The Belief in God’s Existence without Concrete Evidence

1) If some of our ideas are innate, then they do not require empirical evidence in order to for them to be true. 2) The idea of God’s existence is innate. 3) The idea of God existence does not require empirical evidence in order for us to believe it is true. 4) The idea of God’s existence does require empirical evidence in order for us to believe it is true. 5) Empirical evidence about God would require knowledge dependent on human experience with God (humans have no confirmed experience with God). 6) Therefore, God’s existence does not require empirical evidence for it to be true.

The question I will be addressing in this paper will be regarding whether the existence of God can be a true belief without empirical evidence. I will use a deductive argument to prove how the idea of God’s existence can be true without empirical evidence. In addition, I will also refer to “Without Evidence or Argument” by Kelly James Clarks and “Miracles and Testimony” by Simon Blackburn to provide further support of my argument. The first premise of my arguments states that innate ideas do not require empirical evidence. There has been a withstanding debate among psychologists regarding whether human beings are born with innate ideas or whether they develop these ideas through experience. Emotions, such as happiness; excitement; and apprehension, are all instilled within people at birth. No one has to tell you, “you just got shot, you should be experiencing pain” because these are natural ideas that do not require previous experience in order for them to be true. Take for example two toddlers who are playing with each other on a playground. The children are enjoying themselves until one of them throws a rock at the other one. The child begins to scream in agony because they are in pain. The other child becomes overwhelmed with anxiety, and may begin to think: I did not mean to hurt him; we were only playing. The process whereby this scenario occurs does not require the understanding and constant reflection of the children upon their actions. When the children are playing they do not think to themselves “wow, we are really happy” or when the child gets hits with the rocks he does not think “I just got hit with a rock which means I should be experiencing pain”. The reason being is because these ideas of happiness and apprehension are not taught to the children, they are simply natural and innate. They do not require empirical, or experience-based, evidence for them to be true, for this may have been the first injury the child sustained, yet they know that they are in pain. Instead the experience serves merely as an event to trigger the innate ideas of their various emotions. I turn now to my second premise which states that the idea of God’s existence is innate. To best explain this premise, let’s assume the idea of God’s existence is not innate. With this assumption made, the premise must be supported with a posteriori, or empirical, evidence. In order to obtain this empirical evidence, we would need to have knowledge based on experience of God. Human beings cannot have a posteriori knowledge of God because God’s characteristics are infinite In order for human beings to completely understand a being that is infinite, they must possess an intellect that is also infinite. The human intellect is not infinite because humans make errors, and if humans make errors, then it is possible for errors to be made in judgements. Hence, a posteriori evidence about God is not possible. But if there is no a posteriori evidence about God, where does the idea of God’s existence come from? Innate, experience-independent knowledge. The third premise satisfies the requirements for the modus ponens deductive form incorporated in this argument. That it, because the idea of God’s existence is innate, it follows that empirical evidence is not required to prove God’s existence. In “Without Evidence or Argument”, Kelly James Clark makes a similar argument by suggesting that the belief is God’s existence without evidence or argument is rational. To support his argument, he refers to the work of John Calvin in which Calvin states, “it is not a doctrine that must be first learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from his mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no one to forget” (141). Clark goes on to further support his argument by stating that “if God created us with cognitive faculties which by and large reliably produce beliefs without the need for evidence, he would likewise provide us with a cognitive faculty which produces belief in him without the need for evidence” (141). This quote supports the claim that God’s existence does not require empirical evidence because empirical evidence is not a necessary condition for God’s existence. But let’s consider the possibility that empirical evidence is a necessary condition for God’s existence. The first question that comes into play is how would we acquire information about God’s existence? Are the individual claims of experience, also known as testimonies, about miraculous events sufficient evidence to support God’s existence? In “Miracles and Testimony” by Simon Blackburn, he refers to the work of Hume to argue that testimonial claims present two views: “This person is saying m happened. But m did not.” Or “This person is saying m happened. And m did.” (146). From these two claims, Hume balances “which is more surprising, or improbable, and then rejects ‘the greater miracle’” (147). Which brings us back to the question of are miracles and testimonies sufficient evidence to support the claim that God exists. If a man loses his foot and the foot grows back with no biological explanation, then the event will be declared a miraculous one. The event is indeed highly improbable, but what evidence is there to prove that the miracle was of God’s work? Did God tell the man, “I will regrow your foot for you”? Is the man delusional about his experiences, and even if he is not, can this evidence proven again? The possible explanations are endless and the capacity to understand such miraculous events are occasionally beyond human understanding. For this reason experience-dependent evidence cannot be used conclusively to conclude God’s existence. This brings me to my fifth premise which argues that empirical evidence about God would require knowledge dependent on human experience with God. However, as we have already examined in the previous premise, the experiences of miracles cannot solely be used to justify the claim that God exists. Why not? Because the next question of why or how always come into play. For example, the man who lost his foot may claim that God came to him and told him that he would revive his foot. The spectator, however, wants proof. They may make acquisitions such as “how do you know it was God? Do you have evidence to make us believe as well? How do we know you are not lying?” The questions will continue to come but the answers may not. Eventually the man’s answer will become “I don’t know”, for the ability for the man to fully understand what happened to is limited as is his intellectual capacity. Furthermore, because the innate idea of God is infinite and endless, the man cannot fully comprehend what happened to him. Does that mean, that the man did not receive a miraculous healing? No. It just means that there is not concrete evidence to prove this. Therefore, from the premises of this argument, I arrive at the conclusion that God’s existence does not require empirical evidence for it to be true. The capacity of the human intellect is limited which explains why a posteriori claims about God cannot always be conclusive. In some instances, such as the man who miraculously regrew his foot, the suggestion of divine intervention is sufficient for the man, but not for others. The next question arises then regarding the pattern and purpose of such miraculous events. Are they instances of luck and chance, or can there be an argument formed about the function and validity of miracles?