The Balkan Crisis represents a series of tensions in the region that arose, in part, due to the decline of the Ottoman regime in Europe. This culminated in the 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Wars preceding World War I. While not directly causing WWI, these events laid the foundations for disputes amongst the Great Powers as well as solidifying the existing Bismarckian alliance system. Furthermore, the competing nationalistic interests manifested themselves in the Balkan Wars which were largely a war for control of Macedonia, under the guise of liberation from Ottoman rule. The role of nationalism was not the traditionally espoused Serbian aggression, but political elites in all European states using nationalism as a vehicle to manipulate their populations. The Balkan Wars deserve study because they show the burgeoning role of nationalism in European politics and set the precedent for events that unfolded later in the twentieth century.

Historians often attribute nationalism as one of the major causative factors WWI. This statement cannot be blindly accepted because although nationalism is clearly one of the dominant trends of the twentieth century, it was still in its infancy before WWI. The decision to go to war is decided by rulers, not at least initially by the populace. Therefore, nationalism is worthy of definition, especially with respect to a region as complex as the Balkans, where these issues are still a problem today. Although a myriad of definitions of nationalism could be given, a useful starting point would be to suggest that people who share a common culture, language and ethnicity live together in a state where sovereignty resides in the people. Nationalism often leads to the idea that a nation has a claim to land which is sacred and non-transferable. This is demonstrated in the aggressive policy of French Revanchism in the Third Republic aggressively seeking an alliance with Russia, and ties in to the central tenet of this essay. That is, the Balkan Wars were a three way nationalistic, propaganda-driven conflict to control Macedonia, where Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria all claimed a right to Macedonia on the basis of historical arguments. As Hale succinctly surmised, “Nationalism is most frequently cited as a force impelling Europe towards war in 1914.”
The issue of nationalism is particularly complicated in a region like the Balkans due to its history and geography. The alluvial plains along the river basins and maritime coastlands fostered contacts with both the east and west, whilst communities in the rugged terrain of the Dinaric highlands have had a tendency toward cultural isolationism. Consequently, the Balkans has always been politically and culturally heterogeneous. However, the advent of Ottoman rule eradicated the existing political structure, instead imposing the religious “millet system”. Hence, the period of the Balkan Crisis illustrates a growing ethnic identity, or what has been termed a “re-awakening” of the populace, to gradually replace the imposed religious identity people held. That said, the “Macedonian Question” was a particularly important issue for the nationalistic governments in Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. To gain support of the natives who were ethnically diverse, they mobilised mass propaganda and terrorism, from the viewpoint of linguistic, cultural or religious affinity, which the new monarchies aimed to share with the heterogeneous, yet largely parochially minded Macedonian population. This Balkan scenario was coupled with a complicated system of alliances and self interest amongst the European “Great Powers”. Certainly the Russian Empire had particular interest in the region for a long time, and had been frustrated by the western powers’ insistence on propping up the decrepit Ottoman Empire. Russia’s self-interest was promoted by both real, and an apparent, atmosphere of Pan-Slavism amongst the Slavs, who formed the ethno-linguistic majority in the Balkans. The Russian cause was furthered by their image as the Champions of Orthodoxy, thereby attempting to extend influence to Romania and Greece, and the modelling of Moscow as a “Third Rome”. In direct opposition to this was the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had a long established hegemony over Croatia and Slovenia, and wished to expand its influence in the region, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina to replace the “old, sick” Turkish rule. This also put Austria at odds with its former, albeit intermittent ally, Serbia. The new kingdom believed that all southern Slavs should be independent of foreign rule and united as one, Serb-led, country. Austria-Hungary’s ally had little interest in the region, however, its ultra-militaristic and nationalistic regimen viewed war as a necessity. Concurrently, it has been argued, the Third French Republic’s anti-German education system was geared towards indoctrinating an entire generation ready to fight and regain Alsace-Lorraine, which was lost in humiliating fashion during the Franco-Prussian War. The effect of all these various nationalistic drives is that by 1914 the stage for war was set in the “powder keg of Europe”. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand gave the excuse Germany was looking for to go to war. Germany prompted Austria to give Serbia an unacceptable ultimatum.

The Austrian chancellor Metternich, while often criticised for his overt imperialism, illustrated the problems with nationalism in statements such as “Italy is a geographical expression” and “what are the Greeks?” Nationality cannot easily be defined because the language people speak can be liable to change in the span of a single generation, the religion of a region is determined by its local ruler, and there is a large presence of various nationalities in the Balkans. Therefore, in Macedonia, three competing states argued for the annexation of Macedonia on the basis of cultural, historical, linguistic or religious ties. What conclusion can be drawn from this? At its core, nationalism is what people aspire to be. While this may seem controversial, it is essentially the case in the Balkans where an “ignorant and illiterate” peasantry owed loyalty to their local church and chief on the basis of their millet system. Only later was nationalism imposed from above by politicians or powerbrokers. As such, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, politicians from Croatia told Catholics to aspire to Croatian national identity, and the Kingdom of Serbia incited nationalism in the Orthodox population, but the large majority of Muslims did not aspire to any identity at that stage. So while the Bulgarians claimed Macedonia on the basis that it was once the heartland of a Bulgarian Empire, the Serbs claimed linguistic and ethnic affinity, and the Greeks drew on the Ancient rule of Alexander the Great in the region. On the basis of irredentist claims, an interesting situation presents, whereby Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek governments created a “three-way propaganda contest through churches and schools to take control of the thoughts of the Macedonian people.”

The Balkan Wars set the precedent in the twentieth century for “massive wars and ethnic cleansing,” highlighting the extent to which nationalism played a role in fuelling WWI. The nature of the Balkan Wars is best illustrated by Grey’s quote, “The war began as a ‘war of liberation,’ it became a ‘war of annexation,’ and ended as a ‘war of extermination.’” The Balkan states were already autonomous by the advent of the Balkan Wars, but the political power-brokers in each state incited nationalism in their subjects on “justified hatred of the age old Turkish oppressor,” in order to mobilise for war. So the traditional view that the inhabitants of the Balkans were “inherently belligerent” or possessing “age-old hatreds” is somewhat questionable. However, the political elite in the Balkan states had aggressive nationalistic policies of territorial expansion and viewed the Balkan Wars as pre-empting Habsburg expansion in the region. The first Balkan War led to the rapid defeat of Turkey in Europe. However, the Balkan League broke down soon after into the second Balkan War when Serbia and Greece made a secret treaty depriving Bulgaria of Macedonia, with Serbia claiming all of Northern Macedonia, having been deprived of Albania by Austria. Having acquired Northern Macedonia, the Serbs began to “inculcate national values in the population”.
Having discussed the Balkan Wars, it would not be unreasonable to assume the Balkan problems were resolved amongst the Balkan States. However, a few important issues remained. Firstly, the Balkan Wars helped revive the Concert of Europe in that Great Power approval was needed to establish new states. This helped bring in Austria and Russia in opposing camps, with Austria ironically wanting an independent Albania to cut Serbia off from the coast, whereas Russia desired a friendly warm-water port which Serbia would undoubtedly provide to its Slavic brethren. This helped solidify to Balance of Power which is so often cited as one of the causes of WWI. Secondly there was still the issue that Serbia the Kingdom did not include all Serbs in the Balkans. The Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia was a source of ire to the Serbian Kingdom which espoused the loyalty of the significant Serb population in Bosnia, and the Muslims who were viewed as “Islamicised Serbs.” It is important to recognise that, in hindsight, the Serbs were not overly aggressive but merely operated in “framework of adopted Western European nation-state nationalism,” and as such, sought to unify all Serbs into a “Greater Serbia.”

As a result the Serbian government incited nationalism in the Bosnian Serbs. The fitting quote from the Serbian foreign minister Milovanovitch that “Austria-Hungary is not a fatherland but rather a prison of numerous nationalities all panting to escape” encapsulates the atmosphere of nationalism in Bosnia at the time. Now, to suggest that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand caused WWI is highly simplistic as monarchs were frequently assassinated without major reprisals. The issue of German aggression has to be taken into account. It is inarguable that the rapidly empowered German state was agitating for a war, seen through German General Moltke’s “the sooner the better,” referring to war. Whether or not this was in response to aggressive French Revanchism is debatable. However, even though the Germans did issue the oft-quoted “blank cheque” to Austria-Hungary, it seems that none of the Great Powers “wanted war” on the enormous scale that the Alliance system made possible. The great irony that historians have struggled with is why the system which prevented war for so long and gave Europe remarkable stability broke down so tragically. The traditional answer was that the Balkans consisted of aggressive and militant nationalistic groups all vying for supremacy, whereas the explanation that the region was merely the next stage on which the Great Powers enacted their various ambitions is more plausible.

It is evident that nationalism is a major force of the twentieth century. Often, nationalism is the cited as the one major factor that caused WWI. In fact, it is the overarching thread that ties together events in the Balkan Crisis, both with regard to the actions of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians, and the Great Powers. What started as newly independent states naturally wishing to extend their influence drew in the reluctant involvement of Powers such as Austria-Hungary and Russia who wanted to extend their respective spheres of influence. Ironically, while these two Powers strongly desired to avoid war, they were joined in alliances by two countries in an embittered territorial dispute of their own, namely Germany and France. Hence, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the stage was set for war on an unprecedented scale.

Bibliography:

Bax, Mart, ‘ “Stagnating Identification & Violence”: A Case Study in the local sources of The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Anthropological Quarterly, 70, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 11-19

Blank, T. & Scmidt, P., ‘ “National Idenitity in a United Germany”: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Respresentative Data’, Political Psychology, 24, no. 2 (2003), pp. 89-96.

Danforth, Loring, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.28.

Farrar, Larry, ‘ “Aggression versus Apathy”: The Limits of Nationalism during the Balkan Wars’, East European Quarterly, 38, no. 3 (September 2003), pp. 257-280.

Friend, Julius, The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990 (New York: Praeger Publications, 1991), p. 61.

Gerolymatos, Andre, The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the twentieth century and beyond (New York, Basic Books, 2002), p.123.

Hale, Oron, The Great Illusion 1900-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.11.

Howard, Michael, ‘ “The Great War”: Mystery or error?’, The National Interest, 64, Summer 2001, pp. 78-85.

Hupchick, Dennis, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.125.

Martin, Janet, Medieval Russia: 980-1584 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.264.

Milich, Peter, Cumulative Slavicity: Cultural Interaction and Language Replacement in the North Balkans during the Slavic Migration Period, AD500-900 (Cleveland: Ohio University Press, 2005), p.11.

Ortakovski, Vladimir, Minorities in the Balkans (New York: Transnational Publications, 2000), p.53.

Petrovich, Michael, A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918, Volume II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p.601.

Simpson, W. & Jones, M., Europe, 1783-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2000), p.234.

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[ 2 ]. Mart Bax, ‘ “Stagnating Identification & Violence”: A Case Study in the local sources of The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Anthropological Quarterly, 70, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 11-19.
[ 3 ]. Thomas Blank & Peter Schmidt, ‘ “National Idenitity in a United Germany”: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Respresentative Data’, Political Psychology, 24, no. 2 (2003), pp. 89-96.
[ 4 ]. Julius W. Friend, The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990 (New York: Praeger Publications, 1991), p. 61.
[ 5 ]. Oron J. Hale, The Great Illusion 1900-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.11.
[ 6 ]. Peter Milich, Cumulative Slavicity: Cultural Interaction and Language Replacement in the North Balkans during the Slavic Migration Period, AD500-900 (Cleveland: Ohio University Press, 2005), p.11.
[ 7 ]. Dennis P. Hupchick, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.125.
[ 8 ]. Vladimir Ortakovski, Minorities in the Balkans (New York: Transnational Publications, 2000), p.53.
[ 9 ]. Michael Petrovich,, A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918, Volume II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p.601.
[ 10 ]. Janet Martin, Medieval Russia: 980-1584 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.264.
[ 11 ]. Hupchick, The Balkans, p.314
[ 12 ]. William Simpson & Martin Jones, Europe, 1783-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2000), p.234.
[ 13 ]. Andre Gerolymatos, The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the twentieth century and beyond (New York, Basic Books, 2002), p.123.
[ 14 ]. As cited Simpson & Jones, Europe, p.152.
[ 15 ]. Hupchick, The Balkans, p.297.
[ 16 ]. Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.28.
[ 17 ]. Larry L. Farrar, ‘ “Aggression versus Apathy”: The Limits of Nationalism during the Balkan Wars’, East European Quarterly, 38, no. 3 (September 2003), pp. 257-280.
[ 18 ]. Hupchick, The Balkans, p.619
[ 19 ]. Farrar, ‘ “Aggression versus Apathy”, p. 263.
[ 20 ]. Michael Howard, ‘ “The Great War”: Mystery or error?’, The National Interest, 64, Summer 2001, pp. 78-85.
[ 21 ]. Hupchick, The Balkans, p. 296.
[ 22 ]. As cited in Simpson & Jones, Europe, p. 382
[ 23 ]. Simpson & Jones, Europe, p.358.