businesses by Herman Koornhof A FRAMEWORK FOR IT G O V E R N A N C E by IN SMALL BUSINESSES Herman Koornhof TREATISE Submitted for the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree MAGISTER TECHNOLOGIAE in Business Information Systems in the FACULTY ENGINEERING, BUILT ENVIRONMENT OF THE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY of the N E L S O N M A N D E L A M E T R O P O L I T A N U N I V E R SI T Y Supervisor: Prof. Rossouw von Solms January 2009 ii Declaration I, Herman Koornhof, hereby declare that: • • • The work in this treatise is my own work. All sources used or referred to have been documented and recognised. This treatise has not previously been submitted in full of partial fulfilment of the requirements for an equivalent or qualification at any other recognised educational institution. higher Herman Koornhof iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to the following people: • My love, Jenny, for your love and understanding during the past year. Without your encouragement and inspiration this work would not have been possible. • • My family and friends for your interest and support. My supervisor, Prof. Rossouw von Solms, for your guidance and advice, and your detailed and constructive comments. • To Him who is able to do immeasurably more than all we ask or imagine, according to his power that is at work within us. iv Table...
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...Economica (2015) 82, 1177–1216 doi:10.1111/ecca.12156 Family Firms, Corporate Governance and Export By RAOUL MINETTI†, PIERLUIGI MURRO‡ and SUSAN CHUN ZHU† †Michigan State University ‡Lumsa University Final version received 20 June 2015. This paper investigates the effects of family ownership on export using rich data on Italian firms. We find that family ownership increases the probability that firms export. This benefit is especially pronounced when family owners retain control rights and seek the support of external managers. The results suggest that families better internalize the long-run benefits of internationalization, but that their limited competencies attenuate this benefit in high-tech industries and in remote and unfamiliar export markets. Family firms also exhibit some tendency to enter foreign markets in a progressive way (sequential exporting) and through limited collaborations with foreign firms and intermediaries. INTRODUCTION In a global economy, export markets are an important venue for firms to grow. For this reason, scholars and policymakers intensely debate the determinants of firms’ international expansion. There is a growing consensus that firms’ corporate governance influences their ability to export. In recent editorials on the costs and benefits of family firms, The Economist (2012, 2013) mentions the successful experience of German and Northern European family firms in international markets, arguing that these firms have led the export...
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...traded under ‘brands’ and make them for both men and women and have global licenses of fragrances, eyewear, and timepieces. These companies’ retail/ wholesale engages in the sale of luxury goods through mainline stores, have directly operated stores and concessions, a digital platform active in various languages. The companies’ have subsidiaries in Europe, Middle East, India, Africa and Asia Pacific region. Using the companies’ annual report of the recent year ending 2014 and 2015 a corporate governance analysis can be made. Does the geographical location of this company impact on their corporate governance structure? The geographical location is important and has an impact of their corporate governance approach since where the headquarters is situated and proximity to the management board influence the decision making of the companies’ by laws, countries have to adopt a system or more than one system of governance as seen in France. Hugo Boss and Burberry are companies’ whose approach of corporate governance are stakeholder and shareholder oriented respectively. Letza et al 2004, compares shareholders and stakeholders approach as the two distinct model adopted over the years by advanced industrial nations and governments. The world is now a global village, funds can be gotten internationally, so the need to boost income, growth, profitability and longevity is sought after. In order to build cross border investment and growth, the demand for transparency and accountability...
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...of Management Review 2003, Vol. 28, No. 3, 447–465. THE CROSS-NATIONAL DIVERSITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: DIMENSIONS AND DETERMINANTS RUTH V. AGUILERA University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign GREGORY JACKSON Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry We develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations, what interests corporations serve, and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders. Our “actor-centered” institutional approach explains firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors’ interests are defined (“socially constructed”) and represented. Our model has strong implications for studying issues of international convergence. Corporate governance concerns “the structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the firm” (Aoki, 2000: 11). Yet the diversity of practices around the world nearly defies a common definition. Internationalization has sparked policy debates over the transportability of best practices and has fueled academic studies on the prospects of international convergence (Guillen, 2000; Rubach & Sebora, ´ 1998; Thomas & Waring, 1999). What the salient national differences in corporate governance are and how they should best be conceptualized remain hotly debated (Gedajlovic...
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...Péter HARBULA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURES AND VALUE CREATION Summary : This paper analyzes the interaction between shareholder structures and the quality of the corporate governance structure in France using the value creation criterion. Using shareholder structures allows analyzing the performance of French firms and to measure an underperformance of “hard core” and diffuse ownership firms. This paper, updating results from Harbula (2004), also investigates the relationship between performance and shareholder stakes. Keywords: Corporate governance, value creation (EVA, CFROI), enterprise performance, shareholder structures. Classification JEL: G32, G34 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925045 Péter HARBULA: Corporate governance, shareholder structures and value creation 1. INTRODUCTION The objective of this working paper is to determine whether “hard core” governed firms truly underperform their peers. The main cornerstone of the analysis will be again to introduce the concept of shareholder structures. During the analysis, the common tools developed by corporate finance practitioners were used including, among others, value creation and return to shareholders. By performing this analysis, even if it is not the central point, the underlying question of ownership structure and efficiency will also be considered. I will also include in the analysis, beside the performance measurement tools, an analysis if the evolution...
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...Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchanges Working Paper Series Dr. Shahira Abdel Shahid September 2001 Corporate Governance is becoming a global pursuit: what could be done in Egypt? 1 Corporate Governance is becoming a global pursuit: what could be done in Egypt? Abstract: The paper defines corporate governance and explains the reasons for its becoming an important issue pursued by many countries in the last decade. Following, the various codes of corporate governance, used as a guidance for countries, which are set by international organizations such as World Bank, IMF and OECD are summarized. Next, the paper reviews corporate governance experiences in nine diverse, countries including both developed and emerging markets. Finally, the paper assesses corporate governance practices in Egypt, identifying existing problems and proposing recommendations in order to enhance corporate governance practices in Egypt. Acknowledgements: The Research & Markets Development Department at CASE is very pleased to present its first series of research papers that addresses an issue of both local and international importance, which is broadly examined by experts and researchers in both practice and academia. The author would like first to thank Dr. Sameh El Torgoman, Chairman of CASE, for his great support and encouragement. Dr. El Torgoman insisted that corporate governance becomes the first research working series paper to be written by Research & Markets Development, given the worldwide...
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...is true? a. One of the benefits of incorporating your business is that you become entitled to receive unlimited liability. b. Sole proprietorships are subject to more regulations than corporations. c. Sole proprietorships do not have to pay corporate tax. d. All of the statements above are correct. e. None of the statements above is correct. Firm organization Answer: c Diff: E [ii]. Which of the following statements is most correct? a. One of the advantages of the corporate form of organization is that there is no double taxation. b. The partnership form of organization has easy transferability of ownership. c. One of the disadvantages of the sole proprietorship form of organi-zation is that there is unlimited liability. d. Statements b and c are correct. e. None of the statements above is correct. Firm organization Answer: a Diff: E [iii]. Which of the following statements is most correct? a. One advantage of forming a corporation is that you have limited liability. b. Corporations face fewer regulations than sole proprietorships. c. One disadvantage of being a sole proprietor is that you have to pay corporate taxes, even though you don’t realize the benefits of being a corporation. d. Statements b and c are correct. e. None of the statements above is correct. Firm organization Answer: a Diff: E [iv]. Until this year, Cheers Inc. was organized as...
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