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ANTI-CORRUPTION IN VIETNAM: THE SITUATION AFTER TWO YEARS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW

Hanoi, November 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD .....................................................................................................................................1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................2

I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................7

1.1. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH ..................................................................................................7 1.1.1. Incidence of corruption in Vietnam ....................................................................................7 1.1.2. Commitment of the political leadership and public concern ................................................7 1.1.3. Gauging the effect of the Law on the society .......................................................................7 1.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.........................................................................................................8 1.2.2. Stakeholder oriented research............................................................................................ 8 1.2.3. The informants...................................................................................................................8

II. CORRUPTION BEFORE PROMULGATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW ........... 10

2.1. 1990-1998: BEFORE PROMULGATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION ORDINANCE ............................ 10 2.1.1. Local governments preoccupied with economic activities ................................................. 10 2.1.2. Land and budgetary management..................................................................................... 10 2.1.3. Construction investment................................................................................................... 10 2.1.4. Corruption in welfare and the public services................................................................... 11 2.2. PERIOD 1998-2005: AFTER PROMULGATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION ORDINANCE .................. 12 2.2.1. Issuing legal documents ................................................................................................... 12 Robust economic growth: larger scale of corruption .................................................................. 12 2.2.2. Investment in construction ............................................................................................... 12 2.2.3. Land Management ........................................................................................................... 12 2.2.4. State budget management and utilization.......................................................................... 13 2.2.5. Management and equitization of State owned Enterprises [SOEs] .................................... 13 2.2.6. The Judiciary and Inspectorate ........................................................................................ 13

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW (FROM JUNE 2006 TO OCTOBER 2008) ............................................................................................................................. 15

3.1. PROMULGATION OF ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION TO GUIDE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI- CORRUPTION LAW .......................................................................................................................... 15 3.1.1. Legal documents to guide the implementation of the Anti-corruption Law at central level (the State) ................................................................................................................................. 15 3.1.2. Legal documents guiding implementation of the Law at ministerial and sectoral level...... 16 3.1.3. Documents guiding implementation of the Anti-corruption Law at local level .................. 16 3.2. THE ‘ADMONISHING’ EFFECT OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW – HAVING DIMINISHING EFFECTS? 16 3.2.1. ‘Boisterous’ inspection scares the corrupt ....................................................................... 16 3.2.2. Sign of ‘resistance’: more sophisticated responses ........................................................... 16

IV. FIELD SURVEY RESULTS ON ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW ....................................................... 18

4.1. EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW ................................... 18 4.1.1. ‘Loud’ implementation of anti-corruption documents on national scale ............................ 18 4.1.2. Enforcement as a ‘movement’ – not very effective............................................................. 20 4.1.3. Law implementation based mainly on state agencies, less on the people: people are mistrustful ................................................................................................................................. 21 4.2. EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF CORRUPTION ............................................................................. 21 4.2.1. Incidence and characteristics of corruption in Vietnam .................................................... 21 4.2.2. Evaluation of areas susceptible to corruption ................................................................... 24 4.3. EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW ................................................... 25 4.3.1. Impact of prevention and corruption disclosure................................................................ 25 4.3.2. Impact on the level of denouncing corruption and punishment .......................................... 26 4.3.3. Impact on transparency and accountability ...................................................................... 29 4.4. REASONS FOR THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: CORRUPTION HAS NOT DECREASED ...................................................................................................................................................... 30 4.4.1. Taking advantage of the notion of ‘public ownership, state ownership’: easy corruption... 30 4.4.2. Lack of effective mechanism to control power................................................................... 31 4.4.3. Mechanism “ask – give”, “allocation” is widespread in national governance .................. 31 4.4.4. Lack of proper controlling mechanism of CSOs and people .............................................. 32 4.4.5. Low salaries: rent seeking to boost cadres’ incomes......................................................... 32 4.4.6. Is there a lack of political will to fight corruption? ........................................................... 32

V. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITY IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION ................................................................................................................................ 34

5.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................ 34 5.1.1. Background and policy to mobilize the involvement of CSOs in anti-corruption ................ 34 5.1.2. Legal basis for CSOs’ role in fighting corruption ............................................................. 34 5.1.3. Several outstanding anti-corruption activities of CSOs ..................................................... 34 5.2. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION FROM SURVEY ............................................................................. 35 5.2.1. Self-evaluation of CSOs on the effectiveness of their anti-corruption work ........................ 35 5.2.2. A wider view of CSOs’ efforts .......................................................................................... 35 5.3. DIFFICULTIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CSOS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION............................................ 36 5.3.1. Insufficient empowerment ................................................................................................ 36 5.3.2. CSOs have limited powers to oversee but carry a heavy responsibility for propaganda ..... 36 5.3.3. Lack of protection for ‘whistle blowers’ ........................................................................... 37 5.3.4. Inadequate anti-corruption capacity of CSOs and the public ............................................ 38

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 40

6.1. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 40 6.1.1. Implementation of the Law: early loud start but decreasing momentum ............................ 40 6.1.2. CSOs and the general public face obstacles in battling corruption.................................... 40 6.1.3. Limited anti-corruption capacity of CSOs and the people ................................................. 40 6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................ 41 6.2.1. The Heads of Anti-corruption Steering Committees should not double as Chairmen of People’s Committees ................................................................................................................. 41 6.2.2. Corrupt acts by Party’s cadres, at whatever level, should be handled equally before the law ................................................................................................................................................. 41 6.2.3. To reform administrative structures to cut down on ‘ask and give’ and ‘allocation’ .......... 41 6.2.4. To strengthen implementation of the Ordinance on Democracy to support the drive against corruption................................................................................................................................. 41 6.2.5. To strengthen the role and capacity of CSOs in anti-corruption ........................................ 42 ABBREVIATIONS

CBO Community-based Organizations

CECODES Centre for Community Support Development Studies

CSO Civil Society Organization CPV Communist Party of Vietnam FLC Fund of Local Cooperation VFF Fatherland Front of Vietnam FUV Farmer’s Union of Vietnam NGO Non Government Organization TI Transparency International VUSTA Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations

VUV Veteran’s Union of Vietnam

WUV Women’s Union of Vietnam FOREWORD

Corruption is a large, complex and widespread problem in Vietnam today, now having a serious impact on development.

The Vietnam National Assembly promulgated the Anti-corruption Law in November 29th, 2005 (in effect from June 1st, 2006), embodying measures for preventing and controlling corruption, and for detecting and punishing corrupt behavior.

Up to now, October 2008, despite the Anti-corruption Law being in force for more than two years, corruption remains a persistent problem. The Government is setting a ‘National strategy on Anti-Corruption to 2020’, stating: “Corruption remains common, serious and complex, and is a major obstacle to the success of renovation.”

This context highlights the need for a nation-wide review of the reality of anti-corruption measures and the impact of the Anti-corruption Law: this is necessary to identify the nature and causes of corruption, and propose measures and recommendations to help complete the necessary documentation and make the Anti-corruption Law more effective.

With financing from the Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC) under the Embassy of Finland in Hanoi, The Center for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES) of Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA), in collaboration with The Committee for Democracy and Laws of The Fatherland Front of Vietnam (FFV), has started work on Project FLC 08-01:

“Anti-corruption - Evaluate the situation and capacity building of anti-corruption for civil society organizations and rural communities”.

This work will occupy 30 months, starting in March 2008, and will be carried out in two Phases. Phase I will review and evaluate the reality of anti-corruption measures and the impact of the Anti-corruption Law nation-wide; Phase II will build capacity among civil society organizations (CSOs) and rural communities for anti-corruption, and conduct public consultations about cracking-down on corruption.

The project is evaluating policies based on field surveys, by the research question:

Is one reason for the less than expected improvement in anti-corruption, and ineffective enforcement of the Anti-corruption Law after two years in Vietnam, because of institutional deficiencies, in particular the lack of decentralization of power to civil society organisations?

This Report presents the results of the Phase I survey. Data collection was supported by stakeholders and coordinators and the research team wish to express their thanks to:

- Officials and researchers at central and local levels; the representatives of CSOs, unions and communities who have contributed studies and attended discussions, seminars and interviews.

- the Fund for Local Cooperation: Embassy of Finland in Hanoi for financing our research and field survey.

The results and recommendations of the Report, however, are those of the research team and do not necessarily reflect those of the Finnish Embassy.

On behalf of the research team

Assoc. Prof. Dang Ngoc Dinh (PhD), Director of CECODES Project Director EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Corruption, a big complex problem is widespread in Vietnam and has impacted on the country’s development. The Anti-corruption Law of Vietnam (Clause 2, Article 1) states:

Corruption is the behavior of individuals with status and power who take advantage of their position and power to commit actions against the law in their own interests.

Up to this time, October 2008, although the Anti-corruption Law has been in force for more than two years, ‘corruption remains serious and complex across many aspects of public life, and is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of doi moi [reform], the Government has concluded.

In collaboration with the Department of Democracy and Law of The Vietnam Fatherland Front, (VFF) CECODES has begun implementing Project FLC 08-01: “Anti-corruption - Evaluate the situation and capacity building of anti-corruption for civil society organizations and rural communities”.

This is planned to run for 30 months, starting in March 2008. There will be two phases: Phase I will carry out a nation-wide review and evaluation of the reality of anti- corruption and the impact of the Anti-corruption Law. Phase II will build capacity for CSOs and rural communities, equipping them to fight corruption, and hold public consultations on anti-corruption enforcement. This Report presents the results of Phase I survey.

Objectives of research

To evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and the impact of the Anti- corruption Law by conducting surveys in nine provinces; to identify causes and make recommendations to help improve the Anti-corruption legislation, and explore ways of making the law work effectively.

Hypothesis of the research

Is one reason for the less than expected reduction in corruption, and ineffective enforcement of the Anti-corruption Law after two years in Vietnam, the institutional deficiencies and lack of decentralization to civil society organizations?

Survey points and methodology

The survey was conducted in 18 communes and wards in 9 provinces in three areas of the country: four northern provinces, Ha Giang, Lao Cai, Ha Noi, and Thai Binh; three Central provinces, Thanh Hoa, Da Nang and Lam Dong; and two provinces in the South, Ba Ria – Vung Tau and Long An.

Policies include the Anti-corruption Law and associated documentation at central and local levels. The evidence collected includes: research reports and respondents’ evidence in the field surveys. Data was gathered through

(i) inspectorate reports of the provinces surveyed

(ii) in-depth interviews with some 200 members of provincial, district and communal CSOs, the majority being from organizations like FFV, Women’s unions (WUV), Farmer’s unions (FUV), Veteran’s unions (FUV), and certain other organizations;

(iii) questionnaires to about 500 people, most of them were cadres of CSOs and commune inhabitants; (iv) group discussions with some 500 people, in 35 groups, representing 18 communes/wards in the 9 provinces.

Corruption: the situation before promulgation of the Anti-corruption Law

- 1990-1998: before promulgation of the Anti-Corruption Ordinance. This period saw many examples of weak, ineffectual laws and policies. Within the framework of a market economy, local governments from commune to provincial levels drafted resolutions applicable to all socio-economic activity.

Senior officials, from commune and district to provincial level, compete to secure projects, receive funds from the state budget, or sell state-owned land.

- 1998-2005: before the promulgation of the Anti-corruption Law. During this time a number of key legal documents1 were drafted to prepare the country for increasing integration into the international community. Fast economic growth and an improving quality of life provided ample opportunities for corrupt practice to increase and become more sophisticated.

Corruption annoyed and scared off investors, reducing people’s confidence in government. Reclaiming land to hand over to the projects, ‘ask-give’ mechanism, state budget allocations, privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises, and ‘buying positions’ all provided ripe opportunities for corruption to flourish.

Evaluating enforcement of the Anti-corruption Law – Results of field surveys

The Anti-corruption Law has been implemented comprehensively and energetically from central leadership to the general public with the positive outcome of admonishing perpetrators and deterring corruption, especially during 2006 and 2007. The Law has made a breakthrough by requiring all officials working in areas susceptible to corruption to declare personal assets, and this applies equally to relatives and family members.

However enforcement of the Law faced limitations: enforcement was strong at first but became weaker and less effective later. Enforcement was based mainly on the power of party committee and authorities, with little involvement of the general public. Mass organizations such as VFF, VWU and VFU have not seemed to give enough support to the public in fighting corruption. The Anti-corruption Law was popularised to the public who were sceptical, believing that effective enforcement of the law was impossible.

Evaluating the state of corruption

The incidence and nature of corruption were affirmed by many informants in the interviews and discussions. Some believed corruption to be systematic and this could be explained by three reasons: it is so pervasive; it is structured vertically, up and down power hierarchies, and horizontally across parties and ‘gangs’. Anyone in a position of power has the potential for committing corrupt acts.

The survey indicated that far and away the two areas most liable to corrupt practices are land management (85.87%) and construction projects (84.81%).

Evaluating the impact of the Anti-corruption Law

The survey results indicated that 67% of the interviewees thought that at the beginning of the law enforcement corruption seemed to be decreasing; 33% disagreed, with 26% thinking it was at about the same level, and 7% saying it had increased. This could be due

1 The Anti-corruption Ordinance; Comprehensive program on administrative reform for the period 2001- 2010; Regulations on grassroots democracy. to the the Law having an ‘admonishing’ impact at the beginning then later, people became cleverer and better at concealing their corrupt activities. Other explanations could be that it was difficult to expose corrupt actions or there was little point in doing so. 74% of interviewees said that ‘blowing the whistle’ on corruption was ‘low and infrequent’, 38% could recognize corrupt activities by authorities but did not dare to speak out for fear of retribution.

Of the 12 activities requiring transparency by the regulations, people reported that they are able to oversee only two activities: management of small scale community investment projects and utilization of public contributions, both having close links to people’s own interests.

Causes of the ineffectiveness of enforcement of the Law enforcement

- Lack of effective mechanisms to control power. According to procedures of legal implementation the appointed Head of Anti-corruption Steering Committee is also head of the local authority; This can create a situation of conflict of interest. - ‘Ask-give’ transactions2 are widespread in national governance and feature in a variety of dealings ranging from annual budget allocation, project appraisal, human management and decentralization of power. It is a context in which corruption can readily develop.

- Lack of proper control by civil society and ordinary people. The Law has an article specifying involvement by civil society groups and ordinary people in rooting out corruption, but in reality this is tokenistic and does not work properly. A number of corruption cases relating to management officials, even when publicized, have not been resolved.

- Is there sufficient political will to stamp out corruption? If a high status official accused of corruption is not punished, corruption is not cut back. Slack control has apparently caused corruption and ‘judgment buying’ at every level. Only public pressure and transparent media coverage will force the hand of high level officials. Some people even said the political will to stamp out corruption has not been as high as in examples like the ban on firecrackers and enforcement of wearing of helmets by motor cycle riders, thought of being extremely difficult to put in force, where political will has translated into effective enforcement.

Civil Society’s involvement in the fight: difficulties and challenges

The Anti-corruption Law has created an important legal framework for civil society’s engagement however due to the tradition of fighting against foreign aggression, CSOs in Vietnam still have some revolutionary characteristics, with support from authorities. If the authorities are corrupt, it is difficult for CSOs to represent the will of the people and hold them to account for their actions.

2 Nguyen Dinh Huan, Minutes of Workshop, Thai Binh, 7/10/2008, FLC Project 08-01, “The ‘ask-give’ mechanism’ is a system of governing society by orders, not the rule of law. ‘Ask-give’ is not asking for and giving presents, it is asking for approval to do something. The superior, especially executive agencies give permission.In the pre 1986 period of central control and command ‘ask-give’ systems involved commodities and materials. After subsidies were withdrawn the mechanisms persisted, eg. for supplementary budgets, building projects and in many other areas. This is a basic cause of corruption”. Up to now the Law on establishment of Associations and the function and roles of CSOs have not been passed by the National Assembly, even after several drafts and prolonged discussion. This is the reason for the lack of legal backing for mandating the involvement of CSOs, social-profession organizations and voluntary associations in tackling corruption.

Even though the Anti-corruption Law has asserted a positive role for the mass media, in reality they are puzzled and unsure about their role in the fight against corruption.

At this time there is little protection for people who denounce corruption. The Fatherland Front and its member organizations do not have the power and authority to shield and protect whistle blowers.

There were high expectations for capacity building for people and civil society groups but up to now, anti-corruption capacity building has focused just on cadres and party members instead of CSOs and the public: if their capacity were developed stamping out corruption might be much more effective.

Conclusion

(i) The Anti-corruption Law was enforced effectively in the early stages but cooled down later;

(ii) Civil society groups and the general public have faced difficulties and limitations to their fight against corruption due to the lack of legal backing and capacity;

(iii) There has been less concern for building corruption-fighting capacity among CSOs and the public than for cadres and party members

Some recommendations

(i) Anti-corruption Steering Committees should be independent organizations. The Committee Head should not double as the Head of Authority; the Head could be chosen from the National Assembly/ People’s Council, Party’s Inspection Committee or Fatherland Front.

(ii) Party members of any level found acting corruptly should not only be punished by the Party but should also face the force of the law in in court. The Party should issue guidance on leadership;

(iii) Promote administrative reform so as to eliminate ‘ask – give’ and ‘allocation’ mechanisms. The Land law and Enterprise Law should be revised in order to endorse the rights of farmers in land reclamation; the laws should increase the responsibility of State owned Enterprises and Corporations for managing capital and property;

(iv) Foster the enforcement of Democracy Ordinances at grassroots levels to support anti- corruption work, for example: appraising confidence in management, let people vote for officials; have mailboxes for denouncing corrupt individuals; publicize cases of corruption locally; allow people to join in discussions with deputies of the National Assembly; regulate and publicize the incomes of public servants; strengthen mechanisms for reviewing anonymous letters denouncing corrupt people;

(v) Enhance the role and capacity of civil society organizations in the drive against corruption. The Law of Association should be quickly promulgated: the rights and responsibilities of civil society in voicing political criticism and controlling corruption need to be passed into law.

Structure of report (i) Introduction;

(ii) Corruption before promulgation of the Anti-corruption Law; (iii) Enforcement of the Law; (iv) Results of surveys on anti-corruption and Law enforcement;

(v) CSOs and communities fighting corruption; (vi) Conclusion and recommendations. I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Objectives of the Research

1.1.1. Incidence of corruption in Vietnam

According to Transparency International (TI), corruption is the behavior of persons who misuse position, power, or intention to violate the law for personal gains3. The Anti- corruption Law of Vietnam (Clause 2, Article 1)4 states: Corruption is the behavior of individuals with status and power who take advantage of their position to commit actions against the law in their own interests.

Corruption is widespread in the country and has negatively impacted on the nation’s development. According to TI’s 2008 corruption perceptions index5, Vietnam ranked 121st out of 180 countries, and 4th in South East Asia, after Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

1.1.2. Commitment of the political leadership and public concern

Over the past ten years the Communist Party, National Assembly and the Government of Vietnam have enacted various anti-corruption related documents, which acknowledge that ‘corruption has remained a serious issue and threat to the survival of the regime’, and affirm their determination to ‘treat decisively and strictly people who are openly corrupt, regardless of their position, whether on active service or retired’6.

Since the Anti-corruption Law was promulgated, leaders of the Party and State have shown a strong commitment, stating that ‘the entire Party, political system, and the whole of society shall be determined to prevent and fight corruption, to stop and gradually push it back.’7.

However people have shown scepticism and concern saying for instance that ‘Party and the State have been criticizing corruption in society while people in positions of power have obviously been acting corruptly – as if they knew nothing about it. Corruption has increased, and with more sophistication and complexity. Corruption has fostered systematic wrongdoing’8.

1.1.3. Gauging the effect of the Law on the society

To date (October 2008), even though the Anti-corruption Law has been in force for more than two years, ‘corruption remains widespread and serious, particularly in sectors such as land management and use, investment and construction, equitization of State owned enterprises, use of state capital, natural resources and assets. This has eroded public confidence in Party and State leadership’9.

1.1.4. Objectives of the research

To evaluate the fight against corruption and the impact of the Anti-corruption Law across the country.

3 www.vi.wikipedia.org, 10/2006 4 The Anti-Corruption Law No 55/2005/QH11 passed by the National Assembly of Vietnam on 29/11/2005 (in effect from 1/6/2006) 5 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 6 Political report of the 10th Party’s Congress in April 2006 7 Resolution of the 3rd Session of the 10th Party’s Central Standing Committee, 21 August 2006 8 Group discussion in Danang, April 2008 9 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, National Strategy on Anti-Corruption to 2020, draft 7 September 2008 The aim of the research was to identify causes and make recommendations to help completion of the associated legal documents of the Law so that it can be implemeneted more effectively.

1.1.5. Research hypothesis

Is one reason for the less than expected reduction in corruption, and ineffective enforcement of the Anti-corruption Law, the institutional deficiencies and lack of decentralization to civil society organizations?

1.2. Research methodology

1.2.1. Evidence to evaluate the impact of policies

The survey was conducted in 18 communes and wards in 9 provinces located in three parts of the country: four northern provinces, Ha Giang, Lao Cai, Ha Noi, and Thai Binh; three Central provinces, Thanh Hoa, Da Nang and Lam Dong; and two provinces in the South, Ba Ria – Vung Tau and Long An.

Policies include the Anti-corruption Law and associated documentation at central and local levels. The evidence collected includes: research reports and respondents’ evidence in the field surveys. Data was gathered through:

(i) inspectorate assessment reports of the nine surveyed provinces

(ii) in-depth interviews with some 200 members of provincial, district and communal CSOs, the majority being from organizations like FFV, Women’s unions (WUV), Farmer’s unions (FUV), Veteran’s unions (FUV), and other community organizations;

(iii) questionnaires to about 500 people, most of them were cadres of CSOs and commune inhabitants;

(iv) group discussions with some 500 people, in 35 groups, representing 18 communes/wards in the 9 provinces.

1.2.2. Stakeholder oriented research

Project design aimed to ensure that data achieved the following:

topicality as information is updated; direct and practical as it was derived from dialogues and discussions; cross-representative as it derives from a variety of places and cultures

Participation was in clear evidence as information and recommendations all came from ‘insiders’, taking consideration of informants by territory, social and political status, age, sex, ethnicity and education.

1.2.3. The informants

The majority of participants were between 50 and 55 years old, 85.62% were Kinh and 14.35% were ethnic minority people. Ha Giang had the highest proportion of ethnic minority informants, some 95%. Educational levels were relatively high, 72% were high school graduates and more than 30% were university graduates.

The highest proportion, 60%, were representatives of political-social civil society organizations from provincial to commune levels, including VFF, FUV, WUV, and VUV. Community-based organizations accounted for a relatively low 15.23%.

Although the project worked closely with the Standing Committee of the Fatherland Front at different levels - to encourage participation of women, community-based organizations and the general public, i.e. not village cadres, these groups only accounted for a small percentage, as expected. Women accounted for 31.81% of total informants, community-based organizations, for 15.23%; and the general public, only 4.40%.

This is typical and common in rural Vietnam, where the majority of participants at meetings and on training courses are cadres of CSOs and local authorities, while the general population has little chance to be involved. II. CORRUPTION before PROMULGATION of the ANTI- CORRUPTION LAW

2.1. 1990-1998: before promulgation of the Anti-Corruption Ordinance

2.1.1. Local governments preoccupied with economic activities

This period was marked by many inadequate laws and policies which failed to keep pace with movements and developments during the vigorous transition from a centrally planned economy to one based on freer market principles. Production was booming but capital was lacking and governance was too rigid. Power was increased and economic activity was governed by resolutions of local party and government authorities. At this time it was common for local governments to compete for projects to ‘be given’, for budgets to be allocated from the state, or to sell state land.

According to the Thanh Hoa provincial inspectorate report, in order to avoid taking individual responsibility before the law, Party Committees and People’s Councils issued resolutions about these activities. In many communes leaders passed resolutions allowing a ‘transaction commission’ of 30-50% of the allocated money. In the whole country10, investigatory bodies unearthed and brought 3,856 cases relating to economic matters to court in 1997, an increase of 5.6% over 1996; the majority of these cases involved corruption. In 1998 3,546 cases were taken to court, the majority linked to corrupt practices.

2.1.2. Land and budgetary management

Party’s Committees and People’s Councils adopted resolutions on selling land to get money for infrastructure investment, management expenses, salaries or construction debt disbursement. Public money was commonly used to cover meeting allowances and ‘transaction fees’ for collective and personal gain.

Granting licenses and land-use certificates are areas where harassment and corruption thrived. Money could ease acceptance of an application, rapid verification, skipping required procedures or even fraudulent accounting. Here are some examples of violations in land management, financial, and construction management in Thanh Hoa province11:

- In Xuan Lap commune, Tho Xuan District, from 1993 to 1998 the commune government improperly allocated a total of 81,072m2 of land to 385 recipients. District government allowed the legalization of 130 cases involving a total of 38,660m2. The district government made the decision to exempt them from land use fees. The commune people’s committee produced an improper document of land use fee payment but the money was actually given to district leaders and certain agencies, and covered transaction costs to lobby for projects.

- In Nghi Son urban area, seven out of nine communes inspected, had improperly allocated land i.e. had sold it illegally, in 1,208 cases involving a total of 23.4 hectares.

2.1.3. Construction investment

According to the assessment reports of the inspectorate in the provinces surveyed, in the 1990–1998 period, local governments around the country were involved in building

10 www.ch ungta.com, 30/11/2006, Nguyen Ngoc Chi, Hanoi National University, Characteristics of corruption in Vietnam 11 Inspector in Thanh Hoa Province, ibid infrastructure such as power supplies, roads, schools and health centres. While the local budget was small, as fixed revenue was small, and support from government was also small, the ‘optimum’ solution was to sell land to investors or the public. Many communes used a third of money from selling land to pay for planning or ‘getting approval’ from district and provincial governments.

Encouraged by benefits from construction commission, i.e. ‘kickbacks’ or bribes, many commune leaders were determined to have projects implemented. If money was not available, they could borrow with interest. In many cases land was cheap as it was not located in a profitable site, loans with interest could not be paid as funding was limited, budget deficits were common, debts piled up and the construction project fund was squeezed to get payment. In Trieu Son District, Thanh Hoa Province12, 21 out of a total of 28 communes had infrastructure construction debts of 500 million dong to 1 billion dong in 1999. Inspection in 16 communes revealed they had all sold land illegally, with ‘transaction’ and ‘reception’ costs accounting for 30–35% of the budget. Giving and receiving ‘brown envelopes’ was endemic, routine and normal, with little regard for the law.

2.1.4. Corruption in welfare and the public services

There have been a number of cases of harassment for personal gains. The majority of public servants saw their assigned position closely linked to a perquisite: the fruits of bribery being the means of boosting low salaries. If money was available, things could be done quickly but if not, then work was left untouched. People knew they had to bribe officials to get things done.

In the education system, extra tutorials and classes were common, school lessons were considered the essential duty, but outside work is seen as the real job. School management boards required many illicit contributions, some 14-17 different types of ‘contribution’ were listed, of which only three or four were stipulated by the State.

In the health services, overloading and degrading of facilities, low professional morale in hospitals and inadequate salaries fostered corruption, e.g. embezzling drugs from medical insurance, harassing patients. Only people who gave money received good treatment.

In the labor - invalids - social affairs sector, military agencies, youth volunteers, and ‘closely associated’ people sought to become beneficiaries of invalid or revolutionary welfare, or be awarded decorations and medals.

In 1999 the Inspectorate in Thanh Hoa province visited 40 communes, identifying 406 people who had made false declarations about their age and work to receive revolutionary welfare payments, totaling more than 400 million dong; 91 cases where evaluation of a disability had been manipulated enabling people to improperly claim invalid welfare, and 27 instances where fraudulent or improper dossiers had been made up13.

12 Inspector in Thanh Hoa Province, ibid 13 Inspector in Thanh Hoa Province, ibid 2.2. Period 1998-2005: after promulgation of the Anti-Corruption Ordinance

2.2.1. Issuing legal documents

Robust economic growth: larger scale of corruption

- 1998-2005: A number of key legal documents such as The Anti-corruption Ordinance (1998), Comprehensive program on administrative reform for the period 2001-2010 (2001), Regulations on democracy at grassroots level in administrative bodies and communes/wards/towns (2003), were issued to prepare the country for international integration. Fast economic growth and improving quality of life were a substrate for corruption, enabling it to become more widespread, sophisticated and difficult to detect.

Based on the assessment report of the Ba Ria-Vung Tau provincial Inspectorate, the fiscal scale in cases detected increased steadily. In 1993 it was 319 billion dong and in 1994, 712 billion dong. In the 2001-2005 period, Inspectorates at different government levels conducted 58,664 operations, mostly involving construction investment, land management, land use and large state-owned corporations, where violations had been reported.

Numerous violations were discovered. Reclaiming assets and administrative sanctions were applied in 7,584 cases; out of 319 cases 712 people were criminally charged. According to reports on implementation of the Anti-corruption Ordinance from 47 provinces and cities and 20 ministries and sectors (2000 to 2004) 8,851 cases involving 12,438 people cases were uncovered. Administrative sanctions were applied to 9,665 corrupt cadres14.

2.2.2. Investment in construction

In this period, various industrial parks and clusters were established and attracted investment projects. Corruption in investment projects caused great losses to State assets. In Thanh Hoa for example, between 2000 and 2006, the provincial inspectorate looked at 40 projects, unearthing corrupt practices at every stage, and amounting to 53,690 million dong out of a total 254,000 million dong15.

Corruption involved the complicity of various institutions and individuals in stealing and sharing out public money. In most cases economic sanctions were applied but few were really punished.

If an individual steals a few million dong or a staff member embezzles several million dong, they are liable to be treated as criminals. Based on the provincial inspectorate reports, it is common that contractors, consultants and supervisors who collude with project investors to appropriate millions, even billions, of dong of public money are not charged but merely asked to return the money.

2.2.3. Land Management

The biggest issue in the field of land management in this period was land reclamation (allocation) for projects and accounting of land clearance and settlement.

Taking advantage of state policies prioritizing economic development, many individuals and organizations raced to set up projects for the purpose of land allocation. The principal violations were improper allocation of land, illegally sharing or selling it for profit, dividing land into lots and selling it, bribing officials to ‘legalize’ land occupation. In many places change in land use was manipulated to enable profiteers to buy it cheaply, then sell or lease it for a big gain. This was super profitable for ‘business missions’.

2.2.4. State budget management and utilization

The mechanisms of ‘ask-give’ and state budget ‘allocation’ and slack regulation resulted in violations in budget management, allocation and use and resulted in great losses to the State. Many agencies were engaged in lobbying for budgets or a project but in reality this was collective corruption, accompanied by giving expensive gifts and large sums of money. Corruption like this is widespread but difficult to fight.

Procurements by public bodies were frequently transacted at prices above market value, with buyers receiving illegal ‘commissions’. This was common knowledge but nobody was prepared to ‘blow the whistle’.

Examples of corruption in this sphere are illegally selling, buying, and using value added tax (VAT) invoices to deceive and embezzle, stealing VAT refunds, allowing passage of smuggled goods or fraudulent costing of infrastructure projects.

Specific, recorded instances of misappropriating VAT refunds are: the Hanoi Essential Oil Production Company appropriated 7.2 billion dong of refunds; Phuong Nam Company in Lang Son province appropriated 7.3 billion dong of refunds; a branch of the General Export and Import Company in Da Nang, the Import Export and Service Trading Company in Lang Son and other business enterprises appropriated refunds totaling up to 167 billion dong16.

2.2.5. Management and equitization of State owned Enterprises [SOEs]

Corruption in SOEs (operating according to Decision number 90/TTg and Decision 91/TTg, dated 7 March 1994, and hereafter referred to as Corporations 90 and Corporations 91) was a major cause for concern. Inspection of construction projects and procurement in several Corporations 90 and Corporations 91 showed that corruption was quite severe. In big corporations such as oil and gas, electric power, coal, paper, cement, airlines and telecommunications many cases of corruption, involving the loss of billions of dong, came to light.

Corruption occurred during the equitization of SOEs when parties colluded by dishonestly valuing assets or selling and buying shares then diverting the money into their own pockets.17

2.2.6. The Judiciary and Inspectorate

Many cadres in the law protection agencies, including those at central level, committed illegal acts, for example taking bribes and protecting, covering up or even abetting the activities of criminals. Many high profile cases were open to the public, for instance, drug dealing by Vu Xuan Truong, a police officer; smuggling in Doi Cave with the complicity of the Lang Son provincial Customs Department; the ‘Khanh Trang’ gang- leader in Hanoi, and Truong Van Cam and his gangs in Ho Chi Minh City, where corrupt cadres working in law protection agencies had been bribed.

Even among the judiciary there have been cases where a judge took bribes directly or indirectly to reduce sentences and punishment. There have been instances of asking for money or extorting bribes from plaintiffs in civil or economic cases. The Secretary of the

16 Inspectorate in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, Anti-corruption situation and solutions, Ibid 17 Inspectorate in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, Anti-corruption situation and solutions, Ibid Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court received a bribe to influence his judgment; Judge Vo Trong Hieu accepted three taels of gold and six million dong as a bribe in a civil case. Seven police officers were arrested for taking bribes and protecting drug dealers in Hai Ba Trung District, Hanoi.

Corruption also took place during the investigation and handling of corruption cases. Investigators, prosecutors and judges took bribes to mishandle documents and reducing punishments in some cases. In three cases, including Muong Te (Lai Chau province), Pham Minh Thong (Da Nang City) and Kim Boi mineral water (Hoa Binh province), five investigators and prosecutors were punished and held criminally responsible.

During inspection, officials have asked for money in return for not reporting or under- reporting the seriousness of violations. This took place during an inspection mission to Nam Dinh province, another inspection of the Government Inspectorate in Thi Vai port and storage site (Ba Ria - Vung Tau province), and an Inspection of the Oil and Gas Corporation. Some transport inspectors took bribes and this was discovered and reported in the media.18

18 Inspectorate in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, Anti-corruption situation and solutions, Ibid III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW (from June 2006 to October 2008)

3.1. Promulgation of associated documentation to guide implementation of the Anti-corruption Law

3.1.1. Legal documents to guide the implementation of the Anti-corruption Law at central level (the State)

From the end of 2005 to the beginning of 2007, the anti-corruption drive had been particularly promoted. The Party, National Assembly and Government issued a series of anti-corruption legal documents, programs, and agendas. Figure 3-1 on the following page systematically lays out the most important legal documents promulgated to implement the Anti-corruption Law.

The Law was passed by the National Assembly on 29 November 2005 and amended in August 2007 when a critical article was added, relating to the establishment of Anti- corruption Steering Committees in provinces and cities directly under central control. This had not been made explicit in the 2005 Law.

Anti-corruption legal documents are of three levels of importance; see Figure 3-1:

- The highest level which includes legislative documents passed by the National Assembly and the Party’s Central Standing Committee. These are: the Anti-corruption Law and Resolution of the 10th Party’s Central Standing Committee on anti-corruption;

- The second level includes associated documentation from the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; and

- The third level which includes executive documents issued by the Government, the Prime Minister’s Office or line ministries and agencies responsible for stamping out corruption.

After the Central Anti-Corruption Steering Committee had been established in September 2006, the Prime Minister issued several Orders to promote the implementation of the Law. Figure 3-1. Anti-Corruption Law and legal documents guiding its implementation

ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW passed by the National Assembly (29/11/2005), amended in August 2007 Regulates the prevention, discovering, and treating person who takes advantage of his position/power for the sake of personal gains.
Resolution number 04/NQ/TW (21 -8-2006) passed in the 3rd session of the 10th Party’s Central Standing Committee on empowering the Party’s leadership in anti- corruption.

Resolution number 1039 of the Standing committee of the National Assembly (28/8/ 2006) regulating the organization, power, and operation of the central anti-corruption steering committee
Resolution number 1046 of the Standing committee of the National Assembly (30/9/ 2006) approving the decision of the Head of the Supreme People’s Procuracy on the establishment of the Department in charge of exercising the right of prosecution and inspection of corruption cases
Criminal Law (21/12/1999) Regulating organization, power, and operation of the Central Anti-corruption Steering Committee

Decree number 107 of the Government (22/9 /2006) regulating the responsibilities of the head of agencies, organizations, and entities, which use the State asset and budget, in case of letting corruption happen in his/her agencies, organizations, entities.
Decree number
120 of the Government (20/10/2006) detailing corrupt acts
Decree number 37 of the Government (9/3/ 2007) detailing the declaring income and properties of public officials
Decree number
47 of the
Government (9/5/2007) detailing responsibilities of government agencies, media, business, inspection association, and
Decree number
102 of the
Government (14/6
/2007) regulating the period of time when public officials are not allowed to do business after retirement and several other provisions
Decree number 30 of the Government (31/10 /2006) issuing the action plan of the government to implement the ANTI- CORRUPTION LAW
Decision number
1424 of the Prime
Minister (21
/10/2006 approving the establishment of the anti-corruption department under the Government
Inspection.
Decision No.
64/2007/QD-TTg of May 10, 2007, promulgating the Regulation on giving, receipt and hand-over of gifts by state budget-funded agencies, organizations and units and cadres, public employees and servants

Decision number 13 of the Prime Minister (24/01/2007) regulating the establishment, power, and operation of the office of the Central anti- corruption steering Committee
Decision number 01 of the
Ministry of Public Safety (02
/01/2007) approving the establishment of anti-corruption department / corruption crime investigation unit
Decree number 158 of the Government (27/10,2007) regulating position and rotation period of public servants
Decision number 03 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (26/2/2007) regulating code of conduct of public officials at local level

Note: The above system of legal documents does not include guidelines on the implementation (Decisions, Orders, Circulars, etc. ) issued by ministries, sectors, and concerned agencies at central and local levels

15 3.1.2. Legal documents guiding implementation of the Law at ministerial and sectoral level

Drawing on central government anti-corruption legal documents, ministries, Party organizations and the Fatherland Front organizations issued various documents to guide implementation of the Law. These stipulate the revision, amendments and supplementation of several legal documents to enhance transparency and accountability in the management of assets and finances; improved management of investment funds; application of ‘one door’ administrative policies; contractual staffing; adopting flat rate administrative expenditure, and promotion of public accountability and supervision.

3.1.3. Documents guiding implementation of the Anti-corruption Law at local level

Based on government legal documents, local governments from provincial to commune levels, issued documentation to guide implementation of the Law in their jurisdictions, adapting them, if need be, to local conditions.

People’s Committees issued signed Decisions to implement the fight against corruption and established provincial Anti-corruption Steering Committees.

3.2. The ‘admonishing’ effect of the Anti-corruption Law – having diminishing effects?

3.2.1. ‘Boisterous’ inspection scares the corrupt 19

In the early stages of implementing the Anti-corruption Law in 2006 and 2007, agencies such as the Inspectorates, Courts, Police, and Procuracy were energetic in pursuing cases. The Government Inspectorate investigated numerous projects and recovered billions of dong; the Police investigated thousands of cases of economic corruption and the Procuracy prosecuted hundreds of people for misappropriating hundreds of billions of dong.

According to the report of Ba Ria – Vung Tau Inspectorate, in the first 8 months of 2006 the Police on economic crimes investigated 5,855 cases, of which 489 cases were ownership violation, causing a loss of more than 700 billion dong of which they recovered some 82 billion dong. There were 5,366 cases of smuggling and other economic crimes involving more than 90 billion dong worth goods. Investigators brought 815 people to court, in 456 cases. They applied administrative penalties in 3,075 cases.

This energy had a very positive impact. On the one hand it had an admonishing effect; people in a corruption prone position seemed to become more hesitant and cautious. The public, including cadres and Party members knew about the Anti-corruption Law, so in the period after promulgation of the Law corruption seemed to have been contained.

3.2.2. Sign of ‘resistance’: more sophisticated responses

The Anti-corruption Law stipulates six main solutions: Adopt transparency and accountability Implement clear norms and standards

19 Inspectorate in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, Anti-corruption situation and solutions, Ibid Establish clear codes of professionalism and conduct

Adopt asset and income transparency;

Clarify the responsibilities of agency and organization heads

Institute administrative reform; renovate management and systems of payment

When the Law was first promulgated these solutions were seen to be effective, especially in the early period in 2006 and 2007, since then however the agencies have displayed less energy and commitment and the drive has become correspondingly less effective20.

20 www.dantri.com.vn, 9 October 2008, Truong Thi Mai, Chairwoman of Social Affairs Committee, National Assembly 'Less energy has been attached to the handling of some major corruption cases and National Assembly members could not explain why to voters' IV. FIELD SURVEY RESULTS ON ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI- CORRUPTION LAW

4.1. Evaluation of the implementation of the Anti-corruption Law

4.1.1. ‘Loud’ implementation of anti-corruption documents on national scale

Most respondents affirmed that anti-corruption legal documents have been made available to them (see Figure 4-1). Of the legal documents, 97.09% of respondents said the contents of the Anti-corruption Law had been made known to them, while only 70.94%, the lowest number, said Regulations on supervision of community investment had been disseminated. At provincial and district levels, thanks to most cadres being thoroughly informed, all 100% confirmed that anti-corruption legal documents had been disseminated.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

Figure 4-1 shows that Regulation on supervision of community investment, an important means of promoting participation in prevention of corruption, was least known, with a percentage of 70.94%. [pic] Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

People knew less about the regulations on community supervision of investment than other regulations, noted in all survey regions (Figure 4-2), the percentage in Central Coast and Central Highland was the lowest, 62.69% and 60% respectively. Various agencies and the media were involved in disseminating the Anti-corruption Law and accompanying legal documents.

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

Figure 4-3 profiles the relative significance of channels of communication in apprising people of the Law: television and radio, followed by mass organizations; the Press, official gazettes and the Internet had only limited roles. Most heads of civil society organizations and the general public knew about the Law when asked, but had little understanding of the provisions it contained as this information had not been provided.

[pic] Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

Survey results of evaluation of cadres at grassroots level, village heads, heads of residential groups, about dissemination of the Law are shown in Figure 4-4. The great majority of people, 88%, agreed that local implementation of the Law was ‘average’ or moderately effective, while the proportion answering ‘good’ was only 8%.

4.1.2. Enforcement as a ‘movement’ – not very effective

After the initial enthusiasm and effectiveness of the drive against corruption, its effectiveness waned and by 2008 the implementation of the anti-corruption law was uncoordinated and having much less impact. This is characteristic of ‘movements’ in Vietnam. The Anti-corruption action plan had not been implemented in realistic and practical ways and lacked accountability and systems for monitoring and evaluating it. ‘Although anti-corruption legal documents have been made public, thorough communication and assignment of tasks has been unclear, as a result effectiveness has not been very high’21.

According to Resolution number 294A of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and the Central Anti-corruption Steering Committee, Anti-corruption Steering Committees and support systems should be established at local levels. However by the beginning of 2008 in 33 out of 64 provinces and cities under government control no Anti-corruption Steering Committee had been formed22.

21 Group discussion in Thanh Hoa province, FLC Project 08-01, April 2008

22 Institute of Inspection science, the Government Inspectorate, “The state of corruption and the capacity of government and CSOs to carry out anti-corruption activities”.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

Asking the same questions to representatives of businesses and community organizations and the general public produced strikingly different responses as comparison of Figures 4-4 and 4-5 clearly shows: 18.89% - 39.13% responded ‘very bad’; 42.32% - 56.67% responded ‘bad’. There was not a single ‘good’ evaluation.

4.1.3. Law implementation based mainly on state agencies, less on the people: people are mistrustful

Implementation of the Law has been the responsibility of state agencies such as the Party Committees and government agencies, and less on the general public.

Despite hearing about the Law people are not very interested as they have little confidence it will make any difference. Dissemination of anti-corruption documents to the people is limited, being directed mostly to Party members23. Agencies responsible for implementing the Law have paid little attention to community-based, charity or religious organizations24.

The Law can only be enforced effectively where the Party’s organization is really healthy and strong; where it is weak it is difficult for ordinary people to get justice.

4.2. Evaluation of the state of corruption

4.2.1. Incidence and characteristics of corruption in Vietnam

The majority of respondents affirmed the existence of corruption in their area, but not on a large scale, see Figure 4-6. This could, however, be interpreted to mean that corruption is common and systematic but major cases have not been discovered.

23 Group discussion in Thai Binh province,

24 Group discussion in Long An Province, “I represent Cao Dai religious groups but have never been informed by any responsible authority or the FFV about anti-corruption legal documents. I heard about it on television but it was very general”. Importantly, the survey points were mainly rural areas where there are few large construction projects, and consequently less scope for corrupt practice and exploitation.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

Figure 4-6 indicates people’s perception of the extent of corruption at provincial and district levels where it is 97.67% and 96.61% respectively, and at commune and ward level where it is 84.05%. This is to be expected as ‘power’ is greater at provincial and district levels than in communes and wards, and especially when it comes to allocating land to projects25.

Evaluation of corruption levels by region, where project surveys were being undertaken, is shown in Figure 4-7. In general there were small differences between regions, ranging from 80 to 97%.

More than 90% of the interviewees confirmed the existence of corruption in Hanoi (93.4%), Lao Cai (91.5%), Thanh Hoa (92.4%), Lam Dong (91%) and Long An (93.4%). Ha Giang posted the lowest figure, 68%.

25 Group discussion in Lam Dong province, “Corruption is rife in land use and infrastructure projects, where the district government owns the project, while the commune government has only a supervisory role: the district government ‘eats more than the commune government’”.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

Some people believe26 corruption is systemic [inherent and programmed into the system]. In Vietnam it can be characterized in three ways: it is widespread; it operates vertically and hierarchically from high to low levels in political and institutional cultures; and horizontally across ‘parties’ and gangs’. The associations or network connections of individuals may determine their position or status; anyone in a position of power has the potential for committing corrupt acts.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

26 Workshop on sharing anti-corruption experience, 14/10/2008, Danang City Figure 4-8 reveals perceptions of the form taken by corruption. The majority answered ‘misuse of power and position while executing assigned tasks’, 61.31% while ‘taking bribes’ was the second most common form, according to 47.70% of respondents.

4.2.2. Evaluation of areas susceptible to corruption

Figure 4-9 shows two areas, land management (85.87%) and construction projects (84.81%), which have by far the highest rates of corruption. More than 90% of interviewees in four provinces ( Lao Cai, Hanoi, Ba Ria – Vung Tau, and Long An) and over 80% in Thai Binh, DaNang city and Lam Dong, believe that land management is entangled in corrupt practices.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

These findings are borne out by research by the Bureau of Internal Affairs of the Party’s Central Committee27 which identified ten areas of activity at greatest risk of corruption, the top three being land administration and housing28, customs and traffic police.

Corruption in construction projects was found to be common, with more than 90% of responses from Lam Dong and Ba Ria – Vung Tau, more than 80% from Hanoi, Thanh Hoa, Thai Binh, Da Nang City and Lao Cai, and over 70% from Ha Giang and Long An, confirming it.

62.7% of respondents believed corrupt ion to be widespread at the border gate Customs in Lao Cai. Corrupted investigations, trials, and judgments were perceived to be commonest in Hanoi (50.77%) and Thai Binh (50.7%). Corrupt ion in budget revenue and expenditure was seen as least problematic, with the highest

27 Project “Research on anti-corruption”. Executing agency: Bureau of Internal Affairs, Party’s Central Standing Committee. Donor: SIDA, www.tienphongonline.com.vn, published on 30/11/2005

28 Trinh Xuan Thu, Deputy Director of The General Department of Security, The Labourer, 27/9/2006: “Dishonest land dealings brought large illegal benefits; this is an area where corruption is easy. The perpetrators cover up for each other, making it harder to detect. Several instances showed that, from commune to district and provincial levels, it’s very difficult to fight as everybody has their finger in the pie.” rate of 11.4% in Ba Ria – Vung Tau. As most data was collected from rural and suburban areas without major industries or businesses, there is less potential for corruption.

As Figure 4-10 below indicates, most interviewees across the country judged that corruption in management of land would be serious, ranging from 76.92% in Central coastal areas to 95.08% in the Cuu Long [Mekong] delta.

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

4.3. Evaluation of the impact of the Anti-corruption Law

4.3.1. Impact of prevention and corruption disclosure

(1) Gauging corruption levels after promulgation of the Law

Figure 4-11 presents estimations of changes in corruption levels before and after implementation of the Law. 67% thought corruption was falling, 26% believed it was unchanged, and 7% thought it was increasing.

This could be explained by assuming the Law had an ‘admonishing’ effect at first, but patterns and methods of corrupt practice then became more sophisticated and complex, and difficult to detect. A further reason could be that people did not have the means of challenging or denouncing the perpetrators, did not see the point of doing so or felt it would be too risky.

e: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

(2) Evaluation of the level of corruption disclosure
Sourc

Figure 4-12 indicates that some 74% of interviewees said that exposing corruption was ‘low and infrequent’, very few, 4%, believed it was ‘frequent’. This may explain why many interviewees thought that corruption appeared to be falling after promulgation of the Law.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

4.3.2. Impact on the level of denouncing corruption and punishment

(1)Exposing corrupt practice Many people believed they could recognize corrupt activities among authorities but would not dare to denounce the perpetrators, perhaps for fear of revenge.29

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

As Figure 4-13 indicates, some 74% of interviewees felt that corruption cases would not be exposed and even if they were, there would not be sufficient evidence to apply the law with any effect.

(2) Collaboration between anti-corruption agencies

Most interviewees thought that collaboration between the agencies responsible was low. Figure 4-14 presents the findings with 59% answering ‘no cooperation’ while 36% thought there would be cooperation but it would not be effective. Most people also felt that corrupt practices were often unearthed, not by the authorities, but resulted from investigations by ordinary people or the media30.

29 Group discussion in Ba Ria-Vung Tau, “People are aware of corruption but know there’s nothing they can do about it as they don’t have the authority. So they just wish to be ‘safe and sound’ and don’t dare to denounce anyone”.

30 www.vietnamnet.vn 18/07/2008, at first six month review meeting of Ho Chi Minh City on anti- corruption, Mr. Bui Hoang Danh, Presiding Judge of City People’s Court revealed: ‘Corruption cases were mostly exposed by people and the media. Party cells and authorities were almost not aware of the corruption related violations at their offices and localities”. [pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

(3) Competence in dealing with corruption

The handling of corruption by responsible authorities was poorly evaluated by 73% of the interviewees; ‘corruption cases were not handled fully and resolutely’. Only 2% felt that corruption cases were handled fully and correctly. Figure 4-15 indicates the responses.

[pic]

Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

As Figure 4-16 shows, the government Inspectorate was seen to be best at handling cases, 12.4% rating it as ‘good’ and 35.56% as ‘moderately good’; this was followed by the Procuracy with 39% of ‘good’ and ‘moderately good’ ratings, third were the courts with a 32% rating.

[pic] Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008

4.3.3. Impact on transparency and accountability

The Law has made a breakthrough in property enumeration, as this regulation is compulsory for all cadres working in areas susceptible to corruption, and extends to family member s as well. Further, according to the Ordinance on Democracy which has been disseminated to communes and wards, several local government activities are required to be open to the public. However survey respondents thought that regulations had not increased transparency and accountability.

Figure 4-17 shows people’s estimation of the transparency and openness of 12 of commune government activities.

[pic] Source: survey data of FLC Project 08-01, May 2008 People viewed mobilization and utilization of people’s contributions (75.78%), financing and state budgeting (70.21%), and public procurement and infrastructure (64.29%), as being handled with the greatest transparency. This is understandable as these are mostly directly relevant to people’s lives.

Activities rated poorly for transparency were: the annual anti-corruption report (37.08%); housing management and utilization (36.44%); auditing of state budget and the use of state assets (37.71%). Of the 12 activity areas where the law requires transparency, people interviewed thought, only two activities, community based construction project management and utilization of public contributions, were the ones they were able to oversee.

One provision in Decree 47, concerning implementation of the law, stipulates that disclosure of personal assets and income shall not be open to the public, but should be reported to ‘concerned authorities’31. It has also been noted that a majority of people in positions of power do not want, and find ways to get around, declaring their income, although the State requires them to do so32.

4.4. Reasons for the ineffectiveness of Law enforcement: Corruption has not decreased

4.4.1. Taking advantage of the notion of ‘public ownership, state ownership’: easy corruption

According to the Law land is in public ownership: people have only the right to use it. People’s Committees at provincial and district levels are entitled to represent ownership and manage land in their jurisdictions. Putting it simply, ownership rests with local governments and provides an arena ripe for corruption as they have the right to ‘grant’ land33. People commented: ‘as long as property and money are given to owners and heads of SOEs, they have the opportunity to corruptly appropriate state assets’34.

31 Nguyen Dinh Huan, Thematic report for FLC Project 08-01, 2008, “The FFV and people’s inspectors did nothing when there was a directive on the disclosure of personal assets In some places there were instructions to replace inspection with explanation of some “sensitive” issues.

32 Minutes of Group discussion in Thanh Hoa, 08-01, 2008 33 Inspection in Thanh Hoa province, Workshop on sharing anti-corruption experience in Thai Binh, 7/10/2008, FLC Project 08-01, “The State allows provincial and district governments to allocate (“bestow”) land to project implementing enterprises at a very low price equal to “reclaim” price paid to people. These enterprises then sold it on to (rich) people at a price of tens or even hundreds of times higher. This is a domain for corruption to flourish, cadres with power wish to retain this ‘monopoly’ for their personal gain.” - Major general Trinh Xuan Thu, Deputy Director of The General Department of Security, The Laborer, 27/9/2006, “It’s so easy for corrupted cadres at different levels to occupy land, just like picking it from their own pockets. They take advantage of the “public ownership” principle where land is under their management, to share through projects and provisions of laws.”

34- Minutes of Group discussion in Thai Binh, Survey FLC Project, 2008; - Nguyen Binh, Email: bin 200665@yahoo.com, www.tuanvietnam.net , 10/9/2009, “I’ve been working in a big State owned enterprise for dozens of years but have never seen corruption as easy and open as it is now. Taking advantage of equitization policy and diversification of state ownership, leaders of SOEs have set up various subsidiary join-stock companies which apparently receive preferential treatment in terms of capital, fixed assets, natural resources and land use, from the parent companies. Super benefits certainly “drop” into officials’ pockets”. 4.4.2. Lack of effective mechanism to control power

There is perception that the Anti-corruption Law has not been drafted explicitly to make it equally applicable to all: in reality a certain group of people is above the law.35 Anti-corruption documents36 stipulate that the Head of local government also serves as Head of the Anti-corruption Steering Committee; this has hindered implementation of the Law. A majority of interviewees thought that with the head being ‘both player and referee’ the independence and impartiality of the Committee would be hindered.37

4.4.3. Mechanism “ask – give”, “allocation” is widespread in national governance

‘Ask-give’ and ‘allocation’ mechanisms are common at all levels of administration. It is apparent in many activities from budget allocation, appraising projects for investment, management of human resources, to decentralization of power. This changes people from citizens who are being served, to subjects who are managed, subjects who have to ask to be given what is theirs by right. It is a mechanism which creates good opportunities for corruption38.

35 Group discussion in Hanoi, FLC Project 08-01, “I have a deep understanding of the law and am aware that the state has sharedcorruption- fighting experience with other countries. They may not deal with it in the same way as we do: they have the means of enforcing the law”. - Le Dang Doanh, www.tuoitre.com.vn , 27/07/2006, “In fact, there are two systems of law, one for the people, and the other for officials who are Party members of a certain level. Cases where ordinary people had broken the law were handled strictly, while officials guilty of the same offence seemed immune from the law, even the National Assembly could not challenge them”; - Workshop on sharing anti-corruption experience in Danang City, 14/10/2008, “Currently there is a regulation requesting that while expressing opinions it is necessary to consider the organizational structure, i.e. talking about corruption should not sully the reputation of the Party. So difficult!”; - Group discussion in Hanoi, FLC Project 08-01, “In many SOEs, the Director General is also Secretary of the Party’s Committee, which has resulted in arbitrariness and severe corruption. Staff are scared of the Director. Who else would be able to fight and denounce corruption?” 36 Section 2, article 5, Admendment of Anti-corruption Law, 2007

37 - Group discussion in Ha Giang, May 2008 “It is not right when the chairman of the people’s committee is also chairman of the anti-corruption Steering Committee as this makes corruption so easy”. - Group discussion in Lam Dong, May 2008 “It is not appropriate for the chairman of district or provincial People’s Committee to serve as head of the Anti-corruption Committee as they are the ones who manage state capital and assets. How could they fight corruption if it’s so easy for them to be corrupt themselves?”; - Group discussion in Ba Ria-Vung Tau, FLC Project 08-01, May 2008, “Chairman of district or provincial People’s Committee serving as head of Anti-corruption Committee is inappropriate: nobody would dare to raise their voice against corruption”. - Group discussion in Lam Dong, FLC Project 08-01, 2008, “In many cases government and Party’s committee are in collusion with one another, which makes corruption disclosure very difficult so the role of Party organizations is decreasing. Where there is discord between local government and Party’s cadres, people would benefit as corruption is revealed”.

38 - Group discussion in Thai Binh, ‘Ask-give’ system still exists, this is the space where groups of officials embezzle state money”, May 2008 - Minutes of the Workshop, Thai Binh 7/10/2008, “The current financial and public asset allocation has fueled’ ask-give’ and ‘granting’ mechanisms. Managers of public finances and assets want to hang on to this ‘monopoly.’ It is the father of corruption.” 4.4.4. Lack of proper controlling mechanism of CSOs and people

The Anti-corruption Law provides for supervision by civil society and grassroots organizations. Yet the results of the group discussions suggest that in reality this supervison has only been tokenistic. Many provisions relating to anti-corruption in the Ordinance on democracy cannot be enforced39.

Many people interviewed are of the opinion that due to the lack of engagement by civil society and the public in monitoring and controlling corruption, cases relating to Party and government leaders, even when publicized by the media, have not been resolved.

‘It has been noted that where local government activities are required to be transparent key officials, representatives of mass organizations and the Fatherland Front are the only ones present, while the public are not invited. Officials commonly say people know nothing about supervision’40.

4.4.5. Low salaries: rent seeking to boost cadres’ incomes

Salaries are too low even for basic living costs, and fail to promote a sense of public responsibility. This puts temptation in the way of those with status and power. Cadres said that taking advantage of their position was a means of raising their income and bettering working condition!41

4.4.6. Is there a lack of political will to fight corruption?

Many interviewees commented that treatment of corrupt people had not been severe enough. ‘Sometimes they were ‘punished’ by moving them to different jobs, in some cases they were even promoted. Only in high-profile cases where there had been strong criticism from the public and media, was justice sometimes seen to be done. Consequently most people have little confidence in the commitment and competence of the relevant agencies and committees’42.

If a highly placed officials are guilty of corruption but remain unpunished, they set a bad example for others who may then be tempted to be more daring, thus corruption in many sectors has not diminished.’43. Lax control has apparently caused corruption and ‘judgment buying’ at every level44. ‘Law enforcement is not strict: provisions are harsh but punishments are light. Higher and lower level authorities conspire and collude in covering for each other and the efficacy of agencies is poor”45.

Some people believed that leadership’s commitment to anti-corruption did not reach the required level46, for the nation-wide cases where political will prevailed such as

- Le Dang Doanh, www.tuoitre.com.vn 27/07/2006, “It is not only the public who complain about paying bribes to get things done, provincial officials do so too: ‘Go with money return with something, go without money return with nothing!’”

39 Minutes of the Group discussions in Ba Ria-Vung Tau and Danang, Survey “The saying ‘people know, people discuss, people check,’ are just empty words with little meaning. Votes of confidence in the chairman, vice chairman of people’s committee or council are only for show. Only representatives of voters actually vote”.

40 Groupdiscussion in Hanoi, 41 Groupdiscussion in Thanh Hoa, Survey 42 Group discussion in Hanoi, 43 Dang Hung Vo, The New Hanoi, 11/09/2006 44 Nguyen Binh, Canada, www.chongthamnhung.com/forum ,30/9/ 2006 45 Group discussion in Danang City, “firecracker ban” and “wearing helmets when riding motorbikes” cases. ‘Admission of their own corruption by a certain ministry or administration is very rare, despite each having its own unit responsible for inspection. Unearthing and publicizing corruption was mostly the result of people’s denunciations and investigation by police and procuracy’47.

Table 4-1 shows that interviewees reported that the authorities handled corruption cases at average and moderately good level, only a few cases were handled well. This was reflected through the marking by answerers of questionnaire survey and in-depth interview survey of CSOs representatives. As a result, all three concerned agencies received a mark of above the average, 6.1 to 6.8.

Table 4-1. Evaluation (marking) of handling corruption by local anti-corruption agencies (out of grade 10)

| | | | | |Commune |
| |Agency |Total |Provincial |District |/ward |
|1 |Inspectorate |6.5 |6.8 |6.8 |6.4 |
|2 |Procuracy |6.3 |6.6 |6.5 |6.3 |
|3 |Court |6.1 |6.3 |6.4 |6.1 |

Source: survey data in 2008 of FLC Project 08-01

A common view was that controlling corruption has been neglected since the beginning of 2008. Corrupt people seem to have found ways of circumventing the law so the number of cases handled has been lower than the actual number of violations. Media coverage of anti-corruption has been falling and people find all this discouraging, many seeing it as negative and interfering with enforcement of the Law48.

46 Group discussion in Ha Giang, “For many years Ha Giang local government and party committee had seen no corruption. However after police exposures in 2004, they acknowledged its existence but considered it small scale, not as widespread as in other provinces”.

47 Trinh Xuan Thu, Deputy Director of The General Department of Security, The Labourer, 27/9/2006, Ibid

48 Nguyen Dinh Huan, thematic report, “Impact of the Anti-corruption Law on the state of art of anti- corruption in Vietnam”, Hanoi, August 2008; V. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITY IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION

5.1. Legal Framework

5.1.1. Background and policy to mobilize the involvement of CSOs in anti-corruption Civil society in Vietnam49 comprises: (i) mass organizations, (ii) professional associations, including media (iii) non-government organizations (NGOs) and, (iv) community-based organizations (CBOs).

The distinctive feature of Vietnamese civil society, compared to that of neighbouring countries, is that it is made up of public organizations. Arising from the country’s history of fighting against foreign aggression civil society has operated on the basis of ‘revolutionary union’, with special support from authorities. So if authority groups behaved corruptly it was difficult for CSOs to represent rank and file people, demanding them to open up and be accountable for their actions50.

In Vietnam, the state leadership has always highlighted the role of public organizations, especially the Fatherland Front, in formulating and implementing policies51. The Front has the responsibility to mobilize people in a number of ways: encouraging them to condemn and denounce corruption; collaborating with the National Assembly and Government in dealing with complaints; involve themselves in a variety of activities such as supervising free and fair elections to the National Assembly and People’s Councils; operating the People’s Inspection Board, or receiving and processing complaints from the public.

5.1.2. Legal basis for CSOs’ role in fighting corruption

Article 8 of the Anti-corruption Law clearly defines the role of people in overseeing the fight against corruption. Decree 47/2007/ND-CP also details the public’s role: social organizations are entitled to request public agencies to provide information, protect people who expose corruption and define the responsibilities of VFF organizations.

The Fatherland Front is a major force in civil society with its 44 member organizations, the largest of which are the Confederation of Labour, the Farmer’s Union, Women’s Union, Veteran’s Unions and Youth Union. These six are more powerful than other groups, enabling them to support the public and to a certain extent stand up for people’s rights.

5.1.3. Several outstanding anti-corruption activities of CSOs

In early 2007 the Fatherland played an important role in supervising property enumeration of candidates for National Assembly membership, and Front groups were on the look out for corrupt practice.

49 Norlund I., Dang Ngoc Dinh et al Initial evaluation of civil society in Vietnam, Report of Project CIVICUS SCI-SAT, Hanoi, 2006.

50 Dang Ngoc Dinh, Don’t be afraid of civil society, www.tuoitr e.com.vn 21/05/2005

51 Resolution of the 10th Party’s Congress, 2006 “The State needs to adopt policies so that the Fatherland Frontier can exercise its supervisory responsibilities properly.” In recent years the media has been actively covering, and becoming increasingly important, in fighting corruption. Internet coverage has exceeded coverage in the paper media. In 2006 and 2007 after promulgation of the Law, the press disclosed several high profile cases52. The most active press includes The Youth, The Pioneer, the Law in Ho Chi Minh City, and the Vietnamnet. In 2006 the press cited several encouraging examples of courageous individuals who lodged complaints53.

5.2. Quantitative evaluation from Survey

5.2.1. Self-evaluation of CSOs on the effectiveness of their anti- corruption work

To gauge the impact of civil society organizations’ engagement in implementing the Law FLC Project 08-01 asked them to self-assess their anti-corruption capacity.

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Source: 2008 survey statistics of FLC 08-01 Project

As the Figure indicates, all 100% of Communist Party interviewees rated their own organization’s efforts as ‘good’, 80.95% of the Veteran’s Union rated their capacity as ‘good’, and the Fatherland Front, 79.17%.

Within community organizations however, such as the Association for the Elderly or Extension Study Association, only 42.86% of respondents thought their effectiveness as ‘good’, reflecting the reality that they have little voice in fighting corruption.

5.2.2. A wider view of CSOs’ efforts

Figure 5-2 represents the views of all respondents on the effectiveness of all groups. In contrast to the self-evaluation, shown in the Figure 5-1, the Veteran’s Unions receive the highest number of ‘good’ responses, 75.48%, followed by CPV organizations, 67.32%, and Trade Unions, 50%. The most poorly rated were community

52 The cases of Le Quy Don high school in Ho Chi Minh City; land corruption in Do Son, Hai Phong; and the widely publicized PMU-18 scandal in the Ministry of Transport.

53 Teacher Do Viet Khoa in Ha Tay, teacher Le Dinh Hoang in Nghe An, and teacher Le Duc Hien in Hanoi who exposed corruption in the education system. organizations at 42.79%, Youth Unions, 33% and Economic Organizations at 30%. Again it is clear that community organizations are weak, only 42.7% of respondents rating them as ‘good’.

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Source: 2008 survey statistics of FLC 08-01 Project

According to the survey results, large scale unions, of women, farmers and workers are not rated high in fighting corruption. Can these negative views be attributed to their lack of empowerment?

5.3. Difficulties and shortcomings of CSOs in anti-corruption

5.3.1. Insufficient empowerment

Despite much discussion, the Draft Association Law (on the rights of establishment, of codifying roles and mandates for CSOs) has yet to be ratified by the National Assembly. The resulting lack of a solid legal grounding is the main obstacle to CSOs effective pursuit of corruption. In many cases they were simply ignored54.

Although the Law attaches great importance to the role of the media in exposing corruption, they are confused about their real role55. Unless this is clarified, media agencies are likely to remain detached from public opinion, and their contribution to justice diminished.

5.3.2. CSOs have limited powers to oversee but carry a heavy responsibility for propaganda

The corruption-fighting function of CSOs, including the most credible organizations such as the Fatherland Front, is seen as largely tokenistic, their main role actually

54 Nguyen Dinh Huan, thematic report, “FFV and people’s agencies have not inspected disclosure of personal assets despite directives to do so. In some places there were orders to replace such inspection with an explanation of some ‘sensitive’ issues. 55 Group discussion in Da Nang: ‘Now honest persons are afraid of criminals! Look at the recent arrest of the two journalists, everyone should be afraid’

being propaganda, disseminating state policies56. This is partly the result of lack of clear definition of their roles.57

In these inauspicious conditions, popular oversight and supervision through representative organizations tends to be indirect and information is likely to be distorted58.

‘There is no mechanism empowering political-social organizations to oversee corruption monitoring. If complaints are made against a leading figure these organizations are expected to explain and reconcile the events”59.

5.3.3. Lack of protection for ‘whistle blowers’

Although the Anti-corruption Law makes provision for protecting witnesses and ‘whistle blowers’, people do not have faith in it. For instance Government Decree No. 47 stipulates that whistle blowers must give their name and address, detail the corrupt practice and submit documentation to support it. This discourages many people, in particular the poor and those of low social class, from denouncing officials, although they are incensed by the injustice and losses caused60. This makes it impossible to unearth and deal justly with many cases as most denouncers want to remain anonymous, for fear of being threatened and intimidated61.

Figure 5-3 indicates that almost everyone thought there was unfair treatment, including threatening and intimidation of whistle blowers.

56 Group discussion in Lam Dong, “Many people think that VFF and other mass organizations were involved in fighting corruption but in reality their role is limited to propaganda”

57 Group discussion in Thanh Hoa, Survey of FLC Project 08-01, 2008, “There are no documents regulating the power of FFV. People who work there and are going to retire shortly find it difficult to stand up to the People’s Committee. A democratic environment is required so that FFV cadres are not intimidated by People’s Committees.”

58 Group discussion in Long An, VFF should be the agency to represent the public in monitoring the conduct of government. Our poor people can’t do anything against people with position and power; we have no authority to question them. VFF should not be covering up for people like this”

59 Group discussion in Ha Giang,

60 Group discussion in Long An, “People know about corruption but don’t dare to speak out and expose wrongdoing as they are not protected by the state. Why speak? The State requires written documents when making accusation and farmers don’t want to do this”.

61 People who dare to speak out might face intimidation, like Do Viet Khoa a teacher in the former Ha Tay province.

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Source: 2008 survey data of FLC 08-01 Project

5.3.4. Inadequate anti-corruption capacity of CSOs and the public

Capacity-building for CSOs and the general public remains far short of demonstrable need, while many people are very interested in the drive against corruption, as Table 5- 1 indicates. At commune level, up to 86.57% of the population is interested or very interested in fighting corruption at above provincial levels.

Table 5.1. People’s expressed interest in fighting corruption at local levels (%)

| | | | | | |
| |Level of attention |Total |Province |District |Commune |
|1 |Strongly interested |44.82 |33.33 |39.66 |46.48 |
|2 |Interested |40.60 |33.33 |50.00 |40.09 |
|3 |Not interested |13.18 |33.33 |10.34 |11.73 |
|4 |No idea |2.28 |2.38 |1.72 |2.35 |

Source: 2008 survey statistics of FLC 08-01 Project

People’s interest in anti-corruption matters, across regions are shown in Figure 5-4. People in all regions expressed strong interest, more than 80% were ‘interested’ or ‘very interested’.

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Source: 2008 survey data of FLC 08-01 Project

In many places anti-corruption capacity-building is targeted mainly at officials and Party members, however it is clear that CSOs and the general public are the main driving force behind stamping out corruption, and it is they who have greater need of capacity building. In reality ordinary people are only given general information about the Law from radio or their daily talks62. Against this backdrop, people’s limited capacity is understandable. Most interviewees said that given their limited awareness they could not prove anything, and did not have sufficient evidence to make a case of corruption stand up, and this made them very annoyed63.

62 Group discussion in Thanh Hoa, “Ordinary members of Women’s Unions have not been made aware of anti-corruption legal documents. Only those who are Party members, heard about them while learning about Party’s Resolutions. Mass organizations held very few meetings about this legislation.”

63 Group discussion in Ha Giang, Survey of FLC Project 08-01, “Even if people are entitled to supervise, they are incapable of doing so and this creates more chances for corruption.” VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Conclusion

6.1.1. Implementation of the Law: early loud start but decreasing momentum

The Anti-Corruption Law is an important platform for fighting corruption and in the first two years, up to 2007, the problem seemed to have been contained to levels that were better than before, but since that time the implementation has stalled. This could be attributed to by the following reasons:

(i) weak implementation mechanism of the law

(ii) ‘ask and give’ and ‘allocation’ practices remain common in state governance

(iii) civil society groups and the general public lack any real powers to demand and get openness and accountability, and perpetrators feel they have nothing to fear;

(iv) punishments are not severe enough to deter wrong doing

6.1.2. CSOs and the general public face obstacles in battling corruption

The impact of CSOs work is limited by their constitution and history and the fact that a satisfactory Law of Association has yet to be enacted. VFF, although its mandate was institutionalized, has proved unable to force state authorities to provide information on their activities in a transparent manner. Vietnamese community organizations have almost no voice in anti-corruption.

6.1.3. Limited anti-corruption capacity of CSOs and the people

Capacity-building for CSOs and the people is still inadequate, far below what is needed. It is directed mainly at officials and Party cadres. It should be focused on CSOs and the public who are, or should be, the main driving force behind combating corruption. 6.2. Recommendations

6.2.1. The Heads of Anti-corruption Steering Committees should not double as Chairmen of People’s Committees

To help ensure independence and impartiality of action, the chairman of anti- corruption agencies and heads of people’s committees should not be one and the same person64. They should be drawn from the National Assembly, Party committees or Fatherland Front, and be armed with an explicit, detailed mandate and statutory powers.65.

6.2.2. Corrupt acts by Party’s cadres, at whatever level, should be handled equally before the law

In order to maintain the government’s principle of law abiding, and acknowledge public concern that certain persons still ‘step on the law’, especially where Party cadres are involved, such people should face the force of the law, with full transparency, and be punished by the Party committee. It is the Party’s responsibility to assume a leading role and make provision for fighting corruption.66.

6.2.3. To reform administrative structures to cut down on ‘ask and give’ and ‘allocation’

- To review public ownership (the Land law) documentation and state-ownership (Law on Enterprises) supporting and protecting farmers’ rights in land management; developing responsible and accountable management of capital and property in state- owned enterprises;

- To require disclosure of income sources, and salaries paid from state budget. Salary and income transactions should only be processed through the banking system.

6.2.4. To strengthen implementation of the Ordinance on Democracy to support the drive against corruption

- monitor public confidence in government leadership, progressing to a time when people elect their leaders directly;

- make mailboxes available at Fatherland Front offices for posting denouncements against corruption;

- keep the general public regularly informed about corrupt activities locally

- facilitate discussions between the public and members of the National Assembly and People’s Councils

64 Group discussion in Lam Dong, “The fact that members of anti-corruption agencies are at the same time leaders of governmental authorities leads to laxness, making it difficult for ordinary people to criticize and denounce officials. We need to recruit people with talent and dignity for this work”.

65 Group discussion in Lam Dong, “Perhaps the best solution would be to appoint someone from the Fatherland Front or Communist Party as Head of the Anti-corruption Committee”.

66 Experience sharing workshop in Thai Binh, 7 October 2008: “Nowadays major corruption cases involve many administrative levels. Perpetrators shield and protect one another, so they can impede detection and control”

- monitor incomes of public officials67. Information about their property and assets should be in the public domain rather than restricted to higher levels. - supplement provisions on the anonymity of statements of denouncement68.

6.2.5. To strengthen the role and capacity of CSOs in anti-corruption

- enact as soon as possible a Law of Association, codifying the roles and responsibilities of civil society organizations, particularly in keeping a critical watch on policies and holding the government to account;

- improve the capacity of CSOs and the public to confront corruption. Make training courses clear and comprehensible.

- Government officials should be required to discuss, share and listen to CSOs and to public opinions, as a starting point for dealing with corruption, and cut out the practice of ‘respectfully deferring to higher authorities’ that is so commonly seen.

67 Thanh Hoa Inspectorate, Workshop on sharing anti-corruption experience in Thai Binh, “There needs to be independent monitoring of the incomes of public officials; current practice relies mainly on self- disclosure, this is no way to curb corruption”.

68 Group discussion in Danang City and Long An, “Anonymous denouncements should be allowed and encouraged to avoid retribution, however such statements need to be clarified in an impartial way.” REFERENCES

Anti-Corruption Law (No. 55/2005/QH11) passed by the National Assembly on 29/11/2005 (entered into force on 1-6-2006)

Political Report of The Communist Party of Viet Nam at its tenth Congress, April 2006.

Resolution of 3rd Session of 10th Tenure Central Committee of CPV, dated 21-8-2006

The Government of SR of Viet Nam, National strategy on Anti-Corruption towards 2020, draft as of 7/9/2008;

Nguyen Dinh Huan, CECODES, Impacts of Anti-corruption Law on the anti- corruption situation in Viet Nam, General Analysis and Evaluation Report, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, Ha Noi, August 2008;

Nguyen Tuan Anh, Corruption situation and capacity to implement anti-corruption of governments at various levels and social organizations, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, Ha Noi, May 2008;

Tran Ngoc Nhan, Analysis Report on the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Law of Fatherland Front of Viet Nam and member organizations, thematic report of FLC 08- 01 Project, Ha Noi, May 5/2008;

Le Van Thiem, Inspector in Thanh Hoa Province, “Analysis and evaluation of corruption in Thanh Hoa before and after the promulgation of the Anti-Corruption Law; Causes, solutions, and recommendations”, Thematic report for the FLC Project 08-01, Thanh Hoa, April 2008

Inspectorate in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, Anti-corruption situation and solutions, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, May 2008;

Long An Inspectorate, Current Situation and Solutions to Counter Corruption in Long An;

Legal, Population Contact, and Denouncement Processing Office under Lam Dong Inspectorate, Analysis and Evaluation of the Implementation of Anti-corruption Law in Lam Dong – Shortcomings, Challenges and Solutions, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, May 2008;

Pham Thanh Nam, Chief Inspector of Thai Binh, Current Situation and Solutions to Corruption in Thai Binh in Doi Moi period and from promulgation of Anti-Corruption up to now, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, May 2008;

Ha Noi Inspectorate, Analysis and Evaluation of Implementation of Anti-Corruption Law in Lam Dong- Shortcomings, Challenges and Solutions, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, May 2008

Ly Tan, Ha Giang Inspectorate, Analysis and Evaluation of Corruption Situation before and after promulgation of Anti-corruption Law in Ha Giang - Shortcomings, Challenges and Solutions, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, May 2008.

Hoang Cong Phai, Lao Cai Inspectorate, Analysis and Recommendations on Counter- Corruption in the Province; Recommendations on the Improvement of Implementation of Anti-Corruption, thematic report of FLC 08-01 Project, May 2008.

Outcomes of processed statistics of surveys in 18 communes of 9 provinces of FLC 08-01 Project; Minutes of Workshop on sharing anti-corruption experience in Thai Binh (7/10/2008) and Danang City (14/10);

Project “Research on anti-corruption”. Executing agency: Bureau of Internal Affairs, Party’s Central Standing Committee. Donor: SIDA, www.tienphongonline.com.vn, published on 30/11/2005

Norlund I., Dang Ngoc Dinh and others, Initial evaluation of the civil society in Vietnam, Scientific report of Project CIVICUS SCI-SAT, Hanoi, 2006.

Dang Ngoc Dinh, Don’t be afraid of civil society, www.tuoitre.com.vn, 21/05/2005.
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----------------------- ii 14 Inspectorate in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, Anti-corruption situation and solutions, Thematic Report
15 Inspector in Thanh Hoa Province, ibid