The U.S. intervention in Somalia marked the first time that the United States placed its military operations under the flag of the United Nations (UN).

Africa's first post-cold war conflict, the corrupt regime of Muhammed Siad Barre prompted the necessity for intervention in Somalia. In power from 1969 to 1991, Barre created a patron-client relationship with the nation's clan-based society. That system required continuous outside assistance, and by 1987, some 57% of Somalia's gross national product was generated by international aid. Although he lacked legitimacy outside his clan, Somali general Mohamed Farah Aidid overthrew Barre, which led to the collapse of the state, continuous clan-based civil war, and famine. That situation provoked the deployment of the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in April 1992. Yet the force proved insufficient to control the "technicals" (a euphemism for mercenaries who remained loyal to their clans) hired by in-country humanitarian organizations. Under those circumstances, between November 1991 and March 1992, some 30,000–50,000 Somalis died of starvation.

The U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) broke that cycle in December 1992, when the UN Security Council authorized a deployment to Somalia of U.S. troops, which had been offered by the outgoing president George Bush. UNOSOM would work with a unified command (37,000 troops from more than 20 nations, including, at its peak, 29,000 U.S. troops) and continue with its original mandate after the withdrawal of the unified command. UNITAF, code-named Operation Restore Hope, was deployed to the south of Somalia on December 9, 1992 with the exclusive mandate to provide and secure the urgent deliveries of humanitarian assistance. Warlords in Mogadishu had agreed to the intervention following talks with U.S. special envoy Robert Oakley, a former U.S. ambassador to Somalia. That mission is probably best remembered for images of television cameras filming U.S. Navy Seals landing on the beach in Mogadishu as though it was a covert operation. The hope was that UNITAF's mission would be a springboard to the political unification of Somalia.

Following the arrival of UNITAF, a reconciliation conference was hastily arranged among the 15 armed political groups. Although the conference resulted in a cease-fire agreement, signed by the warlords on January 8, 1993 in Addis Ababa, the agreement was criticized because the Somali people did not see the warlords as their representatives. However, the UN targeted the warlords because the international community saw them as the country's leaders. Cooperation with them was perceived as being essential, yet it only legitimized the warlords' positions.

Remarkable progress was made on the humanitarian front in the south. A civilian-military operation center was established to assist humanitarian-military cooperation, and large supplies of food and other emergency relief supplies were successfully delivered into the neediest areas. In addition, the two main Somali factions and UNITAF set up a security committee that met daily, and UNITAF helped establish an indigenous Somali police force. Although much had been achieved by UNITAF in six months, a secure environment had not been established, and incidents of violence continued. Moreover, the humanitarian and political situation in many parts of the country remained unstable.

Military command was transferred from UNITAF to UNOSOM on May 4, 1993, which continued the UN constabulary role but with less U.S.-supplied firepower. In continuing support of UNOSOM II's mandate, the United States deployed the elite Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos (under U.S., not UN, command), and 17,700 troops of the United States Joint Task Force also supported UNOSOM II, which also remained under U.S. command. Violent incidents continued, including a disturbing attack in July by U.S. forces on a building in Mogadishu where a Somali National Alliance (SNA) meeting was taking place. The attack resulted in a large number of Somali casualties, many of whom were Somali elders seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict. Following that incident, Somalis from other clans started supporting Aidid, who retaliated by making a calculated decision to kill U.S. soldiers. Throughout August and September, there were fatal attacks on Americans. U.S. forces fought back, killing hundreds of Somalis, many of them innocent civilians.

The final blow came on October 3, 1993, when U.S. special forces were trapped by armed SNA members as they attempted to capture senior members of Aidid's operation. Fighting broke out; 18 of the special forces were killed, and between 500 and 1,000 Somalis died in what became known as the Battle of Mogadishu. The bodies of the U.S. soldiers were subjected to public acts of outrage that were transmitted on television screens around the world. Aidid had figured correctly: The systematic attacks on U.S. soldiers powerfully influenced U.S. opinion. President Bill Clinton announced the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994.

In retrospect, the Somali experience reflects poorly on the UN administration and U.S. command. The UN leadership failed to comprehend the level of difficulty involved and underestimated the level of international support it enjoyed. The U.S.-led manhunt for Aidid was prosecuted with a divided command structure, with all the control problems that implies, not to mention the failure to consider that Aidid's forces might have been able to offer effective resistance under the right circumstances. As such, Somalia remains a fragmented, warring society.

Further Reading

Bolger, Daniel P., Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle, 1999; Bowden, Mark, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, 1999; Maren, Michael, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity, 1997; Stevenson, Jonathan, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia, 1995.

MLA Citation

"U.S. intervention in Somalia." American History. ABC-CLIO, 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2010.