Singer’s Moral Guilt T
PHI 208
January 7, 2013

Peter Singer’s goal in “Famine, Affluence and Morality” was to try and to get people all around the world to realize that they, as human beings, have a moral responsibility to help other human beings in need if they can. He argues that the way we view moral issues and our moral conceptual schemes need to be altered, and in fact the whole way in which our society takes our way of life for granted. Peter Singer’s argument is that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it”. (Singer, 1972). He believes that everyone in similar circumstances as himself should give as much as possible, up to the point that they might also be at risk of poverty themselves. He argues that if everyone in society all across the world did this, that the world would not only solve the Bengal crisis, but would also end world hunger all together. That also by not contributing to helping people suffering from tragedies we are not being morally responsible as a race to our “global village”. Counter points to Peter Singer’s argument that he makes are as follows: First he states that the view that he has taken on the Bengal crisis and world hunger may seem “too drastic a revision of our moral scheme”. (Singer, 1972). That in fact people would not judge other people in the way that he suggests they should, that they would save their judgment for people who actually violate some moral norm, such as theft, murder, etc. Society would not condemn a person who indulges in unnecessary luxury or material items instead of giving to famine relief. Singer’s response to this counter-point is that giving money to a relief fund or charity is considered charitable but is not looked down on by society if you do not contribute to an effort. A charitable man is praised but a man who contributes nothing is not condemned, he argues that this way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. He uses the example of a person who buys clothes to look “well dressed” instead of staying warm, should instead use that money for the relief because they are not sacrificing anything significant if they continue to wear the old clothes instead of purchasing new ones. A second counter-point Singer makes is that it is sometimes thought that overseas aid should be the government’s responsibility and that by giving to a private charity, it allows the government and noncontributing members of society to escape their responsibilities. This counter-point seems to assume that the more people who contribute to a privately organized relief fund, the less likely it is the government will take responsibility for any aid. Singer on the other hand believes that the opposite will actually happen. He makes the point that it is more plausible that if no one will voluntarily give help that “a government will assume its citizens are uninterested in famine relief and would not wish to be forced in to giving aid”. (Singer, 1972). He also makes the point that unless there is a definite certainty that by not helping private relief funds, that would bring a massive government contribution. Everyone should give now to end any type of suffering. Singer’s last counter-point is that some might believe that until there is effective population control, giving to the relief fund will only save Bengal refugees now and postpone the starvation of future people and children in the area. Those who support this idea often cite facts about the population explosion and limited scope for expanded production. Singer’s rebuttal for this, as he previously states in arguments for other counter-points is the belief that people do not want to end suffering now in fear of the outcome in the future. He goes on to point out that one cannot absolve themselves from any obligation now for fear of future outcomes. He also reiterates his position from earlier arguments, which one ought to be doing all one can to help the relief, that if this was the case, one could promote population control thus ending famine. Singer’s concept of marginal utility, is an idea where he proposes that “I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one’s dependents.” (Singer, 1972). This idea supports his argument by saying, if everyone gave so much to the point if they gave anymore they would be worse off than the people they are trying to help, that this would end famine and everyone would be on the same level of marginal utility. Singer’s concept of duty and charity in his argument are vastly different from the normal views of what society might have pertaining to duty and charity. Singer believes that though society sees a person give money at his own leisure as charitable, until that person gives almost everything to the cause that this is not charitable. If that person can afford to buy things that person “wants” and does not actually “need” than that individual has not given enough to help others. By doing this, that person can potentially keep someone from starvation rather than buying material items the person does not actually need to survive. Singer describes charity as something that is “good to do, but not wrong not to do.” (Singer, 1972). Society does not condemn people who do not give to the fullest potential or at all, but praises the ones who do give. Singer notes that in an article written by J. O. Urman, Urman explains that duty is something that society tells us what we must do, versus what would be good to do and not wrong not to do. Singer concludes that this is most likely the present division between duty and charity. He also says that the moral attitudes are shaped by the needs of the people in the society. Even though most of society has some moral views on violations of normal moral standings such as killing, stealing and so on within itself, he argues that it is just as morally important to prevent the starvation of millions of people elsewhere in the world even though they are outside of one’s immediate society. Singer further expresses his point about duty and charity by quoting Decretum Gratiani saying “The bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the clothing you shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth is the redemption and freedom of the penniless.” (Singer.1972). My personal opinion on Peter Singers argument falls somewhere in the middle of his position. Though I have a strong moral view on helping others in need, I do not feel that Singer has the appropriate attitude or even a realistic idea of helping people who suffer from famine. First, it offers no evidence supporting the idea of marginal utility, instead he gives the reader a moral guilt trip. I find it a hard argument to stand behind that if people across the world were to give up everything they possibly can to others, this would solve the world famine issue. Everyone being on the same level of poverty will result in no one starving, personally does not add up to a solution for me. As Al-Noor Nenshi Nathoo explains in his article, “In the thirty odd years since Singer first published his seminal paper, the idea of addressing poverty exclusively through direct transfers of resources as a means towards the goal of long-term development has been largely dismissed as potentially destructive, disrespectful of the dignity of poor peoples, and, ultimately, ineffective”. (Nathoo). My second argument against Singers position is that we all are morally obligated and in fact it is our duty to do the most we can and give as much as possible to the relief and if we do not, we are doing something that is morally wrong ourselves. I feel very strongly about helping people in need and I would never want anyone to suffer from famine, but it seems Singer would anyone with the ability to give up everything they worked for without question. It does not seem logical to me to go to such extreme lengths without knowing who I was helping and just how I am helping this person. Dale Jamieson points out such problems in his article “Nor are those who suffer in famines always passive victims struck down by the fickle finger of fate. They are often agents in highly complex political struggles. Those who suffered most in the Ethiopian famine of 1983-1985 were ethnic groups hostile to the government or involved in the civil war”.(Jamieson) Now this may just be one example but Jamieson goes on to explain that famines are usually never caused by nature alone, they are often the outcome of a crumbling economy, political struggles and war. It seems to me that just because you cannot or choose not to completely donate your entire life to someone who you have never met and did not cause the outcome of their situation, does not make you any less moral than someone who might have.

References

Singer, Peter (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol 1 pp 229-243

Jamieson, Dale (2005). Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World. The Journal of Ethics 151-156

Nenshi Nathoo, Al-Noor. (2001) Rationalized Selfishness or Reasonable Skepticism?
Objections to Singer and Unger on the Obligations of the Affluent. Retrieved from http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Al-Noor+Nenshi+Nathoo+&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36