Canadian International Council
Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions
Author(s): T. V. Paul
Source: International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 3, Nuclear Politics (Summer, 1996), pp. 440-465
Published by: Canadian International Council
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203123
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International Journal. http://www.jstor.org TV. PAUL
Strengthening
the non-proliferation regime: the role of coercive sanctions
Proposals
for sanctions as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have been in vogue since the early days of the nuclear age. The
1946
Baruch Plan contained recommendations for punishing violators of the universal non-nuclear regime which was expected to emerge after the plan was adopted.1 Sanctions have been an implicit option in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, although the text of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty
(npt), which was signed in
1968
and entered into force in
1970,
contains no reference to them. At the bilateral level, espe- cially since the
1970s,
sanctions have been imposed by supplier countries on states suspected of developing nuclear weapons or on violators of some aspects of the non-proliferation norm.8
Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill
University;
author of
Assymetric
Conflict:
War Initiation by Weaker Powers
(1994)
and co-editor of The Absolute
Weapon
Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the
Emerging
International Order (forth- coming) .
I would like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation and the Canadian
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs and International Trade for their financial support and Baldev
Raj Nayar for his comments.
1 The plan envisaged removing national control over atomic energy and entrusting it to an international authority. Violations of the regime rules would have been stigmatized as international crimes, and punishment would not have been subjected to veto in the United Nations
Security
Council.
William
Epstein,
The Last Chance: Nuclear
Proliferation
and Arms Control (New
York: Free Press
1976),
10.
2 A study published in 1990 lists nine major cases of economic sanctions by nuclear supplier countries against states that did not agree to full-scope safeguards or that were presumed to be developing nuclear weapons. Gary
Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J.
Schott, and
Kimberly
Ann Elliott, eds, Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered. 2:
Supplemental
Case Histories (2nd ed; Washington DC:
Institute for International Economics
1990).
International
Journal
Li summer
1996
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
44
1
The International Atomic
Energy Agency (iaea), which conducts safeguard inspections of nuclear facilities in various countries, has the authority to report to the United Nations
Security
Council any violations of the safeguards agreements, but it has been reluctant to do so because of considerations of state sovereignty.3
The various export control mechanisms in the nuclear and technological arena
-
most prominently the Lon- don Nuclear
Suppliers Group guidelines, the missile technology control regime (mtcr), and the
Coordinating
Committee on
Export
Controls (cocom)
-
contain elements of sanctions against target states. In the
1990s,
the failure of the non-prolif- eration regime to stop signatories of npt, such as
Iraq
and
North Korea, from launching nuclear weapons programmes impelled a new interest in coercive sanctions to achieve more vigorous adherence to the treaty. The npt renewal conference in April/May 1995 briefly addressed the issue of tightening the rules of compliance but left the iaea responsible for working out concrete measures.
Immediately
after the end of the Cold War, analysts of dif- ferent ideological persuasions began to argue that coercive policy instruments were essential for curbing horizontal prolif- eration. A former United States secretary of defense, Robert
McNamara, suggested a global ban on non-nuclear states to pre- vent them from developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The United Nations
Security
Council would be given the power to impose 'collective, coercive action' on any country that disregarded the ban. Violators would be subjected to strict economic sanctions, and,
'if the sanctions had no effect, a un military force would be given a mandate to eliminate the pro- duction capability and destroy any stocks produced or bought.'4
From the right of the political spectrum,
Charles Krauthammer argued in favour of a more active coercive United States strategy 3
Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic
Energy Agency and World Nuclear
Order
(Washington
DC: Resources for the Future
1987) 234-5.
4
Robert S. McNamara, 'Nobody needs nukes,' New York Times, 23 February
1993,
A21.
442
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
of
'confronting, deterring, and, if necessary, disarming states that brandish and use weapons of mass destruction.'5
At the government level,
Bill Clinton's administration adopted a counter-proliferation policy which included coercive strategies. Although the policy emphasizes such traditional approaches to non-proliferation as diplomacy, arms control, economic and security assistance, and export controls, a new element has been added: an increased
Pentagon capacity to detect, disable, and dismantle nuclear weapons and incapacitate research facilities which produce weapons of mass destruction in proliferating states.6 The
Pentagon
would be given a role in devising measures to destroy or deter nuclear weapons not only at an advanced stage but also during the early phases of devel- opment. The
Department
of Defense recommended that in addition to the prevention and rollback of proliferators' nuclear capabilities, priority should be given to destroying hard under- ground targets where weapons are stored in order to disarm proliferators if necessary.7 By raising the profile of proliferation in defence policy and force posture, the Clinton administration has elevated the role of coercive sanctions beyond that of any of its predecessors. The interest in coercive measures in the
1990s
is partly a result of the success of United States attacks on
Iraq's
nuclear and chemical installations during the
1990-1
Persian Gulf War and continued United Nations efforts to search and demolish the remaining Iraqi capability.
In
1991, a major change in national and international attitudes toward coercive measures was evident in the reaction to coalition attacks on the
Iraqi
5
Charles Krauthammer, 'The unipolar moment,' Foreign Affairs 7o(no 1,
19901), 23-33. John
Deutch
argues that the United States should maintain sufficient military forces to make credible threats on nations with nuclear ambitions. 'The new nuclear threat,' ibid
7
1
(autumn 1992) 133.
6
Joseph
F. Pilat and Walter L. Kirchner, 'The technological promise of counterproliferation,' Washington Quarterly
18
(winter 1995), 153-66.
7
Paul R.S. Gebhard, 'Not by diplomacy or defense alone: the role of regional security strategies in US proliferation policy,' ibid, 167-79.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
443
nuclear facilities.
They
were received with approval or silence by the international community, whereas the limited raid by Israel in
1981
on
Iraq's Osiraq reactor met with near universal condemnation. Although the problem of proliferation existed throughout the Cold War, the end of East-West rivalry has raised the issue to a higher salience in the policy objectives of the United States.
The new strategic environment poses challenges to the existing international order because states traditionally perceived as weak and underdeveloped could, over time, acquire nuclear capability and delivery systems which can strike distant targets.8 Analysts debate the need for maintaining United States primacy in the next century even by such means as active external inter- vention. Arresting nuclear proliferation has been viewed as an essential step in forestalling the rise of new great-power challengers.9
Moreover, loopholes in the nuclear non-proliferation regime made it possible for some signatories of the npt, such as Iraq,
North Korea, Iran, and Libya, to pursue clandestine nuclear weapons programmes, even as they remained parties to the treaty. Giving coercive powers to the
Security
Council would give iaea safeguards more credibility and violations of npt responsibilities a strong legal basis for coercive action.
This article evaluates the strategy of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime through coercive means. It looks at two types of coercion, economic and military, and ana- lyzes the conditions under which each might succeed or fail in light of the lessons learned from coercive policies against Iraq and North Korea. It also examines the likely long-term impli- cations of sanctions for the non-proliferation regime.
8 As Krauthammer put it: 'in a shrunken world the divide between regional superpowers and great powers is radically narrowed ... Missiles shrink distance. Nuclear ... devices multiply power.'
'The
unipolar moment,' 30.
9 Christopher Layne,
'The
unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise,'
International
Security 17 (spring 1993), 5-51-
444
INTERNATIONAL
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COERCIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Although
various types of coercive policy mechanisms are avail- able to decision-makers in strong states for use against smaller target states, in the non-proliferation arena the two most rele- vant options are economic sanctions and military threat-based strategies, including coercive diplomacy, compellence, and pre- ventive strikes.10 Blockades could also be a part of sanctions. The rationale and assumptions for including nuclear spread as a legitimate reason for coercive intervention are manifold. First, proliferation constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Notwithstanding the dispute over whether the spread of nuclear weapons to other states can be a stabilizing factor, those who advocate coercive approaches assume that nuclear proliferation is an inherently dangerous process.
If war broke out among nuclear-armed regional adversaries, it could escalate into an atomic exchange which would result not only in incal- culable death and destruction of the belligerents, but also in nuclear contamination of the environment of other countries.
The state that engages in nuclear acquisition, especially if it is a member of the npt, is, therefore, seen as violating the widely accepted norm of international conduct that nuclear weapons should not spread to other countries.
A second rationale could be that the target state is acquiring nuclear weapons not because of security threats, since a signif- icant nuclear challenge is remote in most cases, but because of narrow objectives, such as domestic power calculations or regional power ambitions. Even when security concerns are gen- uine, nuclear acquisitions would pose an even greater threat to international and regional stability and to the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime.
In other words, protecting inter- 10
Anticipation
of hostile response by allies and adversaries, arms transfers, security guarantees, arms control measures, fuel supply assurances, strengthened safeguards, and export controls are traditionally viewed as significant influences on a country's choice to refrain from nuclear acqui- sition. William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and
Nan-Proliferation:
An
Interdisciplinary
Perspective (Cambridge ma: Oelgewschlager,
Gunn 8c Hain
1982), chap.
6.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
445
national non-proliferation norms embodied in the npt and the iaea safeguards system, however unequal they may be, takes precedence over national considerations of military security.
Third, it is assumed that a state's behaviour can be altered by the coercing power, which has the advantage of balance of forces and, in some cases, balance of resolve and balance of interests. The proliferating state is likely to back down in the face of economic hardship or the potential destruction of its nuclear facilities by military attack. Also, its incentive structure could be altered if the economic and political costs and tech- nical difficulties of renewing its nuclear weapons programme outweigh the benefits. Therefore, the leaders of at least some target states would prudently refrain from such actions.
Fourth, the possession of technology and fissile materials is the driving force behind the incentives for nuclear weapons acquisition. Therefore, if existing capabilities can be destroyed or thoroughly safeguarded and if new technology to restart the nuclear programme is denied, the state with nuclear ambitions would not find the enterprise worthwhile and would likely give up the nuclear weapons option eventually.
Fifth, coercive instruments, especially technological and material sanctions and preventive strikes, could prolong the period required for nuclear acquisition. During that period, political or diplomatic conditions could change which would make nuclear abstinence a possibility.11 A regime change could occur, and the new leadership might decide to abandon the nuclear weapons programme.
Coercive actions could convince suppliers to provide no further materials or to cease collaborat- ing in any way for fear of further retaliatory actions. For exam- ple, after the Israeli attack on
Osiraq, Iraqi negotiations with Italy for a heavy water reactor and a reprocessing facility came 1 1 For instance, Israel justified its strike on
Iraq's Osiraq reactor on the grounds that it would provide time for the peace process to make major strides before
Arab countries gained nuclear weapons and for Israel to take sufficient counter-measures. It would also give Arab leaders time to consider the con- sequences of the nuclear arms race. Shai Feldman, 'The bombing of
Osiraq
- revisited,' International
Security 7 (autumn 1982), 114-42.
446
INTERNATIONAL
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to a halt because of Italian fears of further preventive attacks by Israel.18
Finally,
successful military or economic sanctions could deter potential proliferators from launching nuclear weapons programmes. Signatories of the npt would be the most likely targets for economic sanctions if they violated their treaty obli- gations. There is a higher legal justification for imposing sanc- tions in these cases, although a state can withdraw from the npt if its supreme national interests demand that it do so.
Economic sanctions
Economic sanctions include supply-side approaches
-
cutting off the transfer of nuclear materials by suppliers, citing viola- tions of the iaea safeguards agreement, blocking aid and invest- ment to and trade with the nuclearizing nation.
Export
controls currently in place in several supplier states could also be seen as sanction-based because a select group of potential prolifera- tors are usually the targets. Such sanctions are meant to prevent prospective proliferators from eroding the effectiveness of the safeguards system and 'to reinforce international political norms against proliferation.'
^
Economic sanctions are especially attractive against states which depend on the international market for exports or imports or whose primary source of revenue is foreign trade. In the aftermath of the
Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, an economic embargo was imposed on
Iraq
which still continues. After four
12
Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of
Mass Destruction in the Middle East
(London:
Brassey's 1991), 97.
13 John
W. Harned, 'Nuclear sanctions: potential and limitations,' Atlantic
Community Quarterly 15 (winter 1977-8), 467.
The
purposes of economic sanctions here are varied.
They might be used to punish violations of the non-proliferation norm or regime principle. They might compel a state to rescind its nuclear programme and follow the norms fully. And they might be used to reduce the economic, technical, and military capabilities of the target state. David
Leyton-Brown,
'Lessons and policy considerations about eco- nomic sanctions,' in
Leyton-Brown, ed, The
Utility of
International Economic
Sanctions
(London: Croom Helm
1987), 301-10;
Kim Richard Nossal, 'Inter- national sanctions as international punishment,' International
Organization
43 (spring 1989), 301-22.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
447
years of sanctions,
Iraq reportedly complied fully in 1995 with the United Nations resolution by destroying all nuclear weapons facilities and by allowing
United Nations inspectors to install monitoring devices to detect any resumption of its nuclear weapons programme.
The threat of economic sanctions was raised during 1993-4 when North Korea's plans for a nuclear weapons programme began to unravel following its threat to withdraw from the npt in March 1993.
In
June 1994, when North Korea refused to allow the iaea to inspect its nuclear facilities, the United States proposed a plan for sanctions to the United Nations
Security
Council, the first stage of which would be to halt trading in arms with North Korea and to ban all cargo flights to and from the country.14 If
Pyongyang
did not comply and decided to withdraw from the npt, all financial transactions would have been cut off, a step that would have cost the country its main foreign exchange source, about $1.8 billion remitted by North Korean expatriates living in Japan.
But the sanctions came to naught when North Korea declared that they would be seen as an act of war and threatened military invasion of South Korea and destruction of Seoul in a 'sea of fire.'15
The differences between the
Iraqi
and North Korean cases are striking.
Economic sanctions had a clear-cut effect on the
Iraqi
nuclear programme only after Iraq had been decisively defeated in the Gulf War and after four years of intensive appli- cation.
Iraqi compliance was largely the result of the conditions that the allied forces imposed upon it when it surrendered. In the North Korean case, uncertainty about
Pyongyang's
behav- iour and the harm it could do to the industrially prosperous
South resulted in caution on the part of the United States and its allies.
Regional endorsement, especially from North Korea's
14
Other proposed actions included cutting off the United Nations aid programme, reducing the size of
Pyongyang's diplomatic missions abroad, cancelling assistance for an industrial project, and curtailing all cultural and scientific exchanges.
15
For the United States resolutions, see New York Times, 16
June 1994, ai. 448
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL key trading partner,
China, was not forthcoming, whereas in
Iraq, overwhelming regional support helped to cap effectively the flow of
Iraqi
oil to the outside world.
North Korea demonstrates that a determined state can extract concessions from the international community before complying fully with the npt. The United States-North Korean
Accord of 2 1 October
1994 clearly addressed a number of issues of long-standing concern. North Korea agreed to comply with the iaea safeguards in return for United States agreement to provide light water reactor power plants financed by an inter- national consortium. The United States would supply heavy oil in return for a North Korean freeze on its graphite moderated power reactor. The United States agreed to normalize relations with Pyongyang and reduce barriers to trade and investment, while liaison offices would be established in each other's capital as a prelude to full diplomatic relations. Most significantly, the
United States signalled a major change in policy when it for- mally assured North Korea that it would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against it.16 This case demonstrates that carrots are more attractive than sticks to some proliferating states, especially if those states are isolated but possess sufficient military capacity to hurt their neighbours. North Korea's siege mentality, derived from contin- uous post-Korean
War
hostility towards the South and the
United States, became more apparent with the end of the Cold
War when it lost its major allies, the Soviet Union and other east European states.17 Economic or military sanctions would have increased the alienation with unpredictable consequences for war or peace in the Korean peninsula. At the bilateral level, economic and technological sanctions have been used since the
1970s
to achieve non-proliferation objectives.
The nuclear safeguards issue resulted in economic
16 For a full text of the agreement, see Arms Control
Today 24(December 1994),
19-
17
The death of Kim II
Sung
in
July 1994 also helped to intensify
North Korea's sense of insecurity. Selig
Harrison, 'The North Korean nuclear crisis: from stalemate to breakthrough,' Arms Control
Today 24(November 1994),
18-20.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
449
sanctions in eleven cases between
1974
and
1990. They were: Canada vs India
(1974-6),
Canada vs Pakistan
(1974-6),
United
States and Canada vs South Korea
(1975-6),
United States vs
South Africa
(1975-82),
United States vs Taiwan
(1976-7),
Canada vs
Japan
and the
European Community (1977-8),
United States vs Brazil
(1978-81),
United States vs
Argentina
(1978-81),
United States vs India
(1978-82),
United States vs
Pakistan
(1979-80), and Australia vs France
(1983- ). The threat of sanctions was successful in only two cases
(South
Korea and Taiwan).
A third case,
Canada vs
Japan
and the ec, was moderately successful. The other cases were not very successful in changing the policies of the target states, especially in forcing them to accept full-scope safeguards.
The three successful cases involved allies of the sanctioning state while the non-successful cases involved non-allies. In addition, both Taiwan and South
Korea were under the security umbrella of the United States.18
Five of these states were non-signatories of the npt.
Both the United States and Canada imposed export controls on India after its
1974
nuclear test. Indeed, the Indian test was the catalyst for a number of sanction-related activities by sup- plier countries, most notably the passage by the United States
Congress
of the
1978
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and the strengthening of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. Subsequently, the United States abrogated its
1963
nuclear co-operation agreement with India to supply uranium to the
Tarapur power plant near
Bombay, although Washington allowed France to supply the materials for another decade or so. The Canadian response was even more stringent; it cut off all nuclear co-oper- ation with India. These sanctions have had a somewhat adverse effect on, but did not stop, India's civilian nuclear programme. The difficulty in getting components seemed to slow down
India's
space and missile programmes as well but again were not effective in capping the programmes. In
1993
the United
States used the threat of sanctions to block a Russian deal to supply cryogenic rocket engines to India. Yet the Indian test-
18 Hufbauer et al, eds, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 353-486.
45°
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
launching of Prithvi, a short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile, and of
Agni,
an intermediate-range ballistic missile, went ahead, although snags in deployment have occurred.
The United States twice used sanctions to force Pakistan to forgo its nuclear weapons programme.
In
April 1979, the administration of President
Jimmy
Carter terminated aid to Pak- istan as mandated by the Glenn and
Symington
amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act and successfully pressured
France to cancel an agreement to sell a reprocessing plant to Islamabad.
Nonetheless, Pakistan refused to place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards, a condition for lifting the sanc- tions. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan dramatically altered the United States-Pakistani relationship after Islamabad agreed to provide a base for the United
States-supported guerrilla war being waged by the Mujahidin against the Soviet occupying forces. The administration of Ronald
Reagan
made little effort to link aid to United States non-proliferation objectives vis-a-vis Islamabad.
However, pressure from Congress in October
1987
led the
United States to suspend aid to Pakistan as a punishment for reprocessing plutonium at a level of enrichment which indi- cated that it was to be used for nuclear weapons. When the
Soviet Union pulled out of
Afghanistan
in
1989,
Pakistan lost its strategic value to the United States. In October
1990,
the administration of
George
Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. The result was the suspension of arms and economic aid worth $600 million in
1991-2,
as mandated by the Pressler amendment to the
Foreign
Assistance
Act. Nonetheless, the evidence that sanctions did not result in a change of policy is to be found in Pakistan's continuing devel- opment of a nuclear weapons programme.19
19
For United States sanctions against Pakistan, see T.V. Paul, 'Influence through arms transfers: lessons from the US-Pakistani relationship,' Asian
Survey 32 (December 1992), 1078-92.
In
1995, the Clinton administration tried to lift some sanctions so that they could supply 28 F-16 aircraft and other military equipment, which Pakistan had already paid for. The admin- istration finally succeeded in persuading a reluctant
Congress
to allow a one- time waiver of the Pressler amendment.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
45
1
Military
threat-based strategies The most extreme form of threat-based strategy is a preventive attack against a state believed to be acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
A
pre-emptive strike, on the other hand, is an attack by a potential target on the nuclear facilities of the state that is presumed to be planning an attack. The intention is to forestall the use of nuclear weapons in a future war.20 All forms of coer- cive policies require commitment on the part of the coercer, as well as a certain level of communication to the adversary of that commitment. An attempt of this nature is seen as a success if the adversary behaves 'in the way one desires as a result of the communication';81 in this instance, by abandoning its nuclear weapons programme.
Coercive
diplomacy could involve a range of foreign policy instruments available to superior powers.
The first step is often to signal an intent to cause behaviour modification and then, if necessary, to threaten to use force, along with diplomatic efforts, to induce co-operation. The threat to use force is regarded as giving teeth to diplomatic efforts aimed at altering a particular behaviour.
Compellence
threatens to use military force until the target accepts the wishes of the state that initiates the strategy and could include 'both coercive diplomacy and blackmail.'22 Although coercive instruments are generally applied in the context of military action by an adversary, they may well be expanded to include non-military objectives, such as the imple- mentation of particular norms of behaviour, in this case those related to nuclear non-proliferation. In the nuclear non-prolif- eration realm, coercive policies can take the form of a threat of attack to remove a safeguarded nuclear facility to which the
20 For the distinction between prevention and pre-emption, see Kenneth Waltz,
'The
spread of nuclear weapons: more may be better,'
Adelphi Papers, no 171
(autumn 1981).
2 1 Glenn H.
Snyder
and Paul
Diesing, Gmflict Among
Nations:
Bargaining,
Decision
Making and System
Structure in International Crises (Princeton nj:
Princeton
University
Press
1977),
211.
22 Ibid, 5; on compellence, see Robert
J.
Art, 'To what ends military power?'
International
Security 4 (spring 1980), 3-35.
452
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
target state is diverting nuclear materials for weapons pro- grammes, or a threat of attack on a country's nuclear facilities, safeguarded or not, to put an end to its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Such policies can include carrots as well as sticks: co-operation may be induced through promises of aid if the target state modifies its behaviour.83
At the bilateral level, states that engage in coercive tactics could invoke international law, on the basis of
'anticipatory
self- defence,' by arguing that the weapons that are being developed by the adversary will eventually be used against it or its allies.84
Article
51 of the United Nations Charter gives states the right to resort to individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack against a member state, the intention being that the
Security
Council will eventually undertake measures necessary for the maintenance of peace and security. However, nations could resort to anticipatory self-defence by contending that since
'nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are capa- ble of sudden and mass destruction, states must not only wonder whether the
Security
Council will act on their behalf, but whether such assistance, if offered at all, will arrive too late.'
Therefore, national leaders could resort to pre-emptive and pre- ventive attacks if they 'perceive a significant threat to their national security' from an adversary attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.85
Israel invoked the principle to justify its attack on
Iraq's Osiraq reactor in
June 1981.
Prime Minister
23 Along with withdrawal from Kuwait, United States policy towards
Iraq prior to the Gulf War contained compellent threats to force
Iraq
to destroy its weapons of mass destruction. This strategy continued after the war: the
United States threatened force on several occasions when
Iraq
refused to comply with United Nations resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction, especially its non-co-operation with the United Nations inspection team.
24
For a similar debate in the
Reagan
administration on the legality of attacking Libya's chemical weapons plant at Rabta during 1988-9, see Marshall
Silverberg,
'International law and the use of force: may the United States attack the chemical weapons plant at Rabta?' Boston
College
International and
Comparative
Law Review
13 (no 1, 1990), 53-89.
25
Ibid, 56-8.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
453
Menachem
Begin argued that 'Iraq intended to use the nuclear reactor to produce atomic bombs that would ultimately be exploded in Israel/86
It should be noted that the npt regime is ambiguous about using coercive strategies to arrest nuclear proliferation. The iaea could, however, refer the matter to the
Security
Council if and when an npt state is found to be engaged in clandestine activities. That the iaea favours multilateral over unilateral action is evident in its adverse reaction to the Israeli raid on the
Osiraq facility.
How do sanctions affect nuclear choices?
Two critical cases in which sanctions were imposed to obtain compliance with non-proliferation regime principles and norms were Iraq and North Korea. Both are instructive about the con- ditions under which sanctions will or will not work. Lessons from the experience of sanctions imposed against other npt signatories and non-signatories have already been discussed. In general, economic sanctions are more likely to succeed if a state is heavily dependent on international trade for its survival.
According
to a key study of 1 16 cases between
1914
and
1990,
sanctions were successful in
34 per cent of the cases. Efforts to affect the military potential of an adversary were only modestly successful. Economic sanctions were most effective against friends and close trading partners.27
Other
political variables affecting the outcome were supplementary policies to support sanctions, the length of the sanction period, international co- operation, and the political and economic health of the coun- try. Economic variables included the cost imposed on the target country in terms of per capita income and gross national prod- 26 New York Times, lojune 1981,
A 1. A problem with
'anticipatory
self-defence' in the nuclear proliferation realm is determining how imminent a threat of attack is. Nor is it easy to compute the odds of a nuclear attack by a newly nuclearized state on a country that already possesses nuclear weapons and its capability to launch a massive and instantaneous retaliation.
27
Hufbauer et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 92-3, 99.
454
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
uct, the flow of two-way trade as a percentage of total trade, the relative economic size of the country, and the type of sanctions and their cost to the coercive state.88 It should be noted that only eleven of the cases in this study dealt with non-proliferation issues and in a majority sanctions were not particularly effective.
Selective sanctions can hurt key aspects of a country's nuclear energy programme. However, if perceived and actual security challenges are overwhelming, the country may pursue its nuclear option regardless.
Economic sanctions against trade in arms have not forced Pakistan to abandon its nuclear acqui- sition efforts. India is perceived as such an enormous security threat that the Pakistani elite acquired all the components nec- essary for a nuclear weapons programme through clandestine means. Nor is there any substantive evidence that sanctions imposed on India after its
1974
nuclear explosion did anything to reduce the determination of India's leaders to acquire nuclear capability in the face of a perceived overwhelming secu- rity threat from China and Pakistan. It is, however, possible that the fear of economic sanctions contributed to India's decision to conduct no further tests or to declare openly its nuclear weapons activities. The sanctions imposed on South Africa did not have a major effect during the apartheid regime, when a
'total
onslaught' mentality pervaded the South African elite's security perceptions
-
hence their clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Only with the demise of apartheid did the npt become acceptable to South Africa. However, positive assur- ances, coupled with active diplomacy, have produced results in other cases. United States diplomacy vis-a-vis North Korea was somewhat successful, but only after an economic and security incentive package was offered.
While it is possible that sanctions might have a long-term impact, it is difficult to prove that they are the reason for non- acquisition of nuclear weapons because so many factors affect national choices.
However, if one begins with a benign security
28 Ibid, 40.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
455
environment, the impact of the threat of sanctions is easier to assess. It could be argued that Brazil and
Argentina gave up nuclear weapons programmes largely for economic reasons.
Both countries are in a low-conflict zone with no major com- pelling security reasons to acquire nuclear weapons other than prestige and domestic politics. The civilian regimes of both countries saw the removal of the nuclear irritant as necessary to attract foreign investment and to increase foreign trade. How- ever, sanctions against a potential proliferator in a protracted conflict zone without a nuclear ally are unlikely to succeed, par- ticularly if the proliferator is an isolated state. In the case of fencer-sitters, the threat of sanctions might deter them from pursuing an all-out nuclear programme. The successful appli- cation of sanctions could also increase international and insti- tutionalized co-operation in this area.89
One
important implication of coercive sanctions is the ten- dency among new proliferators to pursue an opaque strategy.
Those who pursue nuclear opacity do not follow the sequence through which declared nuclear states acquired their capability. Such states
-
India, Israel, and Pakistan
-
seem to believe that if they do not engage in open nuclear testing, they can avoid possible sanctions. Thus they deny possession; make no direct nuclear threats; espouse no military doctrines; avoid open deployment or open debate; and insulate their nuclear weapons programmes.30
Limits
of economic and military sanctions
Problems with coercive approaches abound. First, as a strategy for obtaining nuclear non-proliferation they do not take into account the incentives that encouraged attempts at nuclear acquisition in the first place. Economic sanctions and coercive
29
For a discussion of how institutions affect co-operation in multilateral sanc- tions, see Lisa Martin, Coercive
Cooperation: Explaining
Multilateral Economic
Sanctions (Princeton nj:
Princeton
University
Press
1992).
30
Avner Cohen and
Benjamin Frankel, 'Opaque nuclear proliferation, Journal of Strategic
Studies
13 (September 1990), 14-44.
456
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
attacks do not remove the security challenges the proliferating state may confront, especially if its perceived threat is from an existing nuclear weapon state or one in the process of devel- oping nuclear weapons. Nor does it remove an incentive struc- ture based on prestige or influence in regional and inter- national affairs.31
On the contrary, an attack or threat of attack on nuclear installations would increase a country's insecurity and strengthen its determination to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent against threats from stronger adversaries. States rarely abandon a course that they perceive is vital to their intrinsic or strategic interests. If a country's leadership views nuclear acqui- sition as a matter of national survival, coercion would not nec- essarily alter that policy,32 especially in the case of an npt signatory attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Treaty viola- tion has its costs in reputation and the likely harsh response from other adherents, especially the violator's neighbours. An npt signatory opting for this route is probably willing to take a greater risk than a non-signatory state attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. An overwhelming majority of those who signed the npt did so after being convinced that nuclear weapons would not make them more secure.
Many
small states have no hope of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
For them, nuclear proliferation could result in adverse counter-measures by their neighbours and by major powers.
For such states, the threat of sanctions is not as relevant as it is for middle ranking npt signatory states with the potential to violate the treaty. And then there is the problem of attacking nuclear facilities.
A one-shot attack may not be sufficient to force a proliferator to back down from its nuclear-building activities. A single, par-
31
Richard K. Betts, 'Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs and nonproliferation,' Foreign
Policy,
no
26(spring 1977), 157-83.
32
For the limitations of coercive diplomacy and compellence, see T.V. Paul,
Asymmetric Conflicts:
War Initiation by Weaker Powers
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University
Press
1994), chap. 9.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
457
rial effort would lead to greater determination on the part of the target state. It might build smaller, tightly protected, under- ground facilities that could withstand air attacks. In other words, limited attacks or threats of attack would not be sufficient to alter the behaviour of a state determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Such a state might have to be decisively defeated and conquered before its nuclear policy could be successfully trans- formed. (To some degree, both
Japan
and
Germany may have accepted nuclear abstinence as a result of being decisively defeated in the Second World War.)
One need look no further than
Iraqi
behaviour after the
Israeli attack on the
Osiraq
reactor. The raid did not reduce
Iraq's
desire for nuclear weapons, although it may have pro- longed the time it would take to acquire a weapons capability.33
It is difficult to prove whether or not the Gulf War altered
Iraqi
incentives for nuclear acquisition permanently, although it did destroy many Iraqi facilities. The extent of
Iraq's attempts to conceal its nuclear weapons programme from the United
Nations
inspectors for over four years came to light only when Hussein Kamal Hassan, the head of the programme and a son- in-law of President Saddam Hussein, defected to
Jordan
in
1995
and threatened to reveal the details.34
During
the years of economic sanctions,
Iraq engaged in a cat and mouse game with the United Nations inspection team.
It tried to hide
40 kilograms of enriched uranium by storing it away from the nuclear reactor facilities. In
1992,
the detection of unsafeguarded highly enriched uranium, laboratory scale production of plutonium, and a bid to build a camouflaged reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium led the
33 According to Iraqi sources, after
Osiraq, Iraq began an internal review and eventually opted to stay in the npt even as they were launching a major nuclear weapons programme.
Instead of a highly visible nuclear reactor, Iraq pursued a large-scale nuclear programme at different unmarked sites. David
A.
Kay,
'Denial and deception practices of wmd proliferators: Iraq and beyond,' Washington Quarterly
18
(winter 1995), 85-105.
34 'Iraq gives
u.N. fuller details on its germ warfare program,' New York Times,
23 August 1995,
A 1, A
7.
458
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL inspection team to fear that significant parts of Iraq's weapons programme were still hidden.
They
also found a large calutron programme 'based on electromagnetic enrichment technology developed by the us during the Manhattan Project to produce the highly enriched uranium for the Hiroshima bomb.'35
Revelations in
August 1995 showed that
Iraq
had under- taken a crash programme to make nuclear weapons immedi- ately after its attack on Kuwait in
August 1990 and that it was only three months away from producing a nuclear weapons sys- tem. It also had a centrifuge enrichment facility housed in a
Baghdad
suburb.36
Although
the inspection team claimed in
August 1994 that Iraq no longer posed a nuclear threat to its neighbours, it is possible that, once international sanctions are lifted, Iraq may revert to covert acquisition of materials from the world nuclear market, especially if the current regime remains in power. In the case of
Iraq,
the implementation of the threatened punishment was possible partly because of a configuration of factors unlikely to be repeated with another potential nuclear weapons state.
Iraq
launched a military offensive against Kuwait, engaged in aggressive behaviour towards its neighbours by deploying troops in an offensive mode, made threats to use nuclear capabilities, and had a history of using chemical wea- pons on the battlefield. It was still at the threshold stage, a phase before it achieved retaliatory nuclear strike capability. Its occu- pation of oil-rich Kuwait paved the way for a rare international and domestic consensus on the need for punishment. Even an outright offensive action involving a potential nuclear prolifer- ator need not result in such an international coalition
-
Kuwait's strategic significance as an oil producer is not likely to be rep- licated in most other scenarios.
35
Paul L. Leventhal, 'Plugging the leaks in nuclear export controls: why bother?' Orbis
36 (spring 1992), 167-80.
36
'Saddam came close to testing N-bomb,' Observer (London), 20
August 1995,
1; 'Crash nuclear program by Iraq is disclosed,' New York Times, 26
August
!995> 3-
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
459
The destruction of
Iraq's capabilities may have taught important lessons to other countries with nuclear ambitions.
Saddam
might have achieved his regional ambitions if he had waited until he had a credible nuclear capability. According to one United States nuclear expert, 'if he had waited he'd have had everything, including the delivery system.'37
If
Iraq had possessed sufficient nuclear capability and deliv- ery systems to hit the cities of Israel and Saudi Arabia as well as the United States forces stationed in the Persian Gulf area, the
United States probably would not have launched a counter- attack as quickly as it did.
Although superior air power and reconnaissance capability would have allowed the United States to detect and destroy many of Iraq's nuclear delivery systems, one or more of them could have remained hidden. Thus a lim- ited retaliatory threat would be credible while the costs of a coalition attack would have been significantly higher because of the level of uncertainty. However crude the bomb, Iraq would have retained a destructive capability sufficient to create panic in the population centres of its chief enemies in the Middle
East. Former United States Defense
Secretary
Les
Aspin sug- gested that
Congress
would not have approved war against Sad- dam nor would the United States have been able to put together a coalition if
Iraq
had possessed nuclear weapons in
1990.38
From this perspective, the effects of the attack on
Iraq's
nuclear facilities seem to be of short-term value for arresting the spread of nuclear weapons. Iraq may not be able to pursue its nuclear course for some time, but other candidates
-
Iran for instance
-
no doubt learned important lessons from the Gulf
War and its aftermath and perhaps have already decided to build nuclear weapons clandestinely. Acquisition of even a crude nuclear capability would probably prevent potential
37
'Saddam's nuclear secrets,' Newsweek, 7
October 1991, 34.
38 Aspin to the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, tederal
News Service, 18
February 1992, cited in
Igor Levin, 'Where have all the weapons gone?'
New York
University Journal of
International Law and Politics
2
4 (winter 1992) 961.
460
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
attacks by an adversary in a situation similar to that which con- fronted Iraq in 1991.
The
possible radioactive fall-out could be disastrous for crowded cities where most of the plants in the threshold states are situated. One estimate suggests that a mod- erate release from an 880 Mwe reactor could contaminate five hundred square miles while a major release could contaminate
3,000
to
5,000 square miles and the effects could last for dec- ades.39 The assumption that the target state would be sensitive to the possibility of nuclear contamination is problem-ridden. A regime with limited concern for public opinion might not view the threat of radiation as sufficient grounds for giving up its nuclear ambitions.
Several historical instances point toward the propensity of states to endure major casualties and the destruction of their economic and military capabilities in the face of a perceived attack on a core interest.
Despite
the possibility of preventive attacks, both the ussr and China developed nuclear weapons as a way of deterring and catching up with the increasingly pow- erful American nuclear forces.
Similarly,
threats of attacks by Egypt and India did not deter Israel and Pakistan, respectively, from developing nuclear weapons of their own.
Because it had not succeeded in assembling a workable bomb at the time of the preventive strikes against it, Iraq was a relatively easy target.
But it is highly unlikely that coercive tactics would succeed against a country that already possessed one or more hidden nuclear weapons. Coercive tactics against such a country would lack credibility.40 Threats of attack would not be easy to put into practice if the target state already possessed nuclear weapons because its response to attack would be highly unpredictable and the danger of escalation would be great. For
39
Cited in Bennett
Ramberg,
Nuclear
Energy
in war: The
Implications of
Israel's
Reactor Strike, AC IS
Working Paper, no 34, University of California, Los
Angeles,
Center for International and
Strategic
Affairs, August 1982, 3.
See
also
Ramberg,
Destruction of Nuclear
Energy
Facilities in War
(Lexington
ma:
Lexington
Books
1980).
40 George Quester, 'Reducing the incentives to proliferation,' Annals of the
American
Academy of
Political and Social Sciences, no
430 (March 1977), 70-81.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
46
1 example, a preventive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities could result in a conventional attack by the North against South
Korea. This would carry with it a high probability of United
States involvement and possible escalation into nuclear war.
Coercive tactics are also unlikely to be effective against more powerful regional states, such as Israel or India, whose defensive capabilities might be strong enough to thwart limited attacks on their facilities.
They might escalate the conflict by counter- attacking countries that supported the action. More impor- tantly, coercive strategies against large countries would serve merely to push them further toward open nuclear acquisition because they would see a strong nuclear weapons capability as the only deterrent. China is a case in point. United States nuclear threats and coercive behaviour in the
1950s, especially during the Korean War, provided a major incentive for China to build a nuclear bomb. The use of nuclear threats by the administration of
Dwight
D. Eisenhower to end the Korean War in 1953, the threats of massive retaliation by Secretary of State
John
Foster Dulles in Indochina in
1954,
and the introduction of Matador tactical nuclear missiles into Taiwan in
1957
all had a powerful impact on the Chinese decision to acquire nuclear weapons.41 In the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test, a
People's Daily editorial declared: 'It was the nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat of United States imperialism that compelled the Chinese people to rely on themselves and work hard to turn their coun- try into a mighty power
...
They have finally gained the means of resisting
u.s. nuclear threat.'42 In the case of India, some analysts argue that United States coercive efforts during the
Bangladesh
War in
1971, especially sending the Seventh Fleet to the
Bay
of
Bengal,
contributed to Prime Minister Indira Gan-
41 Jonathan
D. Pollack, 'China as a nuclear power,' in William Overholt, ed,
Asia's Nuclear Future (Boulder CO: Westview 1977), 38: John
Wilson Lewis and
Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford:
Stanford
University
Press
1988), esp. chap. 2.
42
Cited in Pollack, 'China as a nuclear power,' 38.
462
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
dhi's decision to go ahead with a nuclear test in the
Rajasthan
desert in 1
974-43
The United Nations
Investing
the United Nations
Security
Council with sanctioning power against violators of the non-proliferation regime seems to have many advantages over unilateral action. It could give international legitimacy to a sanctions policy and make it harder for neighbouring states to provide economic or military support to the state under sanctions.
Still, there are a number of prob- lems with this approach. Although the collective security pro- visions of the Charter could be broadened to incorporate contingencies involving new nuclear states, the United Nations has yet to develop the requisite military capacity or political will to impose a non-discriminatory nuclear ban.
Any country that acquires nuclear weapons could be a threat to the security of its neighbours, as well as to world peace. Thus, it should be prevented from possessing such weapons. Because the threat or use of force falls within the mandate of the United Nations, especially under its collective security responsibilities, it could be argued that non-proliferation is a United Nations responsi- bility. However, with a number of peacekeeping operations in existence, especially since the end of the Cold War, the United
Nations is stretched to its limits.
Developing
effective forces for nuclear non-proliferation purposes would put further heavy demands on that world body. 43 According to one analyst, if India had possessed nuclear weapons in
1971,
the United States would not have sent the USS
Enterprise
to the
Bay
of
Bengal
'in what appeared from New Delhi to constitute atomic gunboat diplomacy.'
K.
Subrahmanyam,
'India:
keeping the option open,' in Robert M. Lawrence and Joel
Larus, ed, Nuclear
Proliferation
Phase II (Lawrence: University
Press of
Kansas
1974),
122. The desire to preclude similar actions in the future by acquiring an independent nuclear capability has been pronounced in the
Indian nuclear weapons debate. For these strategic and political consid- erations, see T.V. Paul, Reaching for the Bomb: The Indo-Pak Nuclear Scenario
(New Delhi:
Dialogue
Publications
1984), 28-33;
Onkar Marwah, 'The non- proliferation policies of non-nuclear weapon states,' in David B. Dewitt, ed,
Nuclear
Non-proliferation and Global
Security (London: Croom Helm
1987),
105-18.
COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
463
Second, any attempt by the United Nations to focus on a few small and vulnerable countries, while ignoring a number of others, including the present five nuclear powers and the opaque states, would be tantamount to a new kind of 'atomic colonialism.' Any discriminatory order contains the seeds of its own destruction. Norms sustained over a long period often have to be non-discriminatory in application and beneficial to a large number of participants in some form or another.
Third, since the United Nations does not have the military force to implement a selective ban on nuclear acquisition, it might have to seek the help of one or more of the present nuclear powers, most likely the United States. A United Nations force drawn largely from the United States would result in fur- ther unfairness because
Washington
would have no incentive to employ coercive diplomacy against its allies or states with which it wanted to maintain friendly relations.
Fourth, the npt contains a provision which allows states to withdraw from it if their supreme national interests dictate that they do so.
Thus, in a strictly legal sense, any state can threaten to withdraw under this provision. North Korea is a case in point.44 CONCLUSIONS
By
the mid-1990s, nuclear proliferation was confined to a small group of middle ranking states engaged in protracted conflicts or on-going rivalries with their neighbours. If they fear that their conventional capability does not provide the necessary deter- rent, nuclear weapons could be an option. If they also fear that they could become targets of future interventions from outside powers, nuclear weapons could become attractive.
Regimes
that value nuclear arms for their own survival will not be easily deterred by economic sanctions.
44
One reason for North Korea's decision was the renewal of the 'Team
Spirit'
exercise between the United States and South Korea, which
Pyongyang
claimed was a 'nuclear war rehearsal threatening the dprk.' Letter from
North Korea's minister of foreign affairs to the president of the United
Nations
Security Council, reproduced in Arms Control
Today, April 1993,
22.
464
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Nonetheless, the threat of sanctions could raise the thresh- old of conditions necessary for a state to embrace a nuclear weapons programme.
If
security challenges are not intense, the benefits of nuclear acquisition would be minimal compared to the economic and political costs and the potential damage to reputations.
Sustained sanctions could also undermine the legit- imacy of a state's nuclear weapons programme.
International
efforts since the
1970s
have made it difficult for countries to declare their nuclear weapons programmes openly.
In
fact, non-proliferation has been slowly emerging as an area of international consensus, largely because of a tacit agree- ment among the major powers that violators of the npt are a challenge to their dominance of the international system. All great powers, including
China and France, have joined hands to maintain their systemic monopoly which satisfies one condi- tion of success for the regime, at least in the near term. None- theless, the overwhelming regional interests of one or more major powers could prevent a sanctions-based regime from emerging. China's refusal to join in sanctions against North
Korea or to stop supplying nuclear materials and missiles to
Pakistan, despite the threat of United States sanctions, is a prominent example.
The
difficulty in achieving consensus on punishing violations and obtaining compliance with npt norms is evident in the failure of various npt review conferences to deal with this issue.
Despite
their political appeal, coercive policies have serious limitations as a credible universal option to nuclear non-prolif- eration.
They
are highly context-dependent instruments, if and when they succeed. In the nuclear realm, coercion may be applied only to a state that has not yet assembled nuclear weap- ons. Even if such strategies, especially preventive attacks, work in the short run, in the long term they may increase the target state's determination to acquire nuclear weapons. State choices are heavily dependent on perceived security threats. If these considerations outweigh any potential benefits of compliance, states would pursue the nuclear route even after a preventive COERCIVE SANCTIONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION
465
attack takes place. Those who renounce the nuclear option because of such factors as
*
nuclear allergy* would do so without coercive threats. Limited coercive tactics may backfire and push a country further along the road to nuclear acquisition. More- over, until a non-discriminatory and universal regime can be devised, sanctions will remain political and economic tools in the hands of powerful states and would thus be imposed only selectively upon those states that are not allies. A non-discrimi- natory non-proliferation regime, based on universal member- ship and strong standards of compliance, could change this.
Major
and minor states would then have an equal interest in preventing the emergence of a nuclear renegade state, and both economic and military sanctions would become more effective.