What are the main obstacles to international cooperation between states? Assess with reference to realism and liberalism.
According to Kenneth Waltz, the way states behave is determined by the permanent state of anarchy in which the international system exists. The lack of an ordering sovereign authority to oversee relations between states dominates debate between scholars as to whether the world will ever be a peaceful, threat-free environment. In order to eliminate war and conflict, cooperation must characterize states’ behaviour towards one another, a system in which ‘the security of each [state] is perceived as the responsibility of all’ (Wendt, 1999). The question then becomes why, if cooperation leads to rewards for everyone, do states enter into conflict and war? International Relations theorists seek to explain this paradox by examining the obstacles to cooperation. For classical realists, the answer is simple; lust for power and a drive for conflict are rooted within human nature and, since humans are the operators of state actors, state behaviour mimics this nature in its approach to international relations. Neo-realists, by contrast, follow Waltz in his belief that the anarchic structure of the international system causes states to seek security and power, and therefore provides the ultimate obstacle to cooperation. While liberals disagree altogether, offering the counterargument that men are rational, and therefore states choose to engage in conflict in order to pursue state preferences, based on a cost-benefit analysis. The primary obstacle to cooperation for liberals, then, is the clash of interests between states.
Realist political theory is largely based on the assumption that all states are self-interested and are driven by a desire for power and security. Their main goals are survival and maximizing relative power, therefore they are naturally inclined to compete. Since this core assumption is applied to every state it seems impossible for all states to achieve a beneficial outcome from engaging in international relations, and therefore state nature provides a systemic constraint on cooperation. However to argue that self-interest necessarily provides an obstacle to cooperation is simplistic. Since cooperation, properly defined, equals benefits for all participant states it would, in fact, be in a state’s self-interest to cooperate.
Classical realists attempt to explain this paradox by highlighting the role of human nature in determining a state’s self-interest. They argue that the influence of human nature plays a fundamental role in shaping a state’s foreign policy, since states are subjected to the egoism of their leaders. They assume a fixed nature of mankind, characterized as ‘selfish’, ‘aggressive’ and ‘lust[ful] for power’ and argue that these tendencies towards conflict account for the way states behave in the international arena (Morgenthau, 1973). There is a lot of evidence to support this; many twenty-first century international conflicts have been motivated by the desire to gain economic or military power, for example the underlying motives of the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 are considered by many to be oil interests (Moravcsik, 2008). Pessimist classicals, such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau identify political corruption as a major obstacle to cooperation, since abuses of power under false pretences contribute to the perpetual ‘security dilemma’, a term coined by Herz to explain the spiral pattern of mistrust between states. (Herz, 1951). ‘Out of his self-interest, he develops economic and political theories and attempts to pass them off as universal systems; he is born and reared in insecurity and seeks to make himself absolutely secure; he is a man but he thinks himself God.’ (Niebuhr, 1943). Niebuhr attributes this ‘cheating’ in international relations to the inherent ‘evilness’ of man; the certainty of man’s ‘quality of evil’ is decided by Niebuhr and ideologically-allied pessimists to be the ultimate source of interstate conflict. This approach also provides an explanation, to some extent, for the establishments of dictatorships such as Nazi Germany led by Hitler and Iraq led by Saddam Hussein, both of which became targets in international wars.
Neo-realists are highly critical of classical analysis of human nature. Waltz asks ‘Is the amount of crime in a given society proof that the men in it are bad? Or is it amazing that under the circumstances there is not more crime?’ For neo-realists, ‘circumstance’ is key; the structural constraints of an anarchic international system make cooperation between states ‘inherently difficult’, and instead give birth to the practice of power politics (Waltz, 1959, p. 28). Power politics describes the preference of states to make relative gains over absolute gains through fear of being overpowered by or becoming dependent on another state: ‘As a result of anarchy, critics argue, states prefer relative gains to absolute gains. They seek to protect their power and status and will resist even mutually beneficial cooperation if their partners are likely to benefit more than they are’ (Keohane, 1998, p. 88). Since there is no supreme guarantor of security, states develop the goal of ensuring survival, debatably by maximizing relative power, which is perceived as threatening by other states who thus respond in the same way. The resultant situation of instability brings us again to the security dilemma, which is both the cause and the effect of lack of trust between states and can therefore in itself be considered an impediment to peaceful relations.
The intentions of states when they increase military capacities are largely disputed amongst neo-realists, and the two explanations they allude to are distinguished by Wohlforth as ‘Defensive Realism’ and ‘Offensive Realism’ (Wohlforth, 2008). According to Defensive realists, the main objective is survival; states act according to self-help and base their military strength on what is needed in order to defend themselves in case of an attack. Whereas Offensive realists, such as John Mearshimer, believe states’ priority is to maximize relative power, so they develop offensive military capacities to ensure their ability to overpower other states (Mearshimer, 1994/5). The Cold War provides an example of offensive realism, since both the US and USSR considerably increased their military capacities by arming themselves for possible nuclear war. However, the outcome considerably weakened the credibility of classical realist theory, since the ‘war’ did not result in any large scale fighting, thus disproving realist claims that man must act aggressively in order to survive, and that states, like men, ‘led by passion, are drawn into conflict’(Spinoza, 1670). As a result of this serious misjudgement, critics of realism, especially Liberals, claim that it no longer able to explain conflict and cooperation in international relations; the growth of institutions and ever-increasing globalisation and interdependence of states are not considered in realist theory and therefore it is outdated (Jervis, 1999).
The outcome of the Cold War can be better explained by the core Liberal theory that state preferences determine their behaviour, and whether this behaviour is cooperative or conflictual depends on the nature and intensity of their preferences. Andrew Moravcsik, in his article ‘The New Liberalism’, looks at the role of the state on a domestic level, as well as internationally, to identify the means by which it achieves or avoids international cooperation. He advocates a system by which state preferences are formed in accordance with national interests, decided by individuals and groups within society. When proposed internationally, these preferences have the power to determine the nature of relations between states; ‘where policy alignment can generate mutual gains with low distributive consequences, there is an incentive for international policy coordination or convergence’, therefore allied preferences can aid cooperation, while conflicting preferences obstruct it (p.4). For example, hostile, intensely nationalist preferences may cause tension and rebuttal in the international sphere.
The theory of conflicting state preferences acting as an obstacle to cooperation is more thorough and comprehensible than arguments put forward by realists, since preferences are defined by the variable collective interests of individuals, and these interests are characterized as ever-changing due to globalization. As a modern theorist, Moravcsik considers relevant factors which may align or divide state preferences, such as shared culture and identity between states or their geographical proximity. He also takes into account the potential for internal conflict to determine a state’s international relations: ‘Internationally, the liberal state is a purposive actor, but domestically it is a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction, by coalitions of social interests.’ (Moravcsik, 2008) For example, the ongoing Syrian Civil War was engendered by instability within Syria’s borders, however soon became an international armed conflict since states felt the need to intervene to promote democracy. This situation illustrates the affiliation between the nature of internal and external relations, and provides the ultimate paradox- that (in special cases) conflict or intervention may be needed to achieve cooperation. If it is assumed that undemocratic states impede cooperation- and it can be said that most security threats nowadays come from non-liberal states- then military intervention may be necessary to pursue a long-term goal of international cooperation. It can be surmised, therefore, that conflict has the potential to be both an obstacle and an aid to cooperation. Undeveloped or undemocratic states are an unexplained anomaly to Moravcsik’s system of forming state preferences. To hypothesize that preferences are formed based on national interests is to assume a democratic and stable system of government, thus the Liberal Theory fails to compensate for the circumstance where states are unable to or not inclined to represent the demands of domestic social groups.
Liberal Institutionalists claim that the function of institutions is to ‘facilitate interdependence and integration between states which will lead to a peaceful international environment’ (Martin & Keohane, 1995). Their theory examines the importance of institutions in a globalizing world; Keohane argues that non-actors, such as transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations, are increasingly relied on by states to bridge the gaps between conflicting policies in order to ensure collective security and the representation of each state’s preferences in the international realm. However this reliance means that when institutions are ineffective they present a major obstacle to cooperation. The example of the League of Nations’ failure to prevent the Second World War is often used by critics of Liberal Institutionalism, predominantly realists, to support the counterargument that states will only accept institutions if the proposed policies are in their self-interest, therefore institutions have no legitimate power over the state.
In conclusion, collectively the realist and liberalist theories give a multitude of explanations as to why states find it difficult to cooperate. It is accepted by most international relations theorists that states exist in a condition of anarchy, and as a result are insecure, however the appropriation of this anarchic structure as the primary obstacle to international cooperation is largely a neorealist perspective, with other theorists attributing interstate conflict to the flaws of human nature, lack of international institutions and incompatible state preferences. The assumptions made by realists that man and the state are fundamentally aggressive and drawn to conflict, and that the state of anarchy is a permanent structure appears on first glance to provide a simple explanation as to why cooperation is so difficult to achieve. However this theory ignores the role of non-state actors and the internal stability of a state in securing or obstructing cooperation, and therefore provides an incomprehensive analysis of international relations. Liberalism, on the other hand, presents a more modern approach to explaining the nature of conflict and cooperation, and accounts for ‘substantative and geographical variation in the goals and purposes over which states conflict and cooperate’, imperative factors which Moravcsik criticizes realism for ignoring. (Moravcsik, 2008)

Bibliography

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Martin & Keohane, R. O. (1995, Summer). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security, 20(1), 39-51.
Mearshimer, J. J. (1994/5). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), 5-49.
Moravcsik, A. (2008). The New Liberalism. (C. R.-S. Snidal, Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of International Relations.
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[ 1 ]. 1939-45: The anti-German coalition fought against Nazi Germany during the Second World War.
2003: The United States and allies invaded Iraq and deposed of the Ba’athist government of Saddam Hussein.
[ 2 ]. There was no direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
[ 3 ]. The League of Nations was an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1920.