Emotion has received a mixed reception within terrorism studies. This is partially due to the somewhat nebulous nature of emotion. As Smith notes, research into emotion is multifaceted and contested. Emotion is difficult to define and conceptualise, this challenge is exacerbated by the inability of the individual to convey their own emotional experiences. Additionally, limited contact with individuals involved in terrorism has meant scholars have had little chance to explore the concept at the source. Adding to this difficulty is what Cottee and Hayward call the “hardened empiricism of many terrorism scholars,” who would prefer to focus on other aspects of terrorism such organisational structure, tactics, and ideology.
This has led to the …show more content…
As Taylor and Horgan note, the “psychological and emotional context of the individual” resides at the heart of why an individual becomes involved in terrorism. Wright-Neville and Smith explore the role of intensifying feelings of rage and anger in leading to the adoption of alternate, violent forms of political agency. Similarly, Smith’s work with former IRA members demonstrated that the management of emotions (both positive and negative) was fundamental and crucial in the individual moving into and understanding the meaning of violent action. Stern and Post discuss the importance of humiliation and alienation, and hated, respectfully. Cottee and Hayward examine the emotional attractions of terrorism with a relatively unique focus on the felt phenomenological experience of individuals. They highlight the desire for excitement, meaning, and glory with how it feels to be involved in terrorism, explaining that this felt experience is a fundamental aspect of an individual’s agency and decision to become …show more content…
Bartlett and Miller describe this in their study of violent and non-violent radicalisation when they note that, “For many people violent Jihad is about emotion—not intellect or reasoning.” Some have attempted to minimise emotion and irrationality in their profiles of terrorists. Often, this is to counteract societal ideas of lone actor terrorists as “crazy” and unbalanced. Hoffman remarks that he is “struck by how disturbingly “normal” most terrorists seem… rather than the wild-eyed fanatics or crazed killers that we have been conditioned to expect.” Instead, according to Hoffman, terrorism is an entirely rational choice. Feldman provides another example of this view, noting that lone actor terrorists are “unlike “emotional” mass murderers,” in that they are “calculating, determined [and] “rational”.” In both excerpts, the possibility that emotion and reason co-exist is minimised – the instrumentality of the terrorist is highlighted. Smith articulates a more nuanced view, arguing against an emotional/intellectual duality, noting that that that emotions and cognition are intertwined in the creation of a world-view that supports extremist violent action. Additionally, as Baele’s previously mentioned study found, lone actor terrorists who wrote manifestos displayed both high-anger and high-cognitive