Situational Analysis:

According to the United States Air Force Capital Flyer, in 1997, the Office of management and budget requested a cost comparison or A-76 study, over a three-year period that would affect 700 military and civilian positions within the Federal Government and military entities. The A-76 study reviewed the supply and maintenance operations to determine the effectiveness of maintaining these positions as military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian entities or privatizing the positions through outsourcing. Contrary to popular belief an A-76 study is not contracting. Its purpose is to create cost savings for the DOD through a competitive sourcing program. “The A-76 circular mandates that the government procure commercially available goods and services from the private sector when it makes economic sense to do so”. (A-76 Cost Comparison Overview, p.1, 2002). The cultural makeup of the organization is active duty and federal employees. The A-76 was implemented before our retirement, we would like to revisit the process and research the outcome and its affect on the organization and its members.

This research will uncover some of the problems associated with A-76 studies/processes outside of cost effectiveness. This study will provide the effects outside of cost savings, it will demonstrate the negative affects it has on federal/military personnel jobs, civilian pay, training and the morale of the organization.

Premise:

The outsourcing/A-76 study was implemented to save governmental dollars and increase privatization and competitiveness within the industry. We believe the cost became progressively greater than what the DOD had predicted. In the Schoefield article Warren reported, “in 1998, DOD projected that these savings could amount to over $6 billion by fiscal year 2003 and $2.5 billion each year thereafter” (pg. 33).

Disclaimers:

Views expressed in this research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government of the Department of Defense.

WORK PLAN I – Applied Research Methodology:

The primary research will come from data collected from an interview with the base historian, books, and the US. General Accounting Office. Additionally, an analysis of a 6-question survey instrument, administered to a randomly selected group of individuals, working on a military installation will provide the backdrop of our premise. Other sources will consist of accessing library databases (including online databases), using professional publications, and credible websites.

WORK PLAN II – Core Course Content:

Research will follow the schedule outlined below, as well as integrate various areas of the core curriculum for the Master of Arts in Procurement and Acquisitions offered by Webster University. Specifically, we will examine how the government closely examines contractor’s proposals to assess their ability to perform the contract in a timely, and efficient manner and most importantly at a reasonable cost (PROC 5000). In negotiations, we will identify and discuss the contractor’s cost, price, and the awarding of contracts with the best value to the government. Also, we will discuss knowledge of the solicitation, source selection and the evaluation process that DOD used to award the A-76 contract (PROC 5860). Pricing and contract integration is a more detail analysis on cost/price and recognize the positive and negative effects of competitiveness and privatization (PROC 5870). Lastly, we will discuss the government procurement law that examines the laws/legal framework in relations to government procurement and acquisitions management as it pertains to A-76 (PROC 5890).

Proposed Research Weekly Outline

Week 3 – Complete the draft copy of our current situational analysis, premise, disclaimers, and applied research methodology. Continue to research information using our primary and secondary resources.

Week 4 – Continue to research through our primary and secondary resources.

Week 5 – Begin writing our final paper and make changes as needed.

Week 6 – Develop outline.

Week 7 – Revisit the paper and wrap up any additional findings

Week 8 – Gather and analyze our survey questionnaires and data results.

Week 9 – Finalize, proof read and submit our research project.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The purpose of this survey is to collect data on the effectiveness of the A-76 study for competitive sourcing. This data is being collected for the sole purpose of applying research methods skills and will remain confidential.

Section I.

Are you familiar with the A-76 study?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

How satisfied were you with your knowledge of the A-76 study and its purpose?

[ ] Very satisfied [ ] somewhat unsatisfied

[ ] Somewhat satisfied [ ] Very dissatisfied

Were you affected by the A-76 study implementation in 1997 or later?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

If yes to the above question, please tell us HOW you were affected?

[ ] decrease in salary

[ ] promotion

[ ] relocation of family

[ ] decrease in productivity due to the reduction in the workforce

[ ] reassigned to another base/squadron

[ ] training

Did the A-76 study reduce the organizations’ morale?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Do you feel the A-76 study negatively influenced the organizational goals?

[ ] Yes

[ ] No

Section II.

Gender: [ ] Male [ ] Female

Classification: [ ] Active Duty [ ] Retired Military

[ ] Civilian (government) [ ] Civilian (contractor)

ABSTRACT

Historically, the federal government uses outsourcing as its primary vehicle in promoting cost savings. This paper covers the history and the impact of the A-76 on civilian pay, training, organizational morale and other problems derived from its process. It will analyze whether the anticipated cost savings through outsourcing its supply and maintenance function exceeded or met their expectations and to what extent. Furthermore, this research identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the A-76 process and its competitive sourcing practices and procedures for use in future research projects.

PROC 6000 OUTLINE

The Effectiveness of the A-76

By

Karen Tucker-Alexander

I. Introduction

- Motivation for the research

- Overview

- Purpose

II. Body

- History of A-76

- How does A-76 process function

- Effects on jobs, civilian pay, training, morale

A. Alternatives

- Lockheed and Boeing

- MEO

- Military

B. Best Alternative

- Why the military is the best alternative

- Defend the selection of the military as the best alternative

III. Conclusion

- Summary

INTRODUCTION

For several months there were many conversations concerning the outsourcing of certain supply and maintenance functions using the A-76 study/process. Exploration of the A-76 study/process and its possible effects on the squadron was not a priority since it appeared as though the squadron was running smoothly. The numerous awards for outstanding support and the cost saving efforts were clear indicators that the conversations of A-76 outsourcing would not be approved. Yet, after all the conversations, I never took the initiative to inquire as to what exactly was an A-76 study. Consequently, it came as no surprise when the commander addressed the squadron informing us that the A-76 study will proceed, and would take place over the next three years. I remember him stating that positions would be competitively outsourced, and that the squadron would eventually be deactivated. During this time, the Air Force wanted to decrease support infrastructure to improve quality, efficiency, and generate savings for modernization. As a result, DOD wanted to explore whether it’s better to retain supply/maintenance functions in-house or contract services out to the private sector. How is one supposed to react to news of an A-76 process? What criterion was utilized to identify which organizations and what functions would be outsourced?

OVERVIEW According to the United States Air Force Capital Flyer, in 1997, the Office of Management and Budget requested a cost comparison or A-76 study, over a three-year period that would affect approximately 700 military and civilian positions within the Federal Government and military entities. The A-76 study reviewed the supply and maintenance operations to determine the effectiveness of maintaining these positions as military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian entities or privatizing the positions through outsourcing. Contrary to popular belief an A-76 study is not contracting. Its purpose is to create cost savings for the DOD through a competitive sourcing program. Competitive sourcing is the process for determining whether the private sector or an in-house provider can perform a given commercial activity for the best value to the government (DOE Questions pg 3 online).

“The A-76 circular mandates that the government procure commercially available goods and services from the private sector when it makes economic sense to do so” (A-76 Cost Comparison Overview, p.1, 2002). The cultural makeup of the organization is active duty and federal employees. The A-76 was implemented before my retirement, I would like to revisit the process and research the outcome and its affect on the organization and its members. This research will uncover some of the problems associated with A-76 studies/processes its purpose and cost effectiveness.

This study will provide the effects of cost savings and demonstrate the negative affects it has on federal/military personnel jobs, civilian pay, training, and the morale of the organization. The outsourcing/A-76 study was implemented to save governmental dollars and increase privatization and competitiveness within the industry. We believe the cost became progressively greater than what the DOD had predicted. In the Schoefield article Warren reported, “in 1998, DOD projected that these savings could amount to over $6 billion by fiscal year 2003 and $2.5 billion each year thereafter” (pg. 33).

A-76 History

A-76 process goes back to the mid- 1950’s during President Eisenhower administration. Although, the federal government since it only began receiving significant attention in the mid-1950s when the Eisenhower administration encouraged federal agencies to obtain commercially available goods and services from the private sector whenever it was cost-effective[i]. During this time period, federal agencies was encouraged by the executive branch to obtain commercially available goods and services from the private sector when the agencies determined that such actions was cost-effective.

President Eisenhower’s direction led to the creation of the Commercial-Industrial Studies Program, which developed procedures and guidelines for outsourcing that would result in cost savings while still obtaining the correct support[ii]. The resulting policy stated “Federal agencies will not provide a function in-house that is obtainable from a private source unless Government performance of that function has been justified in the national interest”[iii].

In 1955, the predecessor to the A-76 Circular, Budget Bulletin 55-4, was issued. The Budget Bulletin stated, “It is the general policy of the Federal Government that it will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such a product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels”[iv]

In 1966, Budget Bulletin 55-4 was replaced by the OMB A-76 Circular. A year later, in 1967, the Circular underwent its first revision when formal guidelines for cost comparison procedures were added[v]. In 1979, the Circular was revised a second time to better define whether an agency had a requirement to contract out non-inherently governmental functions[vi].

When President Reagan assumed office, his administration emphasized the view that big government was inefficient, wasteful, and unmanageable[vii]. In 1981, they directed a thorough analysis of the A-76 process, which took two years to complete. After the review was completed in 1983, OMB updated the Circular and set procedures in place to reestablish the initial objective of the Eisenhower administration. In particular, the revision clarified procedures and streamlined the evaluation process for outsourcing determinations[viii].

Administrative and legislative constraints from the late 1980s through the early 190s resulted in a lull, and even a short moratorium, of outsourcing competitions[ix]. This began to change with the creation of the Clinton administration’s National Performance Review (NPR) on 3 March 1993. The NPR focused on transitioning from a government that “works better and costs less” to a government that “works better and does less”[x] and promoted the idea that the government should focus its attention on those activities which it should and could do best and then place incentives in place to ensure optimum results[xi]. The recommendations of the NPR served as an impetus for executive branch to propose new procurement reform in the following years[xii].

In 1995, congressional and administration initiatives placed more emphasis on A-76 competitions as a means to achieve greater economies and efficiencies in operations[xiii] That same year, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed services to make outsourcing of support activities a priority, and the effort subsequently was incorporated as a major initiative under the Secretary’s 1997 Defense Reform Initiative[xiv].

In 1996, the A-76 Circular underwent its fourth revision. The revision further clarified procedures for determining whether recurring commercial activities should be outsourced, balanced the interests of the parties in make-or-buy cost comparisons, provided a level playing field between public and private competitors, and encouraged competition and choice in the management and performance of commercial activities[xv].

The Circular was revised a fifth time in 1999. This revision stated that the government may engage in inherently commercial activities if it can be determined that the function is critical to combat effectiveness or the mission effectiveness will suffer because of outsourcing, a commercial source is not available or cannot provide the product or service to meet government requirements in a timely manner, another Federal agency cannot provide the goods or services, or procuring from commercial firms will result in a higher cost to the government than if the item produced internally[xvi]

The 1999 revision also implemented the statutory requirements of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, which required that the head of each executive agency submit to the Director of OMB and Congress a list of activities performed by Federal Government sources for the executive agency, which in their opinion were not inherently governmental[xvii].

In 2001, President Bush’s “President’s Management Agenda” (PMA), identified competitive sourcing as one of the five management initiatives designed to enhance government effectiveness[xviii]. The identification of competitive sourcing as a management initiative subsequently led to a two-year study of the A-76 process.

In 2003, the newest revision provided guidance on conflicts of interest governance. The revision did away with the two-step process in which industry first competes in a “best value competition” with the government. Now there is a single competition, with the government MEO generally being treated as if it were another commercial bidder[xix].

By the spring of 2009, public-private competitions would convert federal employee jobs into contractor jobs under Circular A-76 had been suspended, and in most cases remain so. Competitive sourcing is currently only permitted in DoD where the result is to determine how to best source work that is not currently performed by federal employees (i.e. new work, or work currently done by contractors). In March 2009, President Obama reiterated the importance of Congress’ tasks and further directed the OMB to “clarify when governmental outsourcing of services is, and is not, appropriate, consistent with section 321 of the 2009 NDAA. (footnote)

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA 2010), Congress imposed a temporary moratorium on new competitions involving functions currently performed by DoD civilian employees until, among other things, DoD reviewed and reported to Congress on various aspects of its public-private competition policies.6 DoD complied with the statutory requirements in conducting its review of public-private competitions and in submitting its June 2011 report to Congress. (footnote) http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/military_law/pdf chapter 15 competitive sourcing and privatization.

According to the Commercial Activities Panel, the group chiefly responsible for many of the recent changes, the “new Circular permits greater reliance on procedures contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and should result in a more transparent, simpler, and consistently applied process”[xx]. Knowledge of the impact this revision has on government outsourcing is limited and should be further observed.

Process of an A-76:

The A-76 process starts with the government advertisement for a cost comparison for work to be performed for outsourcing or privatization. Outsourcing, or “contracting out” is defined as the transferring of the performance of a function, previously accomplished in-house, to an outside provider (Article Base Operations support functions, bottom). With outsourcing, the government contracts with the private sector to provide a service, but retains ownership and control over the operations (Woody p3& philips (Woody p3). Privatization is the transfer of ownership of property or businesses from a government to a privately owned entity (investopedia). With privatization, the government gives up ownership and responsibility of the activity.

Standard competition process work

The government uses a cost comparison study to ascertain which method of outsourcing will produce the best savings by either keeping the work in-house for government civilians or by contracting out to private companies. The Performance Work Statement (PWS) and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) are created by a team of employees or a consultant (USDA WEBSITE). The PWS is a statement of work for performance-based acquisitions that describes the required results in clear, specific and objective terms with measurable outcomes (dau or far). This document is very important because it describes the work that will be accomplished, and sets the deadline date for the task to be completed. If the PWS is completed incorrectly, it can cause legal issues and cause the contractor to file a protest that can hold up the process of the contract.

The agency bid team prepares a proposal for undertaking the function described in the PWS. ( USDA) There are specific guidelines included in the process to cover all costs and performance requirements. Bid competitions place the government and commercial sources on the same playing field and they must meet the performance criterion contained in the PWS.

In addition to the PWS, the management plan must contain the cost estimates and identify the personnel required to meet the performance parameters. Agency bid team members who create the management plan will ensure the required cost estimates and personnel allocations are submitted at the same time private companies submit their initial bids.

The offers are reviewed, evaluated, and rated by a Technical Evaluation Panel (TEP). The TEP reviews outside proposals using best value guidelines and submits their assessment to the Source Selection Authority (SSA). The SSA selects the best offer and then an unbiased IRO will review the proposal to verify the accuracy of cost in accordance with the OMB Circular.

The government will decide what offer will be selected based on cost. In order o secure the bid, the outside offer must come within 10% in personal costs or $10 million over the performance timeframe. The IRO completes their review of the MEO proposal and a preliminary cost comparison is disseminated to all parties concerned and the public for review. An appeal process is utilized to finalize the cost comparison any appeals are addressed during this time. Once the appeal process has run its course, the MEO or conversion to contract is implemented.

How does the Streamlined A-76 competition process work?

In the Streamlined Competition, it is limited to organizations with 65 or fewer FTE, or an MEO that would result in 65 or fewer FTE. Whether commercial or governmental, the winner must adhere to and meet the performance parameters contained in the PWS. (usda/agriculture)

In the Streamlined Competition, the Government may use the as-is organization or develop an MEO at their option. There may not be a PWS, and the private sector costs are developed using market research, or soliciting cost proposals IAW the FAR (in which case a PWS may be developed). Some of the adjustments used in the Standard Competition are not utilized in the Streamlined such as the “One-time-conversion” cost of 10% or $10 million (whichever is smaller). The Cost Comparison Decision is based on the lowest cost option. Once this decision is made, conversion to either the MEO or a private contract must occur within 60 – 90 days. (usda/agriculture webpage).

A-76 Requirements

Title 10, Part IV, Chapter 146, Section 2464 states it’s essential that the Department of Defense (DOD) “maintain a government-owned and government-operated core logistics capability to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other emergency requirements.” (cornell university law school and Phillips case study). Section 8020, fiscal year 96 DOD Appropriations Act, requires a detailed MEO and cost-effective organization analysis of the activity or functions with 10 or more DOD civilian employees (dod appropriations act). A-76 study falls into two categories, cost comparison and direct conversion. In earlier times, the Circular permitted direct conversion to a contractor without the private sector/ government completion, when there were 10 or fewer positions that could perform a commercial activity (usda agriculture webpage).

In 2001, President Bush’s Management Agenda, called for increased competitive sourcing in the government. The 1998 Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act requires agencies to designate jobs that are open to competition, and to identify jobs that are not inherently governmental. Essential military skills or functions that are inherently governmental are not affected by A-76 studies. In accordance with DOD guidance, the Services assign military personnel only to positions that: directly contribute to the prosecution of war (combat, combat support or combat service support), are military by law, are military by custom or tradition, are needed for overseas rotation, operational deployment augmentation, and/or career field sustainment. (AFI38-201). Note these positions are positions civilians cannot perform.

89th Airlift Wing A-76 Study

In 2000, the 89th Airlift Wing underwent an A-76 Study on supply and maintenance functions. It affected approximately 700 military and civilian positions within the Federal Government and military entities on Andrews Air Force Base. The A-76 study reviewed the supply and maintenance operations to determine the effectiveness of maintaining these positions as military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian entities or privatizing the positions through outsourcing.

New Contract Wins The mission of the 89th Airlift Wing is to provide safe, comfortable and reliable aircraft support for the President, Vice President, First Lady, cabinet members, members of Congress, foreign heads of state and other high-ranking government officials. First priority is given to the Senior Executive Service and Presidential Pilot's Office. Andrews Air Force Base obtains contract logistics support under a contract with DynCorp Technical Services, Incorporated. The potential total value of the contract is $280.5 million over a 10- year period that stated on April 1, 2001, with a firm-fixed-price portion of $268.9 million and an over and above portion not to exceed $11.6 million. Under the contract, DynCorp Technical Services Inc. is required to provide all personnel, equipment, tools, material, supervision, and other items or services necessary to perform the management and operations of the aircraft maintenance and base supply functions. In addition, DynCorp Technical Services Inc. is required to provide over and above services including real world contingency support, local manufacturing, dispersals and deployments, and accident investigations. Andrews Air Force Base uses an award term plan process to rate DynCorp Technical Services Inc. performance. (DOD Readiness Logistics) An attempt was made to find out if the Andrews/DynCorp contract was successfully performed under budget, to no avail. The assumption is DynCorp performed successfully because they won the bid and contract for a second term.
Effects on jobs, civilian pay, training, morale According to the GAO, the impact on employment, pay, and benefits of individual employees affected by A-76 studies varies depending on factors such as the results of the competitions, availability of other government jobs, and other individual factors such as retirement eligibility. Pay may also be affected by the location and technical nature of the work. These factors make it difficult to draw universal conclusions about the effects of A-76 decisions on employment, options, pay, and benefits. (GAO DOD Competitive)
Impact on Employees Pay and Benefits where Competition are won by an In-House Organization Federal employees’ employment, pay, and benefits may be adversely affected even when in in-house organization wins an A-76 competition because the new in-house organization typically restructures the work and reduces the number of employees required to perform the work. Employees may be faced with positions being downgraded or even eliminated. However, the ultimate impact on pay and benefits of affected employees varies, depending on factors such as availability of other federal positions, retirement eligibility, or use of “save pay” provisions associated with exercising employment rights under federal personnel reduction-in-force rules. (DOD comp). With organizational restructuring a reduction-in-force should be expected. Employees not retained through the organizational restructuring will have preference when seeking further employment within DOD. Other options include but are not limited to a cash incentive, retirement, or voluntary separation. Morale is a critical factor for almost any organization. In the government, employees of organizations that are undergoing A-76 studies may worry for their jobs, feel that the work they have done has been unappreciated or not recognized, and just have generally low morale. If the MEO wins, morale could actually dip lower if during the course of the contract if the scope of work is increased but the manpower and budget are not. ( An A-76 Survival Guide) Training can suffer when organizational restructuring occurs as well. Training requirements often change hands once the contract is awarded. For instance, DOD has the responsibility to train civilians hired to replace military personnel, however if contractors’ are hired the training responsibilities lies with the contracting entity.

An interview with a retired Chief Master Sergeant, of a maintenance unit, who experienced the A-76 process revealed the alternatives considered in 2000. As an internal stakeholder in this process he believes his vision and authority to speak openly about this contract is unmatched. He worked as a contracting office representative (COR) and have privilege to documents the normal public may not see. Dynacorp won the contract, but there were other competitors, Lockheed and Boeing for contractors, the MEO, and the military. Lockheed or Boeing would have been the logical choice because of their long-standing history with DOD. He states in aircraft maintenance the motto “Experto Crede”, which means trust one who has experience. In keeping with that motto he offers Lockheed and Boeing have over 100 years of experiences together and has been a part of the mission since its inception. Long story short if it is not broke do not try to fix it. Like any relationship, there are numerous conflicts but the parties involved always resolved their differences in the name of the mission. During the post September era, there are many threats and throughout their history Lockheed and Boeing proved they can deliver state-of-the-art equipment and machinery and continue to be on the forefront of innovation and proactive in all their decision making processes. Since the award of the contract to DynCorp, there were numerous contractual disagreements with all the contractors involved in the process. Previous contracts with Boeing to install state-of-the-art communication equipment on aircraft collided with the DynCorp’s takeover simply because Boeing threw in laptop computers for maintenance and technical support. Upon winning the contract DynCorp wanted to utilize those computers much to the dismay of Boeing who wanted to charge DynCorp for the laptop use and the technical coverage or discard the service. This is just one of the numerous contractual disagreements with all contractors involved. Boeing and Lockheed appealed the award of the contract to DynCorp citing two managers that worked for the maintenance squadron had retired and become employed by DynCorp therefore they believed these managers provided information on the organizational structure and all financial considerations only known to those within the unit. They believed DynCorp had an unfair advantage and unleveled playing field of competition, by winning the bid. Ultimately the disagreement was resolved when the Air Force stepped in through mediation and advised the workforce only was changing, not the mission, and that Boeing still had a deal the Air Force and that deal extended to DynCorp. (personal communication) The next alternative was the MEO the government’s response to the contractors. As previously stated, the MEO keep the process inherently governmental, where the workers will remain as civil servants and not a military entity. The decision to convert those positions was made giving the military members unparalleled security to employees because there is no more stable entity in the world. Ultimately, the move was embraced because the military could not fired itself. Other reasons many thought the MEO was a great alternative was because of job security. Contracting jobs are directly linked to the contract they are associated on the contrary the MEO is not contracted, is more stable that any corporation and they would be able to provide a service indefinitely or until the government finds another alternative. Additionally, the MEO offered low cost healthcare benefits, steady pay, bonuses, and a great educational package. In order to attract employees they offered health benefits far below those offered by the competitors as well as quarterly, semi-annually, and annually bonuses. Anyone who has the desire to pursue additional education and training within their career field or field of study is encouraged to do so. Lastly, promotions are the lynch pin for any employees and would definitely aid in the decision by employees to join the MEO. All contractors involved declined to speak about financial possibilities with any candidates for employment unless there was an offer for employment. This was not a favorably position for those employees who wanted to possibly change

DRAFT FOOTNOTES REMEMBER TO MOVE TO APPLICABLE BOTTOM of the pages

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[i] United States General Accounting Office. DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76 Studies on Federal Employees’ Employment, Pay, and Benefits Vary. Washing, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001.

[ii] Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. Monterey, California.

[iii] T.F. Dedman. Memorandum for all Naval Postgraduate Civilian Employees: Commercial-Industrial Program Studies, 1979.

[iv] United States Department of Defense. Defense Reform Initiative Report, 1997.

[v] Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. Monterey, California.

[vi] Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. Monterey, California.

[vii] Valerie Bailey Grasso. Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy. Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2005.

[viii] Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. Monterey, California.

[ix]

[x]

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[xiv]

[xv]

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