Free Essay

Divarty

In:

Submitted By cnj15
Words 1584
Pages 7
“No branch of the Army has suffered a greater identity crisis than Field Artillery, as a result of transformation, COIN-centric operations and non-standard manpower demands of OIF/OEF. The once-mighty ‘King of Battle’ has been described by one of its own officers as a ‘dead branch walking.’ This statement was published in a white paper entitled “The King and I” authored by three ex-maneuver brigade commanders. This paper was recognized widely by the senior leaders of the Army and everyone understood the importance of the issues in the FA. After twelve years of persistent conflict the Army Field Artillery Branch is declining at an alarming rate, there is a continuing deterioration in the Field Artillery skills from section and platoon level through command (FA Center of Excellence). In order for the Artillery to remain reliable and allow the maneuver commander supremacy on the battlefield they will need assistance from a competent higher Field Artillery Headquarters (DIVARTY). DIVARTY is critical for the future of the Army and will allow the Artillery to focus on its three main war fighting functions of fires- deliver fires; integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires; and conduct targeting (ARDP 3.09).
The (fire support observer controller (OC) team at a JRTC rotation in 2010 found was that the soldiers on the guns, as well as the officers in leadership positions, were unaware or untrained on the basic skills required to conduct delivery of fires. The majority of units observed at JRTC and NTC had significant problems with gunnery and crew task. The majority of units were not performing firing tasks, such as howitzer calibration prior to a rotation, and frequently shout out of the safety box (JRTC WFF Trends). The main reason for the continued degradation of these basic skills is that the fires battalions, and fire supporters have been used to fill the non-standard manpower demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also contributing is that under modularization the responsibility for fire support training rests with maneuver commanders who are either not trained or equipped properly to do so.

have been used to fill nonstandard positions. Time spent in these areas compromise our ability to precisely integrate fires and maneuvers. As Artillerymen/women we are beginning to lack the true ability to fire plan and effectively use the close air support (CAS) platform correctly at many levels. Our cannon drills vary through different brigades thus lacking in consistency. Our fire direction centers lack competency due to poor and inadequate manning. The time spent away from training fires magnifies the inconsistencies. Our training has become secondary to focusing on a war on two fronts therefore, we cannot be surprised that we face this dilemma. We need to re-train our soldiers and we need external help to accomplish our goals. We need assistance from a competent higher Field Artillery Headquarters (DIVARTY) to enforce a standard, one standard train, men and reinforce Artillery battalions.
Implementation of DIVARTY will bring organization back to the artillery and re-establish the core competencies which enable Artillerymen to conduct their mission to, “destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket and missile fire and to help integrate all fire support assets into combined arms operation.” The Artillery Brigades will help modernize, discipline, implement precision fires, provide mentors to Artillery officers, coordinate and synchronize the employment of fires to meet the Division Commanders objectives.
Precision targeting and the ability to train this task has become very difficult to carry out as we focus our attention on the wars. Going forward DIVARTY has the ability to train Forward Observers and Fire Support teams to achieve a CAT 1 Target Location Error (TLE) while in combat. A task that has been ignored without the oversight of a higher headquarters. It is no secret that the ultimate goal of the Artillery is accurate fires. This is how we define ourselves as professionals. The complexity of our operational environment requires uncompromising organization. Artillerymen/women must be effectively trained and certified in this area. Our mission in Iraq requires us to routinely fire precision munitions to defeat DAESH. This operational requirement cannot be ignored. Proper training is of the utmost importance.
DIVARTY will also have the ability to field new equipment and resource the appropriate ammunition, training and time. During the time that I spent in a firing battery the primary focus was on the manual firing of guns and working manual calculations. This seems to be an antiquated way of accomplishing our task when we have the equipment to perform digitally however we did not know how to use our digital equipment. The 21st century provides us with some of the most advanced technology. If we don’t know how to operate the equipment properly it becomes excess and useless baggage that we carry and it makes us less lethal.
I had the privilege of sitting in on the DIVARTY semi-annual training brief, a brief delivered from the 82nd Airborne DIVARITY Commander to the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne. A very eye opening brief which provided me the opportunity to listen to planning and synchronization at the most senior level. As the Battalion Commanders talked through their METL and training plans a few issues were common amongst all of the battalion’s. One being, the lack of manning and retention of 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems) and 13B (Cannon Crew Member) and the use of precision munitions.
The lack of retention of 13D and 13B are having a significant impact throughout the Artillery Branch. I would argue the fact that a large contributing factor to this is that those who enlist in the Army as Artillerymen/women, and have a true passion for fires have not been afforded the opportunity to do their job. On my first assignment to the 82nd Airborne Division I was assigned to 2-321 AFAR 4th BCT. They had recently returned from deployment. Four soldiers from my platoon opted not to re-enlist, the reasoning was “I didn’t sign up to guard FOB’s.” These soldiers lacked job satisfaction and they felt their only option was to leave the force. The same can be said for officers in the lack of opportunity to lead at senior levels. As a Captain in the Artillery you are likely to command a Field Artillery Battery, the question is will that battery be fully manned with 3 guns per platoon and a fully operational and functional fire direction center with quality and rank appropriate leaders in the necessary position. Unfortunately and realistically that will probably not be the case.
The Field Artillery Officer will continue in career progression and hopefully go on to become a Battalion Commander where he will be the senior coordinator of all fire support and indirect fire assets. However, for many officers in the Field Artillery branch the career ladder stops there. The Artillery branch lacks the ability to mentor field grade and senior officers without DIVARTY. The Field Artillery has only six Artillery Brigade Commands, this does not leave much opportunity to lead at the most senior level. Does that mean we move on to move up? As a young officer I understand that the Army is not about me or my desires, but it would be dishonest of me to say that I do not desire to lead at the most senior levels. I was born in Pennsylvania where we are all reminded of Benjamin Franklin who once said, “without continual growth and progress, such words as improvement, achievement and success have no meaning.” An Officer should not only strive to lead at every opportunity presented to him but seek opportunities for continued growth. The Army voices and instills Army leadership requirements and the value and importance of leadership, we should strive to live by these values. The springboard of all the qualities of an army officers is, “LEADS.” When we commissioned as Officers in the United States Army we signed up to become progressive leaders. Leaders of men and women both in peacetime and wartime. It is my belief that it should be expected of us to want to grow into senior leaders.
Given the opportunity to ask the FORSCOM Commander his thoughts on DIVARTY, what I viewed as a once in a lifetime opportunity. I asked him what the future was for DIVARTY across the Army and without a DIVARTY does it remove the opportunity for Field Artillery Officers to lead at the most senior level. His response was, we focus on what’s best for the Army and not what’s best for the individual. The FORSCOM Commander explained to me that DIVARTY takes soldiers from the line and puts them in a headquarters removing the talent from the firing battery. Also, as a force we are much more capable and fit to fight when we train together, that the Fire Supporters need to be embedded with their Infantry companies building a relationship with the maneuver Commander.
What I learned from the FORSCOM Commander is the opposing view of the need for DIVARTY. It gave me the opportunity to hear from someone who has served in a time where there has and has not been division level assets. Regardless of the future of DIVARTY I’m prepared to continue to serve the United States Army as a field Artillery Officer and train Artillerymen/women on the core task and skills needed to prepare them to perform as professionals in their chosen field.

Similar Documents

Premium Essay

Unit 9 Movement Control Team

...unique aspects of installation movement, while establishing the support network they will need once assigned to a Brigade. The experience they receive will be vital to conduct the execution of movement and maneuver from strategic, operational and tactical areas of operation to sustain the force. Cost: The associated cost to this would be to leave the Divarty position vacant as a space filler for the Division MOB when he or she deploys. The position would be filled with a BDE MOB who has recently returned from a deployment prior to the DIV MOB deploying. The slot itself is a CW2 position that has little responsibility in terms of equipment and personnel and relies on each Brigade within the division to move its Field artillery units during deployments. This would afford the MWO an opportunity to ensure that the Divarty is in compliance with the CDDP as well as be the continuity providing expertise to support the division. When a Division Mob deploys the division usually handles installation movements through the rear- detachment G-4 section and the LRC. I recommend moving the senior MWO who is not forward deployed to the Divarty when the div MOB deploys. This would allow the MWO the opportunity to augment the MCT for up to 6 months and not disrupt the MTOE requirements for the 21 soldier MCT. This will require the Division MOB to manage inter-post transfers of the other Brigade MWO’s from the Division. ...

Words: 1464 - Pages: 6

Free Essay

Essay

...GENEROLO JONO ŽEMAIČIO LIETUVOS KARO AKADEMIJA Genovaitė LAUGALIENĖ Milda MIRONAITĖ MOKOMASIS ANGLŲ – LIETUVIŲ IR LIETUVIŲ – ANGLŲ KALBŲ KARYBOS ŽODYNAS Eksperimentinis leidinys Vilnius 2008 UDK 355(03)=20=882 La-458 Mokomąjį anglų – lietuvių ir lietuvių – anglų kalbų karybos žodyną parengė Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademijos Užsienio kalbų instituto direktorė Genovaitė Laugalienė ir Užsienio kalbų instituto Užsienio kalbų katedros lektorė Milda Mironaitė. Atsakingoji redaktorė Užsienio kalbų instituto Užsienio kalbų katedros lektorė Aušra Bučaitė. Recenzavo Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademijos viršininko pavaduotojas doc. dr. Pranas Jankauskas, Užsienio kalbų instituto Anglų kalbos mokymo centro viršininkas vyr. ltn. Andrius Kiesas ir Lietuvos kariuomenės Mokymo ir doktrinų valdybos Individualiojo rengimo skyriaus Anglų kalbos mokymo poskyrio vedėja Aušra Narbutienė. © Genovaitė Laugalienė, 2008 © Milda Mironaitė, 2008 © Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2008 Turinys Pratarmė......................................................................................................................... 4 . Angliški ir lietuviški sutrumpinimai ............................................................................ 5 Anglų – lietuvių kalbų karybos žodynas........................................................................ 7 Lietuvių – anglų kalbų karybos žodynas ....................................

Words: 111618 - Pages: 447