Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument Author(s): James Barber Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jul., 1979), pp. 367-384 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2615145 . Accessed: 13/04/2013 21:49
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Wiley and Royal Institute of International Affairs are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT
CONOMIC sanctions economic directed political to are measures such objectives. arenormally They supplemented byother measures, as and or of theseverance restrictiondiplomatic cultural butunless ties; ' in ' refers to otherwise theuseoftheterm sanctions this stated paper only in to Sanctions sometimes are economic sanctions. employed addition force, the buthere areprimarily we situations ofwar.Notthat short considering distinctionalways is Arabstates easyto draw-many have,forexample, imposed sanctions against Israel, they these but as economic see sanctions the dimensiona wider effort. of war Indeed, relationship the between sanctions theuseofforce fraught and is with Whilst of ambiguity. some advocates sanctions them analternative as see toforce, isa contrary that there view sanctions only effective force can be when is available ready beusedifrequired. ambiguity naturally and to This has led to sometimes confusion: example, for whenthe Leagueof Nations was in preparing 1935 to impose sanctions against Italy somemembers were to opposed blocking Suez Canalor cutting the communications Italy with because League the was ' a great instrumentpeace'. In contrast of others that believed ' collective security '-the prevailing of day-could doctrine the if be only ensured force were available. ambiguity,double This or thinking, inthecaseofStanley wasexemplified the Baldwin, British Prime of Minister the time. to AccordingWinston Churchill, Baldwin ' that felt Sanctions meant war;secondly wasresolved must no war;andthirdly, decided he there be he Someofthose whooppose useofforce the argue from importance the of moral factorsinternational in relations, emphasising collective tosustain action prevailing international Woodrow norms. Wilson expounded ideainParis this in December 1918 when spoke 'the organized he of moral force man' of working throughout world that the so 'whenever wherever and wrong -and aggression planned contemplated,searching ofconscience are or this light will beturned them, men upon and everywhere ask," what the will are purposes that holdin your you heart against fortunestheworld?" the of Just little a
* JamesBarber is Professor Political of Scienceat theOpenUniversity. publications His include Rhodesia: the Road to Rebellion (London:Oxford University Press, 1967); Imperial Frontiers (Nairobi:East African Publishing House, 1968); SouthAfrica Foreign 's Policy1945-1970(London: Oxford University Press,1973); and WhoMakes British Foreign Policy(MiltonKeynes:Open University Press,1976). He is currently coDirector a Chatham of House research on project ' Southern Africa Conflict in '. 1. TheSecondWorld War.Vol. I: The GatheringStorm (London: Cassell,1948), p. 137. '. uponSanctions

E

JamesBarber*

367

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

368

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

will mostquestions Other exposure settle of are '.2 supporters sanctions more pragmatic. thatsanctions They recognise provide instrument onlya limited butthey the emphasise needto takeaccount meansas wellas ends;andthey of argue that in many situations forcemay be an unacceptable method. influential been the assumption a simpleand direct has Particularly of between economic and relationship activity political the behaviour, whereby of authority a politicalregimeis believedto dependultimately upon its economic strength. One wayoflooking sanctions to notethenumber states at is of involved. The initiative imposing in international sanctions rests normally on oneortwo particular but governments; to make the sanctions effective theyusually attempt recruit to otherstatesand to involveinternational agencies.Thus sanctions be employed a single may by United States government-the against China; or by a group of states-forexample,the Easternbloc against Yugoslavia; bytheinternational or as community a whole an working through international organisation-the LeagueofNationsagainst Italy.The rangeof sanctionsand the intensity with which they are imposedalso varies considerably. Apartfrom question thenumber statesimposing the of of the sanctions thereis also the questionwhether the sanctions employed are selectively, on concentrating a particular aspectof the economy such as oil or supplies, whether areapplied a muchwider they on basis.Another issueis that of the authority which backs the sanctions.This may be only a recommendationan international by agency itsmember to states-andinside a state a government business by to organisations-or alternatively maybe there an attempt makethesanctions to mandatory, to theextent imposing even of themby law. Rhodesia theonlycase in whichan effort beenmadeto is has maximise on sanctions each ofthesethree scales-universal, comprehensive andmandatory. tookthirty It months reach to that position, eventhen and the application sanctions notgainuniversal of did support. The objectivesofsanctions In eachcase in which sanctions havebeenapplied there appear first at sight to be clearobjectives relating changes thebehaviour thegovernment to in of against whomthey directed. is these are It objectives which emphasised are by thoseimposing sanctions. in reality issuesaremuchlessclearcut, the But the as forinstance threeleadingcases-League of Nationssanctions in against Italy,UnitedStatessanctions againstCuba, and Britishsanctions against Rhodesia. In the Italiancase, one of the chief themes speeches the Leagueof of at Nationswas the need to protect small stateof Abyssinia the againstthe aggression a larger of one. This was the ostensible issue.Yet whenhe was writing about the affair his memoirs in ViscountTempleford-who Sir as
2. WarandPeace: Presidential Messages, Addresses Other and Papers1917-1923. Edited RoyStannard by BakerandWilliam Dodd(London: E. Harper, 1927).

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

369

Hoarehad beenBritish Samuel at Foreign Secretary thetime-paid little he 'seemed attention it.The dispute to between andAbyssinia, wrote, Italy in crisis'. It was and theworld a very serious likely involve to Europe of because Britain's to the other important settle dispute, among reasons, in British interests the on Upper to to League; order safeguard obligationsthe was with Nile;toretain Britain's traditional friendship Italy-which important with inguaranteeingMediterranean for communications the the route British withFrance, and to makeit Middleand Far East; to avoida rupture that an to unnecessary France keep army theItalian for to on border; ensure there an was Mussolini notthrown Hitler's was into arms;and because increasing of inthe Eastarising Japanese threat war Far With from aggression. all these factors play, in when with Hoarediscussed proposed the sanctions ' On Laval, French the Foreign Minister, agreed a double they on approach: a and him theonehand, most that patient cautious negotiation would keep of front at (Mussolini) theAllied on side;on theother, creation a united the Geneva (theLeagueofNations) a necessary as deterrent against German aggression. 3 Inthe of Cuba sanctions case American against there a similar was diversity ofconsiderations. Ball,the then of George Under-Secretary hassetforth State, main for American to the and four reasons the action: reduce will ability the of Cuban and regime export to subversion violence, make to plain theCuban to a to within regime-thatpolicy revolution the could of people-and sections not serve interests, their todemonstrate whole tothe American continent that in Communism no future theWestern had hemisphere, toincrease and the an costto theSoviet Union maintainingoutpost theWest.4 there of in But were a number other also of such considerations as reasons, including domestic the of for that hopes candidates Congress ananti-Castro would them stand gain in support theelection. Indeed these factors entered thepresidential into election Two campaign. weeks before polling inanattempthelp day, to Nixon, President Eisenhower a announcedbanon exports Cuba, to while Kennedy ' promisedto do something Fidel about Castro promise mayhave '-a that 5 contributed Bayof fiasco. tothe Pigs In thecase ofBritish sanctions against Rhodesia, whenHarold Wilson announced impositionsanctions told HouseofCommons the of he the that a 'our purpose to restore situation Rhodesia which is in in there be can untrammeled andallegiance theCrown inwhich loyalty to and there be, can within whatever this rules Houselays down, free a Government ofRhodesia in of acting theinterests thepeople Rhodesia a whole However, of as '.6 Wilson also spokeof his fears-the fearthatthe Commonwealth could
3. Nine Troubled Years(London: Collins, 1954), p. 152. 4. See Margaret Doxey,EconomicSanctions International and Enforcement (London:Oxford University Pressfor RIIA, 1971), p. 41. the ' 5. See Anna P. Schreiber,Economic Coercion an Instrument Foreign as of Policy', World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April1973, p. 405. 6. Hansard, Nov. 11, 1965, Vol. 720, No. 3, Col. 359.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

370

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ifthe disintegrate problem notsettled, thefear if were and that Britain not did seize initiative would, might the others who embark ' dangerous on courses of '. action which should reject There we all a for soul was,hesaid, struggle the ofAfrica; insuch struggle didnot and a he want seea ' Redarmy blue to in berets'entering Rhodesia. Two daysafter Commons that debate Richard Crossman on in reflected thesituation his diary. to According Crossman, Wilson Rhodesia a great ofhisstatesmanship-but same saw as test atthe time the Prime Minister not did forget party-political athome. was the situation He ' not determined, Crossman, toleave flank toHeath, make wrote his and open sure we(the that Labour can't for Government) beblamed UDI '. There was, however, to accordingCrossman, inside Cabinet a split the about potential the of sanctions achieving in effectiveness their ends.Some ministers were sceptical others, Barbara but like acted Wilson's as Castle, conscience, urging the imposition of sanctions the against White regime.7 Primary, secondary tertiary and objectives Thestudy particular of of cases sanctions makes that objectives clear the for which sanctions imposed far are are from or simple straightforward.can They broadly grouped three be into categories. Thereare ' primary objectives' which concerned theactions behaviour thestate regime are with and of or ' against whomthe sanctions directed-thetarget are state'. Thereare 'secondary objectives' to relating thestatus, behaviour expectations and of ' imposing '. Andthere thegovernment(s) the imposing sanctions-the state are' tertiary objectivesconcerned broader ', with international considerations, relating either thestructure operation theinternational as a to and of system whole tothose or parts itwhich regarded importanttheimposing of are as by states. of Examples allthree categories befound the can in cases given above. was It a primary objectivesanctionsstop attacking of to Italy Abyssinia, toreturn and Rhodesia legality;wasa secondary to it objective American for politicians to seekto gaindomestic support taking by action against Cuba,andforthe Labour governmentcounter to attacks theConservatives Rhodesia; by over anditwasa tertiary objective Britain seektodemonstrate utility for to the of the League Nations the of in Abyssinian andfor Americans seek crisis, the to inCubatostop spread communism Western the of tothe Hemisphere. Thediversityobjectives theapplicationsanctions tobemade of in of tends if plain they become drawn-out the long after customary for hopes short, sharp action disappointed. first primary are At the objectives usually emerge most but strongly, eventhisis notalways clear-cut. WhentheSoviet Unionsupported theother by states theEastern of bloc-imposed sanctions on in Yugoslavia 1948,the primary ofachieving aim changes within Yugoslavia were clearly accompanied the by secondary tertiary and objectivesensuring of
7. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister.Vol. I: Ministerof Housing 1964-66 (London: iarmish Hamilton/Cape, 1975), pp. 377-78.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCIlONS AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

371

outside Foreign the world, Office many (and within areagainst it) sanctions, andespecially sanctionsOn theposition theLeague, oil '. at Hankey argued that Britain could beexpected actalone. not to Four the of Great Powers-the United States, Germany, Japan Italy-were one reason another and for or for RIIA,1975), 50. the p.
8. Yugoslavia andtheSovietUnion1939-1973:A DocumentarySuvey (London: Oxford University Press

votesfrom left the wingand could do whattheyliked. . . all the official

that Eastern held the bloc firm that Soviet and the continued enjoy to Union it the advantages gainedfrom ' hegemony.' the Russians, its For the importance Tito's independence not onlywhatit implied of was within but thatit challenged of Yugoslavia, also thefact Stalin's expectations a tothe to Tito'sactions disciplined subordination Soviet Union: haveignored could have the jeopardised whole others structure encouraging todisplay by a similar to independence. Yugoslavia's attempt baseitseconomic development upon a conceptof nationalinterest, ambitious including plans for alsochallenged Russians' industrialisation, the economic preferred strategy by which Soviet the Union would of the supply products heavy while industry Yugoslavia on concentrated developing richmineral its resources. The ' ' extended a refusal it to establish economicdeviation Yugoslavian to a by of range joint ventures similar those to in co-operative operatingother Peoples' to advantagethe Democraciesthe of Soviet Union. the Summarisingsituation, ' has Clissold pointed that Theimmediate Stephen out ofthe. . . rift causes might seem trivial, the Kremlin but saw in themthe culmination of insubordination theexpression an arrogant intractable of and of and frame mind back stretching tothe conduct the of wartime and partisan struggle now an obstacle the constituting to Russians' for designs complete domination on their terms Eastern own of 8 Europe.' Aninstance the inwhich of way different,sometimes and sets competing, of can within is supplied the government objectives be entertained thesame by case of British sanctions against Italy.As has been seen,one of the in considerationsthe mind theBritish of government thedesire was to demonstrate Britain's tothe commitment League Nations. of Another to was to respond thestrong public reaction against Italian aggression. the During 1935 election campaign-which resulted the return the National in of government a handsome with majority-the government itsstand took on for support theLeague against and aggression. Before outcome the the of election known, was action against hadbeen Italy agreed theLeague-and at four after election the days limited sanctions imposed. they not were But did include oil embargo, an which widely was believed-to themost be effective sanction. Hoare'sprivate To comment failure introduce oil that to the embargo would letting the be down League, that and public opinion would not standit, Sir Maurice ' the Hankey, Cabinet the Secretary-replied that Government wonthe had election decisively. nolonger toangle They had for

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

372

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

or to outside opposed theaction, ofthethree and that had demonstrated support-Russia, and Britain the France Britain-only had capacity act.9 to of Thisdifference between and did exhaust approach Hankey Hoare not the full range views of within Britain evenwithin government. or the Harold in noted others connection a speech Hoarein Geneva, with Macmillan by a firm by League. Thisspeech, favouring stand the which made before was the won for election, widespread of the support, a varietyreasons-Baldwin, Prime it saw Minister, hoped would rearmament Churchill it encourage byconsent; as strengthening theLeague an instrument as tosecure European a coalition against Lord it Hitler; Robert andhis Cecil zealots believedwasa return League tothepure doctrine theCovenant; of of devotees theEmpire, Dawsonlike theeditor The Times-were of to stand protect British encouraged a firm by in interestsAfrica; the and general public heartened itas anapparently was by to strong response the increasingly in climate international dangerous relations. '0 To this diversity ofviews Britain-which in strikingly exhibits mixture the of with primary secondary tertiary and objectives-should beadded further the of range views inFrance, held Britain's ally theLeague. French chief in The were even morereluctant than the British alienate to Italy.French ofthe governments 1930swere crippled indecision, they haunted by and were of bythespectre a revived, militant To Germany. many and Frenchmen, to none than less Laval, wasanimportant Italy European whoshould be ally not offended. the During sanctions Lavalkept regular crisis in contact the with Italian government, assuring that action it any France might would take only benominal. French The reluctantly accepted they tokeep that had reasonably nearto their major ally,Britain, thatthey and couldnotbe seento be undermining League. their theBritish the For part government argued that they could nofurther the go than French. wasa caseof horses It two fretting in a single harness, jostling other wanting give impression each but to the that they pulling andinunison. were hard Wheneconomic sanctions applied a lengthy are over period relative the weight these of different categories objectives shift. of may This is clearly inBritish illustrated sanctions against Rhodesia. British objectives as we were, have seen, thoroughly from beginning, atfirst wasa clear mixed the but there commitmentsuchprimary as returning to aims Rhodesia legality to and making unimpeded progress majority to rule. Yet GeorgeThompson, SecretaryState the of for Commonwealth time, admitted hopes atthe has that ofuachieving primary these objectives largely abandoned early had been by 1968.Giving evidence the to Bingham Commission investigating the breaking ofoil sanctions, Thompson that British Lord said the government to came realise that couldn't we bring Rhodesian the Government end sanctions, toan by
9. See,Stephen Roskill, W. Hankey: Man ofSecrets (London: Collins, 1974), p. 187. 10. Winds Change1914-1939.Memoirs, of Vol. I (London: Macmillan, 1966), pp.436-38.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

373

to Africa. were We we them South unless were to prepared apply under no circumstances and we to the prepared do that, therefore more went intotherepeated of aboutoil from problems theallegations British companies Rhodesia more came theconclusion. . the we to reaching . the we make a bad . . . wastobeina position say of to that best could job atleast there nooilfrom that was British companies reaching Rhodesia. Later Lord Thompson, acknowledged sufficienthadcontinued who that oil to ' swaparrangement.' by the British reachRhodesia because a of made in companies, thathad theBritish stated government acquiesced British ' companies the it supplying oildirectthen would done immense have us harm '.j at theUnited Nations elsewhere It is clear and from Lord Thompson's evidence inRhodesia that were secondary objectives becoming as predominant hopes achieving primary of the objectives Rhodesia inside dwindled. in The limitations sanctions achieving of primary objectives Theprimary objectivessanctions as wehave of are, seen, those tend that to begiven most the in imposing andthey alsoreceived emphasis the state; have the mostattention studies sanctions. in of These primary are objectives themselves diverse. Theymayinclude attempts induce to internal political within target change the state-asthe United States sought successfully todo inthe Dominican andBritain todoinRhodesia. may Republic, failed They be an directedforcing erring to membera regional of alliance into fold, back the as the Russians toachieve Yugoslavia. may designed deter tried with be They to thetarget state from someaction beyond borders-which whatthe its is League Nations of attempted against andthe Italy, United States sought do to in against Japan the1930s.Theymay seektoweaken punish target or the as state, in the caseoftheArab boycott Israel, they beintended of or may to force target to accept a state broadly agreed international norms, in the as argument sanctions over against South Africa. Evenafter categorising identifying and as preciselypossible purposes as the forwhichsanctions have been applied is-difficult evaluate it to their effectiveness-for application their cannot isolated be from other factors. Circumstances objectives and change time, there always diversity over and is a ofobjectives against which success failure be measured. even or may Yet, these taking difficulties account, into there a striking is consensus the in literature economic that sanctions have alone been ineffective fulfilment inthe oftheir primary objectives. Johan Galtung commented although has that, had sanctions beenineffective case he was studying in the (Rhodesia) this should ' be taken imply there no conditions not to that are under which '2 economic will sanctions work Andother authors identified have important
11. Report theSupplyofPetroleum on Products Rhodesia to (Bingham Report), FCO (London:HMSO, 1978). 12. ' On the Effects International of EconomicSanctions: WithExamples from Case of Rhodesia the ', World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3, April1967, pp. 378-416.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

374

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

side-effects and damaging of sanctions as thedenial international such of and encouragement of legitimacy the which revolutionary groups-effects may notalways havebeenintended thesanctions imposed which when were but have anadverse had state. impact the upon target These deserve qualifications attention. the But point made most authors that is a mistake expect is it to by economic sanctions toachieve desired alone the Sanctions primary objectives. rather implemented be should of otherwise as part a broader strategy: they become ' victims over-expectation the of '.I Sucha broader strategy might include diplomatic efforts-the isolation the target of the state, denying either or legitimacy ofa regime ofitsparticular actions that will resist its to so iseroded other and are states deterred renewing from or contact supporting it. Thiswas,for the of instance, policy the' Stimson doctrine called '-so after theAmerican of SecretaryState-adopted the States by United against Japan in the1930s.An important ofthis theAmerican aspect was determination to to simply refuse recognise of territorial in any Japan's conquests China. Theconstant of pressure having sanctions with imposed it,together upon the isolation challenge itsvalues, and to when is especially this sustained a over period, undermine self-confidence target andencourage may the of the state its opponents. in this Seen light economic sanctions thus regarded a be may as contributing ifnotthe factor, in main element, pressuring a target into state its or changing behaviour in creating conditions which maymakeother pressures effective.hisstudy Rhodesian more In of sanctions Harry Strack concluded ' Interms political that of achievements, sanctions beregarded must as a marginal instrument of influence employedconjunction other best in with meansofinfluence as armed such force-especially ifpolitical results are in desired theshort run.'Buthebelieved when that majority is achieved rule in Rhodesia, evenifit comesmainly through guerrilla ' theUnited war, Nations still abletoclaim will be for success itssanctions program having as been contributing .14 a factor Suchqualifications doubtless may enable to avoid risk creating us the of excessive expectations; ifsanctions inpractice, bebrought bear, but are to to governments have obviously to be ableto rally sufficient enthusiasm and commitmentwinsupport them, to for sometimes among people whowill themselves Themore suffer. muted rallying the cries-the more sanctions are presented an instrument as oflimited effort-the difficult be to more it may motivate people participatethem. to in Nevertheless, difficulties be the must and faced, ingeneral there seems be a wide to measure agreement of among scholars economic that sanctions alonehaveseldom everachie-ved if their primary Ina general aims. survey sanctions of Margaret Doxey concluded that 'in none the of cases analysed this in study economic have sanctions succeeded in producing desired the political result Rather, argued, '. she international
13. C. LloydBrown-John, MultilateralSanctionsin InternationalLaw: Comparative A Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 3. 14. Sanctions: CaseofRhodesia The (Syracuse, Syracuse NY: University Press,1978), p. 253.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

375

of of ostracism reduced chances a settlement limiting channels the by the more to and communication bymaking understanding difficult achieve.'5 to thatAmerican Turning particular cases, Anna Schreiber concluded for helped effect Cubahadthereverse ofthat sanctions against intended, they for to bolster Castro'sposition and openedup opportunities Russian In involvement.'6thecaseoftheDominican Republic, although Schreiber accepted sanctions that helped topple Trujillo to the family regime,hasbeen it replaced governments areno more by which acceptable theAmericans. to of Evenauthors havenoted who for have somemeasure success sanctions in similar conclusions theattainment ofprimary reached about objectives the For of authors who studied cases theyinvestigated. example, three the ofeconomic wrote ' theeffectiveness that sanctions Rhodesian Galtung case, that' in no waycan the is, generally, negative'; Leonard '7 Kapungu, in weakened economic be Rhodesian rebellion saidtohave by sanctions; fact have the conservative sanctions welded element economic together Rhodesian of regime 1' andHarry that insupport thesurvival the of '; Strack, ' scholars in to the various who have studied useof sanctions secure policy objectivesthe and have that are international system generally concluded they ineffective be counter-productive. of the Rhodesian confirms case their may Study '.II conclusions to not Nonetheless, failure achieve to their primary should be taken aims state. imply thesanctions hadlittle that have economic upon target effect the In some In instances effect been that has substantial.thecaseofYugoslavia, ofthe trade theimplementation FiveYearPlanwasheavily and dependent of went the bloc-in1948,51 per cent Yugoslavia's upon Eastern exports to of theCommunist and46 percent imports from states came them. Stalin's this economic blockade strangled commerce forced Yugoslav and the governmentabandon FiveYear Plan,bringing country to its the closeto American Cubaalsohada considerable bankruptcy. sanctions against impact. The United States government followed itsbanon theimport Cuban up of with banon almost exports-and a all sugar while Soviet the Union quickly filled ofthegapandevensome part Western states continued trade to with the on Cuba, country's dependence American markets been great had so that theCuban economy severely was damaged. Equally Rhodesia-although in there help was from South Africa although and international sanctions have been never watertight-some important sectors theeconomy, as the of such tobacco industry, suffered acutely, Rhodesia hada chronic and has problem of foreign exchange exacerbatedthe by heavy expenditure guerrilla of the war. Thethreat sanctions the of to economic intereststhe of target states cannot therefore takenlightly-indeed was the threat be it rather than the
15. Doxey,opci.,p. 140. 16. Schreiber, cit.,p. 404. op 17. Galtung, cit.,p. 409 op 18. The UnitedNationsand EconomicSanctions AgainstRhodesia(Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1973), p. 128. 19. Strack, cit., 238. op p.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

376

INERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ofsanctions settledboundary a implementation that between Albania dispute andYugoslavia arose which after First the World War. Until November 1921 Yugoslavia refused Paris Peace had to the Conference decision retain 1913 the boundaries. ThenBritain demanded theLeagueCouncil calledto that be consider sanctions almost and to immediately Yugoslavia agreed withdraw to In the line.20 that the old case threat enough: when was but sanctions actually areimposed situation the The one becomes ofhowthe changes. issuethen states imposing canachieve results economic political and the by pressures; for target oneofhowitcanresist proposed state the even political changes ifit suffers economically. Why itbeen difficult has toachieve primary so the of objectivessanctions? is There nosimple answer. single important appears bethe The most reason to failure the of imposing toanticipate the states to fully response sanctions within ' thetarget state. of writes a ' naive Galtung to theoryaccording which a roughly proportional was relationship assumed between economic deprivation and political whileHugh Thomasnotedthatin the disintegration21; Rhodesian British servants theDepartmentEconomic case civil at of Affairs advised when national that the income declined a point could to that roughly be assessed, White Rhodesians would that accept ' thegame no longer was worthwhile Theseassumptionspolitical '.22 of coUapse following upon hard economic disaster proved be unfounded. have to Indeed economic sanctions havegenerally theopposite had effect creatingsense community of a of and in solidarity thetarget state. havealready We noted Leonard Kapungu's comment Rhodesia. on in in Similarly,Italy the1930sChristopher Hibbert hasdescribed the how people rallied round Duce. the Oldladies him sent their to jewelleryhelp pay hiswar, young him for and mensaidthey would gladly in it bysuicidal die air-raids theBritish on Fleet. Many former liberals supported war, theChurch not the and did it. oppose Several former anti-facists involuntary returned living exile to support countryher their in hour need.23 of In postwar Yugoslavia Albania, subject sanctions Communist and both to by the states, effect tofoster was national in resisting unity outside pressures. In Cuba, Schreiber that noted although economic the impact severe gave was it thegovernmentexcuse itsfailings ithelped build an for and to Castro a into ' national hero,standing to the ' NorthAmerican up giant and the 'imperialist blockade'. Within target the state, therefore, sanctions tocreate psychological tend a climate which similar a war-time ofresistance. this is to spirit be And may of critcal significance situationwhich'economic ina in sanctions a battle are of
' 20. Mervin Frost,Colective SanctionsInternational in Relations: historical An of overview theory the and practice (Seminar Paper-Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg). 21. Galtung, cit., 386. op p. 22. Quoted Doxey, cit., 130. in op p. 23. Christopher Hibbert, Mtssolini edn. Benito Rev. (Harmondsworth: 1965), 92. Penguin, p.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

377

confidence states theinternational between (target) the and community '.24 Reluctance accept to and change become may evenstronger, thepopulation of The may be readyto accepta highdegree economic punishment. are to it which offered them-whether is abandoning Italian alternatives imperial aspirations, ordissolving Castro inCuba, accepting the government or or Black the with secular a rulein Rhodesia, replacing Jewish ofIsrael state that of Palestine, appear unattractive theprivationssanctions well so are may worth bearing. Naturally, states try take edge the target also to the off economic of impact sanctions stockpiling, finding markets suppliers, and alternative by by by diversifyingdomestic the economy, buying by illegally ifthisis more even and from politically expensive, bydiverting economic the the impact away dominant groups. somecasestheapplicationsanctions even social In of has stimulated of sectors an economy. Rhodesia In there was a substantial in expansion manufacturing industries UDI: in thetenyears after after 1965 the of manufacturing volume the production 88 per rose cent above 1965 its level, whilein theperiod between 1963 and 1970 therange output of from to expanded 602 products3,837.25Defeating sanctions becomesmajor a national activity, businessmen hadmade loudest with who the protests against the riskof sanctions being imposed leading drive undermine the to and them. circumvent The contrast thesituation theimposing in can with The states be sharp. and for are are to sanctions imposed diverse often objectives which appear be and a to that confused; there ofcourse, price be paid-anda price is not is, than always distributed. imposing willsuffer Some states much more evenly and will others, within particular any some of economy be country sectors the affected others escape while of unscathed. may Feelings resentment up spring those have pay highest who among to the a strong price, for providing motive or the evading modifying sanctions. Whilesanctions decided are by is at government, compliancerequired all levels-individuals, groups, firms, financial the organisations-andgreatest compliance is demandedthose of who haveto paythehighest price. Moreover, samepeople these often havethe doubts greatest aboutthe effectiveness the political and justification of sanctions. incontrast thesituation thetarget there be' Thus in to state may inthe great difficulty imposing increating, even states and more sustaining, in the climate a psychological for national involving effort sacrifices. may What be required achieve a commitment emotional to such isan response similar that to of wartime-but thecircumstances surround imposition in which the of sanctions isnormally that difficult toachieve. Theproblem maintaining of a commitment tosanctions increases itis when seenthat arebeing they breached others. eachcasewhen by In sanctions have been applied therehave been governments commercial and enterprises
24. Kapungu, ci., p. 52. op 25. Strack, cit.,p. 90. op

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

378

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

preparedbreach to them. When action taken was against there even Italy were someLeague members-Austria, Hungary Albania, and eachwith strong in trading interestsItaly-who refused participate.the to In Rhodesian it case was not onlySouthAfrica whichfailed follow United to the Nations resolutions. Leonard When Kapungu looked thebehaviour other at of states, he concluded that Denmarkand Swedenvigorously asserted their to apply determination but had sanctions, they in anycase feweconomic dealings thecolony, they caretoavoid with and took actions which might be 'politically objectionable their to citizens'.Italy's response uncertain was a because succession weakgovernments often of were unable implement to their own decisions, thatports so likeGenoawereused heavily the by Rhodesians. France Spain-who Kapungu's were and in view unsympathetic toBritain other on scores-tried avoid clash to a with Afro-Asian the states; but imposed they sanctions neither with enthusiasm efficiency. were nor There alsotwo notable states members theUnited not of Nations-West Germany andSwitzerlandwhich provided another loophole, a time least, for at since were bound theSecurity not they by Council's resolutions. (Between 1965 and1974 Switzerland increased Rhodesian her imports $5,678million from to$7,352million her and exports Rhodesia $1,641million $4,546 to from to million).26 Finally, thesuper-powers both ignored aspects thesanctions of it when suited interestsdoso-including import chrome the their to the of into 27 under Byrd United States the amendment. about and tension breed Suchexperiences sceptism sanctions, sometimes in considered1933 When was between governments. anarms embargo being Sir Simon out an had inthe Sino-Japanese dispute, John pointed that attempt toChina a civil but war to arms some before stop been made years going during in on into hadtobe taken account thedecision oilsanctions against in Italy and that states 1935 wastheassumption theoilproducing ofCentral South from in not which remote was would America probably co-operate a dispute between 29 Thesuspicion distrust and which be generated can interests. their of and sanctionsillustratedAmerican Dutch is states operating by complaints the On over sanctions. theonehand Americans behaviour Rhodesian British the Britain beinglax in its efforts, on theother Dutch of and accused on of out 3I complained being unfairly singled inreports sanctions breaking. of another exacerbates and Such scepticism resentment problem-that sanctions. Some stateshave to introduce and checking policing special has time produces ofuncertainty. areas which Machinery legislation, takes and the effort which and tobe setup toadminister sanctions, when short, sharp ' American of sanctions turns the hadbeen anticipated into ' policy patienceof
26. Kuyper, cit.,p. 206. op 27. Kapungu, cit.,pp.86-88. op the Pressfor Oxford Sanctions University Group, International (London: 28. See,Report Chatham by Study 29. Ibid.,p. 62. RUA, 1938). Rhodesia(New York: PolicyTowardSouthern 30. Anthony Lake, The 'Tar Baby ' Option:American op Columbia University Press,1976), p. 92; see alsoKuyper, cit.,p. 148.

it. which had ithadfailed countries ignored 28 One ofthefactors because many

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

379

against Cuba,or ' thelonghaul' ofBritish sanctions against the Rhodesia, of implementationthe blockade becomes detailed, a almosta routine governmental When task. international become involved organisations they also setup their ownmachinery, have although normally to rely they on informationtothem their fed by member states. Both national governments and international have to face the headaches the organisations of and bureaucratic legalsupervisionsanctions. of administrative, Evenwhen is there a strong is often and commitment, investigation difficult expensive in skilled But manpower. thecommitment in anycase,notalways has, been In there. hisstudy the of Netherlands' sanctions Rhodesia J.Kuyper P. against ' chose commented the that Dutch Government totry have best both to the of worlds thus and committed verbally complete itself to but implementation, created legalmesswhich largely a actually was ineffective There '. were inter-departmental aboutthe distributionresponsibilities, disputes of and Dutchshipping companies argued thattheir were competitors notbeing restrictedeffectively were. as as they Thesedifficulties reflectedthe were in time-an of average three a half and ittook Netherlands months-which the to answer from United enquiries the Nations Secretary General. inKuyper's Yet viewtheDutchgovernment more was conscientious mostothers than in policing sanctions. difficulties,those other Its and of governments, naturally pleased Smith, Rhodesian Ian the Prime Minister, claimed attitude who the of ' thegovernments that their was companies geton with (trading can it with so Rhodesia), long the as govemments themselves know don't it about ' 32 The fact that implementation is the ofsanctions cannot isolated be from other international domestic and issues. They may clash with other interests, orbe given lower a priority other than goals theimposing of states. clear A is example that the of difficulties for French British imposing posed the and in sanctions against Italy-Churchill, feared who aggressionEurope in more than ' we Italian in aggression Africa, theHouseofCommons, must our told do duty, we must it with but do other nations onlyin accordance the with obligations others which recognisewell. arenot as We strong enough bethe to law-giver the and spokesmanthe of world.' a letter Austen In to Chamberlain hewrote ' itwould a terrible tosmash Italy, itwill us that be deed up and cost dear'.I In Peter Calvocoressi's theFrench British, imposing view and in sanctions against ' wanted incompatible Italy two things-to protect Ethiopia andthe Covenant, still but, more, protect to themselves against Hitler ' The secondary objectives sanctions of It willbe recalled thesecondary that objectives sanctions those of are concerned the with status, reputation position the and of government imposing
31. The Implementation International of Sanctions (Alphenaan den Rijn: Sijthoff Noordhoff, and 1978), p. 206. 32. Strack, cit.,p. 140. op 33. Churchill, cit.,pp. 131 and 136. op 34. In RonaldSegal, ed., Sanctions AgainstSouth Africa(Harmnondsworth: Penguin,1964), p. 49. (International Conference Economic on Sanctions Against SouthAfrica, London, 1964.)

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

380

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

In these have them. broad terms and objectives positive negative and aspects, both and they directed tohome international are audiences. Positively, are they to the intended demonstrate effectiveness imposing ofthe government-for in controlling in Central South that and instance oftheUnited States events and of in The purpose America, that theSoviet Union Eastern of Europe. here a willingness capacity act.Negatively, and sanctions is todemonstrate to In be or the purpose simply toanticipatedeflect criticism.some instances may off of involve states as Britain such this may warding threats action other by from BlackCommonwealth Rhodesia. it mayinvolve faced the over Or on of or domestic It is avoiding criticism thescore ineptitude indifference. for tobe to and generally important governments seen beconcerned busy-as ' said Lloyd George ofsanctions against Italy: Theycametoolateto save '. I to but are in nick time save Government Abyssinia, they just the of the have Once commitments beenmadeto a policy, whether individual by or orinternational political leaders, bygovernments organisations, reputations andpride atstake. public are At in totheir meetings,statements parliaments, atinternational and and conferences, on radio television leaders political give which torenounce; when undertakings become difficult and very are sanctions protracted a long over time increasing an number organisations people of and committed them. to become This has beenan important feature the of it Rhodesian Atfirst waspredominantly case. a British but effort, tomake the more sanctions effective British torecruit support. the had more Other states andinternational organisations involved, that became so their and reputations commitment atstake. so,inturn, became were And it for increasingly difficult the British contemplate to a unilateral settlement the with Rhodesian regime. Secondary objectives contain substantial often a symbolic element. While in thishas sometimes a subject derision, been of symbols important are political for relationships. include instance They attemptsexpresssense to a of For morality. Finland, sanctions against Rhodesia were ' an impressive demonstration behalf the equality rights man', whilethe on of and of Austrians them ' theindispensable saw as complementtheheavy of moral pressure theinternational that community exercises through international public opinion v36 Although moststudies have concentrated primary on objectives of several sanctions, authors turned their have to secondary purposes explain to why governments have persisted introducing applying in or them. Strack Harry notes sevensecondary objectives Rhodesian for sanctions.37 Anna Schreiber concludes ' itismainly symbolic that its functions makes that economic coercion tempting a policy govemments Margaret for '.38 Doxey writes thatAnglo-French sanctions against Italycould be ' accurately
35. 36. 37. 38. QuotedbyMacmillan, ci., p. 430. op Strack, cit.,p. 36. op Strack, cit.,pp. 26-27. op Schreiber, cit.,p. 413. op

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMIC AS SANCTIONS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

381

as describeda face-saving exercise3 ButJohan is '. Galtung more sympathetic togovernments hewrites when that: There thevalue at least is of of the doing something,having illusion of ofbeing in being of When instrumental, action busy time crisis. military isimpossible onereason another, when for or and is doing as nothingseen to tantamount complicity, something to be doneto express then has morality, that something atleast serves a clear as to that signal everyone what receiving the nation done disapprovedIfthesanctions has is of. do not serve instrumental purposes canhave they expressive functions. 4 on Judgments the successor failure sanctions achieving in of their aims secondary aredifficultreach. to Fewofthestudies haveattempted to make suchjudgments, in anycase thenature these and of objectives so is elusive, as do referringthey to issuesofstatus, and symbols, reputation. Obviously is a relationship there between and primary secondary objectivesfor itsprimary if purpose could achieved status the be the of imposing is state likely beenhanced, the to and symbolsisseeking condemn ongreater it to take meaning. although, thewhole, But on primary objectives notbeen have it achieved doesnotfollow secondary that objectives alsofailed be have to realised. Someloss ofprestige havebeensuffered theimposing may by stateit whetheris the of United failure the States the and Soviet Union discipline to CubaandYugoslavia or respectively,theinadequacy theAnglo-French of action against ormore Italy, the recently British failure against Rhodesia which brought fierce such in attacks theCommonwealth theUnited and Nations. However, setagainst is thefact theimposing to this that governments have generally achieved some morelimited objectives. Galtung As rightly commented sanctions have giventhemthe opportunity display to their attitudes concern to be active. and and Furthermore provide wayof they a a general symbolising stance international in relations. Theseare positive but demonstrations, theyhavealso the negative advantages avoiding of criticism attacks home abroad. and at and Added this actofimposing to the sanctions thegovernment gives a breathing Timecanbeimportant space. in politics-circumstances the change, sharp ofthe edge initial criticism be may and blunted other issuesariseto stealattention. thecase ofRhodesia, In although British the government under was persistent criticism the from Black states criticism modifiedthe that was by British action, athome Labour and the government succeeded holding own in its supporters together reasonably well, whereas Conservatives often disarray. public-opinion the were in Also surveys show for year least that a at there a general was confidence government's inthe to the ability handle situation. thequestion by Gallup:' Do you To put of government's approve the handlingthe of Rhodesian situationRhodesia?' in
40. Galtung, cit.,p.411. op

39. Doxey, cit., 93. op p.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

382

AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL

a majority the approved during first ofsanctions strongest year (the support in recorded February being 1966 when55 percentapproved, percent 29 the of but and didn't disapproved, 16 percent know), towards endofthelife had that Labour administration thesupport slipped away June (in 1969 only and cent didn't 27 per whereas per cent cent approved, 49 disapproved 24 per by Rhodesia not was such central inBritish issue a politics. know)-but then Tertiary objectives with structure behaviour and of are Tertiary objectives those concerned the of or affect the the international system generally, thoseparts it which states ensure to a efforts theimposing imposing states. Thismay include by in of of certainpattern behaviour international suchas theLeague affairs, ' aggressiona means settling as of Nations attempted' outlawing by disputes. ' Itwas,ofcourse, todefineaggressionbutthat the was extremely difficult ', the taken and was aspiration-and action against Japan Italy, inpart designed saw toachieve Atthetime more that. the enthusiastic League supporters the of of action a means backing international but the as up law, in view a Chatham House group whichlooked the issuein the late 1930s thatwas a at ofthe of not to misperception nature international itcould be analogous law: in a criminal within state law the there noway which state was because could beperceived treated a criminal. group or as The that League was reported the ' laysdownno out and simply to prevent aggression thattheCovenant of for of peace. It law penalties theviolation international orthe breaking the the to in merely describes methods which State Members bound follow are of the to victims aggression upholding Covenant rendering assistance the and ofthe of law now League Thatview internationalwould bechallenged ,41 by many governments restrictive. would as too They argue that states be can as treated criminals against international the community they when offend certain norms. of against Sanctions, become means upholding a therefore, norms international bydeterring whomight tempted break those be to them if those do. of Black and, necessary, punishing who Thiswould the be view the for who states those break norm racial the of and has equality, anattempt been made theArabstates gainlegitimacy extend by to and their action against Israel branding Israelis ' racialists by the as '. Othertertiary include for objectives support a particular international of structure. form thisstructure depend thewayinternational The on will relations perceived.may, instance, anattempt defendbalance are It for be to a ofpower, toensure coherence a regional or the of grouping,tocounter or the of extensionideologicalreligious or doctrines. actions the The of Americans in Central SouthAmerica theRussians Eastern and or in Europe couldbe in eachorall three these interpreted of ways. Structural considerations may alsoextend a concern the to for organisation ofinterstate relations-either the diplomatic structure between states the establishment support or and of opcit., 41. InternationalSanctions, p. 13.

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

383

and the Italy, for Support theLeagueagainst organisations. international In both casesthe of Rhodesia examples thelatter. are Nations United against onthe is are relations handled superimposed international broader of issue how problem. particular existing or to directed defendingfurthering are objectives usually Tertiary body. or it whetherbean alliance aninternational ororganisations, structures to, or from, setup a challenge the whodeviate it In these instancesis those But to whoare subjected thesanctions. wheninternational order existing the may and are structures norms changing, sanctions alsobeusedtoensure can on imposed Rhodesia The is accepted. sanctions that new the dispensation norm ofthe as the be interpreted implementation newinternational ofracial equalitv. of problems are there even greater objectives In thecase of tertiary into to of The were secondary. range factors betaken than evaluation there for inthe system in and changes developments international is account examining by played sanctions, part the to so great itis impossibleisolate particular that of is and direction change open to wideinterpretation. and the degree (i.e. to element includea deterrent objectives tertiary Furthermore will against state action be taken toothers thetarget that than demonstrate by in taken theUnited This similar behaviour). wasan element theaction and Yugoslavia, in the Unionagainst States against Cuba,by the Soviet what as and to Japan Italy aggressors-but the decision actagainst League's Of be of states only a matter speculation. course can of was effectthis onother that it argued itwas In are judgments made. thecaseoftheLeague hasbeen failure and to sufficient vigour determination-the to thefailure act with to Hitler follow aggressive encouraged an deterrent-that provide adequate Hider's Klaus Hildebrand, In policies. theviewoftheGerman historian, case of was the to arms during period sanctions ' a test decision supply toItaly in as power theLeagueof himto see howGreat Britain, thedecisive for in made Geneva. to decisions would were Reich oppose the behave Nations, Hitler strengthened in or have lack it, Britain's reaction, rather of must Great to also wouldeventually be prepared cometo an thebelief London that (with agreement him) 42 Conclusion to ends political by in are Economic sanctions employedanattempt achieve a of for revealing means. economic Theyare imposed a variety reasons, to themof seeking impose on governments of mixture aims thepart those ofview todifferences considerations, and from ranging internationaldomestic when increases the This of governments. diversity within various sections the into are and organisations taken aimsofother governments international into be categories: canbroadly divided three Theobjectives pursued account.
1973). Batsford, (London: of Polwy theThirdReich The 42. KlausHildebrand, Foreign

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

384

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

withthe behaviour the target of primary, whichare concerned state; and of secondary, refer the which to position reputation imposing and the state; of tertiary, whichare concerned withthe structure behaviour the and international system. During period which in the the sanctions applied are of emphasis theimposing maychange-with state primary aims,perhaps, providing chief the motivation initially (though is notalways case), this the whilst onsecondary tertiary later and/or objectives predominate. may Although are there somedifficultiesevaluation, of there a strong is consensus sanctions notbeen that have in their successful achieving primary objectives (although may toweaken target they help the state's ability resist to other forms pressure). reasons thefailure many-including of The for are problems agreement implementation theimposing of and among states, but alsoa failure appreciate reactions to the inside target andtoomuch the state reliance a naive theory economic on of pressure leading political to disintegration. importancesecondary tertiary The of and objectives often has been undervalued. even Yet, when importance their isrecognised evaluation of their success very is difficult, because someoftheaimsareso elusive (for ofan example,the reputation imposing andthe state), complexity ofothers (for the of system). Despite example, structuretheinternational suchdifficulties sanctions offered have a policy option trying achieverange objectives, in to a of andfrequently have they been seenas a more acceptable method pursuing of those objectives direct than recourse force. to

This content downloaded from 129.93.5.133 on Sat, 13 Apr 2013 21:49:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions