Sun Microsystems case 8-10-99
Sun Microsystems:
Integrating its Own Enterprise
Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick
August, 1999
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Sun Microsystems case 8-10-99
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary
3
I.
INTRODUCTION
4
II.
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
5
III.
BUSINESS STRATEGY
8
IV.
ORGANIZATION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
11
V.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
IT organization
IT architecture
Business applications
IT infrastructure
Web-based applications
Value added of IT innovations
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VI.
FIRM PERFORMANCE
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VII.
CONCLUSIONS
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References
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Sun's vision for the future of networked computing
Figure 2 Sun Microsystems' organization
Figure 3 Sun Microsystems' extended value chain
Figure 4 Sun's IT organization
Figure 5 Sun's IT applications along the value chain
Figure 6 Sun's profitability
Figure 7 Sun's market valuation
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12
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26
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List of Tables
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
Worldwide workstation and server market shares, 1992 and 1997
Worldwide Unix market shares, 1998
Illustrative large Sun customers by industry segment
Sun's SG&A as percent of revenue, 1993-1998
Sun's IT resources
Description of web-based applications by value chain segment
Sun's comparison with industry performance
Sun's financial performance, 1989-1998
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6
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8
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Sun Microsystems case 8-10-99
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Executive Summary
Sun was originally a niche company making engineering workstations. In the late
1980s, Sun began to enter the multiuser server market, offering its products as departmental and network servers. By the mid-1990’s, it was also trying to sell highe4r end servers for enterprise applications and the emerging web server market.
As the company grew, the senior management decided that Sun needed to develop corporate IT systems to be able to manage itself as one whole company. It also lacked knowledge of the enterprise market into which it was trying to sell its high-end servers.
So Sun decided to develop its own enterprise systems running on Sun servers to improve its internal information systems and to gain the experienced needed to sell and sup[port hardware in the enterprise market.
The effort to run Sun on Sun was hobbled by management problems: creating some kind of centralized management structure to pull together the decentralized business units and requiring them to cooperate in developing the enterprise IT systems. In 1996,
Ed Zander took over as Sun’s first COO, restructured Sun to have more central management control, and started SunPeak, a project aimed at creating a complete enterprise information system running on Sun hardware. This effort was expensive and difficult, requiring the company to distribute its Oracle ERP systems across multiple servers and do a lot of custom work to make it operational. However, Sun sees the cost as justified by the experience and understanding gained.
In 1997, Sun developed the Enterprise 10000 server with mainframe-like capabilities using technology purchased from Cray. This system is much more robust than other Solaris servers, and Sun is shifting its own enterprise systems over to it. Sun is also positioning the E-10000 as an alternative to mainframes and high end servers from
HP, IBM and Compaq in the enterprise and web server market.
Sun’s motto of “the network is the computer” has guided the company for a decade, and underlies the new slogan “we put the dot on “dot.com.” This slogan emphasizes Sun’s strategy of providing core technologies (servers, Solaris, Java) and setting standards (Java and Jini) to run the Internet. Sun has repositioned itself away from the slow-growth workstation market and toward the high-growth Internet market, and its servers run high-profile web sites such as AOL, Amazon.com and e-bay.1
Sun faces strong competition from HP and IBM in the high end of the market, and from the Wintel camp in lower end servers and Internet standards but its strong corporate identity, technologies and alliances AOL/Netscape, IBM) are competitive advantages, particularly in the Internet market.
Sun’s willingness to be a testing ground for its own products causes a lot of headaches for the IT department (SunIT), but is important both for marketing purposes and for being able to provide service and support to its customers. Hence the very recent move of the Operations subunit of SunIT into the Services Division to create outsourcing capabilities for both Sun customers and for Sun itself.
1
Arik Hesseldahl, “E-bay outages cast clouds on Sun,” Electronic News, June 21, 1999.
Sun Microsystems case 8-10-99
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Sun Microsystems: Integrating its Own Enterprise
Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick
In an industry synonymous with change, Sun has had one constant vision. It's at the heart of every technology, system, software, and service we offer today--and the focus of everything we invest in for tomorrow. It's the one thing that never changes: The Network Is The Computer.TM Through open interfaces, industry standards, and platform-independent JavaTM technologies, we're working to provide seamless connectivity to anyone, anywhere, anytime, on virtually anything. "Vision," Sun Microsystems, Inc., 1998 Annual Report.
INTRODUCTION2
Sun’s vision appears everywhere—in talks by senior executives, inhouse publications, promotions to business partners and marketing to customers. Sun also lives the vision in the sense that it runs the company on its own networked hardware and software. As put by a Sun CIO, “We are like test pilots--we fly our own planes.
Sometimes we crash so our customers don't have to.”
Sun was founded in 1982 by a small group of classmates at Stanford and UC
Berkeley who named it Sun, for Stanford University Network. Scott McNealy, the current Chairman and CEO of Sun, was an MBA graduate and one of the original founders.3 By the end of 1998, Sun had grown to nearly 26,300 employees and $9.8 billion in revenues with operations in 190 countries.4
Sun's first product was a high-end computer workstation put together from standard parts and using a standard version of Unix for its operating system. The Sun workstation was a desktop machine that was considerably more powerful than a PC and therefore provided a desktop alternative to existing minicomputer systems for computationally intensive commercial and technical tasks. Similar workstations based on proprietary "closed" technologies were being marketed by IBM, DEC and HP at the time, but Sun’s goal was to provide a proprietary "open" alternative.5
In the late 1980s Sun began to manufacture large multi-user servers which were also based on open standards and the Unix operating system. By the early 1990s server
2
This case study has drawn material from several earlier case studies: Richard L. Nolan and Kelley A.
Porter, 1999, "Sun Microsystems and the N-tier Architecture," Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School,
March 4; David Farlow, Glen Schmidt, Andy Tsay and Charles A. Holloway, 1996, "Supplier Management at Sun Microsystems (A) and (B)". Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Graduate School of Business, OIT16-A and OIT-16-B, March; Mark Cotteleer and Robert D. Austin, 1998, "Sun Microsystems: Realizing the Potential of Web Technologies," Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, December 22; Robert D.
Austin, 1998, "Network Computing at Sun Microsystems: A Strategic Deployment," Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Business School, March 13.
3
Two founders left to form or manage other companies; Bill Joy, the UNIX expert from UC Berkeley is still with Sun. See Brent Schlender, The Edison of the Internet, Fortune, 139(3): February 15, 1998.
4
Hoovers Company Profiles, 1999.
5
See footnote14 for a discussion of the meaning of proprietary open.
Sun Microsystems case 8-10-99
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sales for corporate networks had grown so dramatically that Sun declared itself an enterprise server company and developed ever more powerful servers seizing on the slogan "the network is the computer." By 1997, Sun was shipping about 100 servers and
2,500 workstations a day from just one (Milpitas, CA) of its three factories. Sun's servers ranged in price from $14,000 to over $1million with estimated average gross margin of
65%, while its workstations were priced at an average of $15,000 with estimated average margin of 38%.6
Although the leader of Unix workstation and server markets, these are seen as declining markets as the position of Windows NT continues to grow in Sun's entry-level markets. Consequently, Sun is moving into new computing paradigms such as pervasive computing and the information utility which are expected to generate additional demand for higher-level servers (mainframes) while also continuing to exploit its technical and experiential edge in corporate networks and Internet computing. For Sun, networked computing sells computers in the sense that the greater the spread of computing networks of all kinds, the greater the prospect for sales of Sun's full range of computers. And,
Sun's own use of IT internally and with its customers and suppliers is aimed at demonstrating the superior scalability, reliability and price/performance of its technology for networked computing.
Although Sun is a multifaceted company with its own microelectronics, software and service divisions, this case study focuses on the computer division which we refer to as Sun or Sun Microsystems. However, because the software and services divisions are so critical to Sun's business strategy, we elaborate on them where appropriate.
II.
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
Sun operates in three product markets: Unix workstations, Unix servers, and the total server market (Unix/NT/Other). Sun is the leading firm in the traditional workstation market with 18.9% of the industry revenues in 1997 (Table 1).
Sun is also the leading firm in the Unix market for servers (from entry level to large scale) with 26% of units shipped and 24% of the revenues (Table 2). Sun's 1998 revenue growth was the highest of all its competitors in all categories of Unix servers except the midrange where it came in second to HP. Finally, Sun is ranked fourth in the total server market7 including Unix/NT/Other servers (Table 2).
Its primary competitors in these markets have been IBM and HP but new competition is developing from Compaq (DEC/Tandem) and Dell in the midrange server market (Table 1). Competitors like IBM, HP and NCR are reportedly leaving the Unix market and providing a temporary growth opportunity for Sun in what is considered a declining market overall.
6
Brent Schlender, "Javaman: The Adventures of Scott McNealy," Fortune, 138 (17) October 13, 1997.
Sun achieved a 75% year over year increase in total server shipments from 1997-1998. See Andrew
Shikiar, 1998, "Sun Surges Ahead in Server Market, Commands First Place for Total Unix Server
Shipments, Sun Press Release, July 27.
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Sun Microsystems case 8-10-99
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Table 1. Worldwide workstation and server market shares, 1992 and 1997 (percent)
Firm
Workstations
1997
$19 billion
18.9%
13.4
16.3
2.6
7.9
2.1
1992
$10 billion
22.8%
10.9
12.2
9.5
5.8
4.0
Midrange Servers
$5,000-$500,000
1997
1992
$39 billion $24 billion
8.5%
n.a.
16.8
24.2
12.3
8.1
6.5
10.6
Large Scale Servers
>$500,000
1997
1992
$16 billion
$26 billion 