Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States Author(s): Philip Robins Reviewed work(s): Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 593-610 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328631 . Accessed: 14/11/2012 11:59
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BETWEEN SENTIMENTAND SELF-INTEREST:TURKEY'S POLICY TOWARDAZERBAIJANAND THE CENTRALASIAN STATES
Philip Robins

HEN the new republics of CentralAsia and Azerbaijanbegan declaring theirindependencefromMoscow nearthe end of 1991,there was greatexcitement in certain Western circles about Turkey'sfuturerole in their development. Their bond was frequently mentioned, and Turkey common Turkic cultural-linguistic was seen as an economic and political model for these new states. Some In enthusiasts even advanced grandiosenotions of resurgentpan-Turkism. order to limit any possible growth of Iranian-inspired political Islam in these new republics, Western political leaders generallyregardedTurkey as the country to supportin its approachestoward these states.1 Two years later, there are signs of disillusionment.2 Turkey's shortcomings, particularly in the provision of economic aid, are being noted. The relative strengthsof these republicsin comparisonto Turkeyare being accentuated,as is the desire of these new states to establish direct links with the West, ratherthan indirectlyvia Ankara.3Impatienceis being expressed at the slow rate of progress in the forgingof close ties between Turkeyand the republics.Some commentators
1. This latterview came to the fore aroundthe time of the visit to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistanof US secretaryof state JamesBakerin February1992.See, for instance, the Times, February17, 1992,which stated that the "fear of fundamentalism spreading[to CentralAsia] has in turnpromptedWashington encourageTurkeyin its bid for a leadingrole in the region'spolitics." to The Daily Telegraphof February22, 1993, refers to BakerurgingTurkmenistan follow Turkey, "to ratherthan Iran." 2. See Le Monde, January9, 1993.An articleon Turkeyand the republicscontainsa section titled "Le fin de l'euphorie." 3. Shirin Akiner, a Central Asia expert at the School of Oriental and African Studies, Universityof London, was one of the firstcommentators challengethe notion of the emergenceof to a cozy, close, and uncomplicated between Turkeyand the CentralAsian states. relationship Philip Robins is head of the MiddleEast Programmeat the Royal Instituteof International Affairs,
London. MIDDLEEAST JOURNALU VOLUME47, NO. 4, AUTUMN 1993

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TURKEY * 595

are beginningto suggest that it was all an empty sham, that Turkeyis too weak to have more than a marginalimpact on these republics.4 There are problems with both these views, not least that they fail to distinguishamong the six republics. The exaggeratedexpectations were, in part, Western creations. Many Turks from Turkey, beginningwith President Turgut Ozal,5were also guilty of speakingabout CentralAsia with a "dreamyvoice. "6 Given the complete absence of interactionbetween the modern state of Turkey and these former Soviet republicsuntil their independence,Turkishand Western expectations appear to have been born of ignorance. The paucity of Turkish officials with the intellectualskills and knowledge necessary to develop intimate ties with these new states strongly suggests that it is unrealistic to judge the potential in relations between Turkeyand these republicsover such a short time frame. This article is an attempt to look beyond the blanket generalitiesthat have been expressed since late 1991. It will take into account political, cultural, and economic factors in endeavoringto assess the longer-termpotentialfor Turkey's relations with the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. Ultimately, the conclusions are tentativebecause of the manyvariablesthat could alter the nature of their relations in the years ahead. FOREIGNPOLICY:TURKEY'SPRIORITIES There has been much speculation about Turkey's future foreign policy orientation.The rebuffthat Ankarareceived from the EuropeanCommunityover Turkey's 1987 applicationfor admission has led to conjecture about alternative groupings.The Turkishgovernmenthas felt the necessity to deny that it regards the Black Sea Economic Projectas an alternativeto EC membership.7 There has also been idle talk that Turkey might be looking exclusively east to the Turkic republicsas a result of havingfailed to receive admissionto the premierWestern club.8 In Ankara, and indeed among the Kemalist elite as a whole, these are consideredfancifulnotions. Turkeycontinues to place its relationswith the West at the top of its list of foreign policy priorities. Turkeyremainsan active memberof the North AtlanticTreatyOrganization, NATO, sharing the US and British perspectives that the organizationmust be
4. These views have been expressed at a numberof symposia and in the author's private conversationswith regionalobservers. 5. It was Ozal who arguably the precipitated awkwardness, the Turkicsummitin Ankaraat at the end of October 1992, when he attempted to force the participantsinto a close economic relationship.See, for instance, the summitopeningspeech by Ozal in which he called for the taking down of economicwalls amongthe Turkicrepublics,ultimatelyleadingto free trade. "BBC Summary of WorldBroadcasts," MiddleEast, November2, 1992. 6. Hugh Pope, Independent,June 1, 1992, special reporton Turkeyand CentralAsia. 7. For example, see statementby acting ForeignMinistryspokesmanFerhatAtamanin the Guardian,February3, 1992. 8. For example, see referencein the Sunday Telegraph,December22, 1991.

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EASTJOURNAL 596mMIDDLE

sustained and reinvigorated. In November 1992, Turkey joined the Western EuropeanUnion as an associate member,a lesser status than it had desired, but, nevertheless, for the first time a formal connection was established. In the economic domain,the EC marketnow accountsfor around50 percentof Turkey's exports. Turkey and the European Community,moreover, are striving for the introduction of a customs union by the beginning of 1996. By dint of their population size, their relative development, and their ability to trade in hard currency, EC and European Free Trade Association countries are trading partnersthat cannot be easily replaced. If the Western orientationof Turkeyremainsundisputed,the preoccupation of the country is equally clear. New areas of instability have opened up on Turkey's borders, most notably in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Conflict over and Nagorno-Karabakh Bosnia are importantto Turkeyfor several reasons: they are proximate,takingplace in Turkey'sgeostrategicbackyard;they are perceived as having security, and conceivably even existential, implicationsfor the Turkish and republic(for example, Armenianirredentism); they affectfellow Turks.These new problems add to an existing list of regional concerns that include Cyprus, relations with Greece, and relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, most obviously regardingsupport for the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey led by the Kurdistan WorkersParty (PKK). The Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia, and Kurdishissues have been fast-moving crises, requiring close and continuing attention by senior officialsin Ankara,and the concentrationof an enormousamountof politicalwill. They leave senior figuresat the ForeignMinistryrelativelylittle time or energyfor concertedly pursuingstrategieselsewhere. In the longer term, Turkey remainsnervous about the future shape and role of Russia. In the nineteenthcentury, Russia was an expansionist militarypower that soughtto devourpartsof the ailingOttomanEmpire.The Soviet Union posed a similar threat under Stalin. Even when there was relatively little tension, the Soviet Union and Turkey never stabilized their great power/middle power relationship.AlthoughRussia has turnedin on itself and no longerhas a common land border with Turkey-both remain Black Sea littoral states, however-it is still the largest and potentially most powerful state in the area. Short of the of disaggregation Russia, it is likely that in the futureTurkeyonce more will have to deal with a strongstate that has majorintereststo the south. Turkey,therefore, is wary of antagonizingRussia even at a time of weakness, an importantfactor informingits policy towardCentralAsia. It was out of deference to Moscow that Ankarawas reluctantto recognize the new republicsin 1991althoughthe Soviet Union was in terminaldecline. Turkeyand the Republics: The Pecking Order A common problemamong writers and commentatorshas been to overgeneralize about the six republicsdiscussed here. It is true that the six have much in

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TURKEY * 597

common, most obviously the experience of Soviet rule. The differences in location, ethnic composition, demographicsize, and mineral wealth, however, mean that one should be cautious about makingoverarchingstatements. This is certainly the case when looking at the six from the perspective of one external state. The common cultural-cum-linguistic bond that Turkey shares with five of the six states-the exception being the Persian-speaking majorityin Tajikistanoften prompts people to speak of relations with the Turkic republics as if they were one entity. The Turkishgovernmenthas helped to reinforcesuch a view by self-consciously trying not to distinguishamong the republics.9So, for instance, insteadof focusing on those republicsof most importanceto it, Turkeyhas placed all six destinationson the travel schedules of its senior politicians,and dispatched ambassadors to all six capitals. A closer study of Turkish attitudes, however, shows that these six republics-or even only the five Turkic republics-are, for the most part, not treated by Ankaraas an undifferentiated mass. When attempting to rank the six republics in importancefrom a Turkish perspective, it is relativelyeasy to name the most and least important: Azerbaijan and Tajikistan,respectively. The fact that Azerbaijanis in Turkey's geostrategic region means that the policies Azerbaijan pursues have a direct bearing on Turkishinterests. Most obviously the conflict between Azerbaijanand Armenia has over Nagorno-Karabakh affectedTurkishrelationswith Armenia.This is true especially of the round of fightingin the spring of 1993 over Kelbajar, during which Armenianforces opened up a second land corridorbetween Armeniaand Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, Turkeyinsists that Armeniaabandonits "expansionist policy" as one of the two preconditionsfor the establishmentof full diplomatic relations.'1It must be pointed out, however, that Turkishpolicy towardAzerbaijan is neither uncriticalnor entirely supportive. The intensity of relationsbetween Azerbaijanand Turkey has been fostered in two additional ways. First, there exists within Turkey an importantAzeri community. Organized and self-conscious, it acts as a lobby on behalf of Azerbaijanwithin the Turkish state, an "insider" relationshipthat none of the remainingfive republics in Central Asia share. Second, there appears to be a strongpreferenceamongTurkishbusinessmenfor tradingwith Azerbaijanrather than with the other new republics.11 This preference seems to be based on the existence of a vigorous small business culture in that republic, together with a combination of geographicalproximity and ease of language communication.12
9. Interviewwith a memberof the TurkishForeignMinistry workingon CentralAsia, Ankara, April 22, 1993. 10. Turkish Daily News, June 6, 1992. 11. For example, a poll of 1,500Turkishbusinessmenwho had visited the Turkicrepublicsput Azerbaijanat the top of the list regardingthe locale where the business opportunitieswere most attractive. Azerbaijanreceived an aggregatescore of 6.5 out of 10. The second highest score was Uzbekistanwith 5.6. Turkish Daily News, July 20, 1992. 12. For AnatolianTurks, Azeri is the most readilyunderstoodlanguagespoken in the Turkic republics,andAzerbaijan the only republic have embraced new Latinalphabet replaceCyrillic. is to a to

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598 mMIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

None of these factors exist to the same degree with respect to the other republics. Thus, it is hardly surprisingthat in 1992 Azerbaijan accounted for about 50 percent of the trade Turkey conducted with the six republics.13 Turkey's relative lack of interest in Tajikistan results from cultural and linguistic differences, compoundedby the geographicaldistance of that republic from Turkey. Even the Turkishgovernment'sscrupulousattemptsto treat all six republics equally have fallen down over Tajikistan. For example, while 2,000 scholarships were offered to students from each of the five Turkic republics to study in Turkey, this gesture was not extended to Tajikistanbecause of the The internal turmoil in Tajikistanhas further retarded the language barrier.14 developmentof closer ties. Consequently,PrimeMinisterSuleymanDemirel did not visit Dushanbe during his swing through the new republics in May 1992 (althoughthe city had originallybeen on his itinerary).Tajikistanwas also absent from the Turkic summitin Ankarain October 1992althoughit had been invited despite the fact that it was not actually a Turkicrepublic. Of the other four republics, Western analysts would tend to say that Kazakhstan is clearly the most important.15 Its considerable hydrocarbonreserves, the presence of strategicnuclearweapons, the delicateethnic mix, and the geostrategiclocation of the republic-adjacent to both Russia and China-could be regarded as unassailable arguments. For Turkey, however, the outlook is different.Turkey certainly has business hopes in Kazakhstan,linked principally to the energy sector. The most notable include the protocol signed by the Birlesmis Muhendisler Burosu (BMB) in July 1992 for the operation of four oilfields and the construction of a $1.7 billion thermalpower station,'6 and the Turk Petrol Anonim Ortakligi/Pet Holding joint venture with the National Petroleum Company, which was concluded in November 1992, to operate five oilfields. Turkey is unlikely, however, to develop the commerciallinks that it is seeking. Some of its initialsuccesses have alreadyproved false; for example, the BMB deal ultimately fell flat.17 From a more strategic standpoint, it seems doubtful that Kazakhstan will opt to route its oil exports via the Turkish Mediterranean terminalat Yumartalik, oil preferring insteadto continueuse of the Russian outlet of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. Kazakhstan'sapparentpreferencefor existinginfrastructural with Russia ties points to a broader preference on the part of the Kazakh government born of
13. Independent,June 1, 1993. 14. The scholarshipsallow students to study principallysocial studies and managementat Turkishhighereducationalinstitutions. 15. The Guardian,May 19, 1992,describesKazakhstan being "pivotal," andgoes on to say as that the United States sees it as a "lynchpin" of a new security system in Central Asia. The Independent,February26, 1993, refers to the United States, togetherwith the United Kingdom,as havingat first given an unbalancedinitialweight to Kazkhstan. 16. Turkish Daily News, July 14, 1992. 17. Turkish Daily News, December 1, 1992.The BMB deal began to falter when BMB found that threeout of the four oilfieldsit hadbeen allocatedby the Kazakhgovernment were unproductive. BMB asked for an additionalthree fields, a requestthat appearsnot to have been granted.

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TURKEY * 599

essentially political considerations. The demographic balance in the republic between Kazakhs and Russians and the continuinginterest being shown by the Russian state have made the present Kazakh government highly sensitive to Russian interests.18 This, in turn, has restrictedAlma Ata's parametersof action. Consequently, Kazakhstanhas shown little inclinationto rapidlydevelop broadbased ties with Turkeyfor fear of how this would be perceivedby both Russia and its own Russian population. A good example of Kazakh caution came at the Turkicsummitin Ankarain October 1992when PresidentNursultanNazarbayev refused to agree to any binding commitments at the summit.19He stated that Kazakhstanwould develop ties with Turkey and the other Turkicrepublicsonly on the condition that this would not harm its commitmentsto other Commonwealth of IndependentState (CIS) members.20 Such views caused some pique in the Turkishcapital.2'The realitiesof the very limitedinfluenceTurkeywas likely to have on Kazakhstanin comparisonto Russia could not be mistaken. With Kazakhstan(of necessity) a marginalally and a distant neighbor,and and Kyrgyzstansimilarlydistant and of poor economic prospects, Turkmenistan whereTurkeyhopesto develop Uzbekistanareleft as the republics (afterAzerbaijan) ties. Withrespectto Turkmenistan, issue is reducible that the the most productive to to of gas. Ankarais lobbyingthe Turkmenistan government ensurethat a futuregas pipelinewill traverseTurkey.Thiswouldguarantee Turkeyadditional suppliesof gas for domestic use and income from transitfees. If, as a result of exploitingits gas shouldbecome "anotherKuwait,"the republiccouldboost reserves,Turkmenistan in importspurchasable foreigncurrency,an effective demandthat Turkey'smanuand services sectors would be keen to satisfy. facturing The attractivenessof Uzbekistanfor Turkeyis, in part, commercial,because of the existence there of hydrocarbons,other minerals,and cotton that could be used in Turkey's considerable textile industry. The size and geopolitical and militaryimportanceof Uzbekistan, moreover, are also an attractionthat make it a potentially more influential state than either impoverished Kyrgyzstan or underpopulatedTurkmenistan.The signs are, however, that Turkey is likely to encounter with Uzbekistan problems similarto those with Kazakhstan,albeit on a reduced scale. During the Turkic summit, Uzbek president Islam Karimov,
18. The ethnic compositionof Kazakhstanis 41 percent Kazakh, 37.8 percent Russian, 5.8 percent German,5.4 percent Ukranian,and 10 percent other nationalities.Bulletinon Kazakhstan publishedby the ForeignEconomics RelationsBoard(DEIK), Istanbul,April 1993. 19. Turkish Daily News, October31, 1992. 20. Turkish Daily News, November 1, 1992. 21. Azeri presidentAbulfaz Elcibey took advantageof the discomfortof some of the other visiting heads of state to make political capital in Ankara.For instance, when the issue arose of a Turkicorganization,Elcibey stated that those republicsthat were alreadymembersof supranational the CIS-namely all of them with the exception of Azerbaijan, which simply attends as an observer-were likely to be unenthusiastic aboutjoininganothersimilarorganization. disappointThe ment at the negative attitude of some of the CentralAsian heads of state manifesteditself in the singlingout of Elcibeyfor publicpraise.One newspapereditor,for example,describedhimas the only visitingleaderwith the makingsof a statesmanof international calibre.TurkishDaily News, November 4, 1992.

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600 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

echoing President Nazarbayev, was at pains to rule out the need to establish a mechanismto managethe relationsof the Turkicworld.22 Tashkent supranational has enthusiasticallyembraceda new defense relationshipwith Russia as a key to the maintenanceof stability in former Soviet CentralAsia. In summation,therefore, Turkey is likely to have to come to terms increasingly with the fact that Russia will have much more influence over Kazakhstan than will Turkey. Ankara seems already to have accepted that its potential relations with Tajikistan are extremely limited. Turkey's special, though not uncriticalrelationshipwith Azerbaijanis more likely to continue althougheven in this case the common borderbetween Iranand Azerbaijanmeans that the former cannot be eclipsed. Considerablepotentialexists for Turkeyto develop relations and with Turkmenistan Uzbekistan,and the natureof relationswith Turkmenistan will depend, in particular,on the course of futuregas pipelineconstruction.In the case of Turkmenistan,once again the location of Iran means that Turkey, at the very least, will have to share a potentiallyprofitablerelationship. TURKEY'SVISION In keeping with a country that has a highly ideological view of itself and the world, Turkeyhas a strong sense of "'vision"for these six new republics.This is particularly evident in elite circles, and especially in the Foreign Ministry. Accordingto this vision, the republicsshould emerge as essentially independent, secular, and democratic, with liberal, free market-oriented economies. Turkey believes that these are characteristicsit posseses and that it, therefore, should be regardedas an economic and political model for these newly emerged states.23 Ankaratakes the view, however, that it does not have the financialresources to bringabout such an economic orientation.Turkey's role, as Ankarasees it, is to usher in the necessary reforms, while workingwith the West to act as a "funnel of investment" for this purpose.24 Turkey's strongadvocacy has inevitablybroughtit into difficulties with other interestedpowers, and, indeed, with some local elites. Ankara'sadvocacy of real for is as independence the six republics regarded a euphemism independence for from Moscow and the infrastructural, linguistic,and militaryties that continueto bind these new states to the old center. Turkey's advocacy of a secular vision of for government these republicshas also been perceivednegativelyby Iran.Tehran
22. Turkish Daily News, November 1, 1992. 23. Prime Minister Demirel referred to Turkey as being "a model country" as early as December 1991. See Newspot, December 12, 1991. By March 1992, senior officialswere specifically to referring Turkeyas a model countryfor the Turkicrepublics.See ForeignMinisterHikmetCetin's statementafter his returnfromvisits to seven CIS republicsin Newspot, March12, 1992.Turkeyhas been cheeredfrom the sidelinesby influential in commentators the West in developingsuch a notion. See, for instance, GrahamE. Fuller, CentralAsia: TheNew Geopolitics(SantaMonica, CA: Rand, 1992),p. vi, where he refers to Turkeyas "the ideal model." 24. Suleyman Demirel"Newly Emerging Review6, no. 30 (Winter1992),p. 15. Centre,"Turkish

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TURKEY 601 U

Ankaraas intendingto marginalize Iran'sinfluencewith these new has interpreted states. Rhetoricfrom the United States describingTurkeyas a moderateMuslim has "fundamentalism" state capableof actingas a bulwarkagainstIranian-inspired It is also likelythatSaudiArabiahas haddifficulty deepenedIran'ssense of mistrust. with Turkey'ssecularvision despitethe fact thatAnkaraandRiyadhhave discussed with the objectiveof curtailing Iranianinfluence. ways of cooperating,principally Were independent,secular,and democraticstates with liberaleconomies in fact to emerge in the new republics, there is every chance that these countries would, indeed, be more closely linkedto Turkeythanto Russiaor Iran. Turkey's vision for the new republics has also created problems for its in withtheirexistingregimes.Pushing democratic for reforms these new relationships states, Ankarais all too awarethatthe rulingelite are largelythose who held power duringthe CommunistParty era. These regimes seem just as willing to resort to and coercionandcontrolas was the case beforeindependence are, in turn,suspicious rhetoric.Ankara founditselfobliged of Turkey'sdemocratic has, perhapsinevitably, the degreeto which it is comfortable, with the fear to deal with such elites beyond thatsuch actionmaybe costly in the longerterm.The major exceptionamongleaders in the republics is PresidentAskar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan,with whom Turkish For is officialsappearto be noticeablymoreat ease.25 the Turks,the dilemma to what extent they shouldbe seen to be dealingwith the old elites, and to what extent they shouldbe tryingto second guess regimechange. In some cases, Turkey has managed to back both horses to victory. In Azerbaijan,for instance, Turkeyworkedclosely with PresidentYaqubMutalibov despite his CommunistParty associations. When the Popular Front eventually seized power in May 1992, Ankarafound it enjoyed an even warmerrelationship with the new president, Abulfaz Elcibey. The downfallof Elcibey in June 1993, and Ankara's commitment to the support of democratic processes, however, seem set to result now in a period of cooler ties with Azerbaijan. Turkeyhas tried to broadenthe base of its relationswith all the republics.Its and scholarship program the emphasisit has placedon businesscontacts shouldbe seen in this context. Even such initiatives,however,have had limitedeffects. In the Ankarahas foundit difficult ensurethatsuch educational case of the scholarships, to of In placementsare not subjectto the patronage the new republics'nomenklatura.26 of has addition,the absenceof a stratum entrepreneurs usuallyobligedbusinessmen to work with state organizations.27
25. For instance, after the October 1992Turkicsummit,of all the CentralAsian leaders, only PresidentAkayev was praised.One editorialsaid that he injectedsome "moderation understandand ing" into the summit,thereby preventinga "rathernegative situation"from emerging.See Turkish
Daily News, November 4, 1992.

26. Interviewwith senior memberof the Turkishdiplomaticservice, September17, 1992. 27. For example, a glance at the May 1992 monthly bulletin for Uzbekistan, produced by Turkey'sForeignEconomicRelationsBoard,lists 56 prospective joint ventureprojectproposals-an indicationof the extent to which foreignfirmshave to deal with ministriesand state companieswhen they do business.

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602 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

AlthoughTurkey's vision of the republics'futurehas endearedit to the West, especially the United States, it has not unlocked significantvolumes of aid. The vast majorityof US aid to the formerSoviet Union has been concentratedon the Slavic republics, in particular, the Russian Federation. Under the Technical of Assistance for the Commonwealth IndependentStates (TACIS)program,there have been internal obstacles to channelingaid from the European Community throughTurkeyto the Turkicrepublics.The communityis currentlyengagedin a protractedinternaldebate aboutwhetherit shoulduse some of its TACISfunds to pay for direct Turkishparticipationin assisting the Turkic republics. The main obstacle to the development of such a triangularrelationshipis, for once, not political. Rather,it is the objectionsof certainmemberstates-previously France, but now principally Italy-to the use of grant aid to benefit consultants from outside EC countries.28 AND PRACTICE STRATEGY Turkey's strategytowardthe six republicsduringthe first 18 months of their independence may be divided into three areas: the establishmentof formal ties; the development of infrastructural links; and the provision of aid and finance. Formal Ties Turkey's initialeffortto establishformalties with the new republicsreflected the general absence of ties with the republics prior to their declarations of independence. It also reflected that from the outset the Turkishgovernmentdid not have any concrete blueprintfor developingsubstantiveties. The effort at the formal level was primarilyconfined to the diplomaticdomain, although it also included the establishmentof culturalcenters andjoint business councils. In the purely diplomatic arena, Turkey, as senior politicians from Ankaraare fond of reminding their Turkic counterparts, was the first country to recognize the independence of the new republics. Again reflecting its primaryimportanceto Ankara,Azerbaijanwas the first to receive Turkishrecognition,on November 9, 1991,29 although the point has to be made that Baku had actually declared its independence in September of that year. On 16 December, Turkey extended recognition to all the republics that comprised the Soviet Union-a convenient device that permittedthe low-key recognitionof Armenia.Baku was also the first
28. For furtherdetails, see PhilipRobins, New Trendsin EC-Turkish Cooperation(Brussels: ForumEurope, 1993),p. 27. 29. The Turkishgovernmentmighthave likedto have waitedlonger,but theirhandwas forced by Azeri prime ministerHasan Hasanov. He appealedto the Turkishpeople over the government's head duringa stopover in Ankara, saying that Turkishbusiness might lose out were it not the first countryto extend recognition.See Turkey Confidential,December 1991, p. 11-12.

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U TURKEY 603

of the new capitals to receive a Turkishembassy, with the signingof the protocol for that purpose on January13, 1992. A spate of high-level visits accompaniedthe extension of formalrecognition to the republicsand the consequentdiplomaticmanifestations.Seniorofficialsand advisors from the republics were almost queuing up to visit Turkey once the republics had declared their independence. In December 1991, for instance, no less than three heads of state from five of the new Turkic republics visited There was, however, a noticeabledelay before Ankarareciprocatedthe Turkey.30 visits, an indication that Turkey's willingness to forge close relations was not sufficientto change existing political priorities.Consequently,it was late February 1992before ForeignMinisterHikmetCetin paid his firstvisit to the republics, and the following May before PrimeMinisterDemirel's trip took place. When it was organized,the Demirelswing throughthe republicswas reminiscentof Ozal's trips abroadas prime minister.AlthoughDemireltook a 144-mandelegationwith him, the size of the team was balancedby the brevity of the visits; he spent little more than a day in each republic. After the establishment of diplomatic relations came the conclusion of frameworkagreements,often formallyconcluded duringhigh-profile visits. Such accords were brief and general, containinglittle more than vague assertionsof the desire to forge close and coordinatedrelationsin areas rangingfrom economic to cultural to informationpolicy. These were followed by a second generation of more specific accords.31By February1993,Turkeyand the five Turkicrepublics had signed more than 140 bilateralaccords on a variety of differentsubjects,32 adding to the impression that formalities were increasingly a substitute for substance. In a formal sense, business ties, as often is the case with Turkishbusinessmen, were runningahead of political relations. For example, both Turkish-Azeri and Turkish-Uzbekbusiness councils had been establishedas early as November 1991. While commercial relations with Azerbaijan continued to develop, this formal effort appeared deceptive with respect to the Central Asian republics. Turkey's approach to these states contrasted with the rush to get involved in Russia on the back of the growingvolume of gas being importedinto Turkeyfrom the federation; overall trade with the Turkic republics now stands at less than one-fifthof Turkishtrade with Russia. By the end of 1992, Turkishbusinessmen appearedto be adoptinga cautious approachtoward CentralAsia.33Concern at the lack of a legal framework,payment problems (with companies having little
30. These were PresidentSaparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan, who arrivedon 2 December; PresidentKerimovof Uzbekistan,who came on 16 December;and PresidentAkayev of Kyrgyzstan, who arrivedon 22 December. 31. Interviewwith officialfrom TurkishForeignMinistry,April22, 1993. 32. Interviewwith politicaladvisorto Demirel, February18, 1993. 33. Such a conclusion must remain somewhat tentative owing to the absence of anything approaching comprehensivestatisticaldataon privatesectorinvolvementin the Turkicrepublicsfrom officialbodies and organizations such companies. representing

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604 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

and choice but to enter into complex counter-trade arrangements), the absence of appropriateprivate sector partnerswere some of the main concerns most often voiced.34
Infrastructural Ties

Arguably,Turkey'smost tangibleefforttowardthe Turkicrepublicshas been in the field of infrastructural provision. The calculation by Ankara has been If skeleton that connects it straightforward: Turkeycan providean infrastructural then Ankarawill have succeeded in locking these entities with these new states, into an intimate and long-termrelationship.In the political domain these newly independent republics have been keen to keep their options open with other influentialneighbors,such as Russia and Iran, whereas in the infrastructural field, Turkey is more favorablyplaced. Turkey has been most active in four main areas of infrastructural development: transport, energy pipelines, telecommunications,and human resources. With respect to transport,the Turks early on were keen to establish air routes to facilitate contact with the republics. The fact that Turkey is not geographically no contiguous with any of the republics,35 doubt, explains this particularpreference.36In May 1992,direct, scheduledflightsby Turkishairlineswere established with Alma Ata, Baku, and Tashkent;the Bakuflightis expected to be extended to Ashkhabadin 1993. The existence of business opportunitiesin related fields was underlinedin late October 1992when a consortiuminvolvingJohn Laing and the Turkish company ALARKO was awarded a contract for the expansion of the airportin Ashkhabad.37 Despite their strategicprecariousness,Turkeyalso has sought the establishment of land transportlinks across the republics. For example, Turkishofficials took part in a meetingin Kazakhstanin March 1992to considerthe completionof the Caucasianrail network. Ankara's aim is to establish a link with Azerbaijan, via Nakhichevan and Iran, and thence to the Central Asian republics by across the CaspianSea. The feasibilityof this project, as with so many train-ferry land projects for Turkey, is dependentupon free access across Iran. The omens are not especially good given that Iran disruptedTurkishland trafficbound for Kazakhstanin spring 1992.38
34. See InternationalHerald Tribune,April 13, 1993. 35. Turkeydoes have a seven-mileborderwith Nakhichevan,formallypartof Azerbaijan, but itself is not contiguouswith Azerbaijan. 36. Iran,which by contrastis territorially adjacentto Azerbaijan Turkmenistan, placed and has its emphasison terrestrial such as the developmentof rail and road links. ties 37. Turkish Daily News, November2, 1992. 38. Turkish Daily News, April 16, 1992.Accordingto this report,unnameddiplomaticsources in Ankaraspeculatedthatthe move mighthave been in retaliation Turkey'sseizingthe Cypriotship for Cape Maleas, which was boundfor Iranladen with armsfrom Bulgaria.

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TURKEY m605

Hydrocarbonsare the most tangibleand immediatelyexploitableresource of the new republics. For Turkeythese energy resources are attractivefor a host of reasons. For instance, they are a potentialdirect energy supply;in addition,they offer the opportunity for engineering and consultancy in the construction of pipelines, which in turnoffer the possibilityof transitfees. Finally, they offer the possibility of being the motor for trade, either directly throughcounter-tradeor indirectlythroughthe raisingof hardcurrencythroughthe sale of hydrocarbons, giving the concerned republicslimitedabilityto pay for exports of Turkishgoods and services in hard currency. With Kazakhstan's energy exports likely to continue via Russia, the most attractive energy opportunitiescome from Azerbaijan'soil and Turkmenistan's gas, while Uzbekistanhas more modest reserves of oil and gas. On March9, 1993, Turkeyand Azerbaijansigned an accord for the constructionof a 1,060-kilometer pipeline, which would connect with the existing Iraqi-Turkishpipelines that terminal.The new pipeline was at disgorgeon the Mediterranean the Yumurtalik envisaged as transiting Iran and Nakhichevan.39The privileged position that Turkey appearedto enjoy in the negotiationswas seen when the Azerbaijanioil company broughtin Botas, a Turkishpipeline company, as part of the working group on the onshore pipeline.40 With many difficult problems still to be resolved,41 and the political future of Azerbaijan increasingly uncertain, the pipeline saga may still be far from resolution. through Turkeywould like to see a majorpipelineroutedfrom Turkmenistan with the possibility of a spur Turkishterritoryto its outlet on the Mediterranean, allowing Uzbekistan to feed into the line. Such a pipeline could be routed via a numberof thirdcountries.The most obvious routes would be eithervia Iranto the south, or across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijanand Georgia, or Armenia to the north. In October 1992, Turkmenistanand Turkey initialed an accord for the Feasibility studies are to be completed within construction of such a pipeline.42 the next four years on six different routes. It would cause problems for Turkmenistan snubeitherTurkeyor Iranin selectinga route, while there would to be majorpolitical uncertaintieswith a route througheither Georgiaor Armenia. As a result, the most likely route at present would seem to be one runningto the south of the CaspianSea throughIran and then west throughTurkey. of frontiersman" have been describedas the "industrial Telecommunications Once again relations with Azerbaijan Turkey's policy toward the six republics.43 are the most advanced. In October 1992, the Turkish subsidiary of Canada's NorthernTelecom, Netas, connected its self-designedDMS switch in the repub39. See "BBC Summaryof WorldBroadcasts,"MiddleEast, March 16, 1993. 40. Interviewwith foreignoil companyofficial,April 5, 1993. partsof 41. For instance,how will the pipelinebe financed;how will the ownershipof different the pipeline be arrangedas it traverses differentcountries;how will the runningof the pipeline be organized?
42. Turkish Daily News, November 2, 1992. 43. Financial Times, December 4, 1992.

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EASTJOURNAL 606* MIDDLE

lic. Indeed, this was the first digitalswitch to be installedanywherein the former Soviet Union. A third digital exchange is in the process of being laid in Baku, utilizing the city's undergroundsystem. Netas had previously installed a DMS system in Kazakhstan. Turkey's GeneralDirectorateof Post, Telegraph,and Telephone (PTT)also is involved in developingthe phone systems of the CentralAsian republics.It has a turnkeycontractto supplypublicexchanges with 2,500-linecapacitiesto each of the five Central Asian republics (all of which have been installed with the exception of Dushanbe).Such exchanges will service high priorityneeds, such as government departments,foreign embassies, hotels, and companies engaged in foreign trade. This phase will be followed by the installation of 10,000 line exchanges in the main cities of the Turkic republics, and then by the gradual expansion of modern telecommunicationsservices to more remote areas. These telecommunicationsnetworks will be connected, via PTT-supplied earth stations, to the Intelsat satellite, which will connect them to the Turkish gateway exchange and, hence, the wider world. A French-built satellite for It Turkey'sexclusive use, Turksat,is due to be launchedin December 1993.44 will then take over as the link for phone networks in the new republics. Turkish governmentcredits are being used to help finance such schemes. In the long run, PTT hopes to recoup the money through transit revenues. The former Soviet Union is, as a whole, becoming an importantpart of PTT's activities. In 1991, exports to the successor states of the Soviet Union amounted to $230 million, accountingfor around 10 percent of turnover.45 The Turkishprivatesector is becominginvolved in local manufacturing the in new states. In Azerbaijan,Netas has a 51 percent share in a local joint venture, Ultel, which has already produced 150,000 handsets. Netas, through joint ventures, is also in the process of establishing factories near Baku and in Kazakhstanfor the manufacture DRX-4 digital switches, which would be used of in exchanges servicing ruralareas.46 The Turkishgovernmenthas also identifiedthe area of humanresources as crucialto developingits long-termties with the new republics,and, therefore,has sought to play a role in the field of education. The best-known element of this policy has been the offer of 10,000 scholarshipsat Turkisheducationalinstitutions, including about 1,200 at universities. The chronic overcrowding that already exists within Turkisheducationalestablishmentsinevitably restricts the potential for increasingthe numberof slots available. By May 1993, more than 8,400 of the scholarships offered had been taken.47Students arrivingfrom the Central Asian republics first have to take a two-monthlanguage course to help overcome linguistic differences between the Turkic dialects, although such a
44. 45. 46. 47. Independent, June 1, 1993. Financial Times, December 4, 1992. Ibid. Independent, June 1, 1993.

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TURKEY * 607

course is probably insufficient, especially for students from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Other, less dramatic, educational initiatives are in various stages of implementation.48There are plans for student exchanges, for the supply of school have books, and for help in revisingexisting course books. Turkishentrepreneurs also been examining the feasibility of establishing Turkish colleges and even Turkish schools in the republics. The EducationMinistryin Turkey is trying to coordinatesuch initiatives,and even hopes to establishits own schools, following and Uzbekistan.49 requests from Turkmenistan Languagereformis an important partof attemptsat the long-termorientation of the Turkic republics toward Turkey. At present, Istanbul Turkish can be understood relatively easily only in Azerbaijan. By contrast, the difference between Kazakh and IstanbulTurkishhas been described as being similarto the differencebetween Germanand Swedish. Ankarais determinedto make Istanbul Turkisha linguafranca of the new republics, as a vehicle for closer political ties and as a means of facilitatingcommercialinteraction. Alongside the previously mentioned educational policies, the use of the media is regardedas crucial. The Turkishgovernmenthas encouragedtelevision broadcasts, often with Turkishsubtitles to promotefamiliaritywith the script. A new channel specificallyfor that purpose, the AvrasiaChannel,began broadcastand thirteen hours ing in May 1992 with seven hours of weekday programming daily on weekends. In addition, Azerbaijancan also receive TRT-1, the main Turkish state broadcasting channel.50Even so, it is not clear that Turkish television is being received widely, especially in Central Asia. The problem is both technical and political. The programcan be beamed to the republics, via satellites, but, in the absence of a multitudeof residentialsatellite dishes, central facilities are requiredto receive the transmissionsand rebroadcastthem locally. Individual republics appear to be reluctant to extend provisions, fearing to concede control over such a politically sensitive medium. The ultimate form of the written language in the Turkic republics will be crucial to the long-termorientationof the states. Turkey has been campaigning vigorously for the adoption of the Turkish form of the Latin script. The competition includes Cyrillic, which is the script in currentuse, and the Arabic script, which both Iran and Saudi Arabia are pushing. To date, Tajikistanhas announcedthat it will switch to the Arabic script, while Azerbaijanhas declared that it will adopt a version of the Latin script. It is likely that a country like Kazakhstan,with its largeandpoliticallysensitive Russianminoritywill retainthe Cyrillic alphabet for the time being. The other republics appear to have made sympatheticnoises when tackled on the matterby Turkishgovernmentofficials,
48. For example, see the provisionsincludedin the educationprotocol between Turkeyand Uzbekistanin "BBC Summaryof WorldBroadcasts,"MiddleEast, March3, 1992.
49. Turkish Daily News, August 22, 1992.

50. Programming describedin ibid., April27, 1992.

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608* MIDDLE EASTJOURNAL

but they have not taken formal or practical steps in this direction. Ankara is confidentthat the Latin script will eventuallybe adopted, if only because it is the alphabet of the internationalcommerciallanguage, English. Realistically speaking, it will requirea generation,at least, before such a switch is broadlyaccepted. Credits and Finance To foster immediate ties with the new republics, the Turkish government announced a series of largely piecemeal aid initiatives. Some aid relates to educationand training,as referredto earlier.By far, the most significanthas been the announcementof a large Eximbankallocationto stimulatetrade with the new states. Thus far, Turkish credits to the five Turkic republics total some $850 An million. A further$50 millioncredit was made to Tajikistanearlierthis year.51 additional$350 million in food aid (mostly wheat and sugar)has been committed by Turkey to Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan.52 The Eximbankallotmenthas been describedin Turkeyas being more akin to a goodwill gesture than offering the possibility of real stimulation for the economies concerned.53To give the allocation some perspective in terms of Turkish trade policy, in 1991 Turkey granted credits worth $1.1 billion to the Nevertheless, for an economy the size of Turkey's, these Russian Federation.54 are considerable commitments, and they have made Turkey the fourth largest The credits to the five republicsbreak provider of aid to the Turkic republics.55 down as follow: Azerbaijan,$250 million;Uzbekistan, $250 million;Kazakhstan, $200 million; Kyrgyzstan, $75 million;Turkmenistan,$75 million.56 The facilities will have slightlydifferinguses fromrepublicto republic.While in Azerbaijansome of the loan will be for financialinvestments, in additionto the fundingof tradein basic products, in Uzbekistanthe loan will be used principally to fund importsof wheat and sugar. The natureof the use of such funds and the relative indifference of the Turkish private sector toward the Central Asian republicsmeans that Turkey'scontroversialState Economic Enterprises,such as the state cereals purchasingagency, are expected to benefit the most from this financialaid.57The extension of such credits has alreadyhad a markedeffect on deals involvingTurkeyand the republics,with barterarrangements counter-trade being harderto conclude as the republicsinsist that futuredeals now be included under the umbrellaof the credit scheme.58
51. Independent,June 1, 1993. 52. Briefingpaperfrom Turkishmission to EuropeanCommunities,March22, 1993,p. 4. 53. Turkish Daily News, April28, 1992. 54. Ibid., April 30, 1992. 55. Interviewwith senior Turkishdiplomat,February18, 1993. The three largest donors are Japan,the EuropeanCommunity,and the United States. 56. Briefingpaperto EuropeanCommunities, 3-4. pp. 57. TurkeyConfidential,September1992,p. 29. 58. Ibid.

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TURKEY * 609

The Turkish government also has been grappling with the question of long-term development for the new republics. In particular,it has been toying with the relativemeritsand feasibilityof a numberof differenttypes of institutions for this purpose. These have includeda TurkishCentralAsian bank, to comprise the major banks and private sector investors from Turkey; a Eurasian bank modeled on the European Bank for Reconstructionand Development (EBRD), seeking to attractparticipation the majoroil-producing Arab states, as well as by funds from internationalagencies; and a joint venture between Turkey's Eximbank and the EBRD to rendertechnical aid to the republics. Some of Turkey's state banks are not waitingfor the establishmentof such grandiose structures. Ziraat Bankasi (Agricultural Bank) has established a joint venture in Uzbekistan, the Turkish-UzbekBank, owned equally by the bank and UzagroindustrialBank. Future joint ventures are anticipated in Azerbaijan, It Kazakhstan,and Turkmenistan. also hopes to cooperate in such ventures with Riggs National Corporationof the United States. Emlak Bankasi (Real Estate Bank) has been the prime mover in the establishmentof the Turkey-Kazakhstan InternationalBank, in which it has a 51 percent stake. The other partners are Kazakhstan's Kramds Bank and Alem Bank (20 percent apiece) and France's Banque Worms (9 percent). One or two of Turkey's more substantialprivate commercialbanks have also studied the prospects in the new republics, and one of the country's strongest banks, GarantiBankasi, is already active in terms of trade and project financing. On the whole, however, interested private banks, such as Yapi Kredi and MarmaraBank, have adopted a cautious approach.59 CONCLUSIONAND PROSPECTS The emergingrelationshipsbetween Turkeyand Azerbaijanand the Central Asian republics are complex and uneven. Turkey, philosophicallyand economically, still looks westward. Day-to-daypolicymakingis absorbedby the tensions and conflicts in the regions immediately around it. Turkey does enjoy close relations with Azerbaijan. Contacts with the Central Asian republics are more spasmodic. Ankaramay have a vision for the new republics, but it neither has a practical strategy for its realizationnor the political will or diplomaticclout to implementit. Regardlessof the rhetoricof Turkicbrotherhood,in many respects the CentralAsian republicsare a mysteryto the Turksof Turkey.This reflectsthe fact that until very recently there have been no contacts between the peoples or governmentsof Turkey and the CentralAsian republics. The developmentof relations, therefore,has been predominantly formaland The Turkishprivate sector, with a handfulof notable exceptions, has not patchy. been enthusiastic about investment prospects. Emphasis has been placed on
59. See the article on Turkish banks in the advertising section on Turkey and the Central Asian republics in the International Herald Tribune, April 13, 1993, p. 11.

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610 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

infrastructural projects to tie the new republicsto Turkey. Turkey's performance in the area of telephone communicationshas been impressive. Future relations will depend on decisions in a few key areas, most obviously the course of energy pipelines and the directionof languagereform. The likelihoodis that Turkeywill benefit in part from both, but the time frames involved will be long ones. What is clear, after only a year and a half of independencefor the republics, is that hard decisions based on interests rather than fanciful notions of ethnic solidarityare informingdecisions on both sides. Neither Turkeynor the republics want to antagonizeRussia as they forge closer politicalrelations. Iran's relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan,and Turkmenistan too complex for the latterparties are to ride entirely roughshodover the interests of Tehran. Indicationssuggest that Iran, too, has been more circumspectin its policy in CentralAsia than many had predicted.60 Commonmembershipin the Economic CooperationOrganization at least offers a forum for the regulationof such relations. In just a few years, Turkeyhas changedthe style, scope and even substance of its foreign policy. It is no longer the semi-isolationistpower that it was until recently. It thus certainly will continue to try to develop relations with its fellow states to the east. Results are likely to be incremencultural-cum-linguistic tal at best. The greatestfuturevariableswill probablybe Russia and the natureof the regimesin the new republics.The greatesthandicapsthat Turkeyfaces are the limitations of its own economy and its lack of geographicalcontiguity with the new states. While the latterplaces Turkeyat a clear disadvantagein comparison to Russia and Iran, Turkey cannot yet be discounted as a significantpower in relation, at least, to Azerbaijanand the western part of CentralAsia.

60. It is interestingto note that the authoritiesin Turkmenistan, one of the two republics borderingIran, believe that Western fears of Iran have been exaggerated.See ChristianScience Monitor,April 23-29, 1993.

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