Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2008

Islam in Britain and Denmark: Deterritorialized Identity and Reterritorialized Agendas

KIRSTINE SINCLAIR
Abstract This article is based on case studies of two Muslim groups: Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue). In the article, basic elements in the ideology and activities of the Islamist and fundamentalist Hizb ut-Tahrir are outlined and the Danish and British sections of the group are compared in terms of agendas, members and image. Furthermore, a comparison between the Danish section of Hizb ut-Tahrir and another and more recent Danish Muslim organization called Muslimer i Dialog is made. In the article, it is argued that there are distinctive differences between the national sections of Hizb ut-Tahrir which indicate that the group is not entirely immune to national agendas (media, political or otherwise). Based on the comparison between the Danish Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog, it is also argued that a new understanding of the relation between religious, ethnic and national identity is evolving. Groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog seem to thrive and recruit new members on a combination of a transnational, deterritorialized understanding of the Muslim religious community and reterritorialized agendas. Introduction In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001, Hizb ut-Tahrir started making headlines in Denmark. In the media, the group was seen as a local, Danish version of an al-Qaeda cell, and with its public meetings and demonstrations in the streets of Copenhagen in the Autumn of 2001, Hizb ut-Tahrir seemed proud to let its black flag be the target of journalists’ and politicians’ speculations and accusations. Since then, Hizb ut-Tahrir has been debated regularly within and outside the Danish Muslim communities. Rival groups have existed for short periods and other more mainstream groups have appeared on the Muslim activist scene as a more or less direct response to the political climate created by the rhetorical exchanges between Hizb ut-Tahrir and sympathizers on the one side and Danish right wing parties and sympathizers on the other. The following analysis is based partly on research of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain since 20011 and interviews with members conducted in 2003 and partly on ongoing research on new activist Muslim groups in Denmark and the concepts of identity and network among members. In this article, I will discuss Hizb ut-Tahrir’s definition of the Caliphate and ummah and compare these to the underlying understanding of the ummah of a seemingly diametrically opposite organization in Denmark, namely, Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue). As it turns out, the understanding of the Muslim ummah has similar implications in the two groups.2
ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/08/010045-8 # 2008 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs DOI: 10.1080/13602000802011051

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The Caliphate Connection Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Party of Liberation) was established in 1953 in Jerusalem. Since then, the group has set up branches in the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia. ´ The present leader Ata Abu Rashta has held the title since 1 May 2003 and is most probably residing in Jordan.3 Today, there are functioning sections in all Western European countries, the biggest are found in the UK and in Denmark.4 The purpose of the group is explained in a Party document entitled “Hizb ut-Tahrir”: Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics is its work and Islam is its ideology. It works within the Ummah and together with her, so that she adopts Islam as her cause and is led to restore the Khilafah and the ruling by what Allah (swt) revealed. Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political group and not a priestly one. Nor is it an academic, educational or a charity group. The Islamic thought is the soul of its body, its core and the secret of its life. (. . .)5 According to this passage, Islam is a complete system of guidelines for a way of life, including politics, faith, economy and welfare. In Hizb ut-Tahrir’s understanding, politics and religion cannot be separated. The Caliphate is seen as a system of government that has been given by Allah, and Hizb ut-Tahrir works towards the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate. Historically, Caliphate (the word stems from the Arabic khalifa which means substitute or deputy) refers to the system of government imposed by the Arabic tribes after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632. The Caliphate was continued under the Ummayade Dynasty (661 –750) centered in Damascus, the Abbaside Dynasty (750 –1517) first centered in Baghdad, afterwards in Egypt. Between 1517 and 1924, the Ottoman Sultan had the title of Caliph until Kemal Ataturk abolished the last Caliphate as part of the creation ¨ of the modern Turkish national state in 1924. To the Turkish leader, the termination of the Caliphate was a necessary step towards the creation of a modern, secular Turkey.6 From a historical point of view, the Caliphate has been many and very different systems of rule, each one reflecting the prevailing societies and epochs. However, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not differentiate between the different Caliphates and their specific characteristics. On the contrary, Hizb ut-Tahrir sees the Caliphate as one and the same system despite the different forms and manifestations. To Hizb ut-Tahrir the Caliphate is a unifying historical, religious and political basis shared by all Muslims regardless of ethnicity, geography and orthodoxy.7 The Party Origin The founding of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the group’s political program has to be understood in connection with the birth of the state of Israel in 1948. The events between 1947 and 1949 are often referred to as al-Nakba, the catastrophe, in Arabic-Palestinian history writing. The designation is a sign of the mythological meaning given to the establishment of Israel. Al-Nakba covers both the beginning of the Palestinian Diaspora, and the culmination of what is seen as decades of Western colonialism in the Middle Eastern region. Hizb utTahrir shares this understanding and takes it a bit further: the creation of Israel in 1948 is seen as the beginning of a new wave of Western imperialism in the Middle East. Thus recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq are seen in the light of 1948—that is, as a continuation of systematic injustice to Muslims in the Middle East and Islam carried out by the West.8 The abolition of the last Caliphate in 1924 has a similar mythological meaning to Hizb ut-Tahrir. 1924 represents the essence of betrayal of Islam, and Hizb ut-Tahrir draws a

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straight line between the events in 1924 and 1948. Both are perceived as evidence of the West’s political, military, and financial attempts to “erase Muslims from the face of the earth”. However, Hizb ut-Tahrir is based on a strong, intellectual tradition as opposed to other more proactive Islamic groups or parties. The Head of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, Jalaluddin Patel, has explained Hizb ut-Tahrir’s strategy as follows: Our work is to emulate the example set by the Prophet (peace be upon him) in Mecca. He assumed power in Mecca and in Medina. We work to create Islamic opinion in the Islamic world and in particular we work to highlight the people in positions of influence, the media, and any other position of influence in the Islamic world. (. . .) Our attempt to assume power is not by creating a section within society that raises arms against the state, it is rather by convincing people who hold the power in the Islamic world. (. . .)9 This passage points out two important features: one is the rejection of the use of violence to obtain political goals. In accordance with the non-violent strategy, the Danish spokesperson, Fadi Abdullatif, has explained that seizure of power is a question of numbers. When the group becomes the majority in Middle Eastern countries, power will be handed over automatically. The ideology behind Hizb ut-Tahrir is revolutionary but strictly non-violent. The ambition is to overthrow existing governments in the Middle East, but the strategy is to do it by the awakening of the masses. The other important feature in the passage is Jalaluddin Patel’s focus on the need to “create Islamic opinion in the Islamic world”. Hizb ut-Tahrir believes strongly that the group can succeed in leading the Muslim masses to work for the reestablishment of the Caliphate. The combination of the historically incorrect or inadequate perception of the Caliphate as one, coherent type of rule from 632 to 1924 and the general appeal to the “Islamic world” shows that Hizb ut-Tahrir chooses to ignore historical, ethnic, geographical and religious differences among Muslims in order to formulate and address Muslim unity today. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and in Denmark: A Comparison Although all sections of Hizb ut-Tahrir abide by the same ideology and engage in similar activities, there are noticeable national differences. In the following section, the most important will be touched upon. In Britain, Hizb ut-Tahrir counts around 500–1,000 members and the group has been seen to gather up to 10,000 people (members, sympathizers, etc.) at their conferences. The Danish branch only counts for a fraction of these numbers. Membership in Denmark is estimated at 100–200 and the group has not managed to attract more than about 500–1,000 people at any meeting or conference in that country so far. Due to the difference in size between the Muslim community in general and in Hizb ut-Tahrir specifically, the extent of contact with other groups varies from Britain to Denmark. Because of the competition between ideologically related groups in Britain, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not engage in contact and activities with such groups and the competition between ideologically related groups means that Hizb ut-Tahrir is the target for more criticism from the Muslim milieu than is the case in Denmark. In this competition, it is necessary for Hizb ut-Tahrir to have a distinct profile which has been, so far, the intellectual approach to the reestablishment of the Caliphate.10 Al-Muhajiroun is an example of an ideologically related group which focused on the necessity of taking part in “Muslim struggles” throughout the world in order to establish a Caliphate.11

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In Denmark, there seems to be no challenge to Hizb ut-Tahrir on the radical Islamist scene. No other group has managed to recruit members and influence the public agenda as successfully as Hizb ut-Tahrir. Additionally, the Danish Muslim community of politically active young people is so limited in numbers that it would be impossible to isolate members and activities within the group. An example of this is a meeting in Copenhagen in June 2007 hosted by Hizb ut-Tahrir with participants representing a majority of Copenhagen’s Arab mosques and Muslim communities—among them the organization Islamisk Trossamfund (The Islamic Community). The agenda for the meeting was the challenges and dangers faced by Muslims in Denmark and the meeting covered discussions on how to discourage criminal behavior among Muslim youth as well as solving minority related problems for Muslims in general.12 Hizb ut-Tahrir’s relations with the surrounding society are very different in Britain and Denmark. In Denmark, an interview with the spokesperson Fadi Abdullatif was virtually impossible as the group prefers one-way communication such as press releases or leaflets. In contrast, the British section has created a so-called “Info Media Pack” that provides the basic facts about the group (ideology, strategy, etc.) and the British spokesperson for the party, Dr. Imran Waheed, is known to take part in public meetings and give interviews. The British section runs several internet homepages, at least one of which is dedicated to dialogue between group members and intellectual non-Muslims. Also, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain have made use of the British Press Complaints Commission in cases where they have felt misrepresented in the press with newspaper apologies and official corrections as the result. In most cases, Hizb ut-Tahrir has complained of being referred to as militant. In short, the British section of Hizb ut-Tahrir has a far more aggressive press strategy than that of the Danish. The majority of members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain are of South Asian origin. The spokesperson is of Pakistani origin and the leader of the group is of Indian origin. In Denmark, the majority of members are of Arab origin as is the spokesperson and the head of the group. The origins of the members seem to play a part in the political focus of the various national sections. For instance, the Danish section does not contemplate Pakistani politics as the British section does (in July 2007 only the British homepage presents material on the present political unrest in Pakistan). Rather, the Danish section is preoccupied with the Israeli –Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology and published material is coherent and consistent, the comparison between the Danish and the British sections shows that, for instance, the backgrounds of leaders and spokespersons affect the political focus of the different sections. Also, Hizb ut-Tahrir is not necessarily hostile towards the press as is the case in Denmark. The British section has found it necessary to come forward and explain the ideology and agenda of the group to the media due to strong competition for members and status between Muslim Islamist groups in Britain. British Hizb ut-Tahrir feels strongly about upholding an academic and non-violent profile on the British Muslim activist and fundamentalist scene. In a British context, the existence of many national and religious groups—and among them many radical groups—makes Hizb ut-Tahrir seem less radical and controversial. Thus while actual differences between the national sections of the group are a fact, the different contexts also play a role when Hizb ut-Tahrir is interpreted and characterized. To sum up, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims that Islam is a religion and political ideology that is detached from all ethnic or national frames and that all Muslims regardless of orthodoxy or orientation belong to the same religious community, the Muslim ummah. Nevertheless, the group has not yet proved itself to be independent of national contexts. Since its launch

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it has depended on historical and national agendas and today the European sections of the group have different interests depending on the national and ethnic background of the members and the specific context in the European country they live and work in. Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog in Denmark In 2003, Denmark saw the birth of a new group of activist Muslims called Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue). This group consists primarily of young people aged 20 –35 and was started by a group of Pakistanis who left the youth organization of Minhaj ul-Quran protesting the dominance of the mother organization in Pakistan. Minhaj ul-Quran was founded in Pakistan in 1980 and is represented in Pakistani communities all over the world today. The organization has separate activities for women, men and young people.13 Muslimer i Dialog is defined by its preoccupation with questions concerning co-existence, integration and dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. Today, the group has members of Pakistani, Turkish, Palestinian and Danish origin. The focus on integration and dialogue reflects a wish among the founders to engage with the Danish society and to engage in the discussion of the definition of being Danish. In other words, Muslimer i Dialog wish to contribute to the characterization of a modern, multiethnic and multi-religious nation. The group organizes courses on culture and religion as well as social, cultural and charitable events. During the past two years, Muslimer i Dialog has arranged study trips to Jordan, Summer Quran School in Yemen and pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia. The range of destinations emphasizes the fact that the organization does not have links to a specific Middle Eastern country. Also, the choice of destinations emphasizes the group’s religious perspective. It does not organize trips to vibrant capitals or tourist attractions and it is not Middle Eastern countries or cultures that are at the core but history and religion. It would appear that Muslimer i Dialog and Hizb ut-Tahrir share only the Muslim faith. In fact, politically they are in complete contrast: Hizb ut-Tahrir encourages Muslims to isolate themselves and avoid contact with the Danish secular and democratic society which is seen as decadent and immoral. Muslimer i Dialog, on the other hand, engages in discussions about identity, integration and rights of Muslims as a religious minority in Denmark. However, when it comes to self-understanding among members, similarities can be found. Members of both Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog explain that belonging to a network is a very important part of being a member of the community, and the concept of “network” is connected to a certain understanding of the Muslim ummah. Belonging to the ummah transcends all possible national or ethnic categories. As a member of Muslimer i Dialog explained in an interview: I: How would you describe your identity? R: (. . .) When it comes to nationality I don’t care. You can call me Chinese if you wish. You can even call me Danish although it is considered an insult to many immigrants. In Muslimer i Dialog, we often discuss that Muslims must take part in defining what it is to be Danish, to be a Dane. (. . .) But I am not interested in belonging to a fixed nationality (. . .) I wish to be regarded as a human being and a Muslim—a Cosmopolite.14 The sense of belonging to a network of Muslims, a national or regional network as well as the wider ummah, is seen as a very important element of being a practicing Muslim which is emphasized by members of both Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog. Only the

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understanding of the surrounding society and Muslim identity varies: Where Hizb ut-Tahrir operates with dichotomies, “Islam” or “not Islam”, “Muslim” or “non-Muslim” in a black and white pattern, Muslimer i Dialog see the categories as connected and engage in defining what it means to be a Danish Muslim. The understanding of network and ummah is connected to the concept of transnationalism. Like a global NGO, the ummah recognizes only the cause. The imagined, global brotherhood of the ummah transcends national borders and citizenship and so belonging to the ummah means being a part of a movement that reaches back in history and reaches out in the future and transcends time and place. Also, there is a psychological level to this understanding of the ummah: as a member of the ummah, the individual becomes part of something greater than one’s self. Deterritorialization of Islam or Muslims in Europe? In Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah,15 Olivier Roy describes what he understands as Islam’s deterritorialization in Europe. He argues that Islam as a minority religion in Europe is losing the connection with specific states, and that the new reality for Islam involves new possibilities for practicing the religion, new forms of activities and new expressions. At the same time, being a Muslim is understood in a broader sense than it has been earlier. Now, to a large extent, “Muslim” replaces national and cultural affiliations by both Muslims and non-Muslims. The name “Muslim” becomes the description of all with Muslim background irrespective of the religious practices and orthodoxy of the individual. Now, the question is whether or not it is possible to use the concept of “deterritorialization” in connection with Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog. On the one hand, Hizb ut-Tahrir relates to the surrounding Danish or British society and works towards the reestablishment of the Caliphate. Muslimer i Dialog, on the other hand, has detached itself from the national agenda of the Pakistani Minhaj ul-Quran and focuses on the Danish integration debate. The two groups share an understanding of the ummah and network between Muslims as the core of being practicing Muslims and can thus be said to have chosen a deterritorialized Islam, an Islam that unites Muslims globally. It can be argued that all Islamic organizations are a product of their specific historical and political frames at the time of their establishment and in general, and that no organization or movement can be said to be fully deterritorialized at any given time. The founding of Hizb ut-Tahrir has to be understood in light of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, just as the founding of Muslimer i Dialog cannot be interpreted without reference to the modern, Danish society and the circumstances for the Muslim minority in the country. However, although it is important to understand the given conditions for a group, it is at the same time possible that the group’s understanding of its own ideology and sense of network is independent of the frames given by time and place. For instance, members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog have adopted an understanding of Islam as a deterritorialized religion. Their understanding of their religion is independent of the organization of the group. In this case it is important to reflect on both the historical and national contexts as well as the self-understanding of the people involved. In the study of these groups it is rewarding to observe simultaneously facts and contexts as well as the myths and truths that are exchanged and developed among members. In other words: if people say that their religion, ideology or identity is transnational and transcends time, space, nationality, etc., then it is and it does—to them.

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It is my assumption that Muslim groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog in Europe are experiencing a deterritorialization of Islam and transnationalization of the individual in their focus on a global network of Muslims rather than a focus on specific Middle Eastern or Asian nation states. The groups are turning to an Islam that is detached from the migrant generations’ Muslim homelands, just as they construct transnational identities and networks. The groups have chosen “Islam” as “homeland” over any concrete nation state. Nevertheless, the differences between the national sections of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the two countries indicate an antagonism between a transnational and deterritorialized understanding of Islam as ideology and a national or territorial practice in the various sections of the group. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s national sections are partly shaped by their surrounding environment. Both Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog can be said to be transnational phenomena, and it can also be argued that the groups are deterritorialized in the sense that the Muslim ummah is understood as disengaged from specific national contexts. However, the differences between national sections of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the transition from Minhaj ul-Quran to Muslimer i Dialog are not explained by the use of Oliver Roy’s concept of “deterritorialization of Islam”. In my opinion, members of Muslim activist groups seem to be reterritorializing themselves within the context of different European states.

Conclusion Hizb ut-Tahrir believes in one Islam and works towards the reestablishment of one Islamic state, the Caliphate. To members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Caliphate is the unifying historical, religious and political basis for all Muslims: the ummah. The ummah is the unity of all Muslims regardless of nationality, traditions, languages or religious interpretations. This understanding of the Caliphate and the ummah is shared by all Hizb ut-Tahrir members throughout the world. However, a comparison between the Danish and British sections of the organization show that on this common ideological basis there are different national agendas. The national agendas are twofold: first, there is the influence of the specific national frame, Danish or British, and second, there is the focus on different national political issues added by the leading members of the national sections. All Muslims may be part of a global brotherhood, but nationality, nation states and national politics do play a role. Hizb ut-Tahrir and Muslimer i Dialog in Denmark share the understanding of a global brotherhood among Muslims. In both groups members see themselves as part of a transnational network of believers, but they are nevertheless influenced by national, Danish and British agendas. At the same time as maintaining a transnational and deterritorialized approach to fellow believers and Islam itself, these organizations cannot escape being formed and shaped by the surrounding environment. In the final analysis, Muslimer i Dialog and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark are Danish, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain is British.

NOTES
1. This work is published in M. Grøndahl, T. R. Rasmussen and K. Sinclair, Hizb ut-Tahrir i Danmark. Farlig fundamentalisme eller uskyldigt ungdomsoprør? (Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark. Dangerous Funda˚ ˚ mentalism or Innocent Youth Rebellion?), Arhus: Arhus Universitetsforlag, 2003.

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2. My present research project at the Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark, is called “Islam as Homeland” and is aimed at defining the understanding of network and self-depiction among young members of Muslim organizations in Denmark and Britain through interviews with members. 3. Fadi Abdullatif gave a Danish translation of the name Hizb ut-Tahrir as well as an account of the group’s foundation and the name of the new leader in an interview in Copenhagen in May 2003 conducted by Malene Grøndahl and Kirstine Sinclair. The death of the Hizb ut-Tahrir leader, Zalloum, was announced by the British section of Hizb ut-Tahrir on 1 May 2003. 4. Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned in Germany in January 2003, and in 2003 the Danish Public Prosecutor investigated the possibilities of a ban in Denmark. 5. Hizb ut-Tahrir published by Hizb ut-Tahrir, Britain. The excerpt quoted in this article is also available online at: ,http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/about.htm#1. (accessed 27 November 2007). 6. Karen Armstrong gives an account of Islamic history in Islam. A Short History, London: Phoenix Press, 2000. For a detailed account of the history of modern Turkey, see Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent, New York: New York University Press, 1997. 7. S. Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest. A Search for the Islamic Caliphate, London: Grey Seal, 1996, pp. 65, 67. 8. A. Shlaim gives an example of the use of “al-Nakba” in The Iron Wall, London: Penguin, 2000, p. 28. 9. Jalauddin Patel, Head of the Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, interviewed in London in May 2003 by Malene Grøndahl and Kirstine Sinclair. 10. The description of the competition in the Islamist milieu in Britain is from anonymous sources in circles close to Hizb ut-Tahrir in London and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Copenhagen. 11. Omar Bakri Mohammed founded al-Muhajiroun in Britain in 1996 and dissolved it again in 2004. See Q. Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising. Muslim Extremism in the West, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, for a thorough discussion of the group. 12. See Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Danish homepage for details: ,www.hizb-ut-tahrir.dk.. 13. See the organization’s homepage for details: ,www.minhaj.org.. 14. Interview with member of Muslimer i Dialog conducted in May 2006 in Odense, Denmark, by Kirstine Sinclair. 15. O. Roy, Globalized Islam. The Search for a New Ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.