Augustine began to distance himself from Manicheism soon after he moved toRome, which he had been interested in since he was a teenager, in 372. As he went through a difficult period in his life, which contributed to his increasingly disinterest with Manicheism, the Academics, the disciples of Arcesilaus and the New Academy briefly engaged him with the skeptical view. This viewpoint was that everything was a matter of doubt and asserted that we can know nothing for certain. The main argument within this essay is to ask whether Augustine, from previously being tempted by skepticism, managed to overcome this through his writing, and whether his dismissal of skepticism holds up as a major criticism for others.
After his conversion, he wrote Contra Academicos 386-387, focused mainly on arguments against skepticism and the ability to have knowledge. His ultimate victory over the attraction of skepticism he expressed within this, and laid claim that we can ultimately possess knowledge. In the Contra Academicos Augustine writes of wisdom leading to happiness, and knowledge of truth to wisdom. The version of skepticism that Augustine takes from Cicero’s Academic books is that adopted by Cicero himself. The skepticism Augustine concerns himself is the form it took in the Platonic ‘New’ Academy from the middle of the third century, to which the key figure was Arcesilaus in the earliest stages, to the middle of the first century where Carneades came to prominence in the middle of the second century. It would appear that Augustine read Cicero’s Academia, and thus became aware of ancient skepticism, and of the debate between Arcesilaus and the stoic Zeno of Citium.
Augustine expounded his arguments against skepticism in his dialogue Contra Academicos. In Book I, Augustine wrote of the wise man as being the only one who is happy, and from this premise postulated as to the nature of happiness – is it from seeking truth, or in the end result of finding it? In Book II, Augustine outlined the main view of the skeptics, and the assertion that nothing is ever known. From here, also into Book III, Augustine puts forwards his arguments against this position. He attempted to illuminate contradictions within the opinion expressed by the skeptics.