Joe Keegan- History
Short term Significance of the Battle of the Somme
The Battle of the Somme was a war planned late in 1915 as a joint French-British attack. The French Commander in Chief, Joffre, conceived the idea as a battle of attrition, the aim being to drain the German forces of reserves, although territorial gain was a secondary aim. However, the German attack Verdun made the Somme offensive even more pressing because the French army was under severe pressure there. The battle of the Somme was fought from the 1st July 1916 until later in same year where on November the 16th it was brought to an end. The massive amount of casualties in this time, as well how the war was fought Is what has made the battle so historic. For example, It’s best known for the mass amounts of soldiers who died and more specifically how they died In such a short space of time and why. The style of warfare was different and more brutal than ever before, for example better technology and large scale operations which seen over 1.7 million shells were fired at the German’s alone and made the war a huge test for the countries involved who relied heavily on individual decisions, as well as man power.
The first day of the Somme (1s July 1916) proved to be massively significant due to the sheer numbers of soldiers lost. Up to 60 000 British soldiers became casualties thanks to enemy fire (one third of the British military) British hopes were high going in to battle for the first time. Indeed, the poster campaign had been very effective. Public posters such as the very bold yet effective “we need you” poster (see appendix 1) with Kitchener pointing his finger at enthusiastic recruits was one way of attracting soldiers and this had a long lasting effect on men passionate believing that they would make their country proud. With that thought, many were glad at the opportunity given but the trust they had In those of higher command was tested on this first day as they had no idea that they were walking In to a mass death trap. Nonetheless, this is evidence of how recruitment was a key part of the Somme as propaganda at the time was different In regards to what could be published. For example religious references being on that particular poster was an effective technique of gaining more people as ones faith could be a huge factor In their decisions as It was seen by some as a patriotic duty at the time to fight for your country If necessary. This ultimately meant the poster campaign was a great success as many signed up following its release.
The preparations for the battle are significant in other ways. The battle plan relied on a week long bombardment of the German lines. There’s no doubt that this gave the British a great deal of confidence as Alfred Irwin notes. He describes himself and other soldiers as “young and optimistic”. He also highlights that he “didn’t think much about the future. I took it for granted that the wire would be cut, that we’d massacre the Boche In their front line, get to our objective and then be sent to do something else the next day.” This source illustrates how unprepared for and inexperienced the British were of modern high intensity warfare as in reality Irwin and others were misguided and given false hope for the first day of the battle. On the other hand an extract from Haig’s diary on Friday June 30th suggests something very different. He reports that “the men are in splendid spirits. The wire has never been so well cut, nor the artillery preparation so thorough.” This tells us a much more positive view point of the position the soldiers were in at the time as things were seemingly going to plan. Yet it’s estimated that up to one third of the shells did not actually explode. Nor did they cut the wire. This was largely down to experienced workers not being involved in the production of war munitions. One of the important lessons the British had to learn from the Somme was to improve the quality of shell manufacture and introduce proximity fused shells that would cut barbed wire. In “Haig The Unknown Soldier” John Hussey claims that Haig was relying on his intelligence officer John Charters for up to date information and that Charters would put a favourable spin on progress being made by the British. It is open to speculation, whether Haig was receiving the wrong information about the progress of the offensive. On the other hand Haig may have been covering his own back by writing this in his diary as It Is a form of proof that he believed his tactics were the right ones.
The attack begun at roughly 7:30am where thousands of soldiers went over the top after mines had accidently triggered, thus giving the German’s to set up there machine guns which were above ground. This allowed them to see over the British with ease and the mines triggering took away the element of shock leading to just over 20 000 British being killed and ultimately being let down by those of higher command who were making decisions that clearly lacked communication.
Sir Douglas Haig was a major figure In the Somme and regarded as the most controversial of all the generals. The decision he made through the course of the war was what makes him such a big part of how Britain confronted their opposition tactically. It was thought that by committing significant British forces on the Somme, the Germans would necessarily divert troops from Verdun, thereby taking the sting out of the offensive. Whether the attack was a success or not remains an area of controversy. General Sir Hubert Gough who commanded the fifth army under Haig for example expressed how the efforts of the Somme were being felt at home as suffering and anxiety were undoubtedly weakening the resolve of some people. (See documentary film Battle of the Somme) The fact that a general could have these doubts suggests that a clear lack of communication was evident and disagreement was about the battle plan was present between individuals. However, this did not matter as It was difficult for some generals and soldiers involved who had other ideas about attacking the German’s to have an input due to the dominance of Haig. This negative perception surrounding Haig Is reemphasised by historian John Laffin who states “Haig’s attitude to technology was virtually nil. He didn’t understand technology. The horse was always what mattered to him.” This not only suggests Haig was possibly too inexperienced with certain areas such as the more technical side to be making such decisions, but It also highlights the floor In his Input to what was going on physically. For example, where Laffin comments on how the horse was all that mattered to the general, this is evidence of how Haig was not at the front line of the battle but Instead, putting orders forward to vulnerable soldiers that were not thought through properly.
Haig persisted with the offensive in the following days with advances being made. These however were limited and often ultimately repulsed. Rawlinson's forces secured the first line of German trenches on 11 July. On that day German troops were transferred from Verdun to contribute to the German defence, doubling the number of men available for the defence. On 19 July the German defence was re-organised, with the southern wing appointing von Gallwitz. Gallwitz took overall responsibility for the conduct of the defence of the line. Haig was convinced, as were the Germans, that the enemy was on the point of exhaustion and that a breakthrough was imminent. Therefore the offensive was maintained throughout the summer and into November. The British were making little gain. In early September the French Tenth Army under Micheler joined the attack on a 20 kilometre front to the south. Meanwhile the British attack was renewed in north-east, the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, by the Fourth Army on 15 September. This latter attack made use of tanks for the first time and deployed 15 divisions of men. Despite this it still gained just under a kilometre of ground. These first tanks, which there was up to 50 of, were sourced from the Machine Gun Corps, 'C and 'D' Companies, and reached the Somme in September. Mechanical and other failures reduced the original number of participating tanks from 50 to 24. Although they were successful in their attempts to shock when sprung upon the German opposition, these early tanks proved unwieldy and highly unreliable. This is another example of where the British failed in their preparations as previously seen with the one third of duds not exploding.
Haig continued with attacks on the 25-27 September, in the Battle of Morval and the Battle of Thiepval Ridge. British advances were small as other attacks were launched by the British at the Battles of Transloy Ridges (1-20 October) and the Battle of the Ancre Heights (1-11 October). Similarly French attacks were continued in the south around and in the centre east. In October Joffre urged Haig to continue the offensive. By this time the French forces in Verdun were on the offensive and were gaining ground. Joffre was concerned that Haig should keep up the pressure on the Germans so as to prevent a diversion of German manpower back to Verdun to assist with the German defence there. On 13 November the BEF made a final effort on the far east of the Battle of the Ancre, in which they captured the field fortress of Beaumont Hamel. Despite the slow but progressive British advance, poor weather - snow - brought a halt to the Somme offensive on 18 November. During the attack the British and French had gained 12 kilometres of ground, the taking of which resulted in 420,000 estimated British casualties, including many of the volunteer 'pal's' battalions, plus a further 200,000 French casualties. German casualties were estimated to run at around 500,000.