Al-Shabaab Profile
Al-Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidden (al Shabaab) is a designated terrorist organisation (National Counterterrorism Centre, 2013) and part of al Qaeda, which operates in Somalia aiming to establish an Islamic Somali state(Atwan, 2013 pp.111-114).
Al-Shabaab would want to meet clandestinely with the pirates. Al-Shabaab’s need for financing, and al Qaeda’s emphasis on finding local sources, means that al-Shabaab supports pirates in exchange for receiving a portion of the pirates’ ransoms (Atwan, pp.121-126). Ports and maritime access are essential for piracy and al-Shabaab can use this as leverage for further collaboration (Akhgar, 2013 p.42). The failed US attack on an al-Shabaab Barawe stronghold and al-Shabaab’s subsequent deployment of beach defences are demonstrative of the advantages of operating out of al-Shabaab controlled ports and evidence of al-Shabaab’s ability to withstand attacks by foreign forces (Ahmed et al., 2013).
When meeting with the pirates, al-Shabaab could ask for control of the AusAID/WFP food shipment and future pirate food hauls. Over 3 million people are reliant on aid in Somalia (Atwan, p.118) and the food could be used to restore Somali faith in al-Shabaab, lost after recent al-Shabaab attacks. Food supplies could provide incentive for recruitment to the al-Shabaab cause if distributed in Somalia, or in the Somali populated areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.
Al-Shabaab would not meet with aid agencies such as the WFP. The WFP was ‘banned’ in 2009 as a result of negligent practices, where the flooding of food aid negated the Somali farmers’ opportunities to sell their harvest and ability to independently feed and establish themselves economically. Furthermore, al-Shabaab’s position towards aid agencies has been hostile since 2011 when it established the Office for Supervising the Affairs of Foreign Agencies and ‘banned’ many agencies from operating citing agencies as ineffectual and dubious (Atwan, p.117).
Both Kenya and Ethiopia are targets of al-Shabaab reprisal as they have troops in Somalia. The Westgate attack by al-Shabaab is seen as retaliation for the role of Kenya’s troops in AMISOM(Al Arabiya with AFP, 2013). Al-Shabaab has a history of attacking countries with troops in Somalia (Raghavan, 2010) and this could be used as leverage over the foreign governments if required. Al-Shabaab can use the media to threaten these governments, a common tactic seen most recently in parades of the slogan ‘Westgate was just the beginning’ (Associated Foreign Press, 2013).
The US/Ethiopian drone strike would attract reprisal from al-Shabaab and result in attacks/bombing in Ethiopia. Threatening Ethiopia with Westgate style attacks could be used as leverage to force a cessation in US-Ethiopian cooperation. Given Ethiopia has been involved in the conflict since 2006, forcing a complete withdrawal is unlikely.
Reprisal for the U.S. could move up the timetable for the planned US attacks, however the challenge here would be to ensure that the attacks are not rushed and sentiments of retaliation do not undermine the attack, normally undertaken with meticulous al Qaeda influenced precision (Cruickshank and Lister, 2013).
The worst case scenario for al-Shabaab would be for the Australian Navy to establish a maritime foothold and thus lose control over ports and finance from pirating. Previous US drone strikes have eliminated leading members (such as the 2008 assasination of Aden Hashen Ayrow), however al-Shabaab continues to function. Clan rivalries leading to internal conflicts as a result of power changes is a possible threat.
Ahmed, A, Ackerman, S & Smith, D, 2013, How the US raid on al-Shabaab in Somalia went wrong, viewed 23 October 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/us-raid-al-shabaab-somalia-navy-seals).
Akhgar, B 2013, Strategic intelligence management: national security imperatives and information and communications technologies, Burlington, Elsevier Science.
Al Arabiya with Afp, 2013, Somalia’s al-Shabaab pledge terror campaign against Kenya, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/africa/2013/10/02/Somali-al-Shabaab-pledge-terror-campaign-against-Kenya.html.
Associated Foreign Press, 2013, Al Shabaab: Westgate was just the beginning, http://www.news24.co.ke/National/News/Al-Shabaab-Westgate-was-just-the-beginning-20131018.
Atwan, A B 2013, After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the next generation, New York, The New Press.
Cruickshank, P & Lister, T, 2013, Al-Shabaab breaks new ground with complex Nairobi attack, viewed 23 October 2013 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/22/world/meast/kenya-mall-al-shabaab-analysis/.
National Counterterrorism Centre, 2013, Counterterrorism 2013 Calender - Al-Shabaab, viewed 22 October 2013 http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html.
Raghavan, S, 2010, Islamic militant group al-Shabab claims Uganda bombing attacks, viewed 23 October 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071200476.html.