The Eastern Crisis had become a focal point of the electorate’s judgment of Disraeli’s performance in office for the 1880 general election, and while it is true that his 1874 campaign made clear that his foreign policy was one of the assertion of British authority overseas, in reality, Disraeli merely used this in order to appeal to the public. Similarly, his actions during the Eastern Crisis demonstrate how Disraeli’s motivation lay elsewhere; his rejection of the Berlin Memorandum and the sending of a fleet to Besika Bay illustrates how Disraeli appeared to have taken more interest in confronting Russia than advocating peace. Although it can be argued that Disraeli was committed to consolidating British authority in Europe, he managed to achieve this without having promoted peace, and instead gained popular support for his success in the Congress of Berlin. Disraeli’s actions in signing the Andrassy Note and the subsequent reversal of his policy of support of the Berlin memorandum clearly suggest that his motivation was certainly not one focused on the support of a diplomatic solution in the Balkans. His initial response to sign the Andrassy Note appears to have been in part in order to prevent the fragmentation of the Turkish Empire into Russia or Austria and also to ensure that the Dreikaiserbund did not have the upper hand during the diplomatic process thereby allowing Britain to influence the outcome of the Crisis. Thus it seems that Disraeli’s early diplomatic actions were not necessarily influenced by the desire for peace, but instead in order to prevent the expansion of the dreikaiserbund. This, however, could be interpreted as pre-emptive action for sustainable peace as Disraeli argued that Russia in “ten, fifteen, it might be twenty years” would be capable of invading the Ottoman Empire. Thus in this way, Disraeli may have been looking for a solution for long term peace by signing the Andrassy note and, moreover, his rejection of the Berlin Memorandum could be attributed to his mistrust of the dreikaiserbund. However, Disraeli stood by this policy despite the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria of which he called “coffee house babble” which demonstrates how peace had not been one of his motivations. Instead, Disraeli had intervened by sending a fleet to Besika Bay in order to continue to assert Britain’s authority and the Turks interpreted this as British support for them and thus rejected the Memorandum. Thus Disraeli’s aggressive actions merely contributed to the crisis instead of promoting peace in the Balkans. “Honour”, on the other hand, is far more likely to have been the main motivation behind Disraeli’s actions during the Eastern Crisis, for example by sending a fleet to Besika Bay in order to maintain Britain’s authority during the diplomatic process. This aggressive act underlined Britain’s independent policy but was also done in order to gain popular support for Disraeli; he demonstrated how Britain would not be non interventionist as Gladstone’s first ministry had been during the Franco Prussian War, acting on his promise of “bold consolidation”. These two motivations are somewhat interlinked as by consolidating Britain’s authority and honour, Disraeli would be keeping his promise to the electorate, thereby gaining him a personal and party advantage. His policy, however, was undermined after the Bulgarian massacre which damaged both Disraeli’s reputation at home and Britain’s authority in Europe. However, by the time of the Congress of Berlin, Disraeli benefitted from the Russo-Turkish War and jingoism in Britain which he encouraged by moving a British fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean, and Gladstone’s criticisms were undermined severely; civilians had in fact taken to throwing stones at his windows. This suggests that Disraeli was rather focused on using the Eastern Crisis in order to gain support in Britain. Moreover, by obtaining Cyprus during the Congress of Berlin, Disraeli restored the country’s reputation and took advantage of this by claiming personal responsibility, thus crediting himself for the success of bringing “peace with honour” from Berlin. In conclusion, Disraeli’s actions throughout the Eastern Crisis did not appear to have been motivated much by peace but instead in order to enforce Britain’s prestige in Europe for “honour”. His intentions were clearly not peaceful as shown by sending fleets rather than signing the Berlin Memorandum which simply led the diplomatic process into stalemate, and although it can be argued that his mistrust of the dreikaiserbund was well intentioned for peace in the long term, Disraeli seemed more focused on Britain’s “honour” by sending that fleet into Besika Bay. However, it is clear that Disraeli’s commitment to assert Britain’s authority in Europe was in order to gain popular support as he had previously promised to do so during his 1874 campaign. Therefore it can be said that Disraeli’s prime motivations was merely to earn the support of the British public.