The Evolution of Intelligence in the United States
John Doe
Utica University

The Evolution of Intelligence in the United States
The beginning of intelligence in the United States dates back to the Revolutionary War and America’s first president, George Washington. President Washington requested that Congress set aside a ‘secret service fund’ for clandestine and secret activities (Revolutionary Ideas, 2007). After leading the Continental Army during the war, he knew how important it was to have secret agencies analyze and protect the new country. The use of secret agents, counterintelligence, and the clandestine paramilitary, have been used extensively to set up elaborate deceptions, gather sensitive information, and coordinate operations to cause sabotage towards other adversaries or countries that wished to cause us harm throughout the history of our country (Revolutionary Ideas, 2007). Although President Washington set a growing foundation of creating and fostering the need and use of foreign intelligence, it was President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) that helped combined the efforts of the state and war departments to coordinate efforts on a combined government-wide level (History of the CIA, 2007). The events of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 prompted FDR to make a change to all government intelligence. FDR asked World War I veteran William J. Donovan to draft a new plan for an intelligence service that would combine all those departments’ efforts and make sure they were on the same levels of communication (History of the CIA, 2007). Donovan became the new Coordinator of Information (COI). This was the United States’ first peacetime, non-departmental intelligence organization. It was called the Office of Strategic Services, or, OSS.
World War II changed some of OSS’s original abilities and strategic operations. When the war started, OSS was supplying policy makers with intelligence that helped the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military advisors in strategic war planning. It also shared their jurisdiction with the FBI. After the war, all of the OSS’s analysis and collection and counterintelligence services were transferred back to the State and War departments while it was being reduced to a much smaller scale (War Changes the Plan, 2007).
A few years after the reduction of the OSS, President Harry S. Truman wanted a new and more organized intelligence agency. The threat of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States was starting to intensely grow and weighed heavily on both sides of the world. With the help of his top advisors, President Truman put through from Congress the National Security Act of 1947, which enacted the development of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC). Unfortunately, over the years, there have been several problems in the CIA from 1947 through the present. Two studies in particular that brought attention to such matters were the 1949 Dulles Report and the 1971 Schlesinger Report, which were both sponsored by the National Security Council. In the 1949 Dulles Report was created due to a ‘warning failure’ eighteen months at the outset of the Korean War. The new director of DCI, Lt. Gen Walter Bedell Smith, used this report to create new offices of current intelligence and research areas, and then also took control of the Agency’s expanding covert action campaign (Walter & McDonald, 2005). In the 1971 Schlesinger Report showed then President Nixon that a manager was needed to help plan and reduce intelligence collection and evaluate the work that was done.
This work was desperately needed to be accomplished in the Defense Department and all across the intelligence community. Mr. Schlesinger noted that the intelligence community needed to show an appropriate improvement in the quality of its intelligence gathering and the overall quantity of intelligence products (Walter & McDonald, 2005). The result of these reports were a new manager position was created as a result of the Dulles report. This new manager helped shaped the intelligence community into a recognizable and respected community of professionals. After the 1974 Watergate scandal and President Nixon’s resignation, the Schlesinger Report became standard. The changes included were the creation of a staff to help the DCI manage “Community Affairs”, and the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Walter & McDonald, 2005).
A recent and final issue that was studied was by the 9/11 Commission which was established after September 11, 2011. The commission report recommended the splitting up of the DCI’s duties between the Intelligence Community Chief and the director of the CIA. The biggest change from the commission was to enact the “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act” in December 2004 (Walter & McDonald, 2005). These changes took place during public hearings in the midst of an election season (2004), and the 9/11 Commission’s study had an even greater impact towards the positive changes, and was more powerful in prompting these changes within the CIA (Walter & McDonald, 2005).
The 9/11 Commission Report was published at the height of the debate on the War on Terror and the Iraqi operations, which served to magnify and identify the necessity of continued support for intelligence. (Walter & McDonald, 2005). Since then, a trend has emerged and is evident. Studies whose recommendations have caused power in the Intelligence Community to gravitate toward either the Director of Central Intelligence or the Office of the Secretary of Defense or both have generally had the most influence. By 2004, The Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act helped to correct this issue. History has shown that when a new pattern of influence and cooperation forms, it is inevitable that future reform surveys will not hesitate to promote new ways of improvement in the agency (Walter & McDonald, 2005). All new departments have many learning curves and growing pains as a department or agency grows. As a result the agency grew and got much stronger throughout the years.
Intelligence plays a key role in the cyber realm of today’s world. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta mentioned several things in his speech in January 9, 2012 to the nation about our military’s direction… “It must be complemented by the full range of America's national security capabilities - strong intelligence, strong diplomacy, a strong economy, strong technology, developments in cyber capabilities" (Coleman, 2012). As a result of this speech, the U.S. military is going to undergo a huge change, due to budget cuts, for the future (Coleman, 2012). There are five specific areas that were identified in this speech. One of the biggest areas is cyber intelligence. This will comprise of 45% of intelligence and analysis in the cyber realm. As for total cyber capabilities, 100% of this is cyber offensive, defensive and intelligence systems and enablement (Coleman, 2012). Defense Secretary Panetta also emphasized that there are adversaries and cyber enemies that are more than capable of bringing down our government and computer networks in our country. Panetta stated, “to paralyze our financial system in this country will virtually paralyze our country, he said--then it's clearer why cyber funding faired so well!” (Coleman, 2012). The most significant aspect of Panetta’s speech is the result of an enhanced role of cybersecurity for our future, of which cyber intelligence is clearly a major part. If our intelligence does not keep up with the times, then our country will surely falter within the vital area of national security. The United States must adapt our military and civilian counterparts in cybersecurity and cyber intelligence capabilities in order to survive as a superpower for the 21st century.
Sherman Kent’s Analytic Doctrine is an understood step in developing proper intelligence analysis in our country’s intelligence agencies. Applying and implementing all ideas and items from this doctrine is not only logical, but necessary as well in cyber intelligence in modern times. Two of Kent’s analytic doctrine items stand out as a must for proper use in cybersecurity and cyber intelligence, which are the avoidance of a personal policy agenda, and a willingness to consider other judgments. In standard intelligence analysis, an examiner must not have a personal agenda, or any biases, or personal judgments when analyzing important forensic evidence. In cyber intelligence, this also holds true to form. Collecting analysis information in cyber form, if done properly, requires all policy players to be involved (Bardin, 2011). No one policy maker can force their views or any other policy makers’ views. Paying attention to all sides and all outcomes is the norm and not the latter. Avoidance of personal policy agendas also requires evaluating all alternative analytical possibilities, and then the policy clients have the ultimate responsibility to recommend and choose which policies are best (Bardin, 2011). Such viewpoints, approaches, and procedures are standard in Sherman Kent’s doctrine. One must maintain an objective mindset by considering other judgments and viewpoints. Maintaining objective viewpoints when analyzing data or information for cyber intelligence purposes can be difficult. During Mr. Kent’s CIA tenure, there were no electronic devices or computers for coordination and review. The only way to compare and contrast data and information was through assembling twenty to thirty analysts in a single room. Many of the analysts’ ideas, facts, and all points of view would clash and ponder with one another (Bardin, 2011). Assembling many analysts is still used today, but in our cyber-world we have every analyst with one, two, or more computers that are used for comparing analysis, research and checking background information etc. This cuts the work load to less than half the amount of time than it did fifty or more years ago. Now, for an analyst to examine other expert opinions and different judgments is only a mouse click away. Having a full arsenal of huge computer servers allows many analysts to cross reference one another at light speed and allows others to learn different things about conclusions of any previous analyses and drafts. Examining multiple drafts of papers and conclusions from others makes the life of a cyber intelligence analyst job easier than ever before. Several competing hypotheses can be used for cross referencing on several databases at the same time. This improves the cyber intelligence analyses for all computer forensic scientists around the world as it had in pre-computer standard intelligence times. The use of electronic devices and computers lets examiners use thousands of archives to find prior analysis work and research. This has made researching easier for current computer forensic analysts.
Ad hoc, or ‘unplanned’ activities, are activities that are created ‘on they fly’ during a project plan (Aquila, 2010), and are used without changing the project plan. Ad hoc plans are the standard used every day in the computer and business intelligence world. In the business world, the design answers a single and specific business question. The ad hoc analysis is typically a statistical model, analytic report or a type of data summary (ad hoc analysis, 2012). It is important to point out that these tasks are never ‘planned’ out from the beginning. Visualization is the key to ad hocs while in the project plan (standard or intelligence) and the user who is linked to the assigned resource can track actual time and costs for the task (Aquila, 2010). Ad hoc analysis suits well in cyber intelligence too. An ad hoc’s purpose is to fill in the gaps from previous analyses or regular reporting. Since there are many gaps in intelligence analyses during normal reporting using the ‘ad hoc’ has the advantages of either creating reports that does not already exist, or, ad hoc’s can dig deeper in previous transactions, reports or intelligence records (ad hoc analysis, 2012). Ad hoc is a very useful tool in the intellectual world in cyber intelligence and will only give advantages to forensic examiners in their everyday jobs. A Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) is defined as, “Domain of essential information, mastery over which is required for success in a field or profession” (Common Body of Knowledge, 2012). The cyber intelligence realm needs A CBK designed and maintained. One point of reference for a CBK in cyber intelligence should be based on Sherman Kent’s Analytic nine step doctrine. It is important to follow Kent’s doctrine making sure to avoid all types of biases and for all CBK designers to listen to all points of views and judgments. For a CBK in cyber intelligence to be successful there must be multiple opinions and theories from all current cyber intelligence professionals. There should be without question all types of intelligence literature, certification requirements and methodology standards established. Following the standards from the fields of medicine, legal and library science are examples of how to approach establishing requirements for a CBK in cyber intelligence (George & Bruce , 2008) For a CBK to succeed in cyber intelligence it must rely on future practicing professionals’ demands and their commitments to the cybersecurity of our world.
Conclusion
The evolution of the U.S. intelligence and its agencies is a very important and active part of our country’s history and dates back our country’s origins. Our first President George Washington saw the need for a foreign intelligence service and he asked congress to create an intelligence information gathering service to help protect our country’s interest. The U.S. government intelligence agencies learned from vital mistakes from such wars as the Korean War, World War II and the attacks of 9/11. The Korean War set in motion for congress in accepting the 1949 Dulles Report. The Dulles report enabled the creation of new positions in intelligence and research areas. In addition, a new covert action campaign was taken over and upgraded. The 1971 Schlesinger Reports showed that a manager needed to reduce intelligence collection and evaluate the completed work. By this time in our country’s intelligence agencies, the quality of intelligence became more important than quantity. The events of September 11, 2001 prompted the creation of the 9/11 commission. This commission resulted in the splitting up of DCI’s duties between the Intelligence Community Chief and the director of the CIA. Intelligence plays a key role in the new realm of cyber intelligence. Cyber capabilities (to include cyber intelligence) will comprise 45% of all intelligence and analysis in the cyber world of security. Two of Sherman Kent’s Analytic Doctrine steps applies well to cyber intelligence. They are the avoidance of a personal policy agenda and a willingness to consider other judgments when interpreting intelligence and analyzing evidence. Ad hoc activities are ‘unplanned’ activities created ‘on the fly’ during a project plan. Ad hoc’s purpose is to fill in the gaps from previous analyses or regular reporting. Finally, a Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) is important for cyber intelligence in developing cyber intelligence literature, certification requirements and methodology standards in the new areas of cyber intelligence. Our country would not be an independent and sovereign country today without the bravery and persistence of our first leaders in our democracy’s beginning in the intelligence field. The U.S. has grown significantly since its infancy. To maintain our superpower status we must continue to grow in all areas of intelligence and our government’s laws will grant changes to meet those needs during modern times.

References
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