The Battle of Verdun
21 February – 18 December 1916
The Build-up/Plan
The German siege of Verdun and its ring of forts, which comprised the longest battle of the First World War, has its roots in a letter sent by the German Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, to the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, on Christmas Day 1915.
In his letter to Kaiser, Falkenhayn said he wanted to “bleed France White” by launching a massive German attack on a narrow stretch of land that had historic sentiment for the French – Verdun.
In his letter to Wilhelm, Falkenhayn argued that the key to winning the war lay not on the Eastern Front, against Russia, but on the Western Front. He also believed that the French simply couldn’t allow these forts to fall as the national humiliation would have been too much. By fighting to the last man, Falkenhayn believed that the French would lose so many men that the battle would change the course of the war.

Kaiser acted upon Falkenhayn's recommendations. In doing so he agreed to switch focus from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. This strategy was not without its critics; in particular Paul von Hindenburg argued that the opportunity was lost to capture the bulk of the Russian army. Ultimately the failure of Falkenhayn's recommendations cost him his position.
Falkenhayn’s plan had credibility. The forts were very much part of the French moral and they would fight ferociously to keep the Germans out of the area. However, Falkenhayn’s plan also had one major weakness – it assumed that the French would be an easy opponent and that it would be the French who would take massive casualties – and not the Germans. In fact, all the forts around the area had been weakened as the French High Command had moved ammunition out of the forts to other areas on the Western Front. Also the trenches dug for defence had not been completed. Senior officers at the fort complex around Verdun complained to their Commander-in-Chief Joffre about the state of the defences in the area. He rejected their complaints.
Falkenhayn's choice of Verdun as the focus of the German offensive was shrewd. Although relegated by France to the status of a minor fortress during the early stages of the war, France having lost faith in the value of fortress defences, Verdun maintained a great psychological hold in the minds of the French people. On a practical level the woods immediately behind Verdun would have proved far easier to defend than the Verdun forts.
The last fortress town to fall to the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, Verdun's fortifications had been significantly boosted in the 1880s to withstand further attacks. In addition its status as an important fortress since Roman times guaranteed recognition of the name ‘Verdun' to most Frenchmen. In short, it was of greater value symbolically than strategically. Falkenhayn counted upon this.
Another part of his plan was to subject Verdun to intense bombardment, this meant drawing in and diverting French troops from all over the Western Front to the eight mile wide front around Verdun.
The task of besieging Verdun fell to the German Fifth Army under Crown Prince Wilhelm. He planned to assault the town from both sides of the surrounding Meuse River, a plan vetoed by Falkenhayn, who, feared heavy losses, ordered the attack to be restricted to the east bank of the river.
Originally scheduled to start on 12 February the offensive was postponed to 21 February on account of poor weather.
In the mean time between the planned and actual start date French Commander-in-Chief Joffre received intelligence of the imminent attack, quickly deploying reinforcements to the French Second Army. Meanwhile the fortress commander, Lieutenant Colonel Emile Driant, also a politician and published author, vainly attempted to improve Verdun's trench systems in time.
Driant prepared for the attack by posting two battalions, led by himself, at the tip of the Verdun, on the east bank of the Meuse River. He faced formidable opposition: one million German troops against 200,000 defenders.
The Battle/Attack
140,000 German troops started the attack, with Crown Prince Wilhelm in charge. They were supported by 1,200 artillery guns that targeted 2,500,00 shells at the Verdun region, that’s 1,00,000 shells an hour. They had nearby railway facilities. This was good because 1,300 ammunition trains were needed to supply these guns. The Germans also had complete air supremacy with 168 planes located in the area – the largest concentration of planes in history up to that point. To start with the French only had 30,000 troops to oppose the Germans. On the day the battle started February 21st, 1000 German artillery guns fired on a six mile line along the French front. Wilhelm’s intention was to kill the French defenders before the infantry (soldiers on foot) even started their advance to the fortress.
By the close of the day the German forces had succeeded only in capturing the French front line trenches, much less than planned, although Driant himself had been killed during the battle, and his two battalions demolished.

Wilhelm withdrew his forward infantry in preparation for a further artillery bombardment. This allowed the French defenders to position themselves such that they were able to position the advancing German troops from across the river.
Verdun remained in French hands, although the defensive situation was dire. A message was sent to French headquarters on 23 February reporting that Driant had been lost, as had all company commanders, and that the battalion had been reduced from 600 to around 180 men.
The following day, 24 February, German troops succeeded in over-running the French second line of trenches, forcing the defenders to within 8 kilometres of Verdun itself. Nevertheless, two outer forts, Vaux and Douaumont, continued to hold out.
A French division sent in piecemeal that same day was dispersed under heavy German artillery fire; Flame throwers were used in large numbers for the first time to help the German advance the eight miles they needed to if they were to capture Verdun.
By February 25th, the Germans had captured 10,000 French prisoners. To the German's astonishment, the huge fort at Douaumont, considered to be the most powerful fort in the world, was manned by just 56 elderly part-time gunners who gave the German attackers no resistance. On this next day Douaumont fell. The effect on French morale of the loss of Douaumont was marked, on both the remaining defenders and the reinforcements freshly arrived. Popular French sentiment within the country demanded its recapture: withdrawal from Verdun was therefore politically impossible.
The French Commander-in-Chief, Joffre, remained in deep focus. He issued a statement noting that any commander who gave ground to the advancing Germans would be court-martialled. Joffre put General Henri-Philippe Petain in charge of the defence at Verdun.
Petain understood that the defence of Verdun would result in many French casualties. He was determined to inflict the maximum damage to the German invaders in the course of these losses. Hence he effectively re-organised French use of artillery, personally taking commanding of this aspect of the defence.
He also took action to ensure that an effective supply route to Verdun was maintained. This was a difficult situation because the only road to Verdun was from the outside. In fact, it was barely a road by definition. It was only twenty feet wide and vehicles could barely pass one another. Yet along this road, 25,000 tons of supplies were moved into Verdun and 90,000 soldiers. 6,000 vehicles were used in this task and it is said that 66% of the French army was to pass up this road at some time during the battle to save Verdun. The road was given the nickname "Sacred Way" by the French. But despite the new military input, the French suffered badly.

On 6 March the Germans began a fresh offensive after receiving fresh artillery supplies, at first making great progress until French counter-attacks pushed back the advancing German infantry.
For the remainder of the month Wilhelm launched repeated attacks against the French reinforcements constantly pouring into the fortress. Of the 330 infantry regiment of the French army, 259 eventually fought at Verdun.
Falkenhayn reluctantly committed another corps of men to an attack up the left bank of the Meuse River towards a small ridge named Le Morte-homme (the 'Dead Man'), a battle that raged continuously without conclusion.
Meanwhile the casualties were mounting rapidly on both sides. The French were certainly losing huge numbers of men, as were their German opposition. By the time the battle ended almost one million casualties had occurred in roughly equal numbers on either side.
April 9 saw the third major German offensive launched. Both sides suffered casualties, by the end of April; the Germans had lost 120,000 men and the French 133,000 men.

As the battle moved through the spring of 1916, Pétain asked Joffre for more and more men but Joffre refused. He wanted the men for the planned attack on the Somme. Pétain was replaced by General Nivelle - a soldier who believed that the most successful strategy was to be on the offensive at all times.
By the summer, France had achieved some form of air supremacy over the Germans but this counted for nothing as the battle on the ground was one of simple attrition as the casualties mounted on both sides.

German gains continued in June, but slowly. On 1st June they attacked the heights along the Me River and finally took Fort Vaux on 7th June. The fort had h the start of the battle in February. On June 23rd they almost reached Belleville heights; within 2.5 miles of Verdun itself – but this attack faltered as the German army had given all that it had and could give no more. Pétain was preparing to evacuate the east bank of the Meuse when the Allies' offensive on the Somme River was launched on 1 July, partly to relieve the French. The Germans could no longer afford to commit new troops to Verdun and, at a cost of some 400,000 French casualties and a similar number of Germans, the attack was called off.
By the end of October 1916 a new French commander of the Verdun forts Charles Mangin (Third Army's General) took the offensive and managed to retake Douaumont on 24 October, followed by Fort Vaux on 2 November. But unfortunately the surrounding land, around the forts was now wasteland.
The battle at Verdun continued to December - ironically after the Somme conflict was considered to have ended. In this month the French captured 11,000 prisoners and with them 115 heavy guns.
The Results and Casualties
French casualties during the battle were estimated at 550,000 with German losses set at 434,000, half of the total being fatalities. The only real effect of the battle was the irrevocable wounding of both armies. No tactical or strategic advantage had been gained by either side.