come more territorial, whereas the conflicts in the Pacific are likely to challenge the entire state and thus come to concern governance at large (Fiji, Solomon Islands). Fearon (2004; 2005) helps us to understand the dynamics of these wars. He notes that many of the longest civil wars of the world take place in the context of “sons-of-the-soil” disputes. The hallmarks of these wars are that they are protracted, low in intensity, fought between a government and a peripheral ethnic group seeking autonomy or secession, and the rebels do not view the government as a credible partner in peace talks.

Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific Table 1 The territorial wars in Southeast Asia and South Pacific, 1960–2005 Territory Insurgents Start date 5 August 1950 1 January 1965 Episode start 5 August 1950 31 December 1965 1 January 1967 1 January 1976 7 December 1975 7 December 1975 1 January 1992 1 January 1997 1 May 1989 1 January 1963 1 January 1948 8 September 1990 8 January 1999 1 January 1963 31 December 1948 27 January 1995 1 January 1997 12 April 2005 1 January 1948 1 January 1948 29 December 1991 1 January 1994 1 January 1958 31 December 1948 27 March 1990 23 December 1996 1 January 1949 1 January 1957 Episode end

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South Moluccas Republic of South Moluccas West Papua West Papua West Papua East Timor East Timor East Timor Aceh Aceh North Borneo Karen Karen Karen Karen Arakan Arakan Arakan Mon Mon Mon Kachin Kachin Karenni Karenni Karenni Karenni Shan OPM OPM OPM Fretilin Fretilin Fretilin GAM GAM CCO God’s army, KNU God’s army, KNU God’s army, KNU God’s army, KNU Arakan Insurgents, ARIF, RSO Arakan Insurgents, ARIF, RSO Arakan Insurgents, ARIF, RSO Various Insurgents, NMSP, BMA Various Insurgents, NMSP, BMA Various Insurgents, NMSP, BMA PNDF, KIO PNDF, KIO KNPP KNPP KNPP KNPP SSA, SSIA, PSLO, SSNPLO, SSRA, MTA, SSA/s SSA, SSIA, PSLO, SSNPLO, SSRA, MTA, SSA/s SSA, SSIA, PSLO, SSNPLO, SSRA, MTA, SSA/s SSA, SSIA, PSLO, SSNPLO, SSRA, MTA, SSA/s

15 November 1950 31 December 1965 31 December 1969 31 December 1978 31 December 1989 31 December 1992 31 December 1998 31 July 1991 15 August 2005 31 December 1966 28 April 1992 31 December 1995 31 December 2003 Ongoing 31 December 1988 31 December 1992 31 December 1994 31 December 1963 31 December 1990 31 December 1996

15 November 1949 31 December 1949 31 December 1961 1 January 1957 1 January 1992 1 January 1996 16 January 2005 1 October 1992 31 December 1957 31 December 1992 31 December 1996 Ongoing 31 December 1970

1 January 1960

1 January 1960

Shan

1 January 1976

31 December 1988

Shan

1 January 1993

31 December 2002

Shan

27 December 2005

Ongoing

250 Table 1 (continued) Territory Wa Bougainville Bougainville Mindanao Mindanao Patani Insurgents UWSA BRA BRA MIM, MILF, MNLF, 20 August 1970 MNLF faction, ASG MIM, MILF, MNLF, MNLF faction, ASG Patani insurgents 1 January 1965 Start date 1 March 1997 28 October 1989 Episode start 16 March 1997 28 October 1989 1 February 1992 20 August 1970 1 January 1993 25 October 2003

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Episode end 31 December 1997 31 December 1990 31 December 1996 31 December 1990 Ongoing Ongoing

There are two other important conflicts in the region. The territorial conflict in New Caledonia resulted in 23 deaths in 1988 (MacLellan 2007, 130–131). There was conflict in Solomon Islands (1998–2003) between nonstate actors resulting in some 150 deaths (Moore 2007, 169–171). These conflicts are not part of our analysis as they were not contested by a sovereign government and rebels. When exact days are not known January 1 is used as start day and episode start and December 31 as episode end. Source: UCDP conflict termination data OPM, Organisesi Papua Merdeka, CCO Clandestine Communist Organization, KNU Karen National Union, ARIF Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front, RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organization, NMSP New Mon State Party, BMA Beik Mon Army, PNDF Pawngywng National Defense Force, KIO Kachin Independence Organization, KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party, SSIA Shan State Independence Army, SSA Shan State Army, SSNPLO Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization, SSRA Shan State Revolutionary Army, MTA Mong Tai Army, PSLO Palung State Liberation Organization, UWSA United Wa State Army, BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army, ASG Abu Sayyaf Group, MIM Muslim Independence Movement

This seems to be the story of many of the territorial disputes in Southeast Asia. In fact, it suggests that the very strength of the regimes may make challenges directly against the central government more unlikely to succeed, but at the same makes territorially based rebel movements more sustainable. The presence of natural resources can stoke the flames of the wars if the ethnic group perceives ownership to the resource in question. Natural resources have played varied role in the wars of the region. Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge helped finance its operations through the sale of contraband timber and gems. However, it did not turn its conflict into a territorial one, although it sustained itself for a decade and a half in areas with such resources. Ethnic armies in Burma have secured funding through the sale of timber, gems, and illicit drugs (see Fearon 2004; Sherman 2003). In Aceh, one of the motivations for the secessionist conflict is the promise of future wealth from the natural gas deposits in the region. There is also some indication that natural gas reserves indirectly played a role in the onset of the fighting in 1976 as a founder of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM; Hasan di Tiro) was turned down in favor of the multinational Bechtel company for pipeline contract work in 1974 (Huber 2004, 13). In West Papua (Indonesia) and Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), mining of copper and gold has coincided with conflict; however, the casual link in these cases is complicated. In Bougainville, the Panguna copper mine complicated land tenure and ownership patterns and thus provided a formative grievance to the Bougainville Resistance Army (Regan 2007).

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Whereas recent peace processes in Papua New Guinea and Aceh provide hope, the conflict in Thailand increasingly appears to be yet another classic sons-of-the-soil war in the region. The government has carried out policies of assimilation in the south, has reduced autonomy for the region, and tries to reassert its authority. The rebels of southern Thailand do not trust the government to negotiate as a credible partner in negotiations (Vatikiotis 2006).

The peace efforts There have not been many peace agreements signed in the two regions. The UCDP conflict database only includes seven and they concern three of the 15 territories. These are listed in Table 2 below. Thus, the general picture is confirmed. The regions lack experiences in peaceful conflict resolution. A review shows that the Aceh accord in 2005 is an exception and, thus, relevant for other possible peace processes involving territorial issues. The first Aceh agreement between the GAM rebels and the Indonesian government was the result of negotiations with the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC). It stipulated a ceasefire and phased disarmament and demobilization program. The parties also agreed to have further negotiations and an international monitoring committee was established to oversee this process. It fell apart but new efforts were undertaken, this time by The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), founded by the former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari. The second agreement was a comprehensive accord signed in Helsinki, Finland and stipulated among other things the demobilization, disbandment, and reintegration of GAM’s troops. It also restricted the presence of government troops in the region. The territorial incompatibility was regulated through an agreement on self-governance (“special autonomy”) for Aceh (Kivimäki and Gorman 2008). Three peace agreements that concerned the Bougainville conflict in Papua New Guinea were signed between 1991 and 2001, following the short-lived cease-fire agreement in 1990 (Wallensteen 2009). The Honiara Declaration in 1991 specified an end to conflict activity but did not determine the outcome of the incompatibility. The agreement included phased arrangements for the restoration of services on Bougainville and was supposed to take 3 years, with reviews every 6 months. The agreement only lasted a month. The second agreement was signed 3 years later but was also quickly terminated. The third and, hopefully, the last one signed in Papua New Guinea in 2001 was the most ambitious one and dealt with short- and long-term issues. The army was to withdraw from Bougainville and a high level of autonomy for the region of Bougainville would be created. The long-term political status of Bougainville would be solved through a referendum 10–15 years after the election of the first autonomous Bougainville administration. The accords that attempt to regulate the Mindanao conflict have not include all parties to the conflict, as some rebel groups did not participate. The comprehensive agreement, sometimes called the Jakarta Accord, was signed in 1996 by the government and the rebel group Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). It did not include a formal ceasefire but regulated the incompatibility in two phases: First resulting in a special zone in order to transfer funds to the conflict affected area, later

252 Table 2 Peace agreements and mediation in territorial civil wars since 1989 1. Indonesia (Aceh) Date signed Scope Provisions Third party 2. Indonesia (Aceh) Date signed Scope Provisions Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement 9 December 2002 Partial peace agreement

P. Wallensteen et al.

Ceasefire, DDR, local governance, further negotiations and talks Mediated by Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement 15 August 2005 Full peace agreement Ceasefire, DDR, elections, cultural concessions, local governance, amnesty, prisoner release, reconciliation, implementation commission, autonomy, political parties Mediated by a Finnish NGO (CMI) led by former President Martti Ahtisaari; also mentioned EU and ASEAN The Honiara Declaration 21 January 1991 Peace process agreement Ceasefire, DDR, amnesty, prisoner release, outline of peace process, implementation commission, further negotiations and talks Mediated by Solomon Islands, SPCC and SI Christian Association Honiara Commitments to Peace 3 September 1994 Peace process agreement Ceasefire, further negotiations and talks, peacekeepers Mediated by Solomon Islands Bougainville Peace Agreement 30 August 2001 Full peace agreement Ceasefire, DDR, interim government, autonomy, referendum, amnesty, reconciliation, reaffirmation of previous agreement, peacekeepers Mediated by New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, UNOMB Mindanao Final Agreement 9 February 1996 Full peace agreement; dyadic (GRP-MNLF) Integration into army, DDR, referendum, cultural concessions, reaffirmation of previous agreement Mediated by OIC and OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six (Libya, Bangladesh, Senegal, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia) Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 22 January 2001 Peace process agreement; dyadic (GRP-MILF)

Third party 3. Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) Date signed Scope Provisions Third party 4. Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) Date signed Scope Provisions Third party 5. Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) Date signed Scope Provisions Third party 6. Philippines (Mindanao) Date signed Scope Provisions Third party 7. Philippines (Mindanao) Date signed Scope

Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific Table 2 (continued) Provisions Third parties

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Ceasefire, reaffirmation of previous agreement, return of refugees, outline of peace process, implementation commission, outstanding issues spelled out Facilitated by Malaysia, Muammar Gaddafi, Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations

Not included here (for reasons described in previous footnote) are the Townsville peace agreement in the Solomon Islands of 2000 (Moore 2007, 174) and the Matignon (1988) and Noumea (1998) accords in New Caledonia (de Deckker 2007, 116–117). The 1999 agreement regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese through a Direct Ballot between Indonesia and Portugal is not included as it was signed between Indonesian government and Portugal. The FRETILIN rebels were not parties and did not sign. Source: Harbom et al. (2006)

turning into an autonomous region. The 2001 agreement was signed by the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebels and was not as ambitious. It urged the parties to end armed hostilities and to pursue peace talks toward finding a peaceful resolution to the Mindanao problem. The seven agreements are all concluded by governments which exhibit a relatively high degree of democratic credentials. None was on the brink of failure; instead, they were surprisingly entrenched, as democracies: for Papua New Guinea that has been the experience since independence in 1975, for the Philippines since the end of the Marcos regime in 1986, and for Indonesia since the fall of Suharto in 1998. In all the countries, there had been experiences of democratic change with shifts of presidents or prime ministers but without renewed successful military intervention. In contrast, all the conflicts—with the exception of Papua New Guinea—occurred under period of military or authoritarian rule (as is still the case of Burma/Myanmar or was the case for a period, as in Indonesia and the Philippines). The East Timor conflict was entirely identified with the Suharto regime, as it ordered the occupation of the country in 1975 and as the (surprisingly rapid) end of that regime also meant an increased willingness to search for a peaceful solution. Thus, we have to conclude that the initiation of territorial conflict in this region is largely associated with authoritarian regimes that are highly repressive and in that sense vigilant against any challenges. All of them saw as their goal to maintain a strong centralized governmental structure. In spite of overwhelming odds, rebel movements emerged and were able to sustain armed conflicts, possibly as they were territorially based. National democracy movements, on the other hand, had not the same chances of openly challenging such authoritarian regimes over a long period of time. Papua New Guinea is an exception to this, as it was an open regime at the start of the Bougainville conflict. Tensions with the independent-minded military, however, plagued some of its negotiations with the rebels. Similarly, Thailand has seen shifts between military and civilian rule, thus making clear that the military forces have been significant in the choice of action, even those taken by civilian regimes. Thus, as far as we talk about territorial, sons-of-the-soil conflicts, it seems that they are not necessarily related to “anocratic” regimes or failing regimes as Hegre and others have suggested. The region exhibits a different pattern, at least suggesting that the onset of territorial conflict is independent of the type of regime that rules the country, or even more common under authoritarian regimes.

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Most interesting is that peacemaking is clearly associated with the democratization of such regimes. All seven peace agreements were negotiated with democratic governments. To some extent, this is logical: Territorially based conflicts are likely to have a fairly high degree of local support. Brutality against the rebels may also include indiscriminate violence against the population at large, thus undermining the legitimacy of the central government and possibly reinforcing local support for the rebels. Thus, a democratic regime may find it both natural to negotiate a settlement and receive more of a receptive hearing with the rebels. Thailand has not seen this particular pattern yet, possibly testifying to the continued weakness of its democratic structures, constantly facing the danger of military intervention. Again, the military may be a stronger carrier of the view of Thailand as a centralized state, thus restricting the options of civilian, democratically more legitimate regimes. We find that territorial conflicts in Southeast Asia definitely do not follow the patterns suggested by more global studies.

Mediation and democracy One of the key benefits of democratic governance is that mechanisms for the peaceful management of conflicts are embedded in the system. Based on this assumption, the democratization process may have benefits for states not only in terms of their relations with other states (as suggested by democratic peace theory) but also with regard to their ability to manage internal conflicts. So what relationship exists between the use of mediation and the democratization process? In many cases, mediation can be a driving force not only for the resolution of conflicts but also for changes in governance. There are two key reasons why a mediator may seek to favor democratic reforms in conjunction with the management of the conflict. First, as outlined above, democratic states are better equipped to manage conflicts. Therefore, contentious issues which arise in the implementation of a peace agreement are more likely to be dealt with peacefully within a democratic system, rather than becoming a trigger for conflict recurrence. Secondly, democracy can provide a source of power sharing. Many researchers have pointed to the benefits of including provisions for some form of postconflict power sharing as a means to increase the durability of peace agreements (Licklider 1995; Hampson 1996; Stedman and Rothchild 1996). Power sharing refers to the distribution of power across competing groups, not only in the political arena but also in other aspects of society such as the control over the coercive apparatus of the state and key natural resources. Power sharing seeks to minimize the potential for any single party to exclusively control the postconflict state. The implementation of multifaceted power sharing institutions will ensure that the former combatants all have a vested interest in maintaining peace meaning that the peace agreement becomes “self-enforcing” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 304). In a study of 38 civil war peace agreements signed between 1945 and 1998, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003, 319) found that only one did not include any mandate for any form of power sharing. For any regime, the very act of engaging in some form of conflict management involves the ceding of power. This proves to be the case, because entering

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negotiations with an opponent gives them a certain degree of legitimacy and recognition whereas previously, they may have been dismissed as “criminals” or “terrorists” (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 28). Additionally, this willingness to negotiate can lay the foundations for more substantive changes in the structure of governance. Peace agreements which include provisions for some form of regional autonomy have proven to be more likely to hold (Kaufman 1996; Hartzell et al. 2001). Peace agreements which include provisions for democratic reform allow ethnic leaders to use the electoral process to gain influence in regional and national government and hence allow a more legitimate and peaceful avenue through which grievances can be aired. The challenge for mediators is to convince existing governments of the benefits of entering a dialogue with their opposition while at the same time ensuring that a viable power-sharing agreement can be reached. Mediated agreements must balance the existing regimes’ desire to maintain control with the security concerns of opposition movements. Again looking at Table 2, we can note that the three conflicts, which have seen agreements, take into account some form of territorial power sharing. Different forms of self-government, devolution of central powers, and/or special autonomy were used to find a settlement formula that the competing sides could agree on. This means that the central government remained the legal authority, but allowed the regions to operate specific affairs on their own. It may confirm the notion that the democratic framework makes such concessions more credible to the rebels: It will not be easy for the government to renege on its commitment. Similar agreements with authoritarian regimes may lack such basic confidence, as the authoritarian government may suddenly revoke the agreement. In other words, territorial power sharing is likely to be more agreeable under a democratic regime as its actions are more predictable and transparent. It is still too early to judge the sustainability of the agreements in the region, however. Along with the benefits of promoting democracy, it can be argued that the mediation process itself helps to create norms and values, which will be beneficial for the peaceful management of future conflicts. It should be noted, however, that as a form of conflict management, mediation includes a very broad spectrum of behaviors. Mediator strategies range from noncoercive measures such as facilitating discussion through to highly directive techniques including the use of sticks and carrots. Bearing this in mind, it appears that some mediation efforts may be more in keeping with democratic values and norms than others. For example, a mediation effort based on nondirective strategies allowing both parties to have their say and encouraging concessions from both sides is in keeping with key democratic ideals such as equality and fairness. Parties which feel they have received a fair hearing are much more likely to be optimistic about using a similar technique in future. Conversely, mediation efforts which employ directive strategies do little in terms of promoting democratic values. Directive strategies such as threats and bribes fit much more closely with traditional realist power politics than those of liberal democracy. With some knowledge of several of the peace processes, it is possible to say that they largely worked with nondirective strategies: The mediators themselves describe their efforts in terms of persuasion, creative solutions, and trust, not the use of sticks and carrots. Still, continual mediation failures can teach rivals that the conflict in which they are engaged is beyond peaceful management forcing the disputants into

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the adoption of more coercive and aggressive positions (Greig 2005, 692). Similarly, it makes sense that where one or both parties to a dispute are largely unsatisfied by the result of conflict management, they will be more likely to revert to their traditional responses to conflict including force and hostility. As can be seen in Table 3, there have not been many third party preventive measures undertaken during the active years of the territorial wars during the period 1993–2004.2 These do not suffice for a statistical treatment, but an argument can nevertheless be made. Table 3 shows preventive measures by third parties in the territorial armed conflicts of Southeast Asia for a 12-year period in the phase when the conflicts were of a lower intensity (“minor armed conflicts”). Clearly, there were most activities of third parties in the conflicts that also found a peaceful settlement, whereas those with little activity have remained bellicose throughout the period. The exception is the unsolved Patani conflict in Thailand which had third party involvement, primarily, however, for bilateral talks. This conflict did not see any mediated talks. Such talks have been most frequent in the conflicts with more comprehensive agreements (Aceh and Bougainville). The direct contacts noted in Table 3 in Burma/Myanmar all relate to refugee issues that were discussed with neighboring countries or international organizations. Thus, we can conclude that there is a strong correlation between mediated talks and outcomes in the form of peace agreements. The reluctance of governments to directly engage rebels within its own country makes the use of mediation a necessity. Even so, it does not mean that every mediated talk will be successful. The history of the Aceh settlement not only points to the complexity of mediation but also that lessons can be learned from earlier failures. Still, it is unlikely that a conflict will be settled through a peace agreement without mediation. Agreeing to mediation, in other words, demonstrates that the parties are willing to find a negotiated solution. Finally, we see, as expected, a low presence of peacekeepers in Southeast Asian conflicts, Papua New Guinea being the only case. There were, however, European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) observers in Aceh following the Helsinki agreement playing a significant role in its implementation. Also, there were peacekeepers from Southeast Asia in the postcrisis period in East Timor, but Table 3 is concerned with earlier periods. Although the conflicts in the Pacific were largely nonterritorial and thus are not captured by these data, at least one involves a large-scale operation, notably by Australia in the Solomon Islands (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands). In New Caledonia, a colonial dependency, the presence of French forces probably excluded the use of international peacekeeper.

Implications and conclusions This analysis of internal conflicts has revealed clear trends regarding conflicts in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Given the ongoing frequency with which the

2

More detailed information on the third party actors and their activities is included in the “Appendix”.

Table 3 Types and number of preventive engagements by conflict, 1993–2004 Good offices Mediated talks Bilateral talks Total number of measures 73 39 10 6 Polity scoresa Type of peace agreement 1. Partial 2. Full 9 5 23 1. Peace process 2. Peace process 3. Full 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 19 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 131 0 3 0 3 0 25 1 31 34 31 5 3 1 1 0 0 187 8 9 −7 −7 −7 −7 −7 −7 – 1. Full 2. Full – – – – – – – –

Peace-keepers

Fact finding

Indonesia (Aceh)

0

2

14

13

44

Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)

1

1

Philippines (Mindanao)

0

2

Thailand (Patani)

0

3

Myanmar (Shan)

0

2

Myanmar (Karen)

0

0

Myanmar (Karenni)

0

0

Myanmar (Mon)

0

0

Myanmar (Wa)

0

0

Myanmar (Arakan)

0

0

Total

1

10

Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

Source: Möller et al. (2007); only active conflict years included, when conflicts are on some, but low level of intensity (“minor armed conflicts”, see UCDP website)

a

The polity score is a mean of the active conflict years. Based on the Polity2 variable from Polity IV

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Asia-Pacific region is exposed to violent internal conflicts, there has been a relative absence of conflict management efforts in the region and peace agreements are rare. While internal conflicts throughout the world tend to be resilient to conflict management initiatives, conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region have proven to be particularly difficult to resolve. Conflicts in this region demonstrate comparatively few third party interventions. This conflict experience gives rise to some reflections on the origins of conflict, however. There is no evidence that “anocracy” is the main reason for the onset of territorial conflict. Rather, the territorial conflicts emerged under authoritarian regimes. We suggest that such conflict may have a larger propensity to be sustainable than other challenges against strong states (a pattern in Southeast Asia). In cases of weaker states, however, challenges may concern the central government, rather than territory (a pattern in the South Pacific). We also find that the process of democratization away from authoritarian rule is largely associated with settlement of territorial conflict through self-enforcing regional self-rule arrangements, rather than the escalation of such conflicts. Thus, there are lessons to be learned. However, there are reasons to be concerned about the lack of settlement initiatives for the remaining conflicts. Thus, we need to discuss the role of ASEAN as well as the lessons from Aceh. Association of Southeast Asian Nations One positive with regards to the threat posed by internal conflict in the region is the potential for increased involvement by regional organizations. The major organization in the region capable of assuming such a role is the ASEAN. ASEAN is seen as an internally cohesive and internationally effective organization and as such has been attributed as the most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the world (Narine 1998, 195). ASEAN assumes a clear mandate when dealing with interstate conflicts in the region. The Bali Treaty signed by ASEAN members in 1976 stipulates the provisions for conflict management between states. Article 15 states that where conflicts cannot be resolved through direct negotiation the High Council may recommend other forms of conflict management including mediation, inquiry, or conciliation (Amer 1999, 1034). The ASEAN Charter of 2007 cites the adherence to democracy, good governance, rule of law, and human rights as its basic purposes (Article 1.7) as well as a central principle (Art 2.2 (h)). At the same time, it respects the right of every member state to lead “its national existence free from external interference” (Article 2.2 (f)). In effect, it means that governments can block the involvement by ASEAN in internal conflicts, but also possibly use ASEAN when they find it useful. The latter one needs to be developed and is also what happened in the postconflict period in the Aceh settlement. The primary method by which ASEAN has tried achieve internal change has been indirect, through increased economic growth driven by regional cooperation and trade. However, intra-ASEAN trade has remained relatively unchanged, in part due to the fact that member states trade in similar commodities and thus are in competition (Narine 1998, 201). Thus, there is a need to develop other instruments with bearing on intraconflict situations. ASEAN is playing a successful peace-

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building role in aftermath of the Aceh war. Since the peace deal was brokered, the implementation of the agreement has been overseen by an Aceh Monitoring Mission made up of European Union and ASEAN member states (Vatikiotis 2006, 30). Furthermore, Bercovitch (2005) finds that the severity of intractable conflicts may make it problematic for regional organizations to attempt to deal with such conflict between their members; regional organizations may also be hampered by the presence of a major power as one of the rivals and as a hegemon in the organization. This finding may help to explain the relative absence of mediation by regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific. It may open for neighbors to be supportive, however, as we have recorded: Indonesia in the Mindanao conflict (The Jakarta Accords) and Malaysia also in the Patani conflict (see “Appendix”). But that means an opportunity lost for the regional body. Aceh: a model for the region? Aceh has been the location of one of the most intractable conflicts in the region. As have been noted, the 2005 Aceh peace agreement has the potential to be a guide for other stalemated civil wars in the region. According to Indonesia’s chief negotiator during the Aceh peace process, Sastrohandoyo Wiryono (2008), the process benefited from the neutral nature of the two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that mediated from 1999 to 2005. It was not a quick process, and there may have been some pivotal external factors such as the tsunami, but mediation yielded a viable and promising comprehensive peace agreement. Three years later, the process is taking further root. Former rebels are already taking tourists to view the former battlefields in Aceh. The outlook is promising. The local elections early 2009 will be a test of where the agreements are going. The 2005 agreement between GAM and the Indonesian government signed in Helsinki was a culmination of third-party mediation provided by two different groups. The Humanitarian Dialogue Centre’s (formerly the Henry Dunant Centre) involvement that began in 1999 led to the Cessation of Hostilities (COHA) in late 2002 (see Huber 2004). COHA broke down after a few months and was followed by a major government military offensive. Former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland and his group CMI became involved in late 2004 just before the tsunami hit with its epicenter just off the coast of Aceh. While the tsunami surely played a role in the decision making of each side, the importance of mediation by HDC and CMI cannot be overlooked. In fact, the tsunami also hit some other conflictual regions without stimulating the same willingness to negotiate a settlement (Sri Lanka, Somalia). Huber (2004) claims that HDC as an NGO lacked the capacity to enforce and implement the COHA. Accordingly, HDC should have stepped aside rather than maintain its involvement. However, Ahtisaari (2008) and Wiryono (2008) credit HDC for its role in ending the war. CMI’s gradual mediation process was perhaps more circumspect and less rushed than HDC’s. The CMI process was based around the premise that “nothing is agreed before everything is agreed” so that neither side could boast to their own audiences that they had the upper hand in the negotiations (Ahtisaari 2008). Furthermore, CMI was not involved in the implementation, which

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instead was taking over by a resourceful EU, also making clear that this aspect is not necessarily crucial for success in mediation. The 7 months of CMI mediation consisted of five rounds. Ahtisaari moved with deliberation and immediately went to the heart of the matter. The first common ground reached was that a broad “special autonomy” and an end of the independence claim (Feith 2007). The final phases of the agreement were worked out in Finland. The choice of a neutral location helped build trust and kept the focus on the agreement. Also, much of the GAM leadership resided in Sweden, making access to them easier. The August, 2005 power-sharing agreement entailed the disarmament of GAM, a regional flag, amnesty for GAM fighters, withdrawal of nonlocal police and military, a unique set of laws for Aceh, a truth and reconciliation commission, government acceptance of Aceh-based parties, third party monitoring, and GAM gives up demands for independence (BBC News 2005). The EU and ASEAN agreed to provide the monitoring of the agreement through the auspices of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The AMM was on the ground immediately and this surely benefited the buy-in of both parties in the early days and weeks of the agreement (see Feith 2007). This type of agreement was politically costly from the perspective of the government’s domestic audiences. For example, the granting of GAM rebels amnesty could be opposed by Indonesians in other parts of the country who see the rebels as terrorists. It was also costly because it could signal to other regional groups that greater autonomy was there for the taking. Such costs are all the more relevant as the country democratizes. It is improbable that the government would have agreed to these terms were it not for the involvement of third party mediators. The costly provisions also made the process much more credible in the eyes of GAM. A Helsinki framework for territorial conflict While we should not overstate the value of a “one size fits all” mediation style (see Wiryono 2008), the CMI process could possibly lend lessons to other territorial conflicts in the region. The combination of a third party mediated agreement that grants regional autonomy, reintegration, and addresses reconciliation followed by a robust monitoring mission seems promising. This we label the Helsinki framework and it has been cited by others as a model (see Feith 2007; Kivimäki 2008; Vatikiotis 2006). For the Helsinki framework to end other conflicts in the region, however, certain realities must be acknowledged. First, governments must come to terms with wars they are fighting. According to Vatikiotis (2006), the government of Thailand would do well to recognize that the conflict in Patani is a peripheral (regionally based) insurgency that is not directly linked to support from other countries. With this in mind, Thailand could follow the lead of the Aceh accord and allow more regional autonomy in the south of Thailand (Vatikiotis 2006). Second, the choice of mediator is crucial. The ability of an NGO such as the HDC and CMI to hammer out an agreement at a neutral location might be more applicable in Mindanao. Perhaps current HDC involvement in Mindanao can help convince

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separatists to end the armed insurrection. In the case of Patani, Horstmann (2008, 65) observes that mediation similar to that in Aceh could help bring the parties toward a solution by “isolating” more radical elements. Of course, a plethora of private mediating firms with questionable motives and abilities might only serve to confuse things. Even a reputable firm led by experienced individuals such as HDC has been susceptible to criticism (Huber 2004). Third, there must be some level of democratic government. Vatikiotis (2006) argues the liberalization and a parallel move away from the “centralization at all costs” model is key to ending the territorial wars in the region. It was the post-1998 liberalization of Indonesia that eventually led to agreements in Aceh and East Timor. Lack of democracy is a major stumbling block in Myanmar. Some of the experiences in Aceh can be contrasted with the lack of progress in Burma/Myanmar. Also, this country was the victim of a major disaster, in the form of cyclone Nargis that hit the country in May 2008. Instead of inviting obviously needed international assistance, the military regime kept external aid at a minimum. The fear of transparency certainly was one element in this stance, with very little understanding internationally. It is indicative of the lack of the incumbent regime’s willingness to engage in any dialogue on any of its more pressing issues. There is no invitation to third parties to act in any of the many conflicts that the country finds itself in. The military regime makes the assessment that it can ride out these problems and that giving in even to some degree of openness or international involvement is likely to threaten regime survival. From the outside, it is difficult to determine the strength of the regime. It may be a house of cards; it may be the only viable institution in the country. The regime has preferred to engage in cease-fire agreements and attempted to play the different rebel groups against each other. It may enhance its chances of short-term survival, but may bring long-term challenges, as it will be even more difficult to make different areas willing to cooperate for the benefit of all. The military in Burma/Myanmar has a lot to learn from Indonesia. Fourth, as the Helsinki framework has clearly demonstrated, a substantial monitoring mission is critical. As recently as February, 2008 disputes over mineral rights between the government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Government of Bougainville had flared up and were threatening the peace (The Economist 2008). Monitors can help prevent these and related issues from reigniting the fighting. Finally, the question remains what external factors can do in cases where the government is not willing to accept mediation or good offices for conflict resolution. As we have seen, democratization is likely to generate pressures for negotiated solutions. Entrenched authoritarian regimes, however, tend to resist such pressures. Thus, neighboring countries and the international community resort to private and public critique, targeted sanctions, and noncooperation. Sanctions may make a regime more interested in negotiations, reducing some of its international standing and its resource advantage over the rebels. Such measures may not generate quick results but are still registered by such regimes, possibly leading to policy changes at times of transition from one leadership to another. As evidenced in the Papua New Guinea and Indonesian cases, some level of transparency or democracy is critical to third party mediation and for resolution of internal territorial disputes.

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Appendix

Table 4 Third party actors in the region, 1993–2004 1. Aceh Humanitarian Dialogue Centre Sweden Switzerland USA Japan EU World Bank Italy Others include Red Cross, UK, Australia, Philippines, Thailand, other NGOs 2. Arakan None 3. Bougainville Australia Solomon Islands New Zealand 4. Karen UNHCR Thailand 5. Karenni Thailand 6. Mindanao USA Libya Malaysia Individuals 7. Mon Thailand 8. Patani Malaysia Islamic Committees of region ASEAN European Commission USA 12 3 2 2 2 1 16 5 3 2 1 2 1 15 11 4 33 9 8 7 5 5 3 2

Others include Tonga, Truce Monitoring Group, UN, NGOs, church, Commonwealth Secretariat, individuals

Others include Singapore, OIC, France, Finland, Germany, EU, Iran, Pakistan, Quick Response Team

Others include various Muslim nations, ASEM conferees, European Commission, APEC, Laos, Chile, Singapore, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, India, National Human Rights Commission of Thailand 9. Shan UNHCR 2

Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific Table 4 (continued) Amnesty International Thailand 10. Wa None Source: UCDP MILC data; active conflict years only 2 1

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