INTRODUCTION
Much of the literature about the liberation struggle in the South-East Lowveld has documented different counter strategies by the RSF but propaganda as one of the strategy has been partially covered. The study focuses on Rhodesia Front government’s propaganda as a counter insurgency strategy to the guerrilla activities. Propaganda is the control of public opinion. There are three types of propaganda that is white, grey and black propaganda. White propaganda is the dissemination of the truth to someone’s advantage, grey propaganda is the mixture of lies and truth and black propaganda consists of largely but not total lies. All these types were exploited upon implementation of propaganda at different levels through different tactics. Psychological operations which were executed as forms of propaganda involved planned use of communication through words, symbols and actions to influence the behaviour of the targeted audiences and achieve set objectives. The government’s use of propaganda warfare was prompted by a number of reasons which ranged from economic, political, social and military factors. It is worth noting here that, the tempo and conduct of the war varied from one locality to the other depending on the terrain and proximity to strategical areas like borders, transport networks and close to government’s administrative offices.
The study is presented in three chapters. The first chapter outlines the reasons for the introduction of propaganda warfare in Chilonga in 1970. It majors on the motives behind implementation of propaganda warfare before the intensification of the war in the area. Various tactics used to execute propaganda and strategic roles served by different types of propaganda machines is the main thrust of chapter two. Different tactics were employed to execute propaganda because it was dynamic responses to new situations that arose which required new solutions. The last chapter analyzed the effectiveness of the strategy in cutting the guerrilla-civilian interaction. Furthermore, in the same chapter the reasons for the failure and success of each and every tactic used to disseminate propaganda has been discussed. It is also concluded by an analysis of propaganda as a useful tool in war situations.

GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF INVESTIGATION
The area of study is Chilonga which is in the South-East Lowveld of Zimbabwe. During the liberation struggle it was the South Eastern part of Gaza province which was under the Rhodesian “Operation Repulse”. The operation was launched as a counter offensive against guerrilla infiltration in that part of the country. Chilonga area is adjacent to Runde River which runs from the western to eastern part of the area. It is less than 50km from Chiredzi town where government offices are located and it was less than 100km from Rutenga. It is also again more than 100km from Mozambique border and is adjacent to Gonarezhou National Park and Save area under chief Tshovani. The proximity of Chilonga to the Mozambican border, South African border, Chiredzi town and its accessibility through road networks like the South Africa- Rutenga railway and South Africa via Ngundu road to Harare are the major road networks. Locally, there was Malipati to Chiredzi road, Chibwedziva to Boli, Chilonga to Chiredzi and Chikombedzi to Chiredzi commonly called “Binya Road”. All these road networks make Chilonga area easily accessible.
The weather pattern is characterized by very high temperatures with little rainfall ranging between 300mm and 450mm per annum. The area also falls under Region Five which is hot and arid. It has clay and loam soils which are suitable for agricultural practices under irrigation and cattle farming.
Chilonga is next to sugar estates that include Triangle, Hippo Valley, Mkwasine and cattle ranches such as Edenvale, Nuanetsi and Gonarezhou National Park which constitutes its economic importance. Coupled with that, the study evaluates the Rhodesian propaganda as a counter insurgency strategy in such an area with harsh climatic conditions and its successes or failures.

JUSTIFICATION
The relevance of the topic is based upon the statement by N. Bhebhe and T. O. Ranger who remarked that much of the history of South-East Lowveld part of Zimbabwe has not yet been fully covered. J. H .Bannerman echoed the same sentiments in his article about the history of the Hlengwe people. The little that has been covered has to do with the contributions of the civilian population, ZANLA forces, the commercial sugar plantations and landmines among others. Coupled with that, the researcher found an avenue and engulfed the bank of knowledge that was existing in the area particularly the Rhodesian propaganda campaign. This gap of knowledge and information was a serious omission to history. So the researcher has attempted to fill the gap in the form of Rhodesian propaganda machine. However, propaganda is not a new phenomenon in history in general and the art of war in particular. Scholars like J. Fredericks, H. Ellert have written about it citing separated examples from South-East area and majored mainly on the North-east. This is a niche where the researcher has identified a leeway.
A number of counter-insurgency operations have been written and these were in the form of Rhodesian Security Forces, protected villages, and closure of borders among others. Propaganda as counter-insurgency operation has been partially covered in Chilonga area. To avoid generalization the study focuses on the use of propaganda at a small scale that is departing from what has been written by others who mentioned it covering the whole country as a case study. Other scholars gave pedestrian references but this study has taken a different route. Coupled with that, the paper evaluates the impact and strategic roles served by different propaganda warfare tactics employed from 1970 to 1980 as a psychological weapon to forestall guerrilla- civilian contact.
The kick-off year 1970 is when news of an uprising in the form of war reached its peak in all regions. This is because from the 1960’s there were the so called nationalistic skirmishes. In 1966 with the outbreak of the Sinoia (Chinhoyi) battle between RSF and ZANLA guerrillas the war was not yet a mass war but by 1970 the whites had sensed that the war could spread from North-East where it started to South-East Lowveld. The Rhodesian government officials sensed the likelihood of the war spreading to that area, hence the launch of pre-emptive propaganda warfare in 1970. This was implemented in advance before the opening of the Mozambique border in 1975 to hoodwink the minds and win the hearts of the people before the guerrillas could reach them. The other reason that influenced the launch of propaganda so early was the fact that the RSF had bilateral relations with the Portuguese forces operating in Mozambique. They supported each other and cooperated in fighting against black insurgencies along their common borders to avoid domino effect should one of their respective countries succumb to guerrilla attacks. Pamphlets were dropped by the Rhodesian government as early as 1970 in the area carrying Rhodesian propaganda. Newspapers, Selous Scouts (SS) and Special Branch (SB) members were used to spread propaganda to the people during that period. Considering that, the study begins in 1970 so as to create more space to effectively trace the background of Rhodesian propaganda machine and its impact even though the war had not broken out fully fledged in the area.
The cut-off year 1980 is when universal suffrage elections were held and brought independence to the state of Zimbabwe. That phase sealed the fate of the RF government and then ceased to influence people to support the regime. The RSF had lost the game of winning the hearts and minds of the people. In addition, RSF had also lost the control of state media outlets in 1980. Given that scenario, it is suffice to evaluate the impact and roles of the Rhodesian propaganda warfare from 1970 and end in 1980.
Concentrating on Chilonga geographical area, the researcher was avoiding generalization by focusing on a small area. This marked the point of departure from the works of other writers, who also wrote about Rhodesian propaganda. The researcher found the topic holding much substance by focusing on an area that had not been studied in greater details.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The study sought to achieve the following: * Assess the background to the introduction of propaganda warfare in Chilonga from 1970-1974; * Examine the tactics used to execute propaganda and the strategic role of propaganda as a counter-insurgency strategy from 1970-1980; and * Evaluate the impact of Rhodesia Front government propaganda machine from 1970-1980.

LITERATURE REVIEW
A number of scholars have written about Rhodesian propaganda including J. Frederikse. She wrote that ZANLA propaganda was a counter measure to Rhodesian propaganda. The point of departure was that this topic is going to evaluate the impact and the roles served by the Rhodesian propaganda machine unlike what has been done to compare it to ZANLA propaganda. This study has analyzed RF propaganda as a supplement to “Operation Repulse” which was launched in 1976. Frederikse gives journalistic perspective of the liberation struggle. She vividly depicted and illustrated Rhodesian propaganda using photographs and leaflets in short stories. This book immensely informs and inspired the researcher. It gave a lot of insights and pointers. She did a general survey of the Rhodesian propaganda machine but this topic focused on Chilonga area as a case study.
N. Bhebhe wrote a section of Rhodesian propaganda and gave a few tactics used to execute it that is through churches aligned to the Ian Smith regime. He used examples from the Tribal Trust lands in North-East only that is Mtoko, Mt Darwin and Shamva Districts in his book where he discusses about the role of the Evangelical Lutheran Church during the liberation struggle and the role of ZAPU and ZANLA forces. The point of departure from him can be clearly noticed in that this study discusses the reasons for the introduction of propaganda in Chilonga area and goes beyond what Bhebhe has written particularly tactics used to execute propaganda warfare. He concentrated on the role of the church and touched little on the Rhodesian propaganda in North-east. This is a leeway which has been exploited by the researcher through beefing up what has been left out.
The macabre practices of the RF government were written by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. It was a civil society organization that concentrated on the cases of human rights abuses by the incumbent Rhodesian regime. Rhodesian propaganda was mentioned but from a different angle to the one that this research paper had expanded on. This study did not discuss the legality and atrocities committed by the Rhodesian government through its propaganda warfare. The documents compiled by the Catholic Commission gave some perspectives into the types of propaganda and some of the blames raised by Rhodesian government against the guerrillas such as the murder of civilians and then purported that the atrocities had been committed by the guerrillas. The study traces and analyzes Rhodesian propaganda as a weapon of psychological warfare in Chilonga area. The publications by the Catholic Commission immensely helped with different examples of propaganda and places where these propagandistic acts were committed and evaluate their impact but not in legal terms as the Catholic publications did. Their publications contain a lot of information on the Second Chimurenga but concentrated on the violation of human rights perpetrated by the RSF.
The ways the RF government propagated their propaganda has been discussed by D. Martin and P. Johnson. They went further to give a comparative analysis with the ZANLA propaganda. This study will take a different position in that it is going to evaluate Rhodesian propaganda in Chilonga area. The book helps to pinpoint the year propaganda started and the background to the introduction of propaganda warfare in the South-East Lowveld area. Such are the benefits the book offered. They wrote Rhodesian propaganda in passing and it was a general survey in order to elucidate that the guerrillas’ strategy and tactics were counter measures to Rhodesian propaganda offensive. The gap has been an avenue for the writer to fill through specification of Rhodesian propaganda as a counter insurgency strategy. The book was very informative and points out impacts of Rhodesian propaganda. Different phases under which propaganda was launched in response to the prevailing situation has been documented by J. K. Cilliers. It was in phases like manila interface, food control, operation split shot, offering of rewards and sloganeering among others. His work also discusses different counter insurgency measures but area of study marks the differences between the two. However the study borrowed a lot from the work of Cilliers even though he was generalizing. The activities of the Central Intelligent Organisation (CIO), Special Branch (SB), Selous Scouts (SS), C Squadron and how they operated under Joint Operation Command are well detailed in the work of M. Evans. The use of propaganda to counter guerrilla insurgency in the South-East Lowveld is inadequate as it has been written in passing. There are very few examples drawn from that area and left many of them untouched. This gap is being filled by this study which focuses on Chilonga in order to scrutinize each nook and every cranny left out by Evans. Other than that the study greatly benefited from his work for it is on the use of propaganda as a counter insurgency strategy by the RF government that was unearthed by this study.
M. Hove researched a lot on South-East Lowveld focusing areas like the contributions of the Hlengwe-Shangani people, the strategies and tactics used by both the ZANLA forces and Rhodesian Security Forces. All these works were not on Rhodesian propaganda which maps a major departure from his works. Much of the background to war in the area will be sourced from his works. The strategies and tactics he wrote about are going to be used to assess the intensity of the war.
D. Dziva wrote about the methods used by the RSF to prevent the masses from assisting the guerrillas. He detailed the role played by the RSF and the use of psychological strategies which involves the use of propaganda warfare. This study benefited from some of the strategical roles intended to be served by that propaganda. However the point of departure here is that Dziva’s work focuses on Mberengwa as a case study and it included propaganda in passing together with the role of RSF as counter measures to prevent guerrilla- civilian interaction.
ZANLA propaganda was written by P. Dhura. In his thesis he portrayed ZANLA propaganda as it was reacting more or less to Rhodesian propaganda. Tactics and strategies used to execute ZANLA propaganda were also more or less to the ones used by the Rhodesian government that is in the form of radios, newspapers, magazines and political education through political commissars. Such were the insights the researcher has accrued from Dhura’s work even though it is not on Rhodesian propaganda. He wrote ZANLA propaganda with reference to Buhera from 1976-1980. This study is about Rhodesian propaganda with reference to Chilonga area from 1970-1980. Despite the obvious differences, like him on his unintended consequences the paper will discuss the impact of Rhodesian propaganda on both the Rhodesians and the Chilonga residents.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The researcher consulted all types of sources ranging from primary, secondary, internet and unpublished source. Primary sources are oral interviews, archival materials from the National Archives of Zimbabwe and ZANU PF Archive. The major reason for using these sources was the need to seek clarification from the eyewitnesses and first hand materials from oral interviews and archives respectively. Coupled with that, there was dire need to extensively consult the two sources. Oral interviews were conducted to recollect memories and to get the general feelings of the people and this paved the way for evaluating the impact of RF government’s propaganda.
Residents of Chilonga both men and women were interviewed because they are the ones who witnessed Rhodesian propaganda. War veterans in particular were interviewed for they are the ones who were decampaigned and demonized by the government’s propaganda warfare. Former black Rhodesian Security Forces were also interviewed. As a matter of fact, this study accessed information from all angles. This method helped to assess the background to the introduction of propaganda warfare and evaluate the impact of this strategy getting it direct from the affected people.
Secondary sources were also consulted. These are published and unpublished materials. They helped to strengthen the argument, get the tactics and roles served by propaganda and to measure the impact of Rhodesian propaganda in Chilonga area. For diversity purposes and clarity unpublished sources such as dissertations and seminar papers has been used. It is imperative to note that, not only those on Rhodesian propaganda but even with ZANLA propaganda were consulted. These sources help to inform and to add some insights. The study also used internet information to help the researcher to analyze information. Internet sources were used to obtain recent additions on the topic that is Rhodesian propaganda as a counter-insurgency strategy. Recent analysis has also been borrowed from internet. Coupled with that, this helps to avoid distorting history through use of a comparison approach of primary and internet sources.
Zimbabwe Television was used because it broadcast some of the documentaries that cover the topics such as Chimurenga Files and tracing the footsteps of the legends in the liberation struggle. This source added insights and gave the researcher a pictorial mind of the actual events that took place especially when it comes to the evaluation of the impact of Rhodesian propaganda.

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND TO THE INTRODUCTION OF PROPAGANDA IN CHILONGA FROM 1970-1974.
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the reasons for the introduction of propaganda warfare in Chilonga area of Chiredzi, a district in the South-East of Zimbabwe. This will enable an easier understanding of the various tactics used to execute propaganda. From 1970-1974 Chilonga had not experienced intensive war, but as early as 1970 subtle doses of propaganda were introduced to the populace. The major reasons were the geographical location of the area; Ian Smith’s interest; experience of the Rhodesia forces who had participated in the Second World War. In addition, the sense that the chances of the spreading of war to Lowveld were high; the need to counter communism; manpower problems; misconstruing of the circumcision rites among others had prompted the early dissemination of propaganda. It is also imperative to note that from 1970-1974, it was preliminary propaganda based on white and grey propaganda to infringe the mass from adapting the north-eastern uprisings.
The fear for the spreading of war to South-East Lowveled led to the introduction of preliminary propaganda. The Rhodesian Front government had the sense that the probabilities of the war to cascade down to Chilonga were high because some of the members of the security forces had participated in Malaya, Vietnam, Burma and in Kenya where they witnessed such scenarios. Such a scenario was created by the outbreak of the Sinoia (Chinhoyi) battle in 1966, and the hit- and- run raids carried out in the North-East of the country. This led the Rhodesian government to be on guard in all areas that were likely to be affected in the event of war. As a matter of fact they had the sense that the war could spread to the Lowveld particularly when news reached their ears that some of the guerrillas were operating from neighbouring countries such as Zambia and Mozambique. This led Rhodesians to tighten control over border areas along the Rhodesia and Mozambique; and Rhodesia and Zambia boundaries. Adding to that, Chilonga which is along Mozambican border was not an exception. N. Moyo points out that, in Chilonga the campaign was initiated by Special Branch who call upon people at dip tanks and schools to brief them about their mission. He goes on to say, SB said, ‘’there are some other people who might come to you telling you that they are on the verge of liberating the country, do not cooperate with them. Before the SB’s visit in Chilonga the war situation was calm but people used to hear of the skirmishes that were occurring in the North-East. Upenyu Chimuka argues that: ‘’the atmosphere of war in Chilonga was raised by the whites themselves.” The need to prevent the escalation of those skirmishes led to the Rhodesian Front government to introduce propaganda warfare as early as 1970.
The Rhodesia Front government led by Ian Douglas Smith was bedevilled by manpower problems particularly in the security sector. The number of people needed in the army far exceeded the number that was available, hence the need for an alternate plan to assist this manpower gap. M. Evans connotes that, Rhodesian government faced manpower problems that by spreading propaganda in 1970 was the need to curtail exacerbation of the problem. This problem was caused by racist policies whereby whites in the security sector were favoured at the expense of black soldiers who later made the majority of the Rhodesian army. Perhaps, had it not been for racist policies probably they could have avoided the manpower problem by employing blacks and Coloureds as they later did. As a case in point, the conscription of Coloureds into the reserve forces in 1973 and later into the regular force in 1978 was a way of trying to cope with manpower problems. This issue is debatable, Hasani Tomu argues that, the recruitment of blacks started as early as 1968 for they were needed to go and operate in the North-East. Considering this, it might have been a slow growth for the security forces despite the recruitment of blacks hence the numbers remained few. From this it can be seen that they feared that if the North-Eastern scenario happened in their areas they will not be able to contain it hence the need to introduce propaganda warfare.
Propaganda as a counter-insurgency strategy was introduced ostensibly to counter communism in Rhodesia in general and Chilonga in particular. The fact that in 1970 the Cold War between USA and USSR was still raging on the RF government used the Cold War as a smokescreen to gain support from apartheid South Africa, USA and Britain. Frederikse quotes the Sunday Times reporting that, ‘’the Rhodesians were on the anti-communist campaign for the nationalists were inspiring people to reject capitalism. It goes without saying that, Soviet Union supports communists who are anti-Christian.” T. Mahoso once echoes the same sentiments when he said, “Van de Byle wrote a letter to Britain requesting assistance from the commonwealth members to aid their war effort. He purported that they were fighting against anti-Christian in Rhodesia and if the commonwealth failed to assist Christianity would die a natural death in Rhodesia.” The major aim of the Rhodesian government was to gain a political mileage. To make sure that the government achieved its objectives it had to do that quickly in order to get assistance from the West to avert the spreading of guerrilla infiltration into Rhodesia from neighbouring countries. As a matter of fact, they portrayed Rhodesia as a last barrier against the spread of communism in Africa. To this end, the RF government implemented a strategic information and public diplomatic campaign that included propaganda, censorship and psychological operations to appeal to the black majority in Rhodesia as well as and gaining the support of the British commoners. The security situation was also deteriorating because of the criticisms levelled against the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 1965. In order to restore the international relations prior to 1965 level when it was still vibrant was a mammoth task yet a necessary one which they sought to achieve through propaganda. From a strategic and tactical point of view, Rhodesians were in a quandary because to win a war abroad there was a need to first win it at home. Coupled with that, preliminary propaganda was launched to win the minds and hearts of the local people and those who were abroad.
Ian Douglas Smith had personal interest in the Lowveld because he owns a farm there, hence the need to defend it. This came out after the attack on Alterna farm in the North-East in 1972; it acted as an early warning to him. Smith owned Nandi farm just outside of Chiredzi across Chiredzi River and later established Buffalo Range as an air strip in 1968. It started as a small air strip for his aeroplane and went further to construct a railway from Rutenga to Mbiza and from there to Chiredzi in 1970. This railway serves to transport produce from the farms to Rutenga where they were further transported to Salisbury. Given that scenario, there is no doubt that the railroad served the interests of other farmers as P. L. Moocraft and P. McLaughlin assert that: ‘’until 1976, Rhodesian strategy was totally defensive in conception. The objectives of the military machine were to defend Rhodesian territory against guerrilla incursions and to isolate and destroy successful infiltration.” In pursuit of that, it should be understood that the need for Smith to protect personal interests in the Lowveled led to the introduction of propaganda war as early as 1970. The situation was exacerbated to become unbearable particularly to those who were working on farms. White farmers were warned not to trust their black employees because they might be freedom fighters or supporters. The warning was contained in a lengthy pamphlet distributed by the RSF to Europeans living in susceptible areas near Mozambique border. As far as this was concerned, Chilonga was not an exception since it was closer to the Mozambican border. There was dire need therefore to politicise some other whites to avoid a situation where they were going to be caught off guard by the guerrillas without knowing that guerrilla warfare could even start among their employees. If they were to be made aware it then follows that stringent rules were going to be introduced by the white employers to control the mobility of their workers. The whole idea was to protect personal interests because if the area was to be infiltrated it then meant production was going to be adversely affected by the unrest caused by the freedom fighters. The other factor that led to the introduction of propaganda was the publication of T. O. Ranger’s book which was based on First Chimurenga and how it was to be connected to future uprisings. These works of the elite served a dual role to awaken both blacks and whites. Coupled with that, there was a need to prevent the people from supporting guerrilla principles and doctrine.
Geographical location of Chilonga led to the introduction of preliminary propaganda warfare. Chilonga area is closer to Mozambique border, Rutenga- South Africa and Rutenga-Gweru to Salisbury railway and also Chiredzi- Ngundu-Masvingo to Harare road. This facilitated quick movement of goods and people for business and both military equipments and personnel. If the area was infiltrated it follows that the whole transport network was going to be under attack. It was imperative to keep it safe hence the need to educate the people about the guerrilla activities and discourage the general public from joining them. The area was also suitable for guerrilla operations for it was with dense forest mainly Mopane trees to provide cover for freedom fighters. With experience gained from North-East Rhodesia the RSF were aware that guerrillas favoured dense forests to hide. Chilonga had such wilderness so the area was always under patrol to prevent infiltration by the freedom fighters. It also experience high temperatures and low rainfall, has clay and loam fertile soils suitable for agriculture and rearing of animals. Such conditions favoured irrigation and to protect their farming interests in this area the whites had to spread propaganda. The proximity of Chilonga to the Anglo-American Commercial plantations like Triangle and Hippo Valley Estates also made it an economic strategic area worth to be preserved. Those plantations catered for sugar, citrus and cattle farming. The effect of this was that guerrillas would be deterred to get close to these areas. If freedom fighters happen to be in the locality they were not going to get the support of local people because they would have been indoctrinated by the Rhodesian propaganda. In addition to that, if the guerrillas came in they would attack and destroy farming in the Estates. In order to prevent that, ZANLA cadres were to be countered with immediate effect through propaganda machine.
The introduction of preliminary propaganda was as a result of misconstruing the Hlengwe-Shangani cultural practices. Among them was the circumcision rite which they did not clearly understand. Circumcision rites is a cultural practice where boys and girls of the ages between 18-30 years would undergo for manhood and womanhood tutelage so that they would grow to become effective future fathers and mothers .The practice is well known as ‘’Komba” among the Hlengwe-Shangani people. The territorial forces thought that if these youngsters went there they would not come back and instead they would get recruited to join the guerrilla forces or would be sent to Mozambique so that when they come back they will initiate uprisings in the area. This was aggravated by the outbreak of the liberation war in 1972 as a sustained campaign in the north-eastern parts of Rhodesia. This forced the RF government to design a broad policy framework to win the minds and hearts of ordinary African people especially rural people. This culminated into the passing of the Emergency Powers Act of 1973 in which the government could change the policies if need be with little consultation. As a matter of fact, circumcision rites were promulgated illegal from 1972 up to 1974 because they thought this was a strategic and tactical way of recruiting guerrillas. From that point of view, one could wonder whether the RSF get in Chilonga area when they were not practising circumcision rites. If the truth is that, they get in the Lowveld and found the Chilonga people with their culture how come that it was dubbed illegal and a strategic way of recruiting guerrillas. Muhlava Manjatame envisages that, “the whites thought that circumcision rite was a strategical way of recruiting guerrillas under the facade of cultural practise particularly considering the age of the recruited youngsters.” She goes on to say they tell people that circumcision was not suitable for their culture because it was barbaric.
The Native Commissioner for Chiredzi A. Wright used to gather people at Boli, Mukhechani and Neshuro sub-offices explaining what the State of Emergency meant to the people and that circumcision rites and lodges could no longer be established until further notice. Considering such dramatic, actions the propaganda tool was needed to keep people under check in order to deter them from rising against the RF government’s rule. The Native Commissioner used local police sergeants like Musasenyani Dengu and Mpandle Nduma as spies to search whether the people were carrying on circumcision rites at their lodges. Considering that, propaganda was a necessary tool to keep people believing and trusting the RF government.
Experience of the RF government officials during the Second World War had culminated to the introduction of propaganda. Smith himself had participated as a pilot during that war; Peter van de Byle and Clifford Dupont among others were the eyewitnesses of the war. The effect of this was that they knew very well that in war situation propaganda must not be an exception but an inclusion. As K. Flower connotes, “as the pressures of war developed, we found ourselves having to play in the more open field of counter-action. . . . We kept our counter-action in low key for as long as possible, providing disinformation . . . .” With what they had experienced during the war in Europe propaganda worked immensely to deceive the Germans into shifting their goal posts from Operation Sea Lion to Operation Barbarossa of 1940-1943. This was like a pushing experience to introduce propaganda in Chilonga.
Tactical considerations, referencing to the way the Portuguese in Mozambique were losing grip propaganda assured something better. This was an issue of concern because if Mozambique was to fall into the hands of blacks the domino effect would see people in the Lowveld becoming a problem to control their exodus to Mozambique. It was imperative for psychological warfare and grey propaganda to be implemented quickly before the RSF lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the people. The fact that, the Portuguese were losing ground to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in 1972 in the adjacent Gaza province and Tete raised the alarm within the RSF itself. In fact, there was dire need to brainwash people along the Rhodesia-Mozambique border and Chilonga was one such area of focus, thenceforth propaganda machine went into full throttle.

Conclusion
Many reasons had prompted the introduction of preliminary propaganda in Chilonga despite the state of war in the area. The way the RF regime responded to the unfolding events in the North-East could have double standard effects but the issue of major concern was to make sure that the South-East Lowveld people were not sharing the same line of thinking like taking arms against the government. They had a suspicious mind towards the Hlengwe-Shangani culture of circumcision rites and they misconstrued it to be a mind-training session for the guerrilla forces that would be sent to Mozambique with few skills of war. The imminent downfall of the Portuguese army in Mozambique led to the introduction of propaganda. The SB was the first group to use propaganda in the area as a necessary tool for warfare through gathering people at public places and educate them on the need and benefits accrued from supporting the RF government and the dangers of cooperating with the guerrillas. The tactics used to execute propaganda and the roles served by each tactic will be analysed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2
IMPLEMENTATION AND ROLES SERVED BY PROPAGANDA FROM 1970-1980.
After all the necessary preparations for the introduction of propaganda were completed, tactics to implement propaganda followed suit. The way it was executed and the purpose each tactic served is the main thrust of this chapter. Propaganda is not only limited to verbal overtones and direct physical force but it was even executed structurally. It was done through print media, electronic media, legislation, church sermons, spoken word, military displays, body displays. Also, Operation Turkey, pseudo teams Operation, Brainwash, displacement of people, hot pursuits into neighbouring countries that provided succour to guerrillas and chemical warfare. Different tactics used to execute propaganda were to serve different purposes such as to gain the support of the local population, create a hostile environment for the operation of insurgents, instil the psychological fear that the government would win and to inform the people about the atrocities committed by the guerrillas. Coupled with that, propaganda was put into action to serve all those tasks.
Print media
By definition, print media is any written information on board or paper and means to exaggerate what is written. It involves magazines, pamphlets, newspapers, leaflets, posters and stickers. The Rhodesia Front government used newspapers to carry fabricated stories of the atrocities committed by the guerrillas and portrayed the RSF as protectors of the civilians. In other words that was the mouthpiece of the government particularly the Rhodesia Herald which narrated events of the war with unmitigated bias in favour of the Rhodesian regime. E. Windrich notes that the atrocity stories were the most common form of propaganda which was used after discrediting the guerrillas as cowards and brutal. In the same vein T. Mashingaidze posits that, the hypothesis that guerrillas were said to be animals with tails that they could turn into hares, cattle, cabbage and trees. The effect of this propaganda was to alienate the guerrillas from the masses by portraying them as enemies and killers. Taking for instance the Rhodesia Herald of July 18, 1976 carried a report which reads, “RSF have killed another 24 terrorists without loss to themselves . . ., in the S.E from 1972-76 June RSF had killed 500 terrorists whilst terrorists had killed and injured almost 200 civilians in the area.” Stories of RSF killing terrorists and terrorists killing civilians were always the headlines in the press. The tactic had two dimensional effects such as to increase or improve the civil-military relations of the RSF and the civilian population and to isolate the guerrillas from the people.
It is through the newspapers where hate speech was published and black propaganda pertaining to the guerrillas. Black propaganda is total lies about something and grey propaganda is mixing the truth and lies. This was a tactic of the Rhodesians; they used both sorts of propaganda to achieve their objectives. The Herald of July 1976 carried the headline, ‘’Russians taking over key Mozambique jobs.” It then goes without saying that, Russian experts were filling all the important posts in FRELIMO government departments and they were also taking large tracts of land more than what was occupied by Portuguese. Above that the Mozambique economy was reported to be in dolldrums. Since Mozambique had attained her independence in 1975 and during her struggle against the Portuguese imperialism she was backed by Russia and other allies. The same applied to ZANLA forces who were supported by China and allies. As a result Rhodesians wanted to cut ties between the people and the guerrillas under the guise that they were being supported by communist Russia. Frederikse quotes the British Sunday Tabloid describing Mugabe Robert the leader of ZANU as, ‘’black Hitler.” All this was done to discredit the guerrillas and to gain international support particularly from the anti-communist western nations.
Leaflets were used to spread Rhodesian propaganda in operational areas and those that had high chances to be infiltrated. Leaflets were pieces of paper carrying the message of warning, informing and raising concern. It was not only written information, but also photographs of the people who were punished by the RSF after they were found supporting the guerrillas or pictures of guerrillas killed by RSF. They were dropped by helicopters and other low flying aircrafts or distributed by Special Branch group that was based in Chilonga. J. Taylor explains that aeroplanes could fly from Buffalo Ranch Airport across Chiredzi and Chilonga to Chikombedzi dropping leaflets in all these areas and upon reaching the infantry base at Chikombedzi the plane could land there. Use of leaflets started as early as 1971 in North-East of Rhodesia and by 1973 they were being distributed nationwide. The main targets were schools, shopping areas, rural council offices and other public places. These were showing close- up photographs of mutilated bodies of civilians who were purported to have cooperated with the insurgents and were killed by security forces. These communiqués were not selectively dropped but randomly dropped as Manjatame pin points, they dropped information that decampaigned freedom fighters in the forest, bush and even at cemetery areas to make sure they reach everyone knowing that the guerrillas lived in the bushes. These leaflets were to serve as the mouth- piece of the Rhodesia Front government in educating the public about the atrocities that were being committed by guerrillas. The truth of the message was another story but they were more concerned with portraying all the atrocities as guerrilla acts of savagery.
They also carry the information that discourages people from joining the guerrillas. This was fabricated in the leaflets with information like: ‘’The communists instructors have good huts, the recruits must live in the rain and cold. They have guns which they used to kill those recruits who asked about the things they were promised when they were recruited. They grow fat and have big stomachs while all the recruits starve. There is little food for the recruits in Mozambique. Those who have been there knows it all.”

Such a tactic left people confused because the message conveyed in the leaflets caused panic among the readers. Some of the information contained in the pamphlets read, “we have captured guerrilla leaders and killed almost all their collaborators on their way to Mozambique”. They wanted to create a situation that would frighten people and refrain from going to Mozambique. To instil hatred between the civilians and guerrillas, leaflets carried information about the cruelty of communist countries who backed the guerrillas. For instance, “Socialism will take away your property, what Russia promises people are lies but will own all your properties instead”. This was a clever propaganda ploy to counter that of the guerrillas because they were arguing that they wanted to take back their land from the whites and give to the blacks. As a result, they countered with the message that they would never get anything out of the communist promises. This was out of the realisation that communism could thrive well amongst the needy people of which land was what the blacks needed most.
The communiqués in the leaflets served to raise support for Rhodesia in the international community. This was because the leaflets tried to convince people that the liberation movements were not legitimate national force, but tools of communist agents outside the country. They were also geared towards diminishing the popularity of ZANU and its leaders and they sought to isolate guerrillas from the general populace of Chilonga. Moyo says that he could vividly remember one of the leaflets that was dropped at Chambuta School in 1975 by a helicopter which was flying very low just above tree tops. He went on to say that the message reads, the people who are coming to you purporting to be liberators are not but they want to come and introduce dictatorship government from Mozambique and Zambia. On top of that, they are also infected by veneral diseases which they are spreading to your wives after raping them and they will eventually die. They are paving the ways for their evil communist masters who are in Mozambique to come and take your country away from you. This tactic was like a whistleblower to the Western nations sympathising with the Rhodesia Front government to intervene. Also, they wanted to reduce the morale amongst the guerrillas because if they happened to come across such communiqués they would feel very demoralized despite their propaganda which they also spread through pungwe’s and songs.
Through leaflets the government also advertised offering of rewards to the people who provided information of the whereabouts of guerrillas or their weapons. Allan Savoy noted that, land was the binding force between guerrillas and civilians and in order to cut those ties they resorted to offering of rewards as a carrot to attract people to work closely with the RSF. The rewards were offered in either cash or kind. They were not only restricted to cash and kind but failure to report the presence of insurgents it attracted punishment either corporal or imprisonment. This was code- named the carrot and stick method used during the war in Vietnam. Carrot was the rewards that attracts people and stick was the use of force to coerce them to divulge information when need be. J. Herbst echoes the same sentiments pertaining to the importance of land to the people by saying that, “land was the central issue in the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe.” To cut these connections between the freedom fighters and the local populace of Chilonga people were to be impressed by giving them something thus the carrot and then stick was introduced. Cilliers notes that, leaflets with such kind of information were distributed at the early stages of the war at intervals with the first 900,000 leaflets and 2,000 posters distributed between May and April 1974. These were spreading reward news with an eye and mind catching statements to the extent of having debatable results as far as the need to scoop more rewards was concerned. T. Kirk posits that, “some of the statement reads, government will pay substantial rewards to anyone who volunteers secret information which leads to the capture or death of terrorists or their supporters and weapons.” This was a tactic of luring the people to sell out guerrillas and their supporters. Therefore it was a way of getting information from the civilians despite the fact that the information showed double standard effects whereby those people who were greedy for money were tempted to betray others. The leaflets were also dropped in Tribal Trust Lands like Sengwe, Ndowoyo, Save, Boli, Gezane, Chipinda, Chiteya, Chikombedzi and camps in Chilonga which had protected villages. They were described as havens of safety and welcomed by the locals without putting into incognisant the untold miserable faced in the protected villages. The prime objective was to attract and hoodwink the world into believing that people were well catered for in the protected villages. As a matter of fact all the dossiers criticising the Rhodesia Front government were wrongly founded.
The propaganda material also contained information on safe return and amnesty offers to guerrilla forces. These were mainly distributed in the villages and bushes to make sure that guerrillas could access them. Safe return entailed an offer of guarantee against any possible prosecution of those who responded to the amnesty offer to return home from guerrilla camps particularly in Mozambique. This protected them from any likelihood of prosecution from insurgent’s participation during the 1977 even though amnesty remained a politically controversial issue. Cilliers quotes one of the safe return and amnesty offers leaflet which read: “any member of the ZANLA/ZIPRA forces who return home in peace before elections will be well treated . . . . They will be fed, clothed and given proper medical treatment . . . on no account will those returning members of the ZANLA/ZIPRA forces would be stopped from voting in the elections in April, should they wish to do so.” The tactic served as an electioneering ploy by the RF government ostensibly to garner more votes from people returning from the bush for rewards and safe return. They believed that those people who were going to return would automatically support the sitting government because it was the one that would have urged them to return home back from war to their homes.
Publication of booklets was another method of implementing propaganda by the regime. Those booklets were published by the Ministry of Information in conjunction with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The booklets had a compiled series of atrocities committed by the “terrorist”, showing brutalities to innocent civilians. The booklets were Anatomy of Terror, Red for Danger, Spear of the People and Massacre of Innocent. As a matter of fact, the Ministry of Information published a book titled Red for Danger. The booklet identifies ZANU and ZAPU as surrogates of communist expansion and was an attempt to elicit the assistance of Western Nations actively pursuing containment. They allegedly claim that guerrillas captured civilians and indoctrinate them with the communist ideology, they carried the literature of Mao- Tse- Tung and more importantly they were armed with modern automatic rifles and machine guns manufactured in communist countries as well as explosives, grenades and powerful bazookas. Should Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola succumb to communist domination, the Southern Coast of Africa would follow and the lifeline of Western powers would be pathetic. To make the case for Western involvement, the booklets had to portray the guerrillas and their activities in such a manner because the relations between the two were far from cordial, since the West believed in capitalism and the East in communism. Coupled with that, Rhodesians wanted to attract the Western hand using ideological incompatibilities to their own advantage.
The Atomy of Terror was another dossier published by the government in 1976. Flower connotes that, it was designed to portray African nationalists solely as terrorist bent on the destruction of law and order for the benefit of their communist masters in Russia and China. The government wanted to gain international sympathy through dabbing guerrillas as, “mad dogs, communist terrorist, murderers and rapists.” Painting them with a red brush was the order of the day so that financial and material support will pour into Rhodesia from the international community particularly the West if Rhodesians were to win sympathy from the west. The booklet also contained “horrific acts of murder mutilation and even cannibalism which had been committed by communist terrorist in Rhodesia.” Given that scenario, it would serve as a civil action tactic whereby the RSF would be aiming at bringing the population and armed forces closer to each other, so that they would enhance civil military relations. To this end the RSF portrayed itself as providing national security to the generality of the people per se that is why it disclosed all the atrocities committed by the guerrillas. The booklet also bears the introduction that reads: “Let no one doubt the message it conveys, torture has been a weapon of communist trained thugs against peace loving indigenous people.” All this was done to raise a concern locally and abroad. To that end, Flower posits that, in 1973, the guerrillas were avoiding contact with the security forces and concentrate on politicisation of the masses which led to intimidation at its worst. Terrorism, murder, rape and other atrocities were the order of the day. Civilian deaths were publicized by the government to add impact to its propaganda.
The use of T-shirts with Rhodesia colours was another tactic of spreading propaganda. These were massively used in urban areas and farms. Chauke argues that, the T-shirts were given to the white farmers and other blacks who supported the Rhodesia Front government like Hhlaisi Magan’a. He wore a T-shirt with the picture of Ian Smith. Some of the messages on the T-shirts read: “Rhodesia Never die, Zimbabwe –Rhodesia will win, Rhodesia is super, and Rhodesians are coming and flying over different countries!!! Look down on smiling people they drop a bomb on them.” These were the types of messages that most of the T-shirts carried. It was a calculated move to convince the minds of the people into believing that the government was about to win the war and they were worried about the security of the people which was being messed up by the activities of the guerrillas. In Chilonga those who were well known for being loyal to the Rhodesian government could get the T-shirts from Chikombedzi base where the RSF camped. Those near Lundi River could get them from Buffalo Range and in the late 1978’s they were brought to Boli and Neshuro sub-Offices for collection. The RSF thought such tactics could either impress the mass to rally behind them but in most cases the reverse was true. The T-shirts program was taken as clothing and nothing more.
Electronic media
This was a mode of mass communication through the use of radio, television, aerial broadcasts through louder speakers and mobile cinemas. Radio was extensively used by the government to churn out propaganda to compliment the print media and vice-versa. Rhodesian propaganda was churned out on Frequency Modulation (FM) band radio transmission. As a result, in 1978 the Patriotic Front churned out its own propaganda from Mozambique, Radio Maputo, Lusaka, Radio Lusaka and Angola, Radio Cabinda on Short Wave (SW) band transmission. Radio war was also popularised through promoting FM while SW was demonised. To further enhance the chances of people to access the radio news the government went on to manufacture thousands of FM only radio sets and distributed them in rural areas to Chiefs and Headmen. Under this Chilonga was not an exception. They mainly targeted the rural areas where the terrorist threat was greater. Recipients of those radio sets were exempted from paying radio licences. Another strategy used to popularise the FM sets was through employing black people as broadcasters for instance the first black broadcaster Ben Musoni whom the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) Chief Executive Directors described as “a media expert” and he usually called the guerrillas “magandanga or terrorists.” This was a strategy to make the people believe that some of their black counterparts were condemning the guerrillas hence it would be right to join the Rhodesian government and support it. Combining blacks and whites was not only first used in the broadcasting services but even the RSF also did the same. They captured blacks and used them as their cover when they were moving in guerrilla infested areas knowing that if they happen to be shot the blacks would be their cannon fodder. Some were even testifying that they had ran away from the guerrillas in Mozambique and joined the RSF because of poor clothing, ill-fed, poorly equipped and living conditions but they were enjoying the Rhodesian side. Tiane Chilonga envisages that, there was a radio programme starting at 7:00 o’clock evening where most of the guerrilla victims were giving their testimonies pertaining to the brutalities that they had experienced when they were with the guerrillas or even what they saw committed upon a person whom they knew. There was a man called Chikono Bays who repeatedly testified that he had lost his sons and daughters and his wife had her mouth, ear and hand mutilated by the guerrillas and urged the people not to join them. It was a strategy of deterring people from supporting the guerrillas. Was that possible to do to the people whom they grew up with in Chilonga and knew very well, the outcome was debatable?
The propaganda through radio was not only meant to win the minds and hearts of the black people but white Rhodesians as well so that they could invest their confidence in the RSF and government believing that the probability of winning the war was high on their side. In the same vein P. Godwin and I. Hancock contains that, RBC and RTV were very much involved in this propaganda war. Rhodesians were constantly reminded that the Rhodesian Army has more experience in guerrilla warfare than any other army in the world; its aggressive expertise is without parallel. Such kind of propaganda was to boost confidence and morale among the white Rhodesians and blacks by telling them that victory was imminent. Some communiqués were also read on the radio purporting that the RSF had killed guerrillas, captured their leaders and stopped their movement so as to cause mystification among the generality of the people.
Television was used to do the same through broadcasting footage on the contact and fire exchange between guerrillas and RSF. Towards the end of the programme there was a commentary in the favour of the RSF and the government. Communiqués were also read in news bulletins and people were shown photographs of Rhodesian officials celebrating victory over the guerrillas. This form of media was believed by very few blacks if not none at all in Chilonga except handful elites but whites were the majority who owns television. In Chilonga people just knew that there were TVs but never came across one and others were not aware of them at all. From the foregoing, it was clear that only the minority could access TV propaganda. However, in one of the films shown to the people on the evening of Monday 22 September 1975 during the main news bulletin where the film was directed by the political editor D. Pattison. The film showed a large gathering of African people men, women and children somewhere in rural district. They were addressed in Shona by a black soldier. Then military trucks arrives carrying corpses in white plastic bags and were dragged before the people. The essence of this was to intimidate people to cause alarm and despondency among and between the people thus discouraging them to join guerrillas.
After the realization that radio and television were not very effective particularly TVs in rural areas the government introduced the Mobile Cinema Unit in 1976. This was another method of waging propaganda warfare. From 1975 onwards the war in the Lowveld intensified because of the attainment of independence by Mozambique which led to the opening of the Mozambique border to the guerrillas. As a matter of fact, Chilonga was the entry and exit point to and from Mozambique via Chicualacuala. In 1974 the Special Branch had already established a base at Chikombedzi. Chikombedzi camp was next to Bulawayo—Mozambique railway. It was of strategical significance because it was a business centre 120 kilometres south of Chiredzi town and 100 kilometres from Rutenga. Only 50 kilometres from Mozambique border and is adjacent to Gonarezhou National Park closer to the Chiredzi-Rutenga road junction. This is a clear indication of that the area was a hot operational zone. Related to that, Frederikse argued that, “they wanted propaganda to be employed in hottest areas because this is where it was needed most.” At the end of 1976 the Psychological Operation Unit (POU) was formed and given the mandate to convince the masses to shun the guerrillas. To market its propaganda machine the POU employed a number of strategies such as mobile cinema unit which they dispatched in rural areas to show propaganda films to the peasants. The strategy came out after the realization that the radio and television were failing due to the fact that there were very few people who owned such a media particularly in Chilonga.
This was done inconjuction with the Ministry of Internal Affairs which in 1972 had launched a research programme in the local people’s history so the POU had a lot of information about the local people. In Chilonga in particular and South-East Lowveld in general J. H. Bannermen was a historian who researched on the history of the Hlengwe people between Save and Lundi rivers. Coupled with that, the Chilonga people’s culture was well known by the POU. The films screened to the people showed the RSF killing the guerrillas and telling locals that if they collaborate with the guerrillas they would suffer the same consequences such as being killed, jailed or punished. They also screened the RSF tracking the spoors of guerrillas using sniffing dogs until they caught them on their way and they arrested them. In addition to that, the RSF soldiers alleged to have the capabilities of reading the truth from one’s forehead when asking about the guerrillas. This was a ploy to neutralize and eliminate the guerrilla organisation from the people both locally and abroad. Films were used to frighten people so that they would follow the regimes interests no matter how right or wrong were they. By and large most of the villages in Chilonga had access to the films. People in Chilonga used to gather at Chambuta School, Boli, Neshuro and Velemu watching those films. They could also gather people at chief’s homesteads for example at Chilonga, Marhilele, Sengwe and Tshovani’s homesteads to watch films. Coupled with that, it was clear that propaganda was waged through the Mobile Cinema Unit in the Chilonga to increase media coverage in the area which was too far behind.
Aerial broadcast through louder speakers was another way of executing propaganda warfare which the RSF used. The Security Forces could take two or more on board in an aeroplane and they would shout out their names, how they abandoned the guerrillas and the good life that they were experiencing with the RSF. Besides that, there were other blacks who broadcast hate speeches from flying helicopters or Dakota planes. Chauke vividly describes some of the blacks who were residents of Chilonga and others were not whom he heard spreading the very same message through aerial broadcasts. He said, Sarudzai Muzamani, Hleketesani Muleji, Chisasa Hoba and Reuben Rwavachati were broadcasting in one of the days. They were telling people that they had run away from the guerrilla camps in Mozambique because of the untold sufferings such as lack of food, clothing and outbreak of diseases among others that they faced whilst they were there. These people further discouraged others from joining or supporting the guerrilla. Taylor argues that the captives would start from Chiredzi to Chikombedzi spreading the news and at times people got frightened because they had no knowledge of aeroplanes upon hearing the sound of it they could get attracted and listen to the message being broadcasted. They could also broadcast the names of well known guerrilla leaders in the area that they had killed them and captured many whom they were leading. The message portrayed the Darwinism theory which emphasises the superiority of whites over blacks as indicated by the failure of guerrillas to operate successfully against the whites because they were unbeatable in terms of tactics. Such was the type of propaganda broadcast to convince people into believing that their RSF were superior and were winning the war.
Judiciary Legislation Tactic
These were laws, rules and regulations which the government promulgated to control the information disseminated by the media and manipulated the news and information allowed to reach the people. Bhebhe says that, internally the government introduced strict counter insurgency measures in 1972 against the guerrillas and the peasants who supported them. It impose collective punishment on the villagers, if any one was suspected of collaborating with the freedom fighters the culprit was supposed to raise the spot cash fine and if fail their livestock would be seized instead. The need to impose punitive punishment against failure to provide information on the whereabouts of guerrillas was to solicit support from the Chilonga residents. Since the only way one could avoid losing livestock after failing to provide the required information was to tell them something or anything. Another role that was to be served by such a tactic was the need to raise the war effort of the government from the locals. Cash fines were used as salaries for the RSF. Livestock was the source of food. They slaughtered cattle, goats or ship for the relish of the Security Forces. Also, for psychological reasons they wanted the peasant’s morale to dwindle since their livestock were being forcibly seized as form of fine after failing to provide information on the presence of the guerrillas. From an African perspective in general and Chilonga in particular livestock is a form of wealth and their life solely depends on them. Peasants rely on agriculture for their food survival. Such a policy was against their beliefs. It was a strategy to weaken the peasant’s morale, reduce the food production levels which they believed was used to feed the guerrillas. Furthermore, the RSF also wanted to create enemity between the guerrillas and civilians by portraying the guerrillas as people who caused their livestock to be confiscated. Arguing that, had it not been for the guerrillas whom the RSF were looking for possibly people could not have been punished for failing to provide information about the presence of guerrillas. Given such a scenario, it was a two-fold tactic implemented by the RF regime to alienate guerrillas from resources and the local people.
In 1973 the situation was different within the government’s judiciary system, for they introduced the Emergency Powers Regulation Act. This was a law which gives the government the right to implement regulations and change rules without consulting other arms of the state whenever it was necessary. Evans describes the Act as draconian piece of legislation to fight Chimurenga. As a result, the law allowed imposition of collective fines, detain suspects, control labour, food supplies and movement of the African people. This was a ploy to rush against time for it would take so long for the government to gazette new laws but it would take a shorter time to impose laws and regulations as and when necessary without consulting the legislators because it will need ample time to do so.
Censorship of information was another method used by the Rhodesian regime to prosecute propaganda war. No information was supposed to be published without first censured by the Ministry of Information. Some sources were restricted access to journalists and failure to comply would attract a heavy fine. P. Bruce envisages that, in 1975 after the Portuguese lost political power in Mozambique the Rhodesia Front government wasted no time to introduce legislation to deal with the situation. In April 1976 the Rhodesian government reimposed the censorship on local press by a system of punishing offenders, making them pay a fine of 10,000 pounds or 5 years imprisonment for contravening the regulation. What they only wanted was to make sure that it was only the government’s information churned from the Ministry of Information that circulated locally and abroad. The key aim being to create a closed society where people would be given one side of the story without having access to the other side, thereby ended up accepting what was there. This tactic was initiated mainly after 1963 when the Rhodesians were planning unilateral independence from Britain. From 1965 when UDI was launched there was dire need to inform and influence the World about the progress made by the Rhodesia government so that it would be recognised under international law. As time lapsed, stringent press censorship was introduced. As a case in point in 1978 all the material relating to the liberation struggle and the RSF’s operations intended to be published locally and abroad was supposed to be approved in advance by the Ministry of Information. The situation was exacerbated by the failure of the Internal Settlement of 1978 which led the government to tighten the military censorship to either end the war or win the allegiance of the people. Coupled with that, Emergency Powers Act of 1978 invoked the publication of information on the war against terrorism by any non government actor but it would only be done by safe sources such as parliament, the courts and or official communiqués. To make sure that the order was complied with, at Neshuro Office there were law inspectors to monitor trespassers. This was a clear indication of propaganda being forced into the people whereby they only wanted their objectives to be achieved. Denying a variety of views and reports from different people was a clear sign of propaganda war aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people.
Banning the publication of newspapers like the Moto, Umbowo and the deportation of Mambo Press editor of the Moto magazine Michael Traber was another way of propagating. This was due to the fact that it was illegal to publish anything that may contribute to spreading alarm and despondency. The government wanted all people to be exposed to its own sources of information only and repeatedly control their ways of thinking so that they would not find a home in guerrilla doctrine. According to Windrich censorship was also an essential prerequisite for tyrannical administration as alternative points of views were not broadcast or published. One would like to argue that, the Rhodesia Front government was far from promoting democracy where freedom of expression is not by chance but a fundamental right for everyone. In 1975 the government banned the publication of the Civil War in Rhodesia by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. Janice McLaughlin was denied her application for a resident permit. In addition to that, Peter Niesewand a freelance journalist was detained for allegedly breaching security regulations. Above all, journalists were denied access to hot areas particularly the BBC, European and American journalists in general. If journalists had no access to operational areas it then follows that only the government publications were going to be read and heard by the world hence depriving the guerrillas of international sympathy and support. However, in 1979 censorship was relaxed for a period of elections only to foreign journalists but the locals remained abided by it. By so doing that they just relaxed the international tension that they had freed or liberalized the airwaves yet alas it was just a piecemeal, a face server to gain sympathy overseas whilst locals were negatively affected.
Indemnity legislation which was passed in 1971 and re-enacted in 1978 was another method of controlling the minds of the people. At its inception it was called Indemnity and Compensation Act which gave the State, employees and appointees immunity from criminal prosecution or court action for harm done in good faith such as to suppress terrorism or maintaining public order. Such was the strategic role which the law served to protect the RSF from criminal litigation that could lead them to be sued. The law was there to protect them for it was selectively applied. Equality between blacks and whites before the law left a lot to be desired. It pointed back to their aim of only winning the war disregarding the circumstance. As a result, such legislations left the door open to abuses such as torture or murder of civilians in order to get information about guerrillas. In pursuit of this, what matters most was the information that they wanted but also the circumstance under which information was being obtained was another story because perpetrators were protected by the law. However, the law left a lot to be desired as far as the effects were concerned particularly the type of information that they would get and the image of the law enforcements organs among and between the people. In so far as the morale of the soldiers was concerned they wanted to boost it by guaranteeing RSF members immunity from prosecution because they were fighting a just war according to the Indemnity Law. In light of this, the Rhodesia Front government might have been influenced by a theory that goes: An average human does not like killing each other neither by nature place himself in the way of bullets. Most of them do not think that killing others is right, so there is the need to portray the enemy as evil so that they would have the zeal to fight the enemy. Considering this the government opted to motivate its fighters by making them feel secured by the law.
To reinforce the message of cash rewards which was in the leaflets the government declared it a policy to reward people with cash if they provide information about guerrillas and their weapons. In 1974 rewards ranges from 300-400 Rhodesian dollars. This was not only confined to cash rewards alone but even punishment for failure to do so. The Law and Order Maintenance Act was amended on the basis that anyone alleged to be a terrorist would be sentenced to 20 years in prison and will be changed to 30 years or death sentence. This was the speech of Desmond Lardner Barke the Minister of Law and Order. Making this a state policy was the need to convince people that the government was not luring them to give information without rewards at the end. By so doing that the government in general and the RSF in particular were improving the civil-military relations as they would be working together to fight the guerrillas and the RSF would appear as the saviours to society.
The introduction of Martial law in 1979 was an electioneering ploy to contain people and make sure that they had access to government propaganda only. In 1979 there was no freedom of movement, association and organisation to create an atmosphere of free political activity. This was the general display of raw power to the general public. If one reads between the lines it was something else. Since elections were about to be held there was massive churning of propaganda through banning ZANU and ZAPU opposition parties and the rest were supporting Smith/Muzorewa’s government. It was also under the martial law to keep ZANU and ZAPU banned so that there was room to victory for Smith/Muzorewa’s government.
Propaganda was also disseminated in churches. A considerable number of churches in South-East Lowveld that were initiated by whites and had originated from Western countries were used as hunting ground for the supporters of RSF. Churches like the Church of England and the Dutch Reformed Church in Tshovani Township Chiredzi were used to justify and support the government’s actions. These churches were aligned to the RF government, so they used biblical sentiments to dupe people into believing that the RSF’s actions were justified for they were fighting against the evil the terrorists masquerading as freedom fighters. In line with this, the gospel of prosperity was always preached, that if the country is not in turmoil its people will prosper but if guerrillas continued to kill people you are going to face poverty because of the instability that the insurgents will cause in the name of liberating the country which was already free. Such was the message from the preachers to motivate and arouse hatred against the guerrilla forces and turn to the RSF as their protectors as it was even sanctioned by God.
Spoken word
This was another medium of mass communication used to spread propaganda. It can be a message from Selous Scouts, Special Branch, Guard Force or Native Commissioner with the intention of informing people about something. The use of harsh language by government officials to describe freedom fighters was the means to neutralize and alienate the guerrillas from the civilians. When government officials were addressing meetings they used derogatory terms like, ‘’communist terrorists, baboons, thieves and communist thugs,” to describe freedom fighters. Mashingaidze echoes the same sentiments that, “the freedom fighters were described as animals with tails, that they could even turn into hares, cattle, cabbage and trees.” The need to create enemity between the two groups that is guerrillas and civilians was the key aim to the use of such abusive language. Public speeches were a platform to sow hatred as Wright the Native Commissioner toured the whole area of Chilonga gathering people and educate them about the guerrillas. In his speeches he compared the guerrillas to snakes that need to be removed before the people could once again find peace which was disturbed by them. Officials went on to tell the people that life in the villages would be safer without guerrillas for they were detrimental to human security but getting rid of them would bring everlasting peace and security in Chilonga. The issue at stake was to pose the RSF as the people who cared for the general security of the civilians which was under threat from the guerrillas. As a matter of fact, they said: “They were there to protect the civilians from jackals who call themselves freedom fighters.” Given such a scenario, it was beyond doubt that the RF government wanted to discredit the guerrillas and promote their own credibility through that strategy.
The RSF was alleged to have connections with scared places of Chilonga which was their guiding source. There are certain places such as Velemu and Chikhovo where there are kopjes which were believed to be difficult to climb by an ordinary person who did not belong to the genealogy of the ancestors that were believed to dominate spirits at each kopje. The Security Forces would argue that these places were their sources of information and after visiting the places if anyone happened to come across the Security forces who would ask about the whereabouts of the guerrillas if you decline to disclose the whole truth they could read the truth from one’s forehead. Due to these allegations the RSF launched Operation Removal of the Undesired Elements of the Society in around 1978. If one reported the presence of witchcraft in the area the reporter would be asked to kill the accused person while others were watching. At the end they preached to the people that they were against the people who disturbs peace and stability that most of the people were enjoying under the RF government. People were urged to report the presence of guerrillas and promised that their personal details will not be disclosed and nothing would happen to them because they were protected by the spirits of the area. This was a way of trying to use African beliefs to win the minds and hearts of ordinary people for their own good. The RSF had realized that the Chilonga people highly respected and believed in sacred places symbols and objects.
Despite the use of sacred places the RSF purported to also have the support of the spirit mediums such as Lisenga Chilonga, Dhabhu, Nwathlavule, Ntonintoni, Chirhomo, Hlomulo, Matsilele and Matsikule among others in Chilonga area and others who were well known outside the area. The key issue was to turn the African religious beliefs to their own advantage. Believing in spirit mediums was not only common among the Shangani people of Chilonga but even in north-eastern parts of the country during the 1896-97 First Chimurenga uprising spirit mediums were intensively used in the person of Mbuya Nehanda and Mkwati among others. In the Eastern parts of Africa in Tanganyika by then the modern day Tanzania during the Maji-Maji rising of 1905-7 Kinjikitile Ngwale was dominating as a spirit medium who guided the war. Coupled with that, the RSF had all this history in their minds that is why they used spirit mediums in Chilonga. They either used bogus spirit mediums or purported to have their support. To this end they used trusted people such as civil servants to persuade the villagers that crop failure was due to the anger of the ancestral spirits displeased by the villagers who assist the guerrillas. As a result, until they change their habits they were going to face serious problems of drought. The government was the only one that can rescue the people from such tragedy provided they work with it seriously.
In pursuit of this, if they were to cease to support the guerrillas’ rain would come in Chilonga and the government will relief people from hunger. This was a strategic ploy to motivate the Chilonga people to support the RSF with the much needed information and alienate themselves from guerrillas. As a matter of fact, the RSF were portraying themselves as the people who wanted to remove all political, social, religious and economic problems faced by the people of Chilonga. By and large they would be actively involved in assisting the people to sustain a better life. Therefore, the messages from spirit mediums were used as a smokescreen to hide the aims and objectives of the RF government. The essence of this was to reinforce the message that was also carried by the leaflets.
For propaganda to be effectively implemented there must be a repetition of certain words in order to direct people to the principles of the government of winning their minds and hearts. Sloganeering was the only way to achieve this. It was launched in the last phases of the war that is in 1978 during the Internal Settlement Talks. It was further massively used in 1979 during the drafting of the new constitution. The RF government slogan went: “That is what the people want, Forward with the Internal Settlement, Down with terrorists, Down with communist and its thugs.” The need for people to support Internal Settlement and the constitution led the sloganeering tactic to be massively used. This was in line with the view that for propaganda to be effective it must be repeated and simple to understand. Adolf Hitler the Nazi leader upon realizing the importance of sloganeering as an instrument of conscientising people wrote, “the intelligence of the mass is small, their forgetfulness is great, they must be told the same thing thousand times.” Even ZANU had its own slogans such as, “Forward with ZANU, Down with the Puppets” to counter the Rhodesian slogans. From this, it was clear that sloganeering was a way of executing propaganda.
Slogans were conducted when people held a meeting. To begin a speech one has to start with a slogan and songs. Songs were used to relieve pain among the people and to boost morale. The Rhodesian Forces had their songs which they sang to inform people of their aim of fighting and to encourage unity so as to win the war. Frederikse has one of the songs that goes: “Rhodesia Never Die
The story of Rhodesia, a land both fair and great.
On the 11th of November an independent state,
This was much against the wishes of certain governments,
Whose leaders tried to break us down,
And make us all repent”
Chorus
‘’We are all Rhodesians, And we will fight through thick and thin. . .”
From the song people were encouraged to keep fighting until victory and also urged to unite against the enemy. The people were informed that there were others who did not like the way Rhodesia attained her independence in 1965. These were words of encouragement which could boost morale among the fighters and relieve pain. ZANU had also its own songs which it used to do the same to the people such as; ‘’Zimbabwe can only be liberated by a gun . . . or Let us not be fooled by the ongoing talks among Smith and his puppets Muzorewa and Chirau . . .” The idea behind being the need to demonize each other, so it was the battle of winning the support of the masses. Songs were sung at meetings and even on radio and TV.
Military displays
Military displays were used by RSF as a propaganda tool during the liberation war. The government exhibited the invincibility of the army to the public so that the ordinary people would fear the army. The tactic was started as early as 1970 when the RSF started campaigning in Chilonga. They used to call upon people at dip tanks, schools and other public places where they could display their capabilities. This was done by the Special Branch. They even shot at a tree using different types of weapons. At the end they would conclude by saying that never find yourselves involved in a confrontation with the RSF you saw how they shot and kill with their sophisticated weapons. The essence of doing so was to exhibit the invincibility of the Rhodesian military and the vulnerability of the guerrillas. In the same vein at such occasions of military displays there will be some other people confessing their experiences of ill-treatment and torture by the guerrillas. The essence of this was two- fold it was to show what the RSF could do when dealing with their enemies and protecting civilians. The second aim was to discourage anyone who might want to be a guerrilla from joining them. In 1970 there were inter-shot competition held at Clever land Range in Salisbury and the Rhodesian Army emerged as the victors. That issue made the headline news on June 20 to 22 in the Rhodesian Herald newspaper. This was also intended to boost morale among the Rhodesian white civilians, locally and abroad by demonstrating that the army was highly skilled to the extent that they were not going to lose the war. Body displays
The RF wanted to make sure that ordinary people were aware of the capabilities of the RSF and the atrocities committed by the guerrillas. Body displays were used as propaganda to the masses. Through this tactic corpses were displayed at public places where they could be seen by anyone passing by. These people might have fallen prey to RSF or guerrillas. The tactic of displaying corpses disturbed people terribly as some of them were naked and people were asked to view the bodies. Some of the bodies were hardly recognisable because some had their faces completely destroyed. A case in point was the Beitbridge incident where an alleged guerrilla corpse was displayed at a police camp at an open space near the fence where it could be seen by everyone passing by the road. Alongside that body was a coumflage and a Russian made automatic rifle. Besides that, dead bodies were dragged by helicopters like the one that crossed Chilonga from Buffalo Range airport to Chikombedzi grounds with four corpses hanging from the helicopter at a level of approximately ten meters above trees. In addition, they killed cattle alleging that livestock were used by the guerrillas as cover during the night to attack white owned premises. Guerrillas used to hide among a herd of cattle with black clothes so that anyone seeing the cattle would just think that the cattle were foraging without herd boys. It was realized that where cattle passed by there would be an attack or something get missed. This was a tactic of deterring people from associating with guerrillas fearing to become the next victim and get their body dragged. Benson Chikukwa was one of the people who were shot dead by the RSF because he was suspected of collaborating with the guerrillas after he had quit driving for the Rhodesians in Mwenezi. Also, Chikukwa’s son had gone to Mozambique with the guerrillas so he was punished for that. Chikukwa’s body was displayed at an open space at Chikhovo and Masivamele village. All the people were asked to go and see the work of RSF to sell-outs if they catch you up. By and large, RF government tried all means possible to remove the favourable conditions for guerrillas through causing havoc and threatened the people so as to keep them away from guerrillas.
Operation Turkey
Operation Turkey was a code name given to a situation whereby the masses were denied access to basic commodities. The operation entailed the closure of rural stores, schools, hospitals, butcheries, restricting people to go to their lands and look after their livestock. This was done under the auspices of the need to create enough room for the RSF to effectively search for guerrilla collaborators. Some of those institutions were believed to be masquerading as public commercial service providers yet they were feeding points for guerrillas where they could get food, information and recruits. Some of them could pretend to be shop assistants during the day spying the activities of the RSF and become guerrillas at night. This was also followed by mobility control measures to prevent people from getting food from nearby villages such as Save, Maliphati, Chipinda and Chicaulacaula. Schools such as Chambuta, Maliphati, shops at Boli, Chikombedzi, Mwenezi, Neshuro and Chilonga were shut down. People were forbidden to look after their livestock and were moved into the bushes, drinking water in Runde River. They ate crops in the fields, others died after drinking poisoned water. To fully control the movement of people RSF introduced protected villages (PVs) and removed people from their residential areas where they were believed to be assisting the guerrillas. To this end, curfews were imposed. No one was supposed to be seen outside of the PV after 6:00 pm. The RSF wanted to isolate guerrillas from the masses and their resources arguing that hospitals and clinics were shut down because the staff were being attacked and harassed by the guerrillas. Bhebhe posits that, the peasants were told that their closed institutions would operate if they give information that led to the capture of guerrillas and their weapons. That was a strategy to coerce people to give information but one wonders if the information obtained through such means would be authentic or just fiction. The issue is debatable.
Upon realizing that they were duped by ordinary people the RSF implemented a strategy of testing their loyalty to both guerrillas and RSF. Pseudo teams were formed to this end that is Selous Scouts. This was a group of RSF that dressed like guerrillas, mainly black soldiers speaking Shangani, Ndebele and Shona and armed with similar guns to those of guerrillas. The RSF used to ask people the routes used by some of their colleagues when going to Mozambique. If guerrillas asked for food or the whereabouts of the RSF and how they could avoid meeting them on their way to Mozambique were the type of questions asked the civilians. If the person asked was not aware one could disclose everything to the pseudo guerrillas without knowing that he or she will be selling out. They had the duty of countering the guerrilla-civilian interaction. They were secret spies and where they were operating some other security organs were withdrawn and leave them aloof to patrol. The raids at the D16 base where the guerrillas were killed in 1977 were their efforts. The tactic of impersonation was used as early as 1970 when the SB first arrived in Chilonga when they were educating people about the dangers of guerrillas. SB moved around in company of some blacks appearing as if they were informing people yet they were searching for people involved in politics. If they found such people they would detain them. A case in point was John Hlengani who was detained and imprisoned in Fort Victoria but was later killed. There was a member of the Selous Scouts called Ngoshi who in one day arrived at Makhosi dressed like a woman wearing a head kerchief and some knitting materials. He was welcomed and given a reed mat to sit believing that ‘’she” was a lady. When he was taking his sit he fetched out of his pocket a revolver and shot Zacharia Chauke the father of that home who was alleged to have hosted the terrorists the previous night. The use of pseudo teams was a strategy where RSF wanted to find out the allegiance of the local people either to the guerrillas or RSF. By so doing they were finding out the loyalty of the people to both forces and most of the people were caught unaware and they divulged the information that the RSF wanted.
Brainwashing was another method used to win the hearts and minds of the people. It is a form of physical and psychological manipulation including suffering to twist one’s mind to believe s/he has committed an offence. The idea was to make people suffer so much so that when they are tortured they would believe in the government. As a matter of fact, people were beaten up if suspected to be a collaborator of guerrillas. In Mwenezi, Aspinias Mutangirwa was though roughly beaten when RSF thought that she was telling them half truth when they asked him about guerrillas until she ended up waffling for the sake of telling them what they wanted to hear. It was also called convert and baptise tactic whereby the RSF taught captives what to speak and urged them to spread the gospel ahead to others. They would make sure that the person’s mind had get rid of the guerrilla doctrine by portraying guerrillas as evil people who brought havoc in the area then extol the good things the RSF was doing.
Embarking on chemical warfare was a hideous policy that terribly disturbed people especially sudden deaths by the unknown cause to the people affected. Chemicals such as monoflorides were sprayed on clothes particularly demins trousers favoured by guerrillas which killed the incumbent after two weeks. This was done to confuse people. Sudden deaths without getting sick would deter people from joining the guerrillas who were dying of the unknown disease. Water sources such as wells, boreholes were poisoned or were sabotaged especially boreholes whose shafts were removed. Chemicals used were manufactured at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland by the department of Pathology in the faculty of Chemistry. This was unacceptable to the people for the Rhodesians interpreted it as a result of the anger of Chilonga ancestors who were not pleased by the people who caused instability. Therefore, guerrilla fighters were dying of the unknown disease in the forest. Such was the kind of messages that the locals were being told by the RF government. From this, RSF would urge local people to desist from joining guerrilla warfare because it was against their ancestral spirits.
People were moved away from their residential areas particularly those who were adjacent to the border. Those who were living in Chicualacuala, Muphapha and Crooks Corner faced eviction in 1978 and the areas were mined by both warring sides. People were displaced under the auspices that they wanted them to go where they were safe from the landmines and guerrillas. Yet in actual fact the RSF wanted to remove them from areas suspected to be used by guerrillas as their material suppliers. Adding to that, the RF government went on to construct a bridge across Lundi River at Chipinda Pools to link the road from Chiredzi to Sengwe and gravelled it. It was so wide and straight so that one could see a distance of some kilometres to guard the guerrillas from crossing into Mozambique from Chilonga. To prevent them from returning, their homes were razed to ground by fire and border areas were declared no-go area. People were shot on sight and this frightened the people since some of whom were born and grew up in that area. In 1977 the government implemented the “hot pursuit” strategy of invading Mozambique to cause havoc there. The RSF thought the Mozambique citizens would blame the presence of guerrillas as the cause of the trouble. By attacking Mozambique the RSF thought the locals would demand that Zimbabweans should leave their country, so that they would not find a near base for military training. This had a serious psychological effect among and between the guerrillas themselves because if they did train they would lose the war.
Conclusion
In implementing propaganda warfare the government used all tactics at its disposal in order to corner people from all different angles. These tactics had psychological and physiological effects which directly or structurally became a propaganda war. Military, political, economic, social and religious methods were used to execute propaganda warfare with the aim to isolate the guerrillas from the masses, resources so that freedom fighters would be blamed for everything that went wrong and RSF portrayed themselves as protectors of the people. RSF told people that if the guerrillas were freedom fighters why were they using force to gain support of the people they claim to be fighting for hence they were liars. Above all, RSF confiscated people’s property such as land, cattle and wives and children. In addition to that, all forms of mass media such as print and electronic were used together with other different tactics for maximum psychological effect on the people to counter-act the guerrilla warfare effort. The effects of such types of propaganda used are in chapter 3 where the RSF propaganda’s effects were evaluated.

CHAPTER 3 IMPACT OF RHODESIAN PROPAGANDA STRATEGY The Rhodesia Front government propaganda strategy to counter guerrilla-civilian interactions impacted both positively and negatively with different after effects. The Chapter focuses on how successful were different tactics and the reasons for that. If it failed why did it fail and what could have been done. It also discusses the consequences of the use of propaganda as a strategy to civilians and Government itself. Different tactics that were used to execute propaganda had different implications to the residents of Chilonga. This does not necessarily mean that it was an ill-founded strategy but it was a well-founded one for it enabled the Rhodesians to endure a protracted war from 1966-1980 whilst in control of the Government. Propaganda per se cannot be dismissed as it had failed because at face value it was attractive. As a matter of fact, propaganda was crucial to the prosecution of the armed struggle and political allegiance of the black population. In one way or the other it was not a total failure only that it had other negative implications that discredited it and the guerrillas gained the ground. Implementing propaganda through body displays and military hardware displays had double standards for the Rhodesian Government. The tactic of trying to deter people from interacting with the guerrillas was not very successful but it worked. Most of the people feared to be the next victim and get attempted so to avoid that one had just to follow the prescribed design. It had augured very well to the corpse who belonged to the village and if such was the case it was effective because the whole village would be familiar with the body displayed. The displaying of Benson Chikukwa’s body in Boli terribly disturbed the people because he was well known in the area. However, the tactic had negative effects because it was described as an unthinkable move in the Shangani culture to ask people to look at dead corpses. One woman had this to say, “it was a horrible way of trying to instil fear in us through a horrible display because according to the dictates of our culture no man should handle a dead person disrespectfully.” Chauke also concurs with that argument as he said; they failed to understand as in some instance they brought in the villages some corpses from elsewhere whom the locals did not recognise, it led people to be suspicious. Coupled with that, they lost the support of the masses because of that. It is from this analysis that one can argue that, the mental harm brought by body display could not be quantitatively measured as in the case of Beitbridge incident where a body was displayed at a police station and among those who went to see it were children, women, tourists and some residents of Messina. It had a horrible impact that it created to Rhodesia as a country in general and Government in particular. Military displays in Chilonga were the most fearsome propaganda of all types because many had never came across such type of weapons like bazookas, AK-47 and Nato (FN riffles) ever since they were born. This forced many people to support the RF government fearing to be attacked by those sophisticated weapons. Even though the economy was heavily drained of a lot of money which was used to purchase equipment used to conduct the demonstrations. It cost $20,000 (Rhodesian dollars) for the Hawker-Hunter to do the displays and paying military personnel. In pursuit of this strategy, military displays were started as early as 1970 by the Special Branch teams. It worked until 1976 when the situation in Chilonga suddenly changed and the war intensified. The display had worked before even though with little success in the end. Spreading propaganda using leaflets by RSF in Chilonga was an ill-founded move. Considering the low literacy level in the area, one would wonder why they dropped leaflets. Perhaps they wanted the few who could read to further pass on the message to others. These leaflets were written in Shangani, Shona and Ndebele and the task of dropping them was handled by the Air Force. The Rhodesian literature could not be effectively circulated in rural areas because of poor distribution. The use of aircraft to distribute leaflets was an act of desperation because it lacked direct handing of the pamphlet to the right person and explain the content in contrast, the guerrillas went on to hand their literature directly to the people at the right time and place. In response the ZANLA guerrillas introduced the Zimbabwe Magazine which was delivered directly. This method outwitted that of the RSF. The RSF method could have augured well if there was a member of the RSF in the village who would bring the leaflets direct to the people. But alas in Chilonga before the introduction of the Shangani Army in 1977 it was not effective at all. By way of diversifying languages Evans says, “of the total number, 150, 000 leaflets were printed in Shona and 350, 000 in Sindebele.” This was what they perceived to be the best but the question remained unanswered. Were they successful in attracting the masses to their side? In response to this, Muhlava Manjatame has this to say, “Most of the people had no interest in reading these letters even picking them thinking the papers mighty be hazardous.” This was realized later in the late 1977’s when the Selous Scouts started to arrive in the area using poison to kill guerrillas. Before that, most of the people were not taken in by the literature despite the fact that they were illiterate. CCJP quoted one old man saying, “They think we are stupid, we know the so called terrorists they are our sons, brothers and relatives. We know the government tells lies about them.” Adding to that, they were criticised as a waste of government’s resources and instead of degrading guerrillas it made them heroes because they were instead regarded as the people who were causing trouble to the whites to the extent of writing something on them. Given that scenario, leaflets failed to hit the ground with the much anticipated impact by the government officials in Chilonga because of high illiteracy levels. However, even though it looked like that, they did manage to win those few literates who were convinced by the message. From a strategic and tactical point of view, it will be useless to dismiss it as a total failure because they also aimed to create domino effect. They wanted the few who could read to be first converted and then they cascade the information to others that was the domino effect. The extent to which the domino effect would go was debatable but they were aiming at it even though ultimate results in 1980 proved it wrong. Use of radio and TV was only effective among the whites and very few blacks had access to that media. Most of the Chilonga people had no access to radios and TV’s let alone owning a set. As a result, propagating through this media to the Chilonga people was a waste of time but only to the white Rhodesians who had radios. Therefore it worked effectively among a few whites who had radio and television. On the other side it was a dismal failure among blacks since RF propaganda was not believed even by illiterates. It was only after the effort by the government to make sure that everyone received a radio set but in Chilonga they were not distributed widely and it remained lagging behind. As a matter of fact, the Rhodesian propaganda was countered by ZANU and ZAPU particularly ZAPU at first which had its agents in Lusaka who broadcast on Radio Lusaka threatening people of heavy penalties if they listen to subversive broadcasts. ZANU also countered by setting a Department of Information and Publicity by a means of a grant from Sweden in 1978. Prior to that Radio Maputo and Cabinda were used to churn out their propaganda. The strategy was more effective to the whites but to blacks it was quickly countered because guerrilla’s propaganda was simple and understandable as compared to that of the RSF. There is an old adage that goes: “Blood is thicker than water”, the guerrillas might have exploited that to their advantage. Another propaganda ploy that was flawed was the Mobile Cinema Unit which showed films to the people in the rural areas. These were watched at Chikombedzi, Neshuro and Chilonga business centres and at schools. What they did was only to entertain people at night but when they walk away from there after the end of the film they went on to attend pungwe’s with the guerrillas. The plan was well laid but the impact it had was not so effective as compared to that of the guerrillas despite the number of people who watched those films. Frederikse quoted one of the film operators Lawrence Moringay who argued that, the films had no effect to the people. The people knew that the Africans were the majority and hence should lead the country hence dismiss everything. He went on saying that, the people did not want to see things like the guerrillas being killed for they were supporting them. Chilonga echoes the same sentiments by saying, people could just attend and watch, assessing the methods used by RSF to track and how they extracted information about guerrillas and we will then disclose all that we have been shown to the guerrillas at the pungwe’s. Other guerrillas also attended the mobile cinema shows. The Government believed they were showing those films to the civilians but did not know that we were with them among the civilians. After realizing that they were not convincing people effectively the Government went on to show the people who were staying in PV’s but it was to no avail as they failed to cut guerrilla-civilian interactions. As far as psychological effects were concerned anyone who watched those films got affected to the extent of that most of the people lived in fear of the RSF for they had shown them their capabilities. If it was a failure per se it could not have lasted long and also it enabled to blindfold others who joined the RSF because they appreciated the drills and skills. Coupled with that, films had come a long way but only served a small part of the war. The fact that it was introduced at a time when the war intensified shows that it was a well known tactic to have a punch even though they were proved wrong. The closure of public institutions which was code named “Operation Turkey” had ripple effects to both the government and the general public. Shortage of basic commodities like food led to the outbreak of malnutrition and other potential diseases. Stores, grinding mills, clinics, schools, boreholes and transport were problems for they were shutdown. It is very clear that by exposing people to such problems the RF government was alienating itself from the masses instead of alienating the guerrillas from the masses. Instead of starving the guerrillas by making them to go without food, it was the masses that suffered at the end and the government paid the price during the 1978 Internal Settlement, 1979 Constitution and 1980 Election where Rhodesians and their puppets were heavily rejected by the people. Furthermore, the same tactics backfired on the government itself in 1979 December to early 1980 when the election holding centres were few because some schools, business centres, clinics which could have been used for polls were closed. It was a setback to the number of people who were expected to participate in the voting. According to their plan they wanted people to go and vote whilst the messages of propaganda were ringing in their minds and to this end polls were to be conducted in a very short time before they could find out that they were being fooled. Operation Turkey dashed their hopes. T. J. B. Jokonya concurs with that argument saying that; whilst the government was thinking of pushing the people to support them it backfired. Instead of attracting people, it divorced itself from them for the guerrillas used that gap created by the government to win the allegiance of the people who blamed the RF Government for the closure of institutions and they did manage to outwit the government. Therefore the strategy failed. The use of spirit mediums as a mechanism of spreading propaganda exposed the RF Government’s hidden true colours. When they were writing information on leaflets which claimed to be coming from the spirit mediums one wondered if the spirit mediums were capable of writing at all let alone using typewriters and entertaining whites. The fact that some of the statements were targeted at improving the relationship between the masses and the RSF and some of the spirit mediums used like Dhabhu were bogus. Henceforth, their messages were doubted. Also RSF claims of having direct links with scared places were quickly dismissed because they were aliens to the dominating ancestral spirits in the areas they purport to have links with. Coupled with that, the strategy worked when taken at its face value but was later rejected as the people got used to war the truth began to emerge. It was unbelievable for the spirit mediums, well known for fighting and supporting the cause of black people to be seen helping aliens. The First Chimurenga mediums like Nehanda and Mkwati had rejected that and fought a war for the black people not whites. Given that scenario, using bogus spirit mediums was contrary to the customs, tradition and values of black people in Chilonga in particular and Africa in general. That tactic was a dismal failure for RSF. Publication of pamphlets carrying atrocities purportedly committed by the guerrillas proved effective during its initial stages. Most of the white Rhodesians in South-East Lowveld were convinced that the guerrillas were committing crimes against humanity and also the international community was also convinced. As a case in point, the famous booklet “Anatomy of Terror,” was seen as a sound idea when it was published but it was poorly presented. It only mentioned the atrocities claimed to have been committed by the guerrillas with little or no coverage of the acts of RSF’s counter measures and success as if they were not in a war with the guerrillas. It was quickly countered by the guerrillas who went on to publish their own liberation literature despite that it was forbidden to do so by the RF Government through its censorship laws under the Emergency Powers Act. ZANU responded by publishing Zimbabwe News, Zimbabwe Review, Chimurenga Song Books were released, the Star Africa News and Calendars, “ZANU The year of the people.” Those publications were used to spread all the activities of the guerrillas such as the raiding of a beer hall at Triangle Sugar Estate. The guerrillas distributed the entire beer to the local population amid the allegations that the beer hall belonged to the racist terrorists of the Smith regime. All this was carried in the ZANU publications and people were updated about the successes of their freedom fighters. This helped the mass to compare with what they were told by the RSF and it emerged that the RSF were lying to the public to gain their support. The safe return campaign which was parroted in leaflets was successful only to a less extent. This was because the people did not return in their numbers but send very few and others waited to see if the ones who had gone first were to be offered safe return by the government. Tomu remembers vividly how they were told of it when they were in the bush. He has this to say: “We heard of it but we were told that some were already sent to verify if they were going to be offered anything but we then heard that the guerrillas were not offered anything but were killed, captured or imprisoned. This created fear among us and we remained in the bush soldering on with the war. Maybe our leaders wanted us to keep fighting to the last man despite RF government efforts to end the war; we were supposed to end it not the Rhodesian government to end it. The strategy worked only to a certain point. It did brought a trickle of disheartened combatants from the bush but did not produce the predicted flood or tide of deserters from the guerrilla camps. Considering this, it would be strategically flattering to dismiss the tactic as a total failure. By virtue of that it attracted very few people it worked successfully because a half of a loaf is better than nothing. However, the insurgent movements were not hurt. Young men and women continued to leave the rural areas for training in Mozambique. Those who remained in the bush after realizing that others were not offered amnesty promised to them, they remained in the bush calling for more reinforcements. The paying of money to villagers who provided information about the guerrilla whereabouts and their weapons had twofold effect. The tactic in the long run led people to betray their neighbours in order to get cash. That had happened to the schools manager at Chikombedzi who was killed in cold blood after he was allegedly suspected to have connections with the guerrillas and was shot died. The extent of success was difficult to assess as the guerrillas were apt to use similar methods of psychological and physical blackmail. Tomu agrees that rewards do not go long because of fear of the guerrillas who were killing the people who sell them out. As others were lying to the RSF to be rewarded with the money which they would later use when they were in the bush or gave it to the guerrillas. In addition, it strained government finances. The Rhodesian propaganda was countered by that of the guerrillas particularly through songs and slogans. RSF songs were not so attractive to the people as compared to that of their counter- parts. Guerrilla fighters were guaranteed support by the masses because if they were to win the masses would also benefit from the final success of guerrillas. Therefore the RSF’s propaganda lost its credibility. The guerrilla songs like ; “Ngatiregedzei kunyengedzwa nehurukuro dzinoitwa naSmith ne zvimbwasungatazvake Sithole, Muzorewa naChirau . . . Let us not be fooled by the ongoing talks between Smith and his puppets Sithole, Muzorewa and Chirau . . . OR; Gidi chete ndiro rinosungura Zimbabwe . . .; Zimbabwe can only be liberated by the gun . . .” These Chimurenga songs had a meaning to the majority of the people to the extent that, the “Rhodesia Never die” songs were neutralised and reduced to nonsense because they failed to bring out the benefits of the black majority in the post war era. It only portrayed that the whites were the only people who were to enjoy the cake of post war era of which the majority were fed up of living in a country dominated by whites in all walks of life particularly landlessness. RSF’s interference with the Shangani culture was another terrible blunder. The banning of circumcision rites left many in quagmire for they were used to practise their culture without interference from the authorities. Rhodesians regarded the practice as evil, immoral and this was an insult to their Shangani culture which they had practised since time immemorial. This further aggravated the situation because Shangani people were angry over being prohibited from hunting and fishing. It was beyond reasonable doubt that the whites were anti-Shangani cultural practises. P. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin assert that, “white Rhodesians were generally contemptuous of African culture although there were training courses on African customs for most soldiers and policeman an unbridgeable gulf of misunderstanding persisted.” When the RSF used spirit mediums it was after the realization that the Shangani people strongly believed in African tradition. Little did they know that they had messed up when they banned circumcision rites from 1972-1974. Coupled with that, when they started using spirit mediums in 1975 it was directly contradicting to what they had done before. This revealed lack of respect of the culture of other people. The guerrillas sought to use the Shangani culture in their war effort and were successful because they respected the “komba” or circumcision rites and never interfered with it as the RSF has done. The RSF divorced themselves from the people through their policies and they were overtaken by the guerrillas in the battle of the supernatural for both sides were competing to have control of the Shangani traditional culture to their own advantage. Had it not been that, the government’s propaganda could have augured well if they had taken the Shangani culture into incognisance and worked with it in an African way. Failure to do so was a monumental failure to control of the minds and hearts of the people. As far as the ultimate results of the war were concerned, it was clear that the RSF failed to grasp the root cause of the war and the major driving force or motive behind nationalists. From this one can argue that they misconstrued the propeller behind the African nationalism and the basis for the uprising. The government failed to understand the deeply felt grievances of the rural people as the root cause that had constituted a large part in the Rhodesian society. L. W. Bowman posits an argument that, the Rhodesian psychological warfare campaign was fatally flawed by false belief of the government that the black insurgents were the tools of Soviet imperialism. Yet the crucial political impetus of Zimbabwean nationalism was fused with radical African populism. Therefore they were too far from the reality of the radical African populism that it was the driving force behind the nationalists rather than communist doctrines they thought to be the major motivator. It is from this that Evans argues that, the regime could have managed to win militarily but politically failed a thing which Von Moltke in the 1890’s had failed to do and made Germany pay the price in the 1914-18 war. The campaign provided clear evidence of the lack of grass root support for the Rhodesian psychological warfare. Despite hundreds of thousands of leaflets distributed and millions of Rhodesian dollars spent and soliciting Bishops of churches to spread propaganda in Chilonga they wasted time and resources because of poor background of the strategy. Their failure to understand that land was the major cause of the war and that the guerrilla war was intensifying in the rural areas made the RSF to improvise poorly founded tactics which were unsuitable to the situation on the ground. Coupled with that, the Rhodesian propaganda had a self- defeating effect.The South-Eastern Lowveld people in around 1950’s were moved from their fertile lands and pushed further down south- wards where there was dangerous animals like elephants, lions, hyenas, baboons among others. Soil was infertile and unsuitable for cropping. They were dumped near Mozambique border and their former lands were allocated as Estates to white conglomerates that are Mkwasine, Hippo Valley, Triangle and Edenvale Ranch. Coupled with that, the peasants wanted their land back but the government seemed to have casted a blind eye and a deaf ear to people’s grievances and regarded the war for land as a Cold War. That was a poor card to bet. As a result, the guerrillas and nationalists were promising the rural folk that they will get back their fertile lands if they gave enough support to the liberation struggle until they defeat the colonialists. By so doing that, they cemented their guarantee of support from the Chilonga people who wanted to return to their former lands and practises such as hunting, colleting honey and fishing which the government had banned. Therefore labelling freedom fighters as terrorists was to no avail because the Chilonga people wanted their land which was turned into commercial plantations and ranches of the Anglo-American companies back. Considering this, the so called “terrorists” were actually freedom fighters for the people of Chilonga because they were fighting for a just cause that was land. It is from this scenario that one can argue that one’s terrorist is another man’s liberator. The government vainly stirred up racial hysteria through cooked up tales of colour conflict while ignoring the massacres of innocent Africans for no other crime than fighting for their basic political and social rights. That move had incensed the masses. Displacement of local people and raids into Mozambique failed to produce the desired results. The strategy was initiated in the early 1970’s when the RSF was detaining people found to be active in politics and others were banished from the homes. In 1975 the Rhodesian Government was displacing families or the whole village if they suspected villagers to have collaborated with freedom fighters. People from Mavuve village were displaced and settled near Mozambique close to Gonarezhou. The government after 1977 embarked on reducing recruits to the guerrillas so as to cripple the war effort by encouraging recruitment of labour for the South Africa’s gold mines so as to move the males’ south- wards to get employed rather than to swell guerrilla ranks. This was done inconjuction with the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) which recruited most of the young boys in Chilonga even though others evaded it. Freedom of movement was restricted, the level of violence was acute and many deaths go unreported. The tactic had failed to fully forestall people from going to Mozambique and get recruited by the guerrillas as hundreds of people have fled from their rural homes some cross the border to Mozambique and South Africa. These people would later join the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe while in refuge. Some of their ways of crippling the guerrilla recruitment base encourages many youths to go to Mozambique. Intimidation through instilling fear was the most effective propaganda warfare but in the long run it backfired on the RF government. When interviewing people about the whereabouts of guerrillas a person was taken on board in an aeroplane where he/she was asked to disclose everything that s/he knew about guerrillas. If the person on board fails to do so they could intimidate the person that they can drop him down. In fear the person may disclose everything and ended up lying in order to avoid get dropped. Because of that people lived in fear everyday and others even decline to tell the guerrillas the truth so as to protect the government amid the fear that they would be punished by the RSF. As the war continued propaganda through intimidation turned civilians into neutrals taking no sides waiting to see whether the terrorists were freedom fighters or RSF emerge as victors. People were left in a quandary but 1978 saw it all as the Internal Settlement was unanimously rejected and the 1979 constitution. People were tired of colonialism. The country was under white rule for almost eight decades and the people of Chilonga had sacrificed and they were prepared to die fighting for their rights. The brutal treatment and exploitation of the economic resources of south-east Lowveld by colonialists was heavily resented by the Chilonga people. Bhebhe contains that, colonial deprivation and oppression over the years had been so much that when peasants saw their own sons who were not well armed with Chinese and Russian guns who were willing to die, they also endure any type of counter measure by the Rhodesians. The fact that, people were under colonialism for a long time any move to justify colonialism was useless because they had already alienated themselves from the people before the war as in the case of the Chilonga. When Smith was forced by events to embrace political realism and eventually to gain broad support with the Internal Settlement it was too late to do so by 1978. The guerrilla cadres were already too deep in the popular sea to be defeated politically. Given that scenario, the people were ready to withstand any challenge until victory their ends meet. Propaganda could have worked well especially the displacement of people from susceptible areas had it not been the rolling back of the Portuguese in neighbouring countries. The Portuguese were defeated in Angola and Mozambique. That had a psychological effect on most of the guerrillas who bubbled with confidence that they could do it as their neighbours in Mozambique were successful. Again, the invincibility of the Europeans was proved wrong. Adding to that Mozambique opened the border to the guerrilla cadres to go there and conduct their trainings and to take refugee. People were given hope that the liberation process though painful would materialize soon into freedom as Mozambique and Angola had done. Considering that, it had no doubt that the RSF were overwhelmed because the “go east” spree was a threat beyond their control. So propaganda ended up losing substance as the people went to Mozambique en mass with easy and free entry. One could guess that the opening of many entry and exists points along the Mozambican border left the Rhodesians in an untenable situation as invading Mozambique had failed to effect. The RF government failed to deliver services to the people as they had promised. Their propaganda was very attractive but difficult to implement. This caused the people to resent any government policy. A case in point was the 1978 Internal Settlement. Even though locals were given a platform to present their grievances to the Native Commissioner, those grievances were just given a cold shoulder. It was a calamity because the RSF were labelled liars because their promises never came to fruition. Neither did the RSF provide emergency aid such as medical or veterinary services which were possibly within their capabilities. It was from that, that one can argue that if propaganda was accompanied by service delivery it could have worked. But because the propaganda was contrary to the expectation of the masses everything came to a standstill and all systems were rendered dysfunctional by Operation Turkey. Black propaganda or information based on falsehoods in general, is contrary to the survival of history but the RF government massively used it. They misrepresented facts tell the total lies about African people in general and Chilonga people in particular. A case in point was the battle in Eastern parts of Rhodesia in which seven civilians were killed, it was represented in a communiqué issued by the regime’s Combined Operations Headquarters as, ‘’security forces had killed four terrorists and seven collaborators.” The effect was that it distorted history since personal details like names were omitted and figures were farfetched from the truth which shows that it was blatant lies. By denying the Shangani people from practising hunting and circumcision rituals, the RSF government was destroying the Shangani culture to be passed on to the next generation. The state controlled media always talk of the atrocities committed by the guerrillas but rarely gave the other side of the RSF. It then appeared as if the RSF were not retaliating. Taking for instance, the bombing of Mavuve village near Gonarezhou just close to Mozambique in 1977 it was not reported because it was RSF who did that. The clampdown on publications came at a time when the government was desperately trying to create a good image to the outside world. It appears that any information likely to tarnish the government was ruthlessly suppressed. By and large the RF was committing suicidal policies and discredited itself from the International World sympathising with them to their intentions. Propaganda in general had managed to boost morale among many white Rhodesians. The fact that the war took so long was the continuous upholding of supporters morale through portraying RSF as heading towards victory. Such kind of propaganda had little effect on the blacks but it did work on the whites who were in commercial plantations and ranches. The rapid increase in the number of printed leaflets appeared as if they were in high demand so as to boost confidence of the government officials who believed that their propaganda was successful as the number of people it entertained increased little did they know that they were being duped by their representatives. The call for anti-communism campaign was a strategy to rally white opinion behind the government but not a solution to end the war that would enable the Chilonga people to take back their land. Their method impacted positively among the whites but to the blacks who were the majority it left a lot to be desired. Therefore, instead of yielding positive results for the government the RF milked its economy as a lot of money was injected into supporting fruitless efforts to convince the masses. R. Mugabe once commented that, the Rhodesian economy was already in shambles, white farmers were emigrating en masse the morale of Smith’s army was collapsing by 1978. As a matter of fact, whilst the government was more concerned with causing alarm and despondency it prevented people from getting the truth about the war. Selous Scouts or pseudo guerrilla teams sent by the RSF Government had effected to some extent. This is because they were successful in capturing a lot of information which led to the capture of many guerrillas and bombardment of several sites in South-east Lowveld. They operated clandestinely and were successful particularly in their early days before the people got to know them. They could dump poisoned food in the bush or give it to the shopkeepers to sell to guerrillas and most of them were caught off guard. From this it was clear that pseudo teams were effective. Hove contains that the raids at D16 base where the guerrillas were killed on 26 February 1977 were the result of pseudo operations. During this raid air and ground forces were used in an engagement which lasted two and half to three hours. This tactic did not last long because it was well read into the 1978’s and then started to lose the grip. The nationalists started to emphasise on unity among the black majority because the Selous Scouts were successful in dividing them for they went on to sell out each other. They argued that the enemy managed to rule because they were united, but in the 1978 they were weakened and the majority of Zimbabweans were behind Chimurenga and can defeat them despite the hardships. Such kind of guerrilla propaganda managed to win the minds and hearts of the people at the expense of the government effort through Selous Scouts. Coupled with that, that was how and why Rhodesian propaganda lost its meaning at the deep end where it was mostly needed. Use of protected villages and curfews proved to be effective as it caused problems among the guerrillas, a thing which it was implemented for. The argument is based on the fact that PV’s were regarded as a pure means of population control rather than as a basis for winning the hearts and minds of the people. It was a way of cutting guerrilla-civilian interaction. As far as meeting that purpose was concerned, it did its best even though it got flawed at the end. The guerrillas had managed to get inside the protected villages and got the food, medicine, cigarettes and information from the PV’s especially at Chikombedzi where they knew that they would get some medicine from the hospital. Ben an interviewee has this to say pertaining to the success of curfews; it was there to curb the holding of pungwe’s as people would be in the fence from 6:00 pm to 10:30 am. Initially, the holding of night meetings with the guerrillas was halted until late in 1978 when people evaded getting into the PV’s. Death rate of RSF was reduced as they were no longer moving in the bush in large numbers but roamed around PV’s looking for guerrillas so it reduced the frequency of contact between guerrillas and RSF. Despite that, not all the people were put in the protected villages. Some resisted and remained in the forest and they were continuing with the war despite the government’s efforts to thwart it. The strategy failed to achieve its aims per se because it had repercussions to livestock. People were not allowed to look after their livestock which were left alone to wander in the forests and drinking water from Runde and Mwenezi Rivers. Asking one of the victims about their general feeling to such kind of treatment he said, “it was painful but there was nothing you can do.” Because of that, the government alienated itself from the people and PV’s were evaded and invaded by both guerrillas and civilians to the extent that they were rendered obsolete. The government propaganda used told the people lies that these villages were going to develop into growth points but from 1977 to 1979 there was no sign of that. The Government was not aware that the people of Chilonga were fighting to capture towns, to regain their land and customs which they were robbed of by the RF regime. Propaganda as a strategy was affected by the time factor. It could have augured well had the war not prolonged. The fact that, it was a protracted war many people of Chiteya, Chilonga and Sengwe villages contended that they had waited long enough for their rights to be effectively recognised but to no avail. The only option left to them was to fight. The RF’s propaganda from 1970 was full of attractive promises which were not fulfilled a thing which incensed the locals. This was due to the fact that they had ample time to assess what they were being promised by the government and what has been fulfilled and found nothing. The people wanted their land back. Their land was turned into estates and that was the bone of contention which the government failed to redress only to preach propaganda to them. The government embarked on a border minefields strategy to counter the exodus to Mozambique. That was a clear sign of that, propaganda as a strategy had failed to contain people within Chilonga. Had it not been that it had failed to preclude people from going to east possibly border minefields could have been done for other reasons not specifically to deter people from going to Mozambique. The planting of mines started in 1978 in Vila Salazar (Sango Border Post) and along Limpopo and Runde Rivers respectively to deter people from crossing to Mozambique. Cohen contains that, the intensification of the war might have reduced morale in the military because of the increasing casualty figures among white soldiers and extended military service. Considering that, it might have profoundly affected the élan (the belief of being unstoppable) of many front line units. However, in analysis morale had its ups and downs depending on the situation but it does not necessarily mean that if it was low the war was escalating or defeat was imminent. Adding to that, call ups also made people sick and tired of living in the bush leaving their families alone fighting a war that seems to be infinite. In 1979 family breakdowns increased, rise in divorce, alcoholism and suicides among others were on rise, as a matter of fact by the end of the war nearly 2000 white Rhodesians had migrated to other countries. The government had conflicting policies which were also contrary to the operation of propaganda. This was clearly demonstrated by the sudden u-turn made by Smith when he withdrew one of his famous statements which he used to swear with that goes; “there will be no majority rule in my life.” The statement was said at the height of settler strategy of divide and rule. He withdrew his statement in 1978 after the Internal Settlement and the 1979 Constitution in which he called for the inclusion of blacks. This was the benchmark of his turn and it left many white Rhodesians in a quandary as he was contradicting himself from what he used to say. As a result, people got to know that the government was using them in the game of politics and rejected all the proposals which were meant to cater for blacks but it was dismissed as a political gimmick. Until 1976 the hearts and minds approach did not include political reforms to include black participation in local and national politics. Only in 1978 when the Internal Settlement came about when Smith included Sithole, Muzorewa and Chirau into government. These were heavily criticised by the nationalists in particular and freedom fighters in general, amid the allegations that they were forwarding Smith’s puppets. When they were denounced the settlement lacked support and it revealed many loopholes of the strategies used by the RF government to corner people. It was contrary to propaganda implemented by the Psychological Operation Unit. Coupled with that, the method lost its steam. Conclusion In conclusion, it will be strategically immoral to dismiss the Rhodesian propaganda strategy as a total failure as N. Bhebhe and T. O. Ranger argues that, “. . . Rhodesian psychological warfare was half hearted and ineffective.” They seem to be influenced by the overall result of 1980 election but from a strategic stand point propaganda was generally effective but for a given period not a total failure. Propaganda enabled the RF Government to withstand such a protracted war despite its numerical inferiority. Analytically, the atrocities published by the government were a mirage of the truth because the guerrillas had killed more enemy forces than the RSF itself. Within its strategy were some loopholes such as lack of political will. It only had the military tool which was outclassed by guerrilla propaganda. In fact, the strategy was successful at its early stages but in the long run it lost its steam as the guerrillas countered it with better sounding promises. Chilonga area because of its bushy and proximity to Mozambique had experienced a tense war. The Rhodesian propaganda had served its part effectively only that some other counter strategies failed to compliment it and that the RSF were overstretched and failed to contain the problem. However, the strategy failed to hit the ground with much anticipated impact because it was poorly founded. It lacked common African interests in general and Chilonga people in particular. It was flawed as a strategy. CONCLUSION Propaganda as a weapon has been used in different war situations particularly during World War II, cold war era and post-cold war era. Coupled with that, the RF government used a common counter-strategy in warfare. It then enabled the government to endure the protracted war from 1966 to 1980. The reason behind being that, it was attractive and lured many people to rally behind the RF government. As the war went on propaganda began to fade and lost its meaning. Despite having been introduced earlier before the intensification of the war in Chilonga. Due to the government’s failure to combine military action and politics in 1980, propaganda dealt a fatal blow as they lost in the 1980 election. The government could have included local people into the politics of their districts, ceased to confiscate their land, cattle, and extortionate taxes and interfering with their cultural practises. Perhaps that could have helped the government to garner more votes in the 1980 election. Propaganda as a strategy has proved workable during the World War II when it was used by the British against the Germans. The same applies to the RF government they instilled fear among the local people in order to alienate guerrillas from the masses through publishing all the massacres committed by the guerrillas. Propaganda as a strategy in warfare was and is still useful as it is being used in the post-cold war era. Taking for instance in 2001 after the 9/11 attack the USA president G. W. Bush on 20 September 2001 argues that, “each nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” In response to this numerous nations like France, German, Britain, Afghanistan, Parkstan, China, Japan, Zimbabwe, and Uganda among others went on to introduce legislations that were anti-terrorism. Coupled with that, propaganda in warfare is a useful tool provided it is combined with military action and politics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
A.1 Archival Sources
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A.6 Television
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Martin, D. and Johnson, P., The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga war, Faber and Faber Publications, London, 1981.
Meredith, M., The past is Another Country Rhodesia 1890-1979, University of Chicago Press, London, 1979.
Moorcroft, P. L. and McLaughlin, P., Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980, Collins Books, Marshalltown, 1982.
Moorcraft, P. and McLaughlin, P., The Rhodesian War: A military History, Pen and Sword Books, South Yorkshire, 2008.
Monicks, S., “Mythologies of Terrorist Warfare,” in Assegai the Magazine of the Rhodesian Army, Vol.15, No.4, August 1975.
Raeburn, M., Black Fire: Accounts of the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1978.
Wills, A. J., An introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, Oxford University Press, London, 1985.
Windrich, E., “Rhodesian Censorship: The role of the Media in the Making of One-party State,” African Affairs Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol.78, No.310.
‘’ , The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Censorship and Propaganda under Rhodesian Front rule, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1981.
Wright, A., Valley of the Ironwoods, Cape and Transvaal, Cape Town, 1972.

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[ 2 ]. J. Lamprecht, Government by Deception: Psycho politics in Southern Africa, Tiger Maple Press, Arizona, 2002, p.106.
[ 3 ]. Ibid.
[ 4 ]. S. Monicks, Mythologies of Terrorist Warfare, in Assegai the Magazine of the Rhodesian Army, Vol.15, No.4, August 1975, p.25.
[ 5 ]. M. Hove, “A contribution of the Hlengwe-Shangani people in the Liberation Struggle in South-East Zimbabwe1976-1980”(Honours Dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2003, p.10.)
[ 6 ]. NAZ, GON: A brief description of the area, p.10.
[ 7 ]. J. Fredericks, 1981, pp. 90-93.
[ 8 ]. N. Bhebhe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, Gweru, Mambo Press,1992, pp.110-111.
[ 9 ]. Ibid., p. 110.
[ 10 ]. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, The man in the middle: torture, resettlement and eviction: civil war in Rhodesia, Harare, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1999, p.16.
[ 11 ]. D. Martin and P. Johnson, 1981, pp.107-110.
[ 12 ]. Ibid.
[ 13 ]. J. K. Cilliers, Counter insurgency in Rhodesia, Croomhelm Limited, London, 1985, p.139.
[ 14 ]. M. Evans, An analysis of Counter insurgency in Rhodesia 1972-79, Historical Association of Zimbabwe, Vol.1, No.37, 1981, p.8.
[ 15 ]. M. Hove, “A contribution of the Hlengwe-Shangani people in the liberation struggle in South-East Zimbabwe 1976-1980” (Honours Dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2003, p.8.)
[ 16 ]. P. Dhura, “Propaganda Warfare and truth: ZANLA Propaganda in the Liberation War in Buhera District 1976-1980” (Honours Dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2007, p.8.)
[ 17 ]. M. Evans, An analysis of Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972-1979, Historical Association of Zimbabwe, Vol.1, No.37,1981, p.8.
[ 18 ]. Interview with N. Moyo (Headmaster Chambuta primary by then, 63 years), Mkwasine Estate Section R, 14 August 2011.
[ 19 ]. Ibid.
[ 20 ]. Interview with U. Chimuka (former RSF officer, approx 53 years) Mkwasine Estate Section R, 16 August 2011.
[ 21 ]. M. Evans, p.9.
[ 22 ]. P. L. Moorcroft and P. McLaughlin, Chimurenga: The war in Rhodesia 1965-1980, Collins Books, Marshalltown, 1982, p.29.
[ 23 ]. Interview with H. Tomu (ex-combatant, 53 years), Chilonga Township, 14 August 2011.
[ 24 ]. J. Frederikse, None but Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1981, p.22.
[ 25 ]. Zimbabwe Television, T. Mahoso on “Africa Pride” 23 July 2011.
[ 26 ]. http:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Rhodesian propaganda war .html, accessed 17 June 2011.
[ 27 ]. Interview with H. Tomu.
[ 28 ]. Ibid.
[ 29 ]. P. Moocraft and P. McLaughlin, p. 64.
[ 30 ]. NAZ, MS 308 / 58/ 1, Rhodesian Security 1972 /1973, p. 1.
[ 31 ]. M. Meredith, The past is another country Rhodesia 1890-1979, University of Chicago Press, London, 1979, p. 136.
[ 32 ]. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, The man in the middle: torture, resettlement and eviction, a civil war in Rhodesia, Catholic for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Harare, 1999, p. 16.
[ 33 ]. Ibid.
[ 34 ]. H. W. M. Chauke, “A History of Hlengwe Male circumcision in Chiredzi and Mwenezi Districts in Masvingo Province in Zimbabwe 1840-1980,” (M. A. Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, History Department, 2002) p.123.
[ 35 ]. Interview with M. Manjatame, (war-collaborator, approx 50 years) Mkwasine Estate Section R 14 August 2011.
[ 36 ]. Ibid.
[ 37 ]. A. Wright, Valley of the ironwoods, Cape and Transvaal Cape Town, 1972, p. 386.
[ 38 ]. Interview with H. Tomu.
[ 39 ]. K. Flower, Serving secretly: An intelligence chief on record Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981, John Murray Publishers, London, 1987, p.115.
[ 40 ]. M. Balfour, Propaganda in war 1939-1945, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979, p.443.
[ 41 ]. K. Flower, Serving Secretly: An intelligence Chief on record Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, p.116.
[ 42 ]. J. K. Cilliers, Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia, Croomhelm Limited, London, 1985, p.136.
[ 43 ]. E. Windrich, ‘’Rhodesian Censorship: The role of the Media in the Making of one-party state,” African Affairs ,Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 78, No. 310, p. 523.
[ 44 ]. T. Mashingaidze, ‘’The Dynamics of Zimbabwean Struggle for Liberation: The case of Buhera District from 1950 to 1990” (Master’s Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, History Department 2001) p.99.
[ 45 ]. Rhodesian Herald, 18 July 1976, p.1.
[ 46 ]. Ibid., p. 5.
[ 47 ]. Ibid.
[ 48 ]. J. Frederikse, 1981, p. 40.
[ 49 ]. Interview with J. Taylor (former RhAF member, approx. 80 years old) Mkwasine Farm 11, 01 August 2011.
[ 50 ]. CCJP in Rhodesia, “Civil war in Rhodesia: Abduction, Torture and Death in the Counter insurgency Campaign”, 1976, p. 19.
[ 51 ]. Interview with M. Manjatame.
[ 52 ]. NAZ, MS536/11/14, “The man and his ways,” by N. J. Brendon, p. 10.
[ 53 ]. Ibid.
[ 54 ]. Ibid.
[ 55 ]. CCJP, “Rhodesia, The Propaganda War”, 1979, p.5.
[ 56 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 57 ]. D. Dziva, ‘’Methods used by the Rhodesian Forces to prevent the Masses from the Guerrillas during the Liberation Struggle with emphasis on Mberengwa District, 1976-1980” (M.A. Thesis University of Zimbabwe, History Department, 2003) p.53.
[ 58 ]. J. Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, University of Zimbabwe Publication, Harare, 1990, p.40.
[ 59 ]. J. K. Cilliers, 1985, p.149.
[ 60 ]. T. Kirk, ‘’Politics and Violence in Rhodesia,” African Affairs, Vol.74, No.294, January 1975, Ibadan University Press, p.30.
[ 61 ]. J. H. Bannermen, ‘’Hlengweni: The History of the Lower Save and Lundi rivers from the late 18 to 20 Century, Zimbabwean History,” The Journal of the Historical Association of Zimbabwe, Vol.2, 1981, p.3.
[ 62 ]. CCJP, “Rhodesia, The Propaganda War”, 1979, p. 5.
[ 63 ]. J.K. Cilliers, 1985, p.150.
[ 64 ]. T. Arbuckle, ‘’Rhodesia bush War Strategies and Tactics: An assessment,” RUSI Journal, 1979, p.29.
[ 65 ]. Ibid.
[ 66 ]. Ibid.
[ 67 ]. K. Flower, Serving Secretly, pp.121-122.
[ 68 ]. CCJP, “Rhodesia Propaganda war 1979”, p.6.
[ 69 ]. NAZ, MS311/15, “Anatomy of Terror, Harvest of Fear: A Diary of Terrorist Atrocities,” October 1976, p.3.
[ 70 ]. Ibid. , p.ii.
[ 71 ]. K. Flower, 1987, p.121.
[ 72 ]. Interview with E. Chauke (ex-combatant, approx. 70 years) Boli, 14 August 2011.
[ 73 ]. NAZ, MS536/12/942-953, T-shirts Late 1970’s.
[ 74 ]. Interview with U. Chimuka.
[ 75 ]. D. Dziva, p.57.
[ 76 ]. T. Hodges, “Counter insurgency and the Fate of Rural Blacks,” Africa Report, September to October 1977, Vol.22, No.5, p.20.
[ 77 ]. J. Frederikse, 1981, p.79.
[ 78 ]. Interview with U. Chimuka.
[ 79 ]. Interview with T. Chilonga (ex-combatant approx. 73 years) Chilonga homestead 13 August 2011.
[ 80 ]. P. Godwin and I. Hancock, ‘’Rhodesia Never Die”: The impact of war and political change in Rhodesia 1970-1980, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p.170.
[ 81 ]. A point raised by W. Mhanda when presenting his book ‘’Memories of a Fighter,” at the University of Zimbabwe, History Department, Seminar series presentation on 6 October 2011.
[ 82 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 83 ]. CCJP, The Man in the Middle: Torture, Resettlement and Eviction, a Civil war in Rhodesia, Catholic for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Harare, 1998, p.17.
[ 84 ]. M. Hove, ‘’A contribution of the Hlengwe-Shangani people in the liberation struggle in South-East Zimbabwe 1976-1980” (Honours Dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2003) p. 34.
[ 85 ]. J. Frederikse, 1981, p.95.
[ 86 ]. D. Dziva, p.59.
[ 87 ]. J. Frederikse, p.94.
[ 88 ]. Interview with T. Chilonga.
[ 89 ]. Interview with P. Benson (headmen, approx. 84 years) Mukhechani, 18 August 2011.
[ 90 ]. Interview with E. Chauke (ex-combatant, approx. 70 years) Boli 14 August 2011.
[ 91 ]. Interview with J. Taylor.
[ 92 ]. N. Bhebhe, The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1999, p.41.
[ 93 ]. Interview with a former Officer in the RSF (approx. 60 years) Mabelreign 12 October 2011.
[ 94 ]. M. Evans, 1981, p.13.
[ 95 ]. P. Bruce, “Rhodesia Propaganda War,” African Affairs, Vol.78, No.390, November 1979, p.45.
[ 96 ]. NAZ, MS90/12, Social Service 1978, p.2.
[ 97 ]. E. Windrich, The mass media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Censorship and Propaganda under Rhodesian Front rule, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1981, pp.84-87.
[ 98 ]. NAZ, MS90/12, Social Service 1978, p.2.
[ 99 ]. CCJP, Rhodesia Propaganda War 1979, p.4.
[ 100 ]. E. Windrich, “Rhodesian: The role of the Media in the Making of One-Party State,” African Affairs, Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol.78, No.310, 1979, p.523.
[ 101 ]. P. Bruce, “Rhodesian Propaganda War,” p.47.
[ 102 ]. NAZ, MS590/9-16, Rhodesian propaganda war, p.11.
[ 103 ]. ZANU Archives, Zimbabwe News Magazine, July-August 1978, Vol.10, No.4, p.28.
[ 104 ]. J. Lamprecht, Government by Deception: Psycho politics in Southern Africa, Tiger Maple Press, Arizona, 2002, p.112.
[ 105 ]. I. F. W. Beckette, The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency 1972-1979, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p.211.
[ 106 ]. CCJP in Rhodesia, Civil War in Rhodesia: Abduction, Torture and Death in the Counter insurgency Campaign 1976, p.18.
[ 107 ]. Financial Mail, 12 October 1973, p.2.
[ 108 ]. ZANU Archives, The Star Africa News 1976, p.3.
[ 109 ]. P. Charter, Caught in the Crossfire, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1985, p.167.
[ 110 ]. Interview with N. Nkasha (war-collaborator, approx.64 years) Mwenezi Mujuru Irrigation Scheme, 16 September 2011.
[ 111 ]. Ibid.
[ 112 ]. T. Mashingaidze, p.99.
[ 113 ]. M. Raeburn, Black Fire: Accounts of the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1978, p.176.
[ 114 ]. N. Downie, ‘’A study in Military incompetence,” Journal of African Military History, Vol.10, No.5, May 1979, p.33.
[ 115 ]. Interview with S. Madenyika (war-collaborator, approx. 68 years) Tshovani Location in Chiredzi 12 July 2011.
[ 116 ]. Ibid.
[ 117 ]. D. Martin and P. Johnson, 1981, p.105.
[ 118 ]. L. H. Gann and T. H. Henniksen, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, Preager Publishers, Newyork, 1981, p.73.
[ 119 ]. J. K. Cilliers, 1985, p.148.
[ 120 ]. M. Balfour, Propaganda in war 1939-1945, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1979, p.444.
[ 121 ]. J. Frederikse, 1981, p.51.
[ 122 ]. ZANU Archives, Chimurenga Files of Monography, December 1977, 1-14/133, p.5.
[ 123 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 124 ]. J. Frederikse, 1981, p.129.
[ 125 ]. Rhodesian Herald, 20 June 1970, p.9.
[ 126 ]. NAZ, MS311/28, Rhodesia Propaganda War, p.13.
[ 127 ]. CCJP in Rhodesia, Civil War in Rhodesia 1976, p. 18.
[ 128 ]. Interview with J. Taylor.
[ 129 ]. Interview with N. Ingwani.
[ 130 ]. CCJP in Rhodesia, 1976, p. 19.
[ 131 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 132 ]. N. Bhebhe, 1999, p.41.
[ 133 ]. M. Hove, 2003, p.34.
[ 134 ]. Interview with U. Chimuka.
[ 135 ]. Ibid.
[ 136 ]. J. Lamprecht, 2002, p.107.
[ 137 ]. Interview with P. Ben (headmen, approx. 80 years) Mukhechani, 18 August 2011.
[ 138 ]. Ibid.
[ 139 ]. J. K. Cilliers, “A critique on selected Aspects of the Rhodesian Security Forces Counter-Insurgency strategy 1972-80” (M.A. Thesis, University of South Africa 1982) p.164.
[ 140 ]. Interview with N. Moyo
[ 141 ]. Ibid.
[ 142 ]. Ibid.
[ 143 ]. Ibid.
[ 144 ]. ZANU Archives, Zimbabwe News Magazine, July-August 1978, Vol.10, No.4, p.23.
[ 145 ]. Ibid.
[ 146 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 147 ]. J. Frederikse, 1981, p.128.
[ 148 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 149 ]. Interview with N. Ingwani.
[ 150 ]. Interview with E. Chauke.
[ 151 ]. CCJP, Man in the middle, p.17.
[ 152 ]. Ibid.
[ 153 ]. J. Frederikse, 1981, p.128.
[ 154 ]. Ibid., p.113.
[ 155 ]. M. Evans, 1981, p.152.
[ 156 ]. Interview with M. Manjatame.
[ 157 ]. CCJP, Rhodesia: The propaganda war 1979, p.4.
[ 158 ]. Interview with H. Tomu.
[ 159 ]. Ibid.
[ 160 ]. Ibid.
[ 161 ]. A. J. Wills, An introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, Oxford University Press, London, 1985, p.374.
[ 162 ]. N. Bhebhe, 1995, p.57.
[ 163 ]. J. Frederikse, p.94.
[ 164 ]. Ibid., p.96.
[ 165 ]. Interview with T. Chilonga.
[ 166 ]. Ibid.
[ 167 ]. CCJP, Rhodesia at war: A story of Mounting suffering 1979, p.1.
[ 168 ]. P. Charter, 1985, p.167.
[ 169 ]. T. J. B. Jokonya, ‘’Effects of the war on rural population of Zimbabwe,” Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol.5, No.2, 1980, p.139.
[ 170 ]. J. K. Cilliers, 1985, p.141.
[ 171 ]. NAZ, MS536/12/1195-11211, ZANU/ZANLA Publications late 1970-8’s.
[ 172 ]. ZANU Archives, Zimbabwe News Magazine July-August 1978, Vol.10, No.4, p.28.
[ 173 ]. Interview with H. Tomu.
[ 174 ]. L. H. Gann and T. H. Henriksen, 1981, p.75.
[ 175 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 176 ]. L.H. Gann and T. H. Henriksen, 1981, p.73.
[ 177 ]. Interview with H. Tomu.
[ 178 ]. P. Dhura, ‘’Propaganda Warfare and truth: ZANLA Propaganda in the Liberation War in Buhera District” (Honours dissertation, History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 2007) p.35.
[ 179 ]. ZANU Archives, Chimurenga Files of Monography December 1977, 1-14/133, p.5.
[ 180 ]. Interview with P. Ben.
[ 181 ]. P. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A military history, Pen and Sword Books Limited, South Yorkshire, 2008, p.81.
[ 182 ]. J. Frederikse, p.131.
[ 183 ]. M. Evans, p.14.
[ 184 ]. NAZ, MS311/28, Appendix 29-Rhodesian the propaganda war, p.5.
[ 185 ]. L. W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White power in an African State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1973, p.153.
[ 186 ]. M. Evans, 1981 p.14.
[ 187 ]. Ibid., p24.
[ 188 ]. NAZ, MS536/1/1, Radio Broadcasts: Propaganda 1970’s.
[ 189 ]. M. Hove, 2003, p.30.
[ 190 ]. NAZ, NVC/1/1/9, Loss of land in South-East Zimbabwe as Estates were Established 1954, p.455.
[ 191 ]. ZANU Archives, Zimbabwe Magazine, September-October 1979, Vol.2, No.3, p.46.
[ 192 ]. NAZ, MS308/31/1, Raids into Mozambique 1976-1980
[ 193 ]. K. Flower, 1987, p.128.
[ 194 ]. CCJP, Rhodesia at war: A story of Mounting Suffering 1979, p.1.
[ 195 ]. Ibid.
[ 196 ]. Interview with N. Moyo.
[ 197 ]. Interview with N. Ingwani.
[ 198 ]. M. Lonely, Rhodesia white Racism and Imperial Response, Penguin Books, Britain, 1975, p.120.
[ 199 ]. N. Bhebhe, 1995, p.42.
[ 200 ]. M. Evans, 1981, p.14.
[ 201 ]. N. Bhebhe, 1995, p.42.
[ 202 ]. M. Evans, 1981, pp.154-155.
[ 203 ]. J. Lamprecht, 2002, p.105.
[ 204 ]. NAZ, MS90/12, Social Services 1978, p.13.
[ 205 ]. CCJP, Rhodesia: The propaganda war 1979, p3.
[ 206 ]. P. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, 2008, p.129.
[ 207 ]. M. Evans, 1981 p.148.
[ 208 ]. L. H. Gann, “Prospects for White Resistance,” African Report, September-October 1978, Vol.22, No.5, p.10.
[ 209 ]. M. Hove, 2003, p.40.
[ 210 ]. Ibid.
[ 211 ]. ZANU Archives, Voice of Zimbabwe 11 July 1978.
[ 212 ]. Interview with P. Ben.
[ 213 ]. Ibid.
[ 214 ]. J. K. Cilliers, 1982, p.165.
[ 215 ]. B. Cohen, The war in Rhodesia, p.485.
[ 216 ]. P. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, 2008, p.129.
[ 217 ]. ZANU Archives, Voice of Zimbabwe, 11 July 1978.
[ 218 ]. P. Moorcraft and J. McLaughlin, The Chimurenga war, p.65.
[ 219 ]. N. Bhebhe and T. O. Ranger (eds.) Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle war Volume 1, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1992, p.15.