What do you think the enduring strategic and tactical level lessons of OP HUSKY are for the British Army?

'Every soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the little battle he is to fight fits into the larger picture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole.' Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG, GCB, DSO, PC, nicknamed "Monty" and the "Spartan General".

This essay will examine a number of lessons learnt from OP HUSKY July 9th 1943 during World War II. Both strategic and tactical examples will be drawn upon in order to relate to current day/ future operations. Prior to the lessons the question requires further explanation to provide greater accuracy within the analysis. The two main areas for development within the question are the terms strategic and tactical. Strategic can be defined as 'relating to the gaining of overall or long-term military advantage'1 Tactical on the other hand can be defined as 'relating to or constituting actions carefully planned to gain a specific military end.'2

The Allied invasion of Sicily, codenamed OP HUSKY, was one of the major campaigns and naval landings of World War II. It began on the night of 9th - 10th July 1943 and was a combination of a large scale amphibious and fairborne operation proceeded by a six weeks of inland combat.

The first strategic lesson that can be learnt is the need for co-ordination and integration of all arms and services into the initial planning phase and also during the execution of any operation, a key example of evidence to support this is during OP FUSTAIN. OP FUSTAIN was a mission to capture the Primosole bridge over the Simeto river. This bridge was vital ground for both the German/ Sicilian forces and the allied troops. It was the one major crossing point that would allow for the movement of armour onto the Catina plain. The plan was for troops to be dropped by air and glider on the objective in order to secure it before it was denied by the enemy, with the position clear it would then be secured until the XIII Corps arrived up to 18 hours later in order to reinforce the isolated in place force. With the majority of the forces spread out, lost or killed on the approach, the bridge was eventually taken. With no support, in the form of logistics and man power, water and ammunition became scarce therefore forcing a withdrawal. With the bridge back in German hands the initiative had been lost and the bridge became an on-going battle until the arrival of the 8th Army3.

The second strategic lesson was the application of unity of effort, in addition to subordinates having 'moral fibre' when undertaking any operation or campaign. There are countless examples of when ego's have been put before sound logical sense at detriment to those in there command. The Allied forces lead by General Pattern and Field Marshall Montgomery where often in competition with one another rather than working as a cohesive unit. A prime example is the race for Messina to the North east of Sicily. With the axis forces withdrawing from the Island into Italy the shear volume of troops and equipment was absolutely staggering. Thousands of vehicles and equipment, including armour and artillery, not to mention the thousands of battle hardened soldiers from the various units, was successfully withdrawn without any attention from either of the commanders. Their focus was solely on taking the last main town and key port within Messina. With the American forces taking the town they then began celebrating before the Island was even clear to the north. With all this kit, equipment and more importantly experience, the campaign in Italy became very difficult when faced with individuals that had fought on the exact same terrain a year or two earlier. The term 'moral fibre' relates to those under the two key players. Other commanders should of voiced there opinions in relation to the chance for success given the amount of planning. To re-visit the Primosole bridge; Field Marshall Montgomery planned the operation in less than 24 hours, but when the situation changed with the introduction of re-enforcement of the bridge by German paratroopers his ego stood in the way of calling off the airborne assault. 4

In relation to the tactical level lessons a key take away from not only OP HUSKY, but the entire war is how effective deception can be. False information and misguidance was pivotal in diverting attention away from some of the key landing sites both during OP HUSKY and OP MARKET GARDEN. Increased bombing raids on certain locations, in addition to Humint on the ground lead to some daring but very successful missions. An example of the Humint deception was that of 'acquiring' a homeless man, putting a number of false documents on his person and dropping him off the coast of Spain. The Spanish then picked him up and immediately told the Germans about the location of the landings. Contrary to a brilliant deception plan is the fundamental error of setting patterns. Lessons learnt from OP HERRICK can be drawn upon in relation to pattern setting on patrol thus the placement of IEDS. During the campaign the axis forces worked out that between 1200 – 1300 hrs and 1700 – 1800 hrs the allies did not move. No aircraft, no ground movement and this was all because of lunch and tea. Therefore during the reenforcement of the Primosole bridge the airborne drop of around 20 aircraft tok place in broad daylight around tea-time.

The second tactical lesson that is practiced today is the need for deconfliction and control measures throughout all the assets involved in any operation. Due to the vast nature of units and allies as part of OP HUSKY there was considerable stories of blue on blue. Vast air assaults from the allied forces where often mistaken for German bombers when flying out to sea. The Americans for example took 500 casualties just on the approach on OP FUSTAIN. Other supporting evidence is from personal experience of completing TEWT's on a number of the missions. Deconfliction and control measures where difficult to draw out using modern technology and equipment. In comparison to the radio's and equipment used back in 1943. 5

The last tactical lesson is all about question 1 in the commanders estimate, Ground. Previous experiences from using various different terrains and theatres should never be forgotten or brushed aside. The Mountain Warfare aspect of OP HUSKY on and around Mount Etna set the precedence for doctrine today, but more importantly the lessons learnt and terrain encountered mirrored the campaign that was going to take place in Italy.

To conclude, OP HUSKY was a campaign that receives minimal credit in comparison to some of the major beach landings and the Normandy campaign. However the lessons that where learnt became priceless in further campaigns, not only during World War II, such as Iraq and Afghanistan today. The key take aways from this essay are as follows;
Co-ordination and Integration of all arms at every stage of planning and execution in order to maintain combat efficiency and momentum.
Unity of Effort in the objective without personal interference.
Deception can be just as effective as the kinetic plan itself.
Deconfliction and Co-ordination at all levels is vital for success.
Never disregard previous experience, learn and evolve.