An Irregular Warfare Strategy for Somalia
Staff Sergeant Ondrae L. Meyers
Enlisted Professional Military Education- Career Course
9 June 2014

In Somalia there is a constant battle that the country faces with a terroristic organization called Al Shabaab. Within these battles they do not use conventional warfare. The Al Shabaab do not have the support of the people and rule by commanding obedience through fear. In a conventional war military forces attempt to achieve strategic objectives against a recognized state. Irregular Warfare is when adversaries seek to isolate themselves from their external supporters and undermine their opponent’s legitimacy and credibility. Irregular Warfare is defined by the Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, (December 2008), as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” There are specific applications of “keys to success”, in order to carry out the Irregular Warfare campaign. The two applications are unity of success and understanding the operational environment.
Irregular Warfare is defined by Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’, as “Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and in them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.” Thomas Edward Lawrence’s definition illustrates how unity of success is a vital part of the keys to success. Unity of success in dealing with the Irregular Warfare in Somalia is identified as a unified approach