PINTO FIRES CASE

The assumption that ‘it’s easy to be ethical’ assumes that individuals automatically know that they are facing an ethical dilemma and that they should simply choose to do the right thing. But decision makers may not always recognize that they are facing a moral issue. Rarely do decisions come with waving red flags. Dennis Gioia was recall coordinator at Ford Motor
Company in the early 1970s when the company decided not to recall the Pinto despite dangerous fires that were killing the occupants of vehicles involved in low-impact rear-end collisions. In his information and overloaded recall coordinator role, Gioia saw thousands of accident reports, and he followed a cognitive “script” that helped him decide which situations represented strong recall candidates and which did not. The incoming information about the Pinto fires did not penetrate a script designed to surface other issues, and it did not initially raise ethical concerns. He and his colleagues in the recall office did not recognize the recall issue as an ethical issue. From the standpoint of Hooker’s test, we will start with the geralizability test. Hooker (2011) states that to pass generalizability, it must give the reasons for an action have to be consistent with the assumption that others who have the same reasons act the same way. To release the Pinto as scheduled and risk the safety of those who purchased it or spend more time designing the car, thereby seceding more of the subcompact auto market to the competition. After a cost-benefit analysis of the safety improvements and the potential death toll, Ford decided to release the model without the safety improvements. Their estimation showed that it was cheaper to ignore public safety. From the standpoint of the utility test Ford believed that creating an exciting new product in record time was more important than