The Easter Rising

In Ireland 1916, there was an event known as The Easter Rising. The roots of the Rising lie in the ‘new nationalism’ which emerged in Ireland from the 1890s. Its most significant outcome was the rejuvenation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). This small, underground, revolutionary body planned and directed the insurrection in 1916. The truly dynamic element was a tiny minority within this organization; they were acting on the old republican principle: ‘England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity’. In August 1915, this group formed the IRB Military Council. It was eventually composed of seven members – Thomas Clarke, Sean MacDermott, Patrick Pearse, Eamonn Ceannt, Joseph Plunkett, James Connolly, and Thomas MacDonagh. All seven approved and signed the Proclamation, and together they declared themselves to be the ‘Provisional Government’ of the Irish Republic when the Rising began. They were aided throughout by an Irish-American organization, Clan na Gael, which shared their aims and provided virtually the only channel of contact between the insurgents and Germany, from whom they hoped to receive military backing. The IRB was too small in number and covert in operation to precipitate a full-scale rising. For this purpose, it hoped to use the Irish Volunteer Force (IVF). This organization had been formed in 1913 by moderate nationalists, impressed by the impact of the Ulster Volunteer Force and frustrated by the delay in Britain granting Ireland self-government. It had recruited 180,000 men by mid-1914, but then formally split over whether its volunteers should enlist in British Forces and fight in the European war. Its more extreme rump of 11,000 men strongly opposed this and kept the original name (IVF). The Military Council members hoped to use this body as a strike force in the planned rebellion. Of necessity, their efforts to do so involved covert infiltration and deceit as some of the IVF leaders, notably Eoin MacNeill, rejected a wartime rising on grounds of principle. However, they did form an alliance with James Connolly, the revolutionary socialist and commander of the Irish Citizen Army. During 1915, the rebel leaders’ preparations for a rising were gathering momentum. Their plan was centered on an insurrection in Dublin; to be supported by munitions, and hopefully troops from Germany, which were to be landed on the coast of County Kerry. Meanwhile, leadership positions within the IVF were successfully infiltrated, both in Dublin and elsewhere, and its rank and file members trained in street-fighting techniques. By January 1916 the Military Council had set the date for a rising – initially Good Friday, 21st April 1916, later changed to Easter Sunday, 23rd April. Their revolutionary intentions were to be masked behind publicly advertised and apparently routine maneuvers arranged for that day. On 19th April, IVF commandants were given details of the plan for insurrection, despite the risk of this information leaking to those members who opposed it or to the British authorities. Disaster threatened when MacNeill received confirmation of their true intentions on 21st April. After initial hesitation, he issued countermand orders cancelling the now publicized maneuvers for Easter Sunday, by placing a note to this effect in that morning’s edition of the Sunday Independent. By then news had reached Dublin that the ship transporting German arms to Ireland had been captured (21 April). In confusion and despair, the Military Council members met in emergency session on Sunday morning, 23rd April, to consider their options. They decided to proceed with the rising next day with such forces as they could muster. Traditionally, Irish revolutionary nationalists have looked to England’s enemies for aid. So when a number of them met in Dublin on 9th September 1914 to discuss the circumstances arising from the outbreak of war, they agreed to appeal to Germany for its support in an insurrection. Clan na Gael, a republican organization of Irish-Americans in the United States, was to provide the rebels with their main channel of communication with Germany. Already on 24th August 1914 its leader, John Devoy, had met the German ambassador in New York, stressed to him the opportunities for an Irish rising and requested arms and military personnel for this purpose. Roger Casement was the central figure in developing the rebels` relations with Germany. He had been born in Sandycove, near Dublin, in 1864, the son of a British army officer, and for 20 years had served in the British consular service. He had then gained an international reputation for exposing European colonial exploitation of native peoples in Africa and South America. He had meanwhile become increasingly absorbed in militant Irish nationalist politics and attracted by the potential of an Irish-German alliance as a means of securing full Irish independence. He was in the US when the war began and at once submitted a plan to German officials there, outlining how Britain’s power could be broken by exploiting unrest in its vulnerable possessions, especially Ireland. The Berlin government suggested that he travel to Germany for negotiations. On first arrival, Casement met with some success. On 20th November 1914, the German government declared its support for Irish independence, and soon after agreed to him raising an Irish Brigade from among Irish prisoners captured on the western front; its members were to be transported to Ireland to help in the fight for freedom. However, despite his efforts, recruitment to it was poor. Most of the prisoners were politically moderate and regarded Casement as a traitor. German government hesitation ended when it received confirmation in mid-February 1916 that the date for an Irish rising had been set for the coming Easter. It agreed to ship 25,000 captured Russian rifles and one million rounds, hoping thereby to divert some British troops from the western front. The consignment was dispatched aboard the ‘Aud’ on 9th April. Casement considered its size to be wholly inadequate, and that any rising was therefore doomed. He persuaded the German authorities to transport him to Ireland by submarine. His purpose was ostensibly to rendezvous with the ‘Aud’ and supervise the landing of the arms. His actual intention was to prevent an insurrection. The whole enterprise ended in fiasco. Casement was arrested on 21st April, hours after landing on the Kerry coast. The Royal Navy captured the arms ship on the same day. Owing to navigational error, it failed to appear at its agreed rendezvous point. Due to inept planning by the rebel leadership, local volunteers had not been expecting it to arrive when it did. In any case, British intelligence had intercepted messages between the insurrectionists and the German Embassy in New York and was anticipating its arrival. Fearing leaks, full knowledge of such sensitive information was not communicated to the authorities in Dublin, who remained in ignorance of the plans for a rising. The rebels’ failure to receive the arms had a major impact on the Rising. Had they arrived safely, MacNeill would probably have supported the outbreak, and its scale, especially in the provinces, would have been infinitely greater. The Easter Rising was virtually confined to Dublin. The British capture of a shipment of German arms on 21st April 1916 greatly reduced its scale outside the capital. Moreover, confusion was caused by a rash of conflicting orders sent out to the Irish Volunteers – the main strike force - from their headquarters and the decision taken by the rebel leaders to postpone their action arranged for Easter Sunday 23rd April, until the next day. At about 11.00 am on Easter Monday the Volunteers, along with the Irish Citizen Army, assembled at various prearranged meeting points in Dublin, and before noon set out to occupy a number of imposing buildings in the inner city area. These had been selected to command the main routes into the capital, and also because of their strategic position in relation to the major military barracks. They included the General Post Office, the Four Courts, Jacob’s Factory, Boland’s Bakery, the South Dublin Union, St. Stephen’s Green and later the College of Surgeons. Given the advantage of surprise – British intelligence had failed hopelessly – the properties targeted were taken virtually without resistance and immediately the rebels set about making them defensible. The GPO was the nerve center of the rebellion. It served as the rebels’ headquarters and the seat of the provisional government which they declared. Five of its members served there – Pearse, Clarke, Connolly, MacDermott and Plunkett. The British military onslaught, which the rebels had anticipated, did not at first materialize. When the Rising began the authorities had just 400 troops to confront roughly 1,000 insurgents. Their immediate priorities were therefore to amass reinforcements, gather information on volunteer strength and locations and protect strategic positions, including the seat of government, Dublin Castle, which had initially been virtually undefended. As the week progressed, the fighting in some areas did become intense, characterized by prolonged, fiercely contested street battles. Military casualties were highest at Mount Street Bridge. There, newly arrived troops made successive, tactically inept, frontal attacks on determined and disciplined volunteers occupying several strongly fortified outposts. They lost 234 men, dead or wounded while just 5 rebels died. In some instances, lapses in military discipline occurred. Soldiers were alleged to have killed 15 unarmed men in North King Street near the Four Courts during intense gun battles there on 28th and 29th April. The pacifist Francis Sheehy-Skeffington was the best- known civilian victim of the insurrection. He was arrested in Dublin on 25th April, taken to Portobello Barracks and shot by firing squad next morning without trial. Overall the British authorities responded competently to the Rising. Reinforcements were speedily drafted into the capital and by Friday 28th April, the 1,600 rebels (more had joined during the week) were facing 18-20,000 soldiers. From Thursday the GPO was entirely cut off from other rebel garrisons. Next day it came under a ferocious artillery attack which also devastated much of central Dublin. Having learnt the lessons of Mount Street Bridge, the troops did not attempt a mass infantry attack. Their strategy was effective. It compelled the insurgent leaders, based at the Post Office, first to evacuate the building and later to accept the only terms on offer – unconditional surrender. Their decision was then made known to and accepted sometimes reluctantly, by all the rebel garrisons still fighting both in the capital and in the provinces. In total, the Rising cost 450 persons killed, 2,614 injured, and 9 missing, almost all in Dublin. The only significant action elsewhere was at Ashbourne, 10 miles north of Dublin. Military casualties were 116 dead, 368 wounded and 9 missing, and the Irish and Dublin police forces had 16 killed and 29 wounded. A total of 254 civilians died; the high figures were largely because much of the fighting had occurred in or near densely populated areas. It is widely accepted that 64 rebels lost their lives. Their casualties were low because in the capital they were the defending force. Moreover, they fought with discipline and skill until, acting under instruction from their leaders, they surrendered their strongholds rather than fight to the last volunteer. The drafting of the Proclamation was one of the final steps taken by the Irish Republican Brotherhood Military Council who planned the Rising. Its flowing phrases suggest that it was composed mainly by Patrick Pearse, probably aided by the others, particularly James Connolly. Certainly all seven Council members approved it on 17th April 1916 and later signed it; in doing so, they were virtually guaranteeing that they would face the firing squad should the insurrection fail. On 23rd April, the Council agreed to proceed with the Rising next day, Easter Monday. It also decided that the Proclamation should be read to the public outside Dublin’s General Post Office (after it had been occupied by the rebels), by the President of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic. At the meeting this post was offered to Thomas Clarke in recognition of his services to the republican cause. He declined but as a tribute to his past sacrifices, his signature was given pride of place at the head of the list of seven names who had signed the document. It was then agreed that Pearse should act as president. He had the presence and the requisite oratorical gifts. As arranged, at 12:45 on Easter Monday, Pearse accompanied by an armed guard stood on the step outside the GPO and read the Proclamation. Though the occasion was momentous, the crowd who gathered there was sparse and uncomprehending. There were a few perfunctory cheers but no enthusiasm. The Proclamation expressed the hopes and plans of the revolutionaries. Its primary purpose was to declare that an independent Irish Republic had been established and that a provisional government had been appointed - i.e., the seven members of the Council - to administer temporarily its affairs. Ireland’s ‘national right to freedom and sovereignty’ was powerfully asserted. Though a tiny minority, the rebels claimed: ‘Ireland through us summons her children to her flag’ and could thus ‘prove itself worthy of [its] august destiny’. This appeal for support sprang from their conviction that they were acting in the country’s best interests. The Proclamation stated explicitly who had organized and planned the Rising and also referred to the help provided by ‘gallant allies in Europe’. In fact, German aid failed to reach the rebels. Nonetheless the claim damned their leaders in the eyes of the British government. It had been included in order to increase the likelihood of Ireland being granted independence at a post-war peace conference, when it was assumed a victorious Germany would dictate the terms. In part, the text was concerned to justify the Rising; it did so by linking it to previous Irish history. It stated that: ‘the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom … in arms … six times during the past 300 years’. This implied that the present action was not a sudden, opportunist outbreak but part of a long-established nationalist tradition. The historical tradition the rebels identified with was the republican one. The document uses the term ‘republic’ on five occasions. Its signatories would have had difficulty agreeing on a definition of the term, nonetheless it is what the leaders declared in 1916 and what they fought and died for. Their actions and sacrifice helped implant this as a future national aspiration of the Irish people. The Proclamation suggested that the Rising was not just a political event but also foreshadowed social and economic change. It provided a vision of a free Irish state which would oversee the welfare of all its citizens. The republic would guarantee ‘religious and civil liberty, equal rights and opportunities’ and would ‘pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation … cherishing all the children of the nation equally’. This section shows the influence of Connolly’s socialist principles. It held the brightest hope for the future but also the seeds of the deepest disappointment. In the years that followed, national energies focused on the struggle for political independence; questions of social, civil and economic reform received scant and secondary attention. The members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood Military Council which planned the Rising were each at least partially influenced by the idea of a ‘blood sacrifice’. All shared the view that the success of an insurrection could not be gauged solely in military terms: its suppression, and their own deaths would not mean that the enterprise had failed or had not been justified. The Council’s members were convinced that Ireland’s national spirit – its sense of itself as a distinct nation with a right to independence – was fading. They feared that if Britain granted Ireland limited self- government, its people would come to accept permanently their inclusion in the United Kingdom and the English Crown as head of state. They considered that this future could be avoided through a rising, even one that was repressed. In these circumstances, they believed that through their own death and martyrdom, militant Irish nationalism would be revived; this would enable their successors to wage ultimately a successful war against British rule and achieve full national independence. The rebel leaders also hoped to ‘prove’, through their willingness to die, Ireland’s right to freedom. The Proclamation they issued when the Rising began stated: ‘In this supreme hour, the Irish people must … by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves … prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called’. For Pearse, the idea of a blood sacrifice had additional appeal. Even as a child, he had unusual fantasies of self-sacrifice for his country, derived from Celtic myths and religious writings. He later fused together his nationalism and his Catholic faith. His Christian devotion had always centered on Christ’s Passion and Crucifixion, and he gradually developed a consuming yearning for martyrdom, in conscious emulation of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. He wrote: ‘One man can free a people, as one man redeemed the world’. Pearse was also influenced by a mystical belief in the assumed benefit to mankind of blood spilt in violent conflict. He wrote in 1913: ‘Bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying thing’, and two years later, ‘the old heart of the earth needed to be warmed by the red wine of the battlefield’. Such ideas were then widespread in Europe with roots in contemporary philosophy, science and economics. The dominant artistic group in Italy glorified war, describing it as ‘the world’s only hygiene’. The German Chancellor, at the outbreak of World War I, stated that the war was at first regarded as appropriate and regenerative. Its outbreak was celebrated with popular rallies and demonstrations across Europe. But the influence of blood sacrifice ideas on the leaders of the Rising can easily be overstated. Pearse was not the driving force behind it, but rather Thomas Clarke and Sean MacDermott. Both were traditional republicans – hardheaded, practical, ruthless, committed to the use of force to gain Irish independence, and convinced that war had provided them with a unique opportunity to achieve this goal. The plans which the Military Council prepared in 1915 indicate the scale of the operations which it was anticipating and the extent of its ambitions. With substantial German help, the outcome it sought and prepared for was that British military units in Ireland would be crushed and the episode culminate, not in their martyrdom, but in a rebel victory march. Events did not develop as they had hoped. At the end of the Rising, when the leaders faced certain defeat, the terms that they sought to negotiate with Britain were that they themselves would be executed and their followers allowed to go free. In practice, their blood sacrifice was not therefore a strategy calculated long in advance, but a tactic hastily improvised. It was designed, not to redeem Ireland, but to perform the practical task of saving the lives of their men. A secret group within the Irish Republican Brotherhood planned and directed the Rising. The response of Irish political leaders to their action varied. When imprisoned after it, James Connolly, the dominant figure in the Rising commented: "the socialists will never understand why I am here. They will forget I am an Irishman". It was in Edinburgh, where he was born, that he had first absorbed his firm commitment to Irish independence and his revolutionary socialism. After coming to Dublin in 1896, his ideas developed further. He believed that Ireland must become a free self-governing nation, but that social and economic change was equally essential – the elimination of private property and of capitalist power to exploit and repress the Irish people. As leader of the Irish Citizen Army, he demanded that members commit themselves to socialist revolution and the goal of an Irish republic. But he himself increasingly doubted the likelihood of a successful revolt by the working class; its defeat in the 1913 Dublin Lockout had exposed its weakness and the prospect of Ireland’s partition (and the loss of the industrial north-east) threatened to weaken it further. However, when World War 1 began, he at once argued and prepared for an Irish insurrection. As a nationalist, he supported the dictum: ‘England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity’. Moreover, he was convinced that even if it failed, it would ‘reawaken the soul of the nation’. The response of Ulster unionists to the Rising was more predictable. When the war began, their leader Edward Carson, fervently supported Britain’s military effort, stating, "England’s difficulty is not Ulster’s opportunity, England’s difficulty is our difficulty". The 1916 insurrection did not directly affect the north; no fighting occurred there. The Rising was generally regarded by unionists as an act of treachery and proof that Irish nationalists were at heart disloyal. They later contrasted this with the loyalty displayed by the 36th Division (composed largely of Ulster Volunteer Force members) at the Somme. In total, 5,500 of its men were killed, wounded or went missing in the first two days of the battle on 1st - 2nd July 1916 - as one of them said "doing their duty for King and Country". Unionists applauded the government’s imposition of martial law in Ireland during Easter week and urged that nationalists’ sedition should not be ‘rewarded’ by British concessions. However, when the trials of the rebel leaders began, Carson urged caution, saying: "it will be a matter requiring the greatest wisdom … dealing with these men. Whatever is done, let it be done, not in a moment of temporary excitement, but with due deliberation in regard to the past and to the future". Like Carson, John Redmond the Irish Parliamentary Party leader had backed Britain’s war effort. A moderate nationalist, he also forthrightly condemned the Rising, expressing his detestation and horror at it and claiming Germany had plotted, organized and paid for it. As public attitudes towards Easter week changed, both he and his party were amongst its casualties. The Rising helped transform Irish nationalist politics. Whilst it was the climax and the end of the careers of some republican leaders, it was the making of others. Eamon de Valera was little known in Ireland until Easter week. During the Rising he served as commandant: he was the most senior figure in it to survive. His subsequent political rise was meteoric. As public adulation for the rebels grew, he was able to share in the glory of having been one of them. Similarly, the insurrection was the launching pad for Michael Collins’ political career. Aged 16, he had gone to work in London and after joining the IRB there, became convinced that independence could only be achieved by force. Aware of plans for a Rising, he returned to Dublin in January 1916 and during Easter week served as Joseph Plunkett’s aide at the GPO; he was described as ‘the most effective and efficient officer in the place’. Subsequently he was interned at Frongoch, North Wales, where he first illustrated his leadership potential by helping organize prisoner resistance to camp regulations. He also set up a branch of the Irish Republican Brotherhood there, and after his release (December 1916) rapidly rose to prominence in this organization as well as becoming the dominant figure in the re-formed Irish Volunteer Force. He was to go on to co-ordinate the republican campaign in the Anglo-Irish war, 1919-21. He has aptly been described as ‘the powerhouse of the revolution’. The aftermath of The Rising is pretty sad and unpleasant, but this report isn’t just about the pretty facts. It’s about the cold, hard truth of what had happened in Ireland in 1916-1921 which includes the aftermath. The civilian population was by no means uniformly hostile to the Rising, even during Easter week. There was, of course, anger expressed at the number of fatalities it had caused, and the scale of destruction and distress. Its timing outraged those with relatives fighting with the British Army. When they surrendered, some rebel garrisons had to be protected by the British Army from hostile crowds - for example, at the College of Surgeons. But in contrast elsewhere, at Boland’s Bakery and the South Dublin Union, the insurgents were heartened by the spontaneous warmth of the popular response. With justification some believed that sympathy for their action had grown as the week progressed. Certainly there was a widespread feeling that they had fought a clean fight in Ireland’s cause, and shown courage and conviction and also concern for the suffering caused to the civilian population. There was admiration for the fact that though poorly armed, the volunteers had held out for so long against the resources of an empire, apparently willing and able to deploy limitless numbers of well-equipped troops. There can be no doubt that the response of the British government to the Rising contributed measurably to the further alienation of Irish public opinion. On 26th April 1916, it had introduced martial law and next day appointed Major-General Sir John Maxwell as Commander-in-Chief of troops, Ireland. He had full authority to restore order, put down the rebellion, and punish its participants. Maxwell never doubted that its leaders should be court-martialed and those most prominent executed. He was also determined that, in order to crush militant nationalism, those who had surrendered with them, and their suspected supporters, should be arrested and their arms seized in a nationwide sweep by soldiers, supported by police. In total, the security forces arrested 3,430 men and 79 women and of these 1,841 were sent to England and interned there. They were substantial figures in relation to the scale of the outbreak, though most (about 2,700) had been released by early August 1916. Meanwhile, those thought to have organized the insurrection had been held back in Ireland for trial – 190 men and 1 woman, Countess Markievicz. In 90 cases the court’s verdict was ‘Death by being shot’. Maxwell confirmed this judgement on 15 defendants, and these were executed between 3-12 May 1916. The predictable effect of these measures was to increase public sympathy, both for the rebels and their goals. During May, the police authorities noted even amongst moderate nationalists a growing ‘wave of resentment,’ prompted by the feeling that ‘unnecessary severity had been deployed’. Symptoms of the change in attitudes included the following: the increasing frequency of memorial masses for the executed rebels; the growing sales of photographs of them; the setting up of aid funds for their families; the appearance of songs and ballads celebrating their actions; the ubiquity of republican flags and badges; the sight of young men marching military style at Gaelic football matches, and the shouting of rebel slogans anywhere people gathered anonymously together, such as at railway stations. The government also observed that recruitment levels to the British army had diminished to a trickle. Moreover, there were ominous signs that militant nationalists were reorganizing, reflected in a rise in arms thefts and hardening of attitudes towards the police. The release of many who had been interned after the Rising - far from earning public gratitude - fuelled resentment, as it was seen as providing evidence that the arrests had been made ‘without just cause’. Already in mid-June 1916, Maxwell predicted that in a General Election the moderate nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party would probably be replaced. He was right; in December 1918, it was swept aside by Sinn Féin (pronounced shin fane). The threat of civil conflict in Ireland in mid-1914 was defused when the unionist and nationalist leaders, Edward Carson and John Redmond, pledged their respective parties and paramilitary forces to support the Imperial war effort. Responding to Ulster Unionist pressure and urgently in need of men, the War Office created a division specifically for the Ulster Volunteer Force - the 36th Division: 30,000 of its members joined in the first wave of recruitment. However, English recruiting officers were reluctant to support the formation of Irish nationalist divisions, fearing they might return after the war, possibly in 1915, with military training and equipment. But thousands of Irish Volunteer Force members did join the predominantly catholic and nationalist 10th and 16th divisions. The pattern of Irish recruitment was erratic. There was an initial surge but then the level declined sharply. Roughly as many enlisted in the first year of the war as in the remaining three years; just 12,000 volunteered in the eight months before the Easter Rising. The geographical distribution of enlistment and the religious make-up of the recruits were similarly uneven. Protestants came forward in greater numbers proportionately than Catholics. In Ulster, men of both faiths were more likely to join up than those from the rest of Ireland. Generally, urban areas returned more soldiers than rural. For unionists and moderate nationalists, war provided an opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty, so earning Britain’s gratitude and hopefully influencing the terms of its post-war settlement of the Irish question. A further motivation for enlistment was economic necessity. That 16,000 had joined up in Dublin between August 1914 – December 1915, was related to the disruptive impact of war on the city’s industry. The fall in recruitment began in 1915, which indicates that it was not solely due to the anti-English sentiment generated by the Rising. The slaughter on the Western Front was certainly a factor. Two of the Irish Divisions, the 36th and 16th, saw action at the Somme, whilst the 10th suffered heavy losses in Gallipoli in August 1915. Moreover, Irish troops in the British Army appear to have been treated with particular harshness in World War One. They constituted just two per cent of the membership of the force, yet they were the recipients of eight per cent (271) of all death sentences imposed by its courts-martial. Enlistment levels were also influenced by the increasing prosperity of war-time Ireland – particularly its agriculture. Farmers were as well off by 1918-19 as at any time before the 1950s. But in any case, enthusiasm for the war was never as widespread in nationalist Ireland as the media, dominated by pro-war elements, suggested. There was a common perception that it was not Ireland’s affair. In total, about 206,000 men from Ireland served in the conflict, of whom some 30,000 died. These figures dwarfed the numbers who had fought and lost their lives at home, in the Rising and in the Anglo-Irish War. But the percentage of those of conscription age who served (10.7 per cent) was well below both the Scottish (26.9 per cent) and the English and Welsh figures (24.2 per cent). In mid-1916, Westminster therefore considered imposing conscription on Ireland, out of concern at the depleted Irish divisions and the growing resentment in England at the slackness of recruiting there. The acute shortage of troops on the Western Front prompted it to reconsider the issue in April-May 1918. For Ulster unionists, the high casualty rate experienced by the 36th Division at the Somme did help earn them Britain’s gratitude and ensure that they would not be compelled to accept Dublin rule after the war. Meanwhile, the war-time experience of southern unionists had transformed their attitudes towards moderate nationalists. Having shared platforms with them at Irish recruitment meetings and fought alongside them at the front, they had lost by 1916 their earlier aversion to self-government for Ireland and had come to regard Redmond as a worthy and acceptable first premier. This was not to be. When the Irish soldiers returned home from the trenches in 1918, it was to a country whose attitudes had by then undergone a transformation. The predominant mood amongst nationalists was one of deep bitterness towards England and of contempt for those who had served in its forces. The rebels who had died in Easter week had become the focus of their uncritical adulation. Outside Ulster, Ireland’s war veterans became the object of a sort of ‘national amnesia’, their contribution unrecognized and forgotten until a more recent generation. The executions and deportations after the Rising fuelled popular hostility in Ireland towards Britain. They also increased sympathy for the use of force to achieve independence as well as support for an independent Irish republic. Other aspects of the British government’s policy reinforced these trends - it persisted with nationwide martial law until November 1916; it arrested prominent and articulate critics of its administration and it threatened to impose conscription, so causing deepening resentment, especially among young men. In these circumstances, the appeal of the moderate nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party declined further. It was also damaged by its continuing failure in wartime to achieve Irish self-government. It was not until 1917 that the IPP’s 50-year domination of Irish politics was challenged. The delay was because its militant nationalist opponents were divided and split into numerous separate organizations, with their own programs and priorities, and also because the leaders of these had been imprisoned after the Rising. The process of forming a single cohesive political force to challenge the IPP was begun with their gradual release from December 1916. It was the Sinn Féin party which eventually displaced the IPP. Sinn Féin was not directly involved in the Rising, but benefited immensely from it. It was quite wrongly associated with the outbreak by the Irish public. This was because the role of the Irish Republican Brotherhood Military Council in planning the insurrection was not widely known. Sinn Féin was believed to be involved as it was the best-known, openly anti-English, nationalist propaganda body in Dublin. As admiration for the rebels grew, it had become by mid-1916 a ‘magic name’ in Ireland, instantly recognizable with powerful appeal. In the course of 1917, the movement was transformed. First its organization changed: it coalesced with and absorbed other militant nationalist bodies and its party branches spread nationwide. Then, in October it elected a new leader - Eamon de Valera - and agreed a new program, which broadly committed it to the goal of an Irish republic. The December 1918 General Election was the Sinn Féin movement’s supreme test. Its manifesto offered voters a republic. It also stated that the party would refuse to attend Westminster and set up an Irish assembly as ‘the supreme …authority’. It would make use of ‘every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection’ and appeal to a post-war peace conference ‘for the establishment of Ireland as an independent nation’. Sinn Féin swept the polls winning 73 seats, having previously held 6 (IPP representation fell from 68 to seven). It won because it was the natural focus for the pervasive hatred many then felt towards England. Also it was well organized and led; this was vital as the Irish electorate had trebled since the previous election in 1910. Moreover, Irish voters now aspired to a greater measure of independence than the limited self-government on offer from the IPP. Sinn Féin acted quickly to fulfil its far-reaching manifesto pledges. It summoned those elected to meet in Dublin on 21st January; 27 of them did so, all of them Sinn Féin members (most of its other successful candidates had been arrested). The occasion was historic. It was the first session of the promised assembly of Ireland (Dáil Éireann). It immediately approved a provisional Irish constitution and then ratified three statements. The first proclaimed the establishment of an Irish Republic. The second was an appeal for recognition and support addressed to all the ‘free nations of the world’. The third, the ‘Democratic Program’ stated that Ireland would be governed by principles of ‘Liberty, Equality and Justice’, that the government’s first duty would be to the nation’s children, and that all citizens should enjoy an ‘adequate share’ of its wealth. Inevitably these aspirations were to be neglected in the struggle for Irish independence which consumed the next three years. After their election victory in 1918, the Sinn Féin leaders declared an independent Irish republic and established a government in Dublin. These actions alone were likely to lead to war with Britain; the Westminster government was at that time willing to offer nationalists only very limited powers of self-government.
The Anglo-Irish war, 21st January 1919–11th July 1921 was initiated by a small number of young, determined Irish Volunteers, known from August 1919 as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). They were convinced that a republic could only be gained by force. Some had been preparing for action since shortly after the Easter Rising. From necessity, they adopted a guerrilla campaign. A conventional war of large-scale open conflict was not feasible, given their lack of men, training and arms. They were organized initially into numerous small, fragmented, fiercely independent units who, acting on their own initiative, launched frequent low-level surprise attacks. They then melted back into the civilian population. The Proclamation expressed the hopes and plans of the revolutionaries. Its primary purpose was to declare that an independent Irish Republic had been established and that a provisional government had been appointed - i.e., the seven members of the Council - to administer temporarily its affairs. Ireland’s ‘national right to freedom and sovereignty’ was powerfully asserted. Though a tiny minority, the rebels claimed: ‘Ireland through us summons her children to her flag’ and could thus ‘prove itself worthy of [its] august destiny’. This appeal for support sprang from their conviction that they were acting in the country’s best interests. The volunteers attacked government property, carried out raids for desperately needed weapons and funds and, to disrupt the British administration, assassinated prominent individuals. Their most significant single target was the Royal Irish Constabulary. The force was the eyes and ears of Dublin Castle and had the prime responsibility for maintaining law and order. Its members were vulnerable, increasingly unpopular in Ireland, and the best available source of arms. The civilian population was at first shocked by the IRA`s actions but rapidly came to support them out of patriotic sentiment and because of the repressive nature of the British government’s response. The Sinn Féin government backed the IRA campaign. Michael Collins, a leading figure in both, played a pivotal, co-ordination role. He provided the volunteers with funds, arms and equipment and appointed their officers. He encouraged them to act – identifying targets, issuing instructions and offering advice. His most critical contribution lay in the provision of intelligence, using as sources his network of informers; it penetrated even Dublin Castle and the police forces. During 1919, his ‘squad’, a group of hand-picked agents, eliminated Dublin’s detective constables, the ‘G men’. But given the nature of guerrilla warfare, it was the individual volunteer units and their commanders who held the real initiative. In the course of the Anglo-Irish War, 15,000 volunteers were actively involved, with around 3,000 in service at any given time – sufficient to wage a potent campaign. From the autumn of 1919, the force had sufficient strength to attempt more spectacular actions. Their main purpose was to provoke Westminster into a brutal and repressive retaliatory response. This then served to guarantee popular support in Ireland for the continuing IRA campaign. It was also exploited by Sinn Féin propaganda relating to police atrocities. As these were broadly confirmed by independent journalists, they contributed to a mounting chorus of criticism in Britain and America of the government’s actions. The violence in Ireland peaked in late 1920. Collins` most celebrated action of the war occurred on 21st November, ‘Bloody Sunday’. On that day his ‘squad’ gunned down 19 suspected British Army intelligence officers living as civilians in Dublin houses and hotels. The incident illustrated the quality of his informants and the continuing devastating capability of the IRA. It immediately stung the security forces into brutal retaliation; hours later, newly recruited members of the police force fired indiscriminately into the crowd at a football match in Dublin, killing 12 people. By late 1920, IRA strategy had been modified further. In August, the British Army was given powers to intern persons on suspicion without trial. A consequence of the arrests which followed - 4,500 by August 1921 - was that large numbers of volunteers went ‘on the run’. They became in effect professional revolutionaries, differentiated from their part-time colleagues, and with no prospect of normal life until British rule was ended. In Munster especially, these organized themselves into ‘flying columns’ – mobile units of about 100 men, based in remote camps or safe houses - ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. Throughout the war, the IRA sustained an effective, calculated and flexible campaign. Nonetheless, by mid-1921 the Sinn Féin leadership favoured negotiations with Britain. They considered then that continued violence would break the volunteers, given their lack of men, arms and funds and the steady build-up of troops in Ireland. Moreover, they doubted the capacity of the Irish people to endure more fighting. Also, they were convinced that there was nothing to be gained by it as they were anticipating a generous political settlement. The British government’s offer of negotiations was not conditional on the handover of arms or formal surrender and suggested a real desire for peace. In 1920, the British government attempted to solve the Irish question by passing legislation partitioning Ireland and granting it limited self-government. It believed – wrongly - that this would satisfy the majority of Irish nationalists. Meanwhile, it had responded to the Irish Republican Army’s developing physical force campaign with repression. Westminster underestimated how difficult it would be to defeat the volunteers; it regarded their actions as terrorism, not war, and so relied mainly on the police force to restore order. It considered that to deploy troops in peacetime would arouse criticism in Britain. Gradually the level of its coercion in Ireland increased. Overall, this policy was self-defeating. It proved unable to suppress the IRA, yet alienated Irish opinion whilst the British public came to regard it as excessive and unacceptable. From the outset, the IRA campaign was mainly directed against the Royal Irish Constabulary – by June 1920, 55 policemen had been killed, 16 barracks destroyed and hundreds abandoned. As a result its conviction rates, recruitment levels and morale, all fell sharply. In response, the British government initiated changes (autumn 1919), which in effect transformed the force into an auxiliary army, by equipping it with motor vehicles, rockets, bombs and shotguns. By January 1920, Westminster felt compelled to take more drastic action. It launched a recruitment drive in England to attract ex-soldiers to join a new force, soon nicknamed the ‘Black and Tans’ owing to the distinctive uniforms its members were initially issued with. It eventually numbered about 10,000 and quickly acquired an unenviable reputation for ill-discipline. Owing to the urgent need for men, selection procedures had been increasingly relaxed. Some of those who enlisted had been brutalized by war: almost all were ignorant of Ireland and ill-trained. Moreover, they were attached to scattered RICA barracks, mainly in the south west, under no effective control from police or army officers. As the IRA campaign intensified, the government responded in July 1920 by establishing a second force, the Auxiliaries. They were better-paid and recruited from demobilized army officers. Eventually 1,900 men were enlisted and these were divided into 15 heavily armed and mobile companies, and deployed in the ten Irish counties where the IRA was most active. But, like the Black and Tans, its members were also ill-trained for guerrilla warfare, and knew little of Ireland. Though under nominal RICA control, they generally operated independently and they also established a reputation for drunkenness and brutality. Meanwhile, during 1920, troop numbers in Ireland were steadily increased and their powers extended. In August, they were empowered to intern citizens without trial and court-martial those suspected of political offences. Despite these reinforcements, police frustration and the strain resulting from the persistence and virulence of the IRA campaign, led to them conducting ‘unofficial reprisals’. These ranged from assaults on IRA suspects and supporters, occasionally causing death, to the sacking of towns, such as Limerick and Balbriggan. They were condoned by police officers and ignored by the government as they helped sustain the force’s fragile morale, and facilitated the gathering of intelligence. The price however was the alienation of public opinion, both in Ireland and in Britain. The worst reprisals occurred during the crescendo of terror and counter-terror in October 1920. On 21st November, ‘Bloody Sunday’, IRA agents gunned down 19 suspected Army intelligence officers in Dublin. Later that day, Auxiliaries who were dispatched to a football match at Croke Park to search for wanted men, fired indiscriminately into the crowd, causing 12 deaths and wounding 65. On 9th December, two lorries transporting Auxiliaries were ambushed by an IRA ‘flying column’ in County Cork, killing all but one of the occupants. Two days later their Auxiliary colleagues, along with Black and Tans, entered Cork and sacked and burnt part of the city center. Reluctantly, the British government was thus compelled to declare martial law over much of south-west Ireland. Later it sanctioned ‘official reprisals’; if an IRA ‘outrage’ occurred, troops were given authority to blow up the property of those suspected of involvement. By mid-1921 the British government had become more amenable to a political settlement with the IRA. In two and a half years over 1,300 people had died in the conflict (550 of them troops and police), yet military victory still seemed a remote and uncertain prospect. The British public would not accept the further repressive measures thought necessary to achieve it, was increasingly critical of those already taken and desired peace – though not at any price. In 1920 Westminster passed the Government of Ireland Act and created two governments – one in Belfast with jurisdiction over the six north-eastern counties and the other in Dublin with authority over the remainder. Both were given very limited devolved powers. This was acceptable to Ulster unionists, who implemented the Act, but not to Irish nationalists, who broadly supported the IRA campaign during the Anglo-Irish war (1919-1921). This conflict ended with a truce, operative from 11th July; negotiations then followed between the Sinn Féin leaders and the British government, the crucial phase beginning on 11th October 1921. The Sinn Féin delegation was led by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins. Its ideal settlement would have been the creation of a sovereign, united Irish Republic. Griffith especially appreciated that the British representatives, led by Prime Minister Lloyd George, would not accept such terms, but he aimed to maximize the degree of Irish independence and gain a united Ireland. Throughout the negotiations, Lloyd George was indeed insistent that Ireland must remain within the British Empire and accept the Crown as head of state. To secure Sinn Féin agreement, he approached the Ulster Unionist leader, James Craig, and urged him to accept Dublin rule. When Craig refused, he advised him that the borders of Northern Ireland would be re-drawn by a Boundary Commission according to the preferences of the population living there. This seemed likely to transfer a significant proportion of the six-county state (the nationalist areas) to Southern Irish jurisdiction. The Irish delegation broadly accepted this proposal as a solution to the partition issue. Heated argument then ensued over whether the Sinn Féin delegation would agree to Ireland’s membership of the British Empire and to the British Crown remaining as head of state. Eventually on 6th December the Anglo-Irish Treaty was agreed and signed by the Irish delegates without consulting their colleagues in Dublin. Under the Treaty, Southern Ireland – henceforth the ‘Irish Free State’ – became a self- governing dominion. In contrast to the 1920 legislation, it was now given complete independence in its domestic affairs: powers to levy all taxes; regulate foreign trade; raise an army; and considerable freedom of foreign policy. From a nationalist perspective, its main defect was that Ireland did not become a republic; it remained within the Empire with the Crown still head of state. In addition, Britain retained its naval bases there so compromising Irish neutrality in a future war. Also partition remained, though it was anticipated that the findings of the future Boundary Commission would lead to unity. The Treaty caused deep divisions amongst nationalists in Ireland. It was the subject of furious debates in the Dáil - the assembly set up by the Sinn Féin party after its election victory in December 1918. Those who favoured acceptance argued that the powers it granted made it worthy of support; that it would lead to Irish unity; that it had the support of most Irish people and that the only alternative to it was renewed war with Britain. Collins stated that it provided Ireland not with ‘the ultimate freedom that all nations desire, but the freedom to achieve it’. The Treaty’s opponents criticized it most for failing to do ‘the fundamental thing’, i.e., grant Ireland a republic; the English Crown would remain monarch of Ireland, with government there still conducted in its name. Whilst accepting that it had majority Irish support, Eamon de Valera noted ominously: ‘the majority has no right to do wrong’. Others expressed concern that Britain would retain naval bases in Ireland. It was also claimed that Griffith’s delegation had exceeded its powers in signing the agreement without referring back to Dublin, and that with greater courage and daring more generous terms could have been extracted from Britain. It was evident from the debate that, though under the Treaty Ireland was constitutionally a member of the Empire, it never was psychologically. Arguably the settlement was a lost opportunity to lay the foundations for improved Anglo-Irish relations. It did, however, as Collins had argued, provide the Free State with sufficient power to determine its own destiny. At Easter 1949, Ireland became a fully independent republic. But in December 1921, the Sinn Féin delegation had little option other than to sign the terms on offer. The only alternative was a renewal of the Anglo-Irish war. Membership of the Empire and the position of the Crown were issues on which Lloyd George could not compromise – nor could republican purists. If the Treaty was implemented, civil war in Ireland was inevitable.