NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

School of World Economy and International Affairs

Foreign Languages Department

Disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation

Dmitry M. Kuritsyn

group 429

MOSCOW 2013

Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………3

1. Historical background ……………………………………………….5 1. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)…………………5 2. New non-proliferation agreement……………………………………6 1. New START ………………………………………………….7 2. The future of disarmament ……………………………………10
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..11

References…………………………………………………………………...13

Introduction

The complexities in implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, which includes nuclear disarmament as one of the principle integral parts, have always been the issue in difficult and controversial discussions attended by all members of international community.

Nuclear disarmament, which has eventually become the safeguard and a key condition of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’s successful performance, have always been an effective factor reducing the risk of unleashing a nuclear war and reinforcing the confidence of nuclear-free countries that the threat to their security is contained. The logic of nuclear disarmament is to curtail the lethal nuclear arms race and to provide for better predictability and transparency in this field. The aforementioned factors altogether enable defining the nuclear disarmament as the process crucial to global strategic stability.

The nuclear factor within the current political environment, which represents a sophisticated tangle of different political processes and tendencies in development of international relations, plays an utmost important role, since the global community more than ever strives for transparency, predictability and stability in international situation. The issue of nuclear disarmament is deemed to be especially essential and acute against the backdrop of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’s crisis.

The outcome of the bilateral dialogue should be of vital importance to Russia, because its nuclear strength, besides being so far the only area, where it is equally competitive to the United States, is yet the warranty of national security. The New START Treaty has sparked numerous discussions and controversial judgments from both Russian and overseas experts. It means that even today it’s far from obvious whether the changes in the US approach towards the disarmament may bring about any considerable benefits or will be yet another attempts of the United States to draw the encouragement of the global community and to raise the profile of the US that suffered a significant downfall during the tenure of George Bush Jr. Anyway the progress in the dialogue shall be quite significant for both the future of Russian-US relations alone and global strategic stability together with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime performance.

It is exactly why this particular topic is worthy of all-round study and evaluation.

The particular goal of my work is to evaluate the development of bilateral nuclear disarmament process with a special focus towards the New START Treaty. In the course of my study, I was supposed to learn in details the provisions and the essence of the START I Treaty in the context of the international situation at that time, whereas the New START Treaty should naturally be considered through the lense of the START I. I was also expected to answer the question if the New START would really contribute to significant strengthening of strategic stability and eventually become a foundation for curbing arms race, or, otherwise, it should be considered as a strictly next step towards further arrangements between the parties.

In preparation of my research paper I referred to the original texts of the most important arrangements between USSR/Russia and the US in the area of nuclear disarmament, as well as formal statements and declarations of the high ranking officials pertinent to this issue published, e.g., in such collections of the official documents as “Soviet Union in Struggle for the Disarmament”, “USSR’s Fight Against Nuclear Danger and Arms Race, Towards Disarmament”. Besides those collections, I referred to the documents and information available through online sources like www.president.kremlin.ru, www.mid.ru, www.armscontrol.ru. A large variety of monograph publications was also of great help.

Historical background

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution the global situation underwent dramatic changes. So did the Russian and US approaches towards the concept of nuclear disarmament as well as its place in the priorities of their respective international policies. Across the 1990-s and early 2000-s the issue of reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons is gradually replaced by other challenges to international security, in the wake of global terrorism, escalation of regional armed conflicts, distribution of WMD.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty / START I), signed on July 31, 1991 and expired on December 5, 2009 marked a kind of a peak in the process of bilateral nuclear disarmament. Despite the fact that it had been signed by the former Soviet Union, both Russia and the USA consistently strove for its ratification until it entered into force on December 5, 1994.

This Treaty during 15 years provided for predictability and transparency of strategic offensive arms control policy and has greatly contributed to strengthening of strategic stability. However, further developments in geo-political situation, emergence of new international security threats, changes in both countries approaches towards the issue of disarmament, US denials of the necessity to adhere to the respective obligations under legal arrangements in the area of SOA and Missile Defense, development of new means of deterrence, all that made the compromise between the USA and the Russian Federation practically unfeasible. Moreover after the expiry of START I a real danger of legal vacuum in the field of SOA was imminent[1].

Changes in the positions of the parties on the necessity to sign a new SOA treaty were attributed to a number of reasons. The Russian party consistently stood for resumption of bilateral dialog in this field. Both sides realized that the termination of the Treaty would cease the entire mechanism of monitoring and control developed under START I that was against the interest of Russia, and even more so of the US.

As the unipolar world concept ultimately crumbled, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan flopped and the economic crisis tended to stretch against any expectations, the US approach noticeably transformed shifting in favor of necessity to sustain the dialogue with Russia in the field of arms control. Furthermore, amid the obvious crisis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, the United States seems to change its attitude towards the issue of disarmament, one of the essential and integral parts of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.

The consultations on the fate of the START I Treaty commenced yet in 2008 during George Bush presidency and protracted into the term of President Barack Obama, whose rhetoric, notably in terms of disarmament and nonproliferation of WMD, significantly parted from the views of the previous administration[2].

New non-proliferation agreement

The new US president has identified the conclusion of a new treaty with Russia in the field of SOA to be one of the utmost priorities in the US foreign policy.

The parties agreed to the principle provisions of the new Treaty together with preliminary levels of reduction yet in July 2009 during the visit of President Obama to Moscow. The Treaty was supposed to be signed before December 5, 2009, i.e. before the expiry of START I, but the talks stretched longer than expected, what testified about significant discord in the positions of the parties in the course of the negations. As anticipated, particular disagreement arose with respect to the issue of Missile Defense. In September 2009 the United States announced their final decision to abandon the idea of Missile Defense elements deployment in Poland and Czech Republic, the move obviously aimed to calm down Russia and to provoke counter concessions in return. But soon thereafter the US intentions to place Missile Defense elements in Bulgaria and Romania were promulgated only to stir new controversy[3]. Already in February 2010 Romania indicated its readiness to participate in the deployment of the US new generation missile defense elements, and that was a sign that the parties (US and Russia) would have a hard time to come to an agreement on this principle issue. Nevertheless the fact itself that the parties have engaged in the talks guided by the necessity to maintain predictability and transparency of SOA policy, is an important token of political atmosphere improvement in the relations between the two counties.

New START

After 10 rounds of negotiations the parties have finally managed to adjust their positions and to sign a new treaty in the field of SOA. The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague, to replace the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and the relevant Protocol[4].

The new Treaty limits the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers to 1550 units. The deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers were limited by the Treaty to 700 units. The Treaty also imposes limitations on the aggregated number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs as well as deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, which presently cannot exceed 800 units[5]. These figures represent the “face” of the Treaty and witness that the parties thereto reduce the combined limitation levels for the warheads and the carriers in comparison to the preceding arrangements.

The Treaty is valid for 10 years from the date of promulgation. It stipulates that either party in exercise of its sovereign rights is empowered to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances pertinent to the essence of the Treaty imperil its supreme interests[6].

When it comes to the issue of equality of the Treaty, it is pretty much nominal. The fact is that according to some observers the considerable part of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces is expected to go out of date by the year of 2015 and in any case is supposed to be retired. Whereas in the meantime Russia doesn’t possess such nuclear rearmament program that is capable to entirely compensate for the facility and equipment expected to go out of service. Russia is rather shifting to the principle of defensive sufficiency, than trying to maintain parity with the US in this area as the Soviet Union used to do throughout the years of “cold war”; at present it is a matter of upholding the ability of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces to survive[7].

One of the most visible shortcomings of the new Treaty is the lack of correlation between SOA and NATO Missile Defense System giving the US a free hand to implement Missile Defense plans.

The US reluctance to accept the limitations to the deployment of the Missile Defense System in the framework of the new treaty was telegraphed a mile away, yet before the commencement of the talks. Whereas Russia is deprived of any leverage of pressure on the United States, one could hardly expect such concessions from the American side.

Therefore, on the day of signing of the Treaty the Russian party has made a statement, that the new treaty “can only be effective and viable subject to waiver of quantitative and qualitative buildup of US missile defense system capabilities. Hence the extraordinary circumstances indicated in Article XIV of the Treaty also assume such buildup of US missile defense system capabilities posing a threat to the potential of the Russian Federation’s Strategic Nuclear Forces”[8].

Basically, by signing the Treaty the parties succeeded in accomplishing the main task of reaching a compromise based on the principle of equal partnership relations and consideration of mutual interests. Yet the Treaty respected positive experience of previous arrangements adapted to modern realities. Indeed, the new treaty is based on the principles of strict parity imposing equal ceilings both for the warhead and for the carriers, assuming actual reduction of SOA, which really does matter. Besides, the Treaty obviously doesn’t entail painful reductions from Russia. Among other merits of the Treaty worthy of mention is the fact that it limits ICBMs and SLBMs both in nuclear and non-nuclear equipments, which may be regarded as a real success of the Russian diplomacy. Of no less importance is the provision stipulating that either party is entitled to determine on its own discretion the composition and structure of its strategic nuclear forces, which at least doesn’t impose additional restrictions on the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, unlike it was provided by the START I Treaty.

However the rules of mutual counting of warheads on carriers introduced by the treaty open possibilities both for the USA and Russia to accumulate “breakout potential”, therefore the maximum number of warheads set by the Treaty exercise strictly political function demonstrating pure ostentation of reduction.

The future of disarmament

The new Treaty could hardly be admitted unambiguously. Arguably, the very fact that the parties finally managed to come to an agreement after so many years, idle in terms of the nuclear disarmament, is a good token of positive developments in the relations between the two countries and of higher mutual confidence. The United States has finally diverted from the principles it adhered with respect to the nuclear disarmament when the SOA Treaty was signed, which is another cheerful indication[9].

Reelection of Barack Obama greatly contributed to the progress in this regard. The Republicans are normally less benevolent towards conclusion of such kind of agreements than the Democrats. And the reelection of President Obama signals that the negotiations on the issues of disarmament will go on. The mid-February visit to Moscow of Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security may easily support this argument. In the course of her visit she met Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Ryabkov and other Russian officials. The parties held a constructive dialogue in the format of the Working Group on Arms Control and International Security of the Russian-American Presidential Commission and discussed numerous issues relevant to missile defense, arms control, non-proliferation of WMD and the security of space activities as well as the prospects for cooperation in these areas.

Conclusion

Apparently, one agreement on SOA alone can hardly be sufficient to pursue the goal of setting effective regime of arms control. Whilst at present it may be quite challenging, but the dialogue on such principle issues as Missile Defense, PGM and militarization of space should go on further.

In the current situation it is especially important to engage to the dialogue other countries, particularly those having nuclear deterrence potential. Russia no longer can exercise reductions that ignore nuclear potentials of China, members of NATO (France and UK), and de facto nuclear countries that often demonstrate ambiguous stance on this issue. Nonetheless, without involvement of these countries into the dialogue, any efforts to exercise control over armament and to strengthen the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Regime would eventually come to naught.

That’s why the New START Treaty is deemed so controversial. Obviously, after the long slack period in the field of nuclear disarmament the fact that the parties eventually come to an agreement may be regarded as an evidence of the positive shift in bilateral relations, yet a higher degree of mutual confidence. The United States eventually has given up their conservative approach towards nuclear disarmament demonstrated during the negotiations on the first “START”.

The parity principle laid into foundation of this new Treaty should also be praised. What is most important, it sets maximum levels of reduction common for both parties. Russia has managed to retain the right to determine the structure of its SOA and to modernize them, yet to persuade the US to count BM’s conventional warheads and to evade discrimination in the issues of control. As many experts believe, Russia won’t have to perform fierce reductions of its SOA, which one way or another would be decreased to the levels set by the new Treaty.

On the other side, the US neither has to perform excessive reductions. It would be sufficient to retire outdated SOA units or to reequip them into the carriers of the precision-guided munitions, not embraced by the Treaty, which is in line with the US new nuclear policy. The rules of warheads counting on BMs and, especially, on tactical bombers, stipulated by the new Treaty would enable both Russia and the US possess considerable “breakout potential” and significant number of “concealed warheads”. Therefore the actual numbers of warheads deployed on BM and bombers will hardly correspond to the limits specified by the Treaty.

The formal provision on correlation between the strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms is purely declarative and will be incapable to restrain the US intentions to deploy Missile Defense System, notorious of its destabilizing role. Lack of mutual arrangements in such principal area bears a potential threat to the viability of the Russian SNF. Moreover, the deployment of American Missile Defense System, which cannot be ignored not only by Russia, but China as well, may spur further escalation of arms race of global proportions.

Increasingly destabilizing roles are played by precision-guided munitions and the US plans towards militarization of space. These particular components are prioritized in the US nuclear deterrence strategy.

Hence the conclusion of the Treaty itself doesn’t provide for palpable strengthening of strategic stability and is hardly a reliable foundation for arms race control. It could be only regarded as a step towards further arrangements on wider scope of issues involving many other countries. Only thus it may provide real contribution into strengthening of global strategic stability and the Nuclear Arms Non-proliferation Regime.

References

Daniel H. Joyner, Marco Roscini «Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime: A Contribution to Fragmentation Theory in International Law»

N. Schulte “Dismantlement and Destruction of Chemical, Nuclear and Conventional Weapons”

Alisa L. Rebane ”The New Start Treaty Between the U.S. and Russia”

Alexey Pushkov, The New START Treaty has been undermined. Source: http://news.km.ru/v_dogovor_snv-3_zalozhena_mina

Protocol to the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8 2010. Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d2ef6d0dc8b2e65fc5.pdf

The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8 2010. Article II, prov.1 Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/512

The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8 2010. Article XV Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/512

The Russian Party Statement on the Missile Defense, April 8, 2010. Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/511

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[1] Daniel H. Joyner, Marco Roscini «Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime: A Contribution to Fragmentation Theory in International Law»
[2] N. Schulte “Dismantlement and Destruction of Chemical, Nuclear and Conventional Weapons”
[3] Alisa L. Rebane «The New Start Treaty Between the U.S. and Russia”

[4] Protocol to the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8 2010. Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d2ef6d0dc8b2e65fc5.pdf

[5] The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8 2010. Article II, prov.1 Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/512

[6] The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8 2010. Article XV Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/512

[7] Alexey Pushkov, The New START Treaty has been undermined. Source: http://news.km.ru/v_dogovor_snv-3_zalozhena_mina

[8] The Russian Party Statement on the Missile Defense, April 8, 2010. Source: http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/511

[9] Alisa L. Rebane «The New Start Treaty Between the U.S. and Russia”