The works “Preventive War and Democratic Politics”, “Democratization and the
Danger of War”, “Terrorism, the Use of Force, and International Law After 11 September”, and “Failed States: Fixing a Broken World” all describe and aim to formulate the motivations for modern wars between two states. By using historical precedents, each author makes assertions about war theory, leaving the reader with a framework to analyze conflicts occurring in the world today. While each entry makes a unique assumption, the content of arguments invariably overlaps. In my response I will examine each piece and the questions I was left with after contemplating the implications of their respective theories. In “Preventive War and Democratic Politics”, Levy first distinguishes preemptive wars from preventive wars, claiming that the former involves an immediate threat to a state’s safety while the latter is determined by the presence of a non-immediate threat—often an adversary “crossing a particular threshold of military power, leading to a stop-level power shift” (Levy, 7). He goes on to discuss that since the advent of nuclear military developments, the majority of wars have been preventive. This argument is logical because as the stakes are raised, states have the responsibility to their constituents to mitigate threats; citizens are much more willing to tolerate smaller skirmishes than risk the threat of an over-militarization of another state with different social and political values, beliefs, and goals. This theory has been manifested in my lifetime by the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and sanctions on Iran, who have strived to develop their capacity for nuclear warfare in recent years. While there is a myriad of reasons for U.S. military occupation of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Middle East nations, the threat of nuclear development in Iran has played a major role in sustaining the American “preventive strategy.” The question then becomes how much “conceptual stretching” plays a role in determining foreign policy. In mild contrast, “Democratization and the Danger of War” argues that although two legitimately democratic states have never engaged in a war against one another, democratizing nations are 33% more likely to involve themselves in external conflicts because of vulnerable constituencies. The most interesting takeaway here is the analysis of the concept of squaring the circle:
Since democratizing states typically comprise such a broad spectrum of social interests, would-be ruling coalitions must often be cobbled together from diverse or even contradictory bases of support. For this reason, one of the characteristic problems of the leadership of transitional, democratizing states is explaining away the self-contradictory aspects of a coalition or policy that must integrate antithetical elements. In foreign affairs, this often means sweeping tough trade-offs under the rug, pretending that contradictory policies actually make sense or cannot be avoided. As a consequence, the foreign policies of democratizing states are often overcommitted, provoking too many enemies at the same time. (Mansfield & Snyder, 32)

By this logic, developing democratic states are essentially vulnerable because they cannot yet manage the diverse opinions of their respective constituencies as effectively as could a mature democracy. The quote is an interesting counterpoint to the commonly held belief that democracy is always the best form of government; in many cases it is difficult for us as Americans to accept that an autocracy can be a better solution in the short and medium term. Lastly, “Failed States: Fixing a Broken World” and “Terrorism, the Use of Force, and International Law After 11 September” examine these theories in the scope of the current state of affairs in the Middle East. It is noted once again that the concept of “self-defence” is becoming more subjective as threats to national security become less concrete. For better or worse, we can now invade a country simply on the belief that a threat may be residing in that area; the American invasion of Afghanistan to target Al-Qaeda is a clear example of the conceptual stretching done in order to justify the means of national security. I found the role of the UN particularly interesting in these analyses. Member countries have simply found a way to navigate around certain restrictions by loosening the self-defence clause when it makes sense to do so. If the correlation of developed democracy and war held true, shouldn’t UN ambassadors be elected, not appointed? The illusion of collaboration in deciding foreign policy is in and of itself more derisive to international affairs than no collaboration at all. The scholastic works analyzed aim to achieve a better understanding of the influences involved in wartime affairs. Examining the current state of U.S. foreign involvement in the Middle East exposes the preventive nature of a major conflict and the conceptual stretching used in coming to the successful decision of military action. As a mature democracy, the U.S. is able to make the ends justify the means in the realm of foreign policy. As a corollary, international organizations such as the UN become powerless under the U.S. model of foreign policy because of the aforementioned sociopolitical factors.

Works Cited 1. Levy, Jack S. "Preventive War and Democratic Politics." Int Studies Q International Studies Quarterly 52.1 (2008): 1-24. Web. 2. Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and the Danger of War." International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), Pp. 5-38(1995): n. pag. Print.