Section 300 of the Penal Code
Section 300 of the Penal Code mainly lays down the elements that need to be proved upon the conviction of murder by the accused. In this section, it provides 4 clauses as can be seen below :
(a) Killing with the intent to kill
(b) The accused intended to inflict bodily injury on the victim and knows that death is likely the result of the bodily injury. ( It combines both the elements contained in the second and third limbs of s 299, that is the intention to inflict a bodily injury and knowledge that death is likely as a result of this act)
(c) the accused has intentionally inflicted a bodily injury that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of a person of the similar size, age and sex even though the accused did not intend or foresee death as a result of the injury inflicted.
(d) It requires proof that the accused knew that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death as well as the accused knew the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause a bodily injury that was likely to cause death. s 299 of the Penal Code can be understood by looking at its different limbs. By looking at its first limb, it states that whoever who have committed the act of murder, should actually have carried out the act with the intention of causing death. This is very similar to that of s 300(a) that both this limb as well as s 300(a) emphasis the intention of the accused in carrying out the act which result in death. Therefore, the accused can normally be convicted under both this limb as well as this clause without much problem in proving their intention.

The second limb of s 299 requires proof that the accused intended “such bodily injury” that is likely to cause death. Comparatively, s 300(c) requires proof that the accused intended a bodily injury and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient under ordinary course of nature to cause death. The second limb and s 300 (c) could be distinguished from the probability of death resulting from the injury. An injury will be considered as ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature’ to cause death , which means that the probability of death should be assessed by giving reference to the inherent nature of the injuries and not by referring to the possible effects of medical intervention.
The third limb of s 299 is based on knowledge rather than intention, in this section it requires proof that the accused had already knew that his or her act was ‘likely to cause death’. Whereby, section 300 (d) can be subdivided into two clauses, of which the first clause stated that, it requires proof that the accused knew that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. This can be differentiated from s.299 for which death is foreseen as ‘likely’ in s.299which is different from s.300 for which death ‘must in all probability’ occur in this section. The second clause of s 300 (d), states that, the accused knew the act was so imminently dangerous which it must in all probability cause a bodily injury that was likely to cause death. Therefore, it can be simplified that this section, s 300 (d) merely states that, it must be proved that the accused knew that the act was so imminently dangerous, that it must in all probability cause death or bodily injury likely to cause death. Referring to the case T.Paramsparan A/L Thanigajalam v Pendakwa Raya in this case, the appellant, was charged for murdering his wife by the name of Mageswary a/p Sonny @ Veeran on 28th Oct 2002 between 8.30 pm to 9.30 pm in a housing area addressed, number 9, Solok Dato’ Abdul Hamid 16A, Taman Sri Sentosa, in the district of Klang in the State of Selangor Darul Ehsan. The appellant in this case was convicted and sentenced to death by the High Court at Shah Alam and he now appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Basically, in this case, the appellant was found guilty for beating up his wife, who was 8-months pregnant that particular time and causing severely bodily injury which eventually lead to death of his wife. Upon cross-examination by the defence, it was found that he used a rice cooker wire as well as a broom stick to beat up his wife severely. He had also slapped her. As a result, she sustained sixty four (64) injuries, which was too much for her to bear and eventually it led to her death. Based on the post mortem report, it was stated that, her cause of death was based on traumatic shock that is due to the diffuse blunt force injuries to the body. This was further testified by the doctor that the injuries sustained by the deceased is not self inflicted or due to epilepsy. The doctor also testified that the cause of death was due to the injuries sustained from punches and blows using a blunt instrument, that is the rice cooker wire and broom stick, in this case.
When inflicting such bodily injuries on her head, neck, body trunk, upper limbs and lower limbs, it was proven that the accused knew that she was in an advanced state of pregnancy and upon inflicting such bodily injuries, the appellant was in complete control of the situation at all times, he was not in the state of unsound mind or insanity or even drunk. Thus, the appellant cannot raise the defence of insanity and unsound mind over here.
It was very clear and obvious that his act of beating up his wife and causing bodily injury upon his wife and such bodily injury inflicted during that period of time was sufficient enough in the ordinary cause of nature to cause her death. This is in line with the provision provided in s 300(c), of which in this section, it states that in order to convict the accused under this section, it must be proven that the accused intended a bodily injury and that bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient enough in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death.
Therefore, in this case, it was proven that his act of slapping and beating up his wife, who is in the advanced state of pregnancy continuously using the rice cooker wire as well as the broom stick was sufficient enough in order to convict him under this section.

Part 2
Choose any one section under the Penal Code which your group thinks should be amended and provide one reason why your group thinks it should be amended.
The section in the Penal Code that should be amended is Section 304A causing death by negligence. The section stated that “Whoever causes the death of any person, by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or fine, or with both.” This section is controversial as it attracted the most judicial attention.

The Mens Rea required for Section 304A is negligence or rashness. The negligent conduct is criminally blameworthy since the actor’s conduct will pose inattentive danger to others. S304A will be invoked if death had taken place and the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to prove intention or knowledge. Under this section, the prosecution has a duty to prove either that the accused had acted rashly or negligently. Both these guilty states of mind are not defined under the Penal Code as such courts have to refer to case law. If the facts show that the accused was conscious of the fact that death will take place then it is likely the prosecution may prove that the accused had acted rashly. The prosecution has to prove that the accused was conscious of the illegal consequences and yet had decided to take the risk. The court in deciding if the accused had acted negligently will use the objective and subjective test. The court will apply reasonable man’s test on the accused. This would mean whether the accused taking into consideration his characteristics, age, etc had acted as any other reasonable person who has these same characteristics.

Unlawful homicide is recognized under s 300, s 299 and also s 304A. However, the punishment of s 304A is much lower than s 300 and s 299. This is because different levels of Mens Rea will result in different levels of punishment. Serious crimes require a higher state of blameworthiness compared to less serious crimes. For example, for murder under s 300, the requisite Mens Rea need to be proved by the prosecution is intention. Even though the legislators had imposed maximum of 2 yrs of imprisonment, however this punishment is not adequate to act as retribution and deterrence function. In practical, there are some cases which agreed on the abovementioned point.

In the case of Regina v Rw Downey, the respondent was seen in company with another soldier taking and driving away without Military permission a Military 1-ton lorry of which he was not the driver. While driving along the road, the respondent collided with a Malay who was pushing a bicycle with 2 children on the same direction. The vehicle failed to stop down. The respondent admitted partaking of alcoholic refreshment prior to the accident. This was an appeal by the Public Prosecutor against the sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate on a charge under s. 304A of the Penal Code. The respondent had pleaded guilty to the charge and was fined $1,500 or 3 months rigorous imprisonment in default. The judge held that in the present case, the sentence of fine was inadequate.

In the case of Lee Kim Leng, the deceased was knocked down and killed as she was crossing a road. The appellant’s car had collided with a stationery taxi, which had been pushed forward to the deceased. He was convicted under section 304A of the Penal Code and sentenced to 4 months imprisonment and disqualified from driving any motor vehicle for 3 years.

Next, in the case of Public Posecutor v Teo Poh Leng, the respondent pleaded guilty in a district court in causing the death of two persons by the negligent act in which she drove her car. She was fined $5,000 and disqualified of driving in any of the vehicles for 5 years. The public prosecutor now appeals on the ground that the sentences imposed are manifestly inadequate and urges the court to impose a custodial sentence on her. It was argued in the case that the fine should be increased from $5,000 to $10,000 and a sentence of imprisonment of three months.

In S Balakrishnan & Anor v Public Prosecutor, the first appellant and second appellant were charged in their respective roles in command and supervising the officers. Both were charged with causing the death of Hu and the grievous hurt of Capt Ho. The first appellant was charged by illegal omission, second appellant was charged by instigation. The trial judge sentenced the appellants to two months' imprisonment, while another was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. It was held that “…by view of the sentencing precedents, the sentences for both appellants were manifestly inadequate. The second appellant’s abuse of his power made him more morally culpable than the two instructors who had actually carried out the dunking. As for the first appellant, although he deserved a lower sentence than the first appellant given his role in the commission of the offences, the sentences of two months were inadequate.” As a consequence, the first appellant was sentenced to 6 months and the second appellant was given a sentence of 12 months.

In the case of Public Prosecutor v Tiyatun & Anor, the respondents were feeding a child aged 21 months. The child’s meal comprised of porridge blended with soft minced meat and vegetables. They press the child’s nostrils together while holding his hands so as to temporarily incapacitate his movements in order to force him open his mouth. The child had difficulty breathing and passed away three days later and the final cause of death was due to ‘inhalation of foreign material’. The respondents were charged under S 304A read with s34 of Penal Code. The respondents pleaded guilty to their charges and were sentenced to a term of nine months' imprisonment each. The public prosecutor appealed because of the sentence was manifestly inadequate. It was held that ‘the sentence of nine months' imprisonment was an adequate reflection of the degree of culpable rashness exhibited by the respondent’. Although the rash acts of the respondents not amounting to culpable homicide but it was manifestly inadequate to sentence them only nine months imprisonments as the culpability of the respondents arose largely from their ignorance of the fact that may causing death.
Suggested reforms As can see from the above cases, the punishment imposed under s 304A is manifestly inadequate. In our point of view, the punishment should be raised from maximum of 2 years to 10 years. The present day practical reality had urged for the punishment to increase to 10 years imprisonment. In Road Transport Act 1987, section 41 stated that:

“Any person who, by the driving of a motor vehicle on a road recklessly or at a speed or in a manner which having regard to all the circumstances (including the nature, condition and size of the road, and the amount of traffic which is or might be expected to be on the road) is dangerous to the public, causes the death of any person shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than two years and not more than ten years and to a fine not less than five thousand ringgit and not more than twenty thousand ringgit.”

There is no uniformity in the law and punishment across the country even though the Actus Reus and the Mens Rea of the offence is the same. The current maximum penalty for s 304A is low, some cases may involve a high level of ‘rashness’ but just short of knowledge required for s 299. A maximum of 2 years seems too low to cover such borderline cases. It does not makes sense that the worst cases under s 304A carry only maximum of 2 years while the incidents on road carry minimum of 2 years and maximum of 10 years. For example, if a jet-skier who ‘rides’ in a very rash way and killed someone at the beach, he or she cannot be punished to the same extend as the reckless driver on the road. The result of the crime is the same which is innocent live had been taken away but the punishment suffered by the accused is different. Therefore, the punishment of s 304A should be increase from maximum of 2 years to minimum of 2 years and maximum of 10 years.

Furthermore, in Penal Code the punishment for offences of rashness and negligence is the same. In the case of PP v Teo Poh Leng, it was held that rashness was the graver offence. In rashness, it is the accused’s actual knowledge of the risk of harm produced by his or her conduct. The accused recognized that there is some risks but choose to run the risk. The imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness. Whereas for negligence, the accused is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow. The imputability arises from the neglect if the civic duty of circumspection. In Singapore, the punishment of causing death by rash conduct is maximum of 5 years but causing death by negligence is maximum of 2 years. Since the level of Mens Rea is different, it is suggested that the punishment for causing death by rash should be made higher than causing death by negligence in Penal Code.
Punishment for both offence is suggested to be maximum of 10 years but the minimum of sentence of rash conduct should be make higher which is 5 years than the minimum of sentence of negligent conduct which is minimum of 2 years.

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[ 1 ]. s 300 Penal Code (Act 574)
[ 2 ]. Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (2nd Ed), Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan, Chan Wing Cheong, Lexis Nexis Publication
[ 3 ]. [2011] MLJ 963
[ 4 ]. s 300 (c) Penal Code (Act 574)
[ 5 ]. [1954] 1 MLJ 148
[ 6 ]. [1964] MLJ 285
[ 7 ]. (1992) 1 SLR 15
[ 8 ]. [2005] SGHC 146
[ 9 ]. [2002] 2 SLR 246
[ 10 ]. [1991] 2 SLR(R)541