INTRODUCTION
This assignment is on the role of the Constitution Review commission in the constitution making process, the relationship between 1972 constitution and the UNIP constitution. The assignment will also analyse the difference between provisions of article 71(2) (c) of 1991 and 1996 and the relevant case law that brought about the change of the provision. Definitions of CRC will be given and a brief history of the various CRCs will be given and in addition each of the relevant questions will be looked at individually and answered according to the case law and statutes available and relevant to them.
A: THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION IN THE CONSTITUTION MAKING PROCESS
A constitution review commission is an inquiry into matters of public interest that is appointed by the president. The constitution review commission is normally abbreviated as CRC. A CRC is made in pursuance of the Inquiries Act CAP 41 which states in part that the Act (Inquiries Act) shall provide for the appointment of a commission to inquire into and report on matters referred to them.
Article 2 (1) states, “The president may issue a commission appointing one or more commissions to inquire into any matter in which an inquiry would in the opinion of the president, be for the public welfare”.
Role of CRCs in constitution making process.
The role that CRCs play in the constitution making process can never be over emphasized. These two aspects that is the process of constitutional making and the content of the constitution must not be discussed in isolation.
The CRC receives submissions from the people and some of these submissions are enacted into law and this makes the constitution to have legitimacy as it will be identified as the people’s own law. CRCs are also used to make certain amendments to the constitution. In order to understand fully the roles that CRCs play in constitution making process, the four CRCs that Zambia has had will be looked at individually and in detail. These four CRCs that Zambia has had are; 1) The Chona Commission
The Chona CRC was chaired by the then vice president of Zambia, Mainza Chona. It was appointed in 1972 on 30th March by President Kaunda. The terms of reference of the Commission were to consider and examine changes in the Republican and UNIP Constitutions; and practices and procedures of government, which were necessary to create a one-party system in Zambia. It must be noted that the Chona commission received instructions not to consider whether or not there should be a one party state, but only the form the one party state would take.
The Chona commission made a number of recommendations that had the effect of curtailing presidential powers but only the basic concept of the one party system was accepted and the recommendations pertaining to the limitation of the presidential powers were rejected. 2) The Mvunga Constitutional Commission
On October 8, 1990, Kaunda appointed a 22 member CRC under the Inquiries Act. This CRC was chaired by Professor Partrick Mvunga whilst the secretary was Dr. Vukani Nyirenda. The Commission toured the country extensively and obtained the views of a broad range of people on the future constitution of Zambia. Having obtained the views of the people, the Commission presented its report, containing recommendations, to the Government. The Government rejected some of the recommendations and prepared a Constitution for adoption by Parliament. Parliament being overwhelmingly controlled by UNIP then adopted and enacted the Constitution on 2nd August, 1991. The Constitution was perceived as a transitional one to meet the immediate pressures of that time. 3) The Mwanakatwe Constitution review commission
Prior to the MMD coming into office, it undertook, once elected, to change the 1991 Constitution and replace it with one that would be above partisan considerations and reflect high goals of national interest. Thus, on 22nd December, 1993, two years after the MMD acquired power, Government appointed a Commission called the Mwanakatwe Constitution Review Commission.
Its terms of reference included recommending a system that would ensure that Zambia was governed in a manner that would promote the democratic principles of regular and fair elections, transparency and accountability, and that would guard against the re-emergence of a dictatorial form of government. The Commission was also mandated to recommend appropriate arrangements for the entrenchment and protection of human rights, the rule of law, good governance, and the competence, impartiality and independence of the judiciary. In addition, the Commission was mandated to recommend whether the Constitution should have been adopted by the National Assembly, a constituent assembly, a national referendum or other method. The Commission was also mandated to propose a suitable method of amending the Constitution. The Commission toured the country extensively, and collected a large volume of views of the populace. The Commission made many recommendations, amongst others, that a presidential candidate must receive 50 percent plus one of the valid votes cast for him/her to be declared winner; that to achieve maximum consensus, the Constitution should be adopted through a constituent assembly attended by representatives of all political parties, and by those drawn from many segments of Zambian society, such as trade unions, women’s groups, churches and many others; and that a referendum be required for subsequent amendments. The Government in a White Paper rejected some of the recommendations of the Mwanakatwe reports

4) Mung’ omba Constitution Review Commission
On 17th April, 2003, President Levy Mwanawasa announced the appointment of a fourth constitution review commission chaired by Mr. Willa Mung ‘omba. The Commission toured the country extensively, and obtained the views of the people. It then proceeded to prepare, and publish its report and a draft Constitution and submitted it to government in December, 2005. Unfortunately, each Constitution has largely been rejected by most Zambians because of lacking constitutional legitimacy. This is primarily because the Inquiries Act (that establishes a “Commission of Inquiry”) gives government the powers to reject or accept people’s recommendations and make any modifications that government desires through a document commonly referred to as the government “white paper”.
B: WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 1972 AND THE UNIP CONSTITUTION?
The constitution promulgated on August 25, 1973, abrogated the original 1964 constitution. The new constitution and the national elections that followed in December 1973 were the final steps in achieving what was called a "one party participatory democracy".
The 1973 constitution provided for a strong president and a unicameral National Assembly. National policy was formulated by the Central Committee of the United National Independence party (UNIP), the sole legal party in Zambia. The UNIP constitution was upended to the Republican constitution.
In 1975 the National Council passed the following resolution:
“Since the UNIP is Supreme and the sole custodian of the people’s interests, the Republican Constitution should be approximately amended to reflect the paramountacy of this party over other institutions of the land.” Thus, Parliament at the time was acting pursuant to this direction when it enacted the Amendment Act no. 22 of 1975. The underlined words in Article 4 were deleted and were replaced by a new clause which stressed the fact that the Party Constitution annexed to the Republican Constitution was an authentic text of the Constitution of the Party for all legal purposes including the interpretation of the Republican Constitution or any other written law.
The relationship between the 1972 constitution and the UNIP constitution was that the UNIP constitution was annexed to the country’s constitution which had a provision in which article 4 of the Republican constitution read as follows, “There shall be one and only one political Party or Organization in Zambia, namely, the United National Independence Party”.Article 4 (3) 0f the 1972 constitution states, “Where any reference to the constitution of the party is necessary for the purpose of interpreting or construing any provision of this constitution or any written law or for any other purpose, the text of the constitution of the party annexed hereto, together with such amendments as may from time to time be made thereto by the party and published in the gazette, shall be taken to be the sole authentic text of the constitution of the party.”This new amendment ensured that Zambian courts would recognise that the party constitution annexed to the republican constitution was an integral and inseparable part of the constitution for the purpose of interpretation.
Furthermore, it must be noted that article 4 gave decisions made by UNIP’s central committee precedence over any cabinet decisions and being as it may parliament was UNIP and UNIP made laws as all the MPs were from the party.
C: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 71 (2) (C) OF THE 1991 AND 1996 CONSTITUTIONS?
The difference between article 71 (2) (C) of the constitution of 1991 and article 71(2) (C) of the constitution of 1996 is that the 1996 also states that a seat of an MP may be declared vacant if the MP resigns from the party on which he won the seat and becomes an independent unlike the provision of the 1991 which made a seat only vacant if the MP joined another political party.
In the article 71 (2) (C) of 1991, the constitution did not specify what happened when an MP resigned from the party that sponsored his election and he/she decided to become independent. In the case of Attorney General and the movement for Multi Party Democracy V Lewanika and four others, the literal interpretation of the provision was interpreted in the courts of law.
The facts of this case are that the four respondents were members of the MMD. They won the elections on the MMD ticket but later resigned from the party and the secretary of the party wrote to the speaker of the national assembly informing him of the resignation of the respondents from the party. The speaker wrote to the respondents that in terms of article 71 (2) (c) of the Republic of Zambia, they ceased to be members of parliament. The respondents then petitioned the attorney general contending that although they had resigned from the party on whose tickets they won the elections, they were still members of parliament and asked the court to declare the speaker’s decision that their seats were vacant, null and void.
The High Court held that the four had vacated their seats when the party came into power in September of 1993. The appellants appealed against the judgement which applied the literal rule of interpretation but the respondents also cross appealed against the finding that they had joined another party (National Party). The Supreme Court held that; i) Acts of parliament ought to be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expand those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Whenever a strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurdity and unjust situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it – by reading words in it if necessary - so as to do what parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind. ii) Article 71(2) (c) was intended to prohibit floor-crossing generally and it was discriminatory against an independent member who resigned from one party and joined another party. By employing a ‘purposive’ approach and reading words into the article it was possible to achieve Parliament’s intention - art 71(2)(c) should now read:
‘71(2) a member of the National Assembly shall vacate his seat in the Assembly (c) In the case of an elected member if he becomes a member of a political party other than the party of which he was an authorized candidate when he was elected to the National Assembly or if having been an independent candidate he joins a political party or vice.
This case is what made article 71 (2) (c) of 1991 and article 71 (2) (c) of 1996 differ in terms of specification on what would happen if one became an independent when they left a party that sponsored their election into parliament. I addition to a seat being declared vacant when an MP left the party that sponsored his elections into parliament to join another party, a seat was also vacant when an MP left the party that sponsored his election to become an independent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books
Barnett H. (2005), Constitutional and administrative. 5th edition. Australia, Cavendish Publishing.
Statutes
CAP 1 of the laws of Zambia, 1972
CAP 1 of the laws of Zambia, 1991
CAP 1 of the laws of Zambia, 1996
CAP 41 of the laws of Zambia, 1972
Cases cited
The Attorney General, The movement for Multiparty Democracy V AKashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika, Fabian Kasonde, John Mulwila, Chilufya Chileshe Kapwepwe, Katongo Mulenga Maine (1994) S.J. (S.C.)
Articles cited
Chanda A. (1993-96) Zambia’s fledgling democracy;prospects for the future. Zambia Law journal Volume 25-28. UNZA press
Hasungule, Michelo (2004), “Experiences at constitution-making in SADC: The Zambian Experience,” in Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Edition 4, Issue 3, November, pp. 28-32.
Mwale S. (May, 2006). Constitutional Review;The Zambian search for an ideal constitution. AFCAST

--------------------------------------------
[ 2 ]. Article 2(1) of the Inquiries Act CAP 41
[ 3 ]. Barnett H. (2004)
[ 4 ]. Hasungule Michelo (2004)
[ 5 ]. Article 4 of the 1972 constitution of the Republic of Zambia
[ 6 ]. Article 4 (3) ibid
[ 7 ]. Chanda Alfred (1993-96) Zambia’s fledgling democracy prospects for the future
[ 8 ]. Article 71 (2) (c) of the 1996 constitution
[ 9 ]. (1994) S.J S.C