...reception where the performance can be measured easily. Following his advice and being interested by the subject, I therefore decided to study more precisely this process and how it was implemented, rightly or not, in the Disneyland Hotel. Apart from this person, I would also like to thank my manager Mr. Oliver Drutschmann who hired me as a Team Leader intern and allowed me to work in this environment, involving me in several projects such as the transformation process of the majority our standard rooms in terrace rooms situated in the main floor of our hotel (in order to get a higher average price / room) or empowering me and other team leaders in taking operational decision related to management. I had also the opportunity to work with a wonderful team, always available if needed and I’m grateful to them as my time at the Disneyland Hotel was very positive in terms of personal and professional experience. 3. Table of contents 2. Acknowledgments 4. Development I) Introduction II) Disneyland Paris: the Disneyland Hotel III) The overall quality of the reception of the DLH 5. Conclusion 6. Sources 7. Appendixes 4. Development Introduction The Disneyland Hotel is a five star...
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...CASE 2-1 Ali Zein Kazmi February 1, 1999 THE NOT-SO-WONDERFUL-WORLD OF EURODISNEY -THINGS ARE BETTER NOW AT PARIS DISNEYLAND- 1. What are the factors contributed to EuroDisney’s poor performance during its first year of operation? Walt Disney overestimated the magic that was to be in introducing Europe's most lavish and extravagant theme park in April of 1992. The fiscal year 1992-1993 brought EuroDisney a loss of nearly $1 billion. Mickey, a major promotion tool of Disney management did not create reason or attraction enough for the European community, unlike at the sister theme park Tokyo Disneyland. European families found EuroDisney to be an “over-rated” promotion of American culture and lifestyle, contrary to what was seen by Disney's management as a family affair. In the initial years of operation this led to an overestimation of expected revenue and audience figures. Advertising messages had been miscommunicated, “emphasizing glitz and size…not the rides or attractions”. Disney remained unsuccessful in attracting customers just by vigorous brand name promotion communicated through Mickey and his friends. Moreover, families were reluctant to pay hefty price tags on accommodation and entertainment needed to enjoy the attractions of the park. Disney failed to manage a healthy relationship with partner organizations in the host country, which most importantly alienated them from their number one ally, the French government. Regional affairs in Eastern...
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...CASE 21 The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney*—Things Are Better Now at Disneyland Resort Paris BONJOUR, MICKEY! In April 1992, EuroDisney SCA opened its doors to European visitors. Located by the river Marne some 20 miles east of Paris, it was designed to be the biggest and most lavish theme park that Walt Disney Company (Disney) had built to date—bigger than Disneyland in Anaheim, California; Disneyworld in Orlando, Florida; and Tokyo Disneyland in Japan. Much to Disney management’s surprise, Europeans failed to “go goofy” over Mickey, unlike their Japanese counterparts. Between 1990 and early 1992, some 14 million people had visited Tokyo Disneyland, with three-quarters being repeat visitors. A family of four staying overnight at a nearby hotel would easily spend $600 on a visit to the park. In contrast, at EuroDisney, families were reluctant to spend the $280 a day needed to enjoy the attractions of the park, including les hamburgers and les milkshakes. Staying overnight was out of the question for many because hotel rooms were so high priced. For example, prices ranged from $110 to $380 a night at the Newport Bay Club, the largest of EuroDisney’s six new hotels and one of the biggest in Europe. In comparison, a room in a top hotel in Paris cost between $340 and $380 a night. Financial losses became so massive at EuroDisney that the president had to structure a rescue package to put EuroDisney back on firm financial ground. Many French bankers questioned the initial financing...
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...landscapes are developed to distill a glimpse of world /out of this world locations, not unlike a world's fair, at a single location. These entertainment complexes are familiar vacation territories for generations of the world's travel public, as theme parks are deliberately designed to be internationally-focused attractants. The successful dynamism of these landscapes designed for appeal and dependable itinerary offer assurances of what can be expected, with safety and value for the expense of time and money. Generally, themed landscapes perpetuate and promote folk history and cultural traditions, as these are exploited, yet celebrated, simultaneously. Perception of space in the themed environment, without apologies, is inauthentic, but never-the-less successful, and delightful moments for the viewer. Intentionally, architecture is manipulated in order to impart the necessary factors which will aid in promoting happiness by use of ironic realism. Despite pretentions, everyone enjoys themed experiences at some level. Ambivalent designers are not undermined by the pristine and ineffectual notions the design profession propagates on what characterizes good design. Rather, the successful destination architect gives social value and art to underappreciated human elements in architecture. Human experiences and moments must include not just subtle design considerations, but the human emotional need for the bold and brash as distractions from the world of work, from which the viewer wishes to...
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...CASE 2-1 Ali Zein Kazmi February 1, 1999 THE NOT-SO-WONDERFUL-WORLD OF EURODISNEY -THINGS ARE BETTER NOW AT PARIS DISNEYLAND- 1. What are the factors contributed to EuroDisney’s poor performance during its first year of operation? Walt Disney overestimated the magic that was to be in introducing Europe's most lavish and extravagant theme park in April of 1992. The fiscal year 1992-1993 brought EuroDisney a loss of nearly $1 billion. Mickey, a major promotion tool of Disney management did not create reason or attraction enough for the European community, unlike at the sister theme park Tokyo Disneyland. European families found EuroDisney to be an “over-rated” promotion of American culture and lifestyle, contrary to what was seen by Disney's management as a family affair. In the initial years of operation this led to an overestimation of expected revenue and audience figures. Advertising messages had been miscommunicated, “emphasizing glitz and size…not the rides or attractions”. Disney remained unsuccessful in attracting customers just by vigorous brand name promotion communicated through Mickey and his friends. Moreover, families were reluctant to pay hefty price tags on accommodation and entertainment needed to enjoy the attractions of the park. Disney failed to manage a healthy relationship with partner organizations in the host country, which most importantly alienated them from their number one ally, the French government. Regional affairs...
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...studies shows what happens when consumer behavior and marketing mix in globalization goes very wrong. These two studies reveal how marketer think they are giving a wonderful product and service in the case of Apple's the iPhone and Disney the Shark's Fin Soup. Understanding the consumer’s behavior and the customs and values of the culture impacted these two campaigns. Apologies good media press and changes in the strategy to get the approval of the consumers. Both case studies points out the impact of technology and how it at first affected the campaigns for bad with negative that changed the reputation of both companys. Apple's dilemma was very embarrassing for the company with negative reports and predictions of how the iPhone was going to sell in Japan. The propaganda was already put out to the media about the Japanese saying No Thanks to Apple concerning the iPhone 3. Apple thought that Japan would be ecstatic with the new product but supposedly the opposite occurred with reports of weak showing of the iPhone3. Of course with Apple being the cutting edge in technology and innovation in the western world Japan did not feel the same way about Apple's iPhone3. First Japan was a hard market to try to get into the for Apple and their competition Nokia, and Motorola, whose attempts to grab Japanese customers were futile. So this was going to be a difficult campaign for Apple. At the time Japan was hostile toward western brand including Nokia and Motorola which I thought were Japanese...
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...The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney—Things Are Better Now at Paris Disneyland Bonjour, Mickey! In April 1992, EuroDisney SCA opened its doors to European visitors. Located by the river Marne some 20 miles east of Paris, it was designed to be the biggest and most lavish theme park that Walt Disney Company (Disney) had built to date—Bigger than Disneyland in Anaheim, California; Disneyworld in Orlando, Florida; and Tokyo Disneyland in Japan. In 1989, EuroDisney was expected to be a surefire moneymaker for its parent, Disney, led by Chairman Michael Eisner and President Frank Wells. Since then, sadly, Wells was killed in an air accident in spring of 1994, and EuroDisney lost nearly $1 billion during the 1992-1993 fiscal year. Much to Disney management’s surprise, Europeans failed to “go goofy” over Mickey, unlike their Japanese counterparts. Between 1990 and early 1992, some 14 million people had visited Tokyo Disneyland, with three-quarters being repeat visitors. A family of four staying overnight at a nearby hotel would easily spend $600 on a visit to the park. In contrast, at Euro Disney, families were reluctant to spend the $280 a day needed to enjoy the attractions of the park, including les hamburgers and les milkshakes. Staying overnight was out of the question for many because hotel rooms were so high priced. For example, prices ranged from $110 to $380 a night at the Newport Bay Club, the largest of EuroDisney’s six new hotels and one of the biggest...
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...CASE 2-1 Ali Zein Kazmi February 1, 1999 THE NOT-SO-WONDERFUL-WORLD OF EURODISNEY -THINGS ARE BETTER NOW AT PARIS DISNEYLAND- 1. What are the factors contributed to EuroDisney’s poor performance during its first year of operation? Walt Disney overestimated the magic that was to be in introducing Europe's most lavish and extravagant theme park in April of 1992. The fiscal year 1992-1993 brought EuroDisney a loss of nearly $1 billion. Mickey, a major promotion tool of Disney management did not create reason or attraction enough for the European community, unlike at the sister theme park Tokyo Disneyland. European families found EuroDisney to be an “over-rated” promotion of American culture and lifestyle, contrary to what was seen by Disney's management as a family affair. In the initial years of operation this led to an overestimation of expected revenue and audience figures. Advertising messages had been miscommunicated, “emphasizing glitz and size…not the rides or attractions”. Disney remained unsuccessful in attracting customers just by vigorous brand name promotion communicated through Mickey and his friends. Moreover, families were reluctant to pay hefty price tags on accommodation and entertainment needed to enjoy the attractions of the park. Disney failed to manage a healthy relationship with partner organizations in the host country, which most importantly alienated them from their number one ally, the French government. Regional affairs...
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...CASE 21 The Not-So-Wonderful World of BONJOUR, MICKEY! In April 1992, EuroDisney SCA opened its doors to European visitors. Located by the river Marne some 20 miles east of Paris, it was designed to be the biggest and most lavish theme park that Walt Disney Company (Disney) had built to date—bigger than Disneyland in Anaheim, California; Disneyworld in Orlando, Florida; and Tokyo Disneyland in Japan. Much to Disney management’s surprise, Europeans failed to “go goofy” over Mickey, unlike their Japanese counterparts. Between 1990 and early 1992, some 14 million people had visited Tokyo Disneyland, with three-quarters being repeat visitors. A family of four staying overnight at a nearby hotel would easily spend $600 on a visit to the park. In contrast, at EuroDisney, families were reluctant to spend the $280 a day needed to enjoy the attractions of the park, including les hamburgers and les milkshakes. Staying overnight was out of the question for many because hotel rooms were so high priced. For example, prices ranged from $110 to $380 a night at the Newport Bay Club, the largest of EuroDisney’s six new hotels and one of the biggest in Europe. In comparison, a room in a top hotel in Paris cost between $340 and $380 a night. Financial losses became so massive at EuroDisney that the president had to structure a rescue package to put EuroDisney back on firm financial ground. Many French bankers questioned the initial financing, but the Disney response was that their views reflected...
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...CASE 21 The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney*—Things Are Better Now at Disneyland Resort Paris BONJOUR, MICKEY! In April 1992, EuroDisney SCA opened its doors to European visitors. Located by the river Marne some 20 miles east of Paris, it was designed to be the biggest and most lavish theme park that Walt Disney Company (Disney) had built to date—bigger than Disneyland in Anaheim, California; Disneyworld in Orlando, Florida; and Tokyo Disneyland in Japan. Much to Disney management’s surprise, Europeans failed to “go goofy” over Mickey, unlike their Japanese counterparts. Between 1990 and early 1992, some 14 million people had visited Tokyo Disneyland, with three-quarters being repeat visitors. A family of four staying overnight at a nearby hotel would easily spend $600 on a visit to the park. In contrast, at EuroDisney, families were reluctant to spend the $280 a day needed to enjoy the attractions of the park, including les hamburgers and les milkshakes. Staying overnight was out of the question for many because hotel rooms were so high priced. For example, prices ranged from $110 to $380 a night at the Newport Bay Club, the largest of EuroDisney’s six new hotels and one of the biggest in Europe. In comparison, a room in a top hotel in Paris cost between $340 and $380 a night. Financial losses became so massive at EuroDisney that the president had to structure a rescue package to put EuroDisney back on firm financial ground. Many French bankers questioned ...
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...of American Fantasy World to the Chinese Case prepared by Professors Susan H. C. TAI and Lorett B. Y. LAU1 Introduction The 80-year-old Disneyland in the United States now appeals only to families, as Mickey Mouse is no longer an attraction for young Americans (October 20, 2005, Kyodo News International, Tokyo). The Walt Disney Company has also opened parks in Paris and Tokyo on the assumption that family values are relevant to any part of the world. Disney, however, has a mixed record of walking the cultural tightrope. It was criticized for ignoring French culture when it built Euro Disney in Paris, but Tokyo Disneyland has been well received by the Japanese (June 16, 2005, The Wall Street Journal). Since 1983, people in Japan and around the world have enjoyed the dreams and magic of Tokyo Disneyland, the first Disney theme park to be built outside the United States. Tokyo Disneyland did not try to adapt to the culture in which it was built. It worked because of the Japanese attachment to Disney characters and the ultimate US entertainment experience (Amine, 2005). Euro Disney, opened in 1992, lost almost $1 billion in its first 18 months of operation and quickly developed into one of the most costly mistakes in the company‟s history. The French perceived Euro Disney as a symbol of American influence (Spencer, 1995) and many Europeans would not visit the theme park because they believed the real Disney experience was in the US (Marsh, 1996). Euro Disney mistakenly ignored...
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...The Not-So-Wonderful World of EuroDisney: a cultural lesson by Emilio González Introduction This paper introduces some thoughts about the Disney strategy choosing the place for its European park and about the beginnings of its operations; in some way related to cultural factors. It constitutes a personal answer to a case study placed in the book "International Marketing" 13/e by Philip C. Cateora and John Graham, McGraw-Hill 2007. Factors that contributed to Euro Disney's poor performance during its first year of operation. There are several different in nature factors that joined together and contributed to a disastrous beginning of operations. Most of them were management mistakes and others, although external factors, if considered, could have result in different management decisions leading to a better start. In my view these are the most important ones: The timing. EuroDisney opened in 1992, just when two other international events had place: the Olympics games in Barcelona and the World's Fair in Seville; both in Europe and relatively close to Paris. It's obvious that been unrepeatable events, available only for a certain limited amount of time they were a strong competition. A huge amount of people choose attend to these events instead visiting EuroDisney. Suffice it to say that more than 40 million people visited the Seville Expo during the 6 months it was open (versus 9 million EuroDisney visitors accounted for 1992 all year around). To add insult to injury...
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...Introduction The Walt Disney Company was originally founded in 1923; a company committed to providing quality and wholesome entertainment experiences to people of all ages. The company is known for the following four segments, which consist of Studio Entertainment, Parks and Resorts, Consumer Products and Media Networks. The Walt Disney Company consists of five (5) Disneyland and Disney Park Resorts, in total. Two are located in the United States, one in Europe and two in Asia Pacific. The original Disneyland Resort was built in 1955, in Anaheim, California; followed by Disney World Resort, Lake Buena Vista, Florida in 1971. After the success of these two large theme parks in the United States, Disney decided to expand internationally. First Tokyo Disney Resort built in 1983, secondly, Disneyland Resort Paris (EuroDisney) which opened its doors in 1992, and thirdly, Hong Kong Disneyland, opening its doors in 2005. Case Study Questions 1. The factors that contributed to EuroDisney, now called Disneyland Resort Paris, poor performance during its first year of operation was the lack of knowledge of their target market, cultural differences between the USA and Europe, and the failure to take into account that “Paris is Europe’s most-popular city destination among tourist of all nationalities”. Disney did a bad job at understanding Europeans and their lifestyles. Unfortunately, for Disney the French were neither happy nor receptive to having what they called “America Cultural...
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...The Fluidity of Disney. Gender Norms & Racial Bias in the Study of the Modern “Disney” The Walt Disney Company, commonly known as Disney, is an American diversified multinational mass media corporation headquartered at the Walt Disney Studios in Burbank, California. It is the world's second largest broadcasting and cable company in terms of revenue, after Comcast. Disney was founded on October 16, 1923, by Walt Disney and Roy O. Disney as the Disney Brothers Cartoon Studio, and established itself as a leader in the American animation industry before diversifying into live-action film production, television, and theme parks. The company also operated under the names The Walt Disney Studio, then Walt Disney Productions. Taking on its current name in 1986, it expanded its existing operations and also started divisions focused upon theater, radio, music, publishing, and online media. In addition, Disney has created new corporate divisions in order to market more mature content than is typically associated with its flagship family-oriented brands. The company is best known for the products of its film studio, the Walt Disney Studios, which is today one of the largest and best-known studios in Hollywood. Disney also owns and operates the ABC broadcast television network; cable television networks such as Disney Channel, ESPN, A+E Networks, and ABC Family; publishing, merchandising, and theatre divisions; and owns and licenses 14 theme parks around the world. It also has a...
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...The Walt Disney Company: A Corporate Strategy Analysis Written by Carlos Carillo, Jeremy Crumley, Kendree Thieringer and Jeffrey S. Harrison at the Robins School of Business, University of Richmond. Copyright © Jeffrey S. Harrison. This case was written for the purpose of classroom discussion. It is not to be duplicated or cited in any form without the copyright holder’s express permission. For permission to reproduce or cite this case, contact Jeffrey S. Harrison (RCNcases@richmond.edu). In your message, state your name, affiliation and the intended use of the case. Permission for classroom use will be granted free of charge. Other cases are available at: http://robins.richmond.edu/centers/center-‐for-‐active-‐business-‐education/research/case-‐network.html November 2012 "Walt was never afraid to dream. That song from Pinocchio, 'When You Wish Upon a Star,' is the perfect summary of Walt's approach to life: dream big dreams, even hopelessly impossible...
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