Is Negative or ‘Attack’ Advertising at effective tool in of Political engagement and mobilization?

There are assault ads, conveying the simple message over and over, that Brand X, the rival, is a cheesy piece of goods, won’t hold up, has to be cranked by hand… This is the model for not just our commercial product sales but, rather more vigorously, for our political campaigns as well… we have gradually just gotten used to them. Its not so much that I am wonderful the candidate explains, as the opponent is a lying, cowardly, two faced cheat and con artist.
(Pulitzer Prize winner and Washington Post columnist Meg Greenfield, 1995)

Whether through print or television media, advertising affects behaviour. A key tool of political parties, it has been used to win support during critical governmental assessment or change, and engage the susceptible electorate to participate in the political process. Yet, where features such as wit, charisma or aptitude have been emphasized and admired, the intemperance of political campaigning has also drawn out a negative side, one that seeks to cast a damaging shadow on any opposition in order to attain the support of the majority. The types of political message given out by both politicians and the media vary in how they are constructed and what they intend to achieve, and despite widespread criticism surrounding its ethical fragilities, attack politics in particular have become a fundamental component of any political campaign and evidence has shown the electorate to show a greater interest in a more pessimistic tone of politics. This essay intends to address whether negative publicity in the form of attack advertising is an effective tool of electoral manipulation by evaluating its influence in engaging and mobilizing voters. Indeed, where research has shown it to be counterproductive, or to produce unintended consequences, its proficiency is a key subject of contention in the playground of political marketing. Nevertheless, whether ethically unsound or effectively redundant, it continues to be used by professionals and commentators to influence voters and political campaigns continue to accentuate the negative.
No matter how loyal a person may be to a particular party or candidate, politicians recognise the malleability of the perception of the voter. Advertising itself is all about persuasion. Whether increasing awareness, interest or in priming a particular issue, attack advertising has the intension of diminishing the voter’s estimation of the opposition, thus ensuring the ‘voters evaluation becomes so polarized that their electoral choice becomes simplified.’ Pfau and Kenski identify the 1980s as being a key turning point in both the use and content of attack advertising, where the election of 1988 in particular highlighted its proliferation as seen through television, the radio and in print. Since then these forms of propaganda have been emphasized as being particularly effective as viewers absorb information passively, ‘within a low-affect cognitive state,’ while repetition aids viewers memory retention of the advertisement message, thus the intension is to engage the electorate further and therefore to increase interest. Whether policy or personally orientated, concentrating on the flaws of an opponent rather than the strength of a candidate proves the textured nature of persuasive power to be a highly valuable tool of political manoeuvre.
Yet the definition of negative advertising is itself contentious. This essay looks at the term through a number of dimensions, not only taking ‘negativity’ to concern the outcome - in the sense that it recognises that callous adverts can positively effect the electoral process in increasing voter’s desire and capacity to choose rationally, but also looks deeper to the holistic way in which an attack advert is perceived and processed by an individual. Through analysing the results of survey research, such as the findings of the 1992 and 1996 American Nation Election Study, which focussed more on electoral turnout as a purely empirical measurement variable, as well as considering the research of such scientists as Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, whose conclusions into the discourse have had a tendency to focus more on the ‘tone’ of negative versus positive advertisements, justifications can be made for campaign managers employing “harsh,” “strident,” “relentless attacks,” evoking emotion to employ in “mudslinging” as a viable electoral channel. Indeed, advertising executives have been keen to support this view; as Winston Fletcher argued as Chairman of the Advertising Association: “positive advertising does not work because all parties favor the same goals –peace, prosperity, better welfare services, safe streets and so on. The challenge is to say how they will achieve and that is too complex for an advert.”
No matter its use however, the key question remains; does attack advertising mobilize the voter or ultimately lead to lower levels of participation on Election Day? A person may be more interested in a campaign, but this may not actually influence whether they go out and vote. But research by pollsters does suggest that by concentrating primarily on the weakness of the opponent, attack politics increases voter turnout. Negative messages extend the scope of electoral interest, Larry M. Bartels and Lynn Vavreck recognise a clear correlation of the rise of attack advertising with citizen’s interest. They contend that ‘despite the growth in distasteful campaigning [from 1980 to 1992], people who were interested in the campaigns increased their attention levels [and]… attack based campaigning does not seem to have a negative relationship with campaign attention… Campaign attacks are not accusing citizens to ignore campaigns.’ Indeed, when it comes to publicity, success is measured by victory. Attack politics adds an air of dramatization and aggression to the process which, even when heavily criticised is hard to ignore.
In this sense, the opinions of voters are much more influenced by negative images than by positive, they feel more passionate about a particular issue and are more likely to stand up to or stand against the matter in hand. Whether we like it or not, today’s media carries a distinctly pessimistic undertone of the current political climate, but this may not just be reflective of current events, the media needs to find a way of drawing readers in, to buy their papers or watch their shows, publicity works in the same way. Attack advertising depicts a negative image of the opponent, demanding a bias from one to the other. Where research has shown that the general public dislike and distrust this, it is of no obvious importance to the justification of negative campaign use in general, as research also shows people to retain the damaging political message projected. Their use is therefore of affluence by pollsters such as democrat Ed Mellman who stated, “when we ask people about negative ads, they’ll say they don’t like them. But that’s not the point. The point is that they absorb the information.”
As a case study, the 1992 American Nation Election Study asked a sample of voters “do you recall seeing any presidential campaign advertisements on television?” and “Please tell me, what do you remember about any of these ads?” The results correlated with the hypothesis discussed above. The single largest response category concerned negative campaigning with a significantly smaller 2% of respondents offering recollection of positive adverts, furthermore it must be noted that the predominant commercial of the campaign was not itself negative in tone, indeed the Bush “Agenda” only drew out the predications of the candidate’s economic plan and had no hostile application towards his opponent. Taking this into account, and building on the research collected by Wattenberg and Brians, negative adverts may increase voter turnout if they persuade the electorate that their choice between candidates is an important one. By offering unexpected ‘non-normative’ data and ‘by facilitating candidate image differentiation and attitude polarization, negative political advertising may aid voters in feeling more confident about their voting decisions and may intensify their involvement in political races.’
The negative image portrayed by attack advertising generates a sense of conflict, of ‘game’ politics in which elections are personified as competitive playoffs between confrontational and bloodthirsty candidates. While this adversarial tone has come to characterize the negative discourse, Lynda Kaid is keen to stipulate that negative ads are also more issue-orientated than positive ads. Irrespective of tone, and regardless of impression, content also matters; exposure to provocative advertising should theoretically have a mobilizing effect on the electorate and this has been verified through further research carried out by Wattenberg and Brains into their comparisons of the 1992 and the 1996 Presidential campaign. If negative commercials intend to persuade voters that the choice between the candidates is an important one, the 1992 survey data they collected associates with this hypotheses showing an improvement in turnout despite the widespread use of attack ads. The candidate’s of 1996 however ‘failed to produce commercials that had such an effect.’ Substantiating the supposition that this is the logical outcome given the 1992 ads were much more factual than those used in other elections.
Indeed, there exists much speculation as to whether negative advertising offers a valuable contribution to the democratic process, particularly since its rise has correlated with a declining democratic confidence. But as negative advertising does not necessary act to suppress a view, it has in fact often been used to highlight flaws or diversion of an opponents campaign in order to make the electorate more aware of the opponent's underlying intensions and increase the degree to which to they care about the outcome of the election. Surely then it could be argued that negative advertising helps in bolstering political dialogue and enhancing information effects. According to Finkel and Geer, it is a ‘recognised truth’ that those with greater political knowledge are much more likely to participate in a given political process. Advertising can be regarded as another way of educating voters of the constituent parts of an opponents lobby, but projected in a destructive and malicious way as to leave the punter unsettled of their original voting intensions.
There can be little doubt that attack advertising does cause a reevaluation of the intensions of the electorate; either by making them more intelligently aware or appealing to emotions such as anxiety or confidence. But this does not necessarily mean that attack advertising is effective. Indeed, where it may derive a vote away from one’s opposition and towards a sponsor, it may also demobilize and discourage the attachment of the voter to the campaign. Negative drives may interest but not inspire voters. Instead of creating awareness in a campaign, the argument has been made by numerous political commentators that attack advertising instead only stands to polarize a proportion of the electorate while the remainder are left unsatisfied and detached by the nature of the promotion itself. Furthermore, the relationship between negative advertising and cynicism has also been exposed as a possible spillover of attack politics; and was represented in the research findings of Ansolabehere and Iyengar who concluded that ‘as campaigns become more negative and cynical, so does the electorate.’
Destroying political interest and disincentivising the electorate from voting altogether would call questions of the democratic legitimacy of attack politics to the fora and certainly, the results of Wattenberg and Brains’ 1999 study correlate with the results collected by Ansolabehere and Iyengar in their highly appraised 1994 study; ‘Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate,’ where they maintain that with regards to turnout, “campaigns can be either mobilizing or demobilizing events, depending upon the nature of the messages they generate.” Their study drew up extensive theories regarding mobilization and notably suggested that attack ads could generate ‘blanket negativity’ where ‘voters not only become more critical of the target but turn against the sponsor as well.’ Consequently, negative advertising is not only ineffective but is a dangerous and unreliable tool that sponsors spending hundreds of thousands on advertising must take into consideration. Evidence conveying that attack advertising has unintended consequence such as ‘backlash’ or ‘boomerang effects,’ serves to highlight the overall significance of the question in hand, as, in the highly expensive world of PR, backers expect to get as much ‘bang for their buck’ as possible, and more importantly avoid bolstering their opponents campaign.
Nonetheless, despite their work revealing a broadly anti-attack advance, their results actually indicated this was of little significance as their sample ratings retained relatively unchanged opinions of the sponsor when it came to negative publicity in the mobilization of their sample on a partisan basis. However, As Pinkleton et al consider, ‘citizens consistently say negative advertising is unfair, uninformative, unethical and deceptive,’ and those who participate in the political process, those with a high political knowledge may become increasingly unsatisfied with the distasteful attack strategies employed by the candidate they had supported before the campaign. Taken on a short-term basis, Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s results don’t highlight any particular significance of their use, however, their results fail to consider the long-term effects which must be considered despite there being no substantial research grounds. Indeed, the unintended consequences of attack adds cannot be avoided given the high amount of media attention they draw in during an election and must be a key concern of any party looking to engage in such conduct. But looking ahead, attack ads may have a much greater effect, hence Pinkleton et al recommend a mix of both negative and positive advertising, focussed on short-term blows, which leave no long-term damage to the candidate.
Yet a number of considerations of the studies relating to this hypothesis must be taken into account. While the amount of research done on the relationship between the variables of attack ads and participation or interest is widespread, results are relatively inconclusive or incomparable as they have been done using fully contrasting data sets or methods of analysis. Where some researchers have found intersection, they have not been able to conclude any change is down to the independent variable alone. Furthermore, the survey methods of research as carried out my scientists such as Ansolabehere and Iyengar, have been criticized as being biased and unreliable; As Mutz et al point out, where information is collected about the effectiveness of advertising through survey analysis, ‘survey research is hard-pushed to uncover either attitudinal or behavioural effects... [They] must rely on self-reports or recall of a particular advertisement to measure exposure to advertising.’ A final consideration is over definition as previously discussed. There remains no universal explanation of what should be included and whether it should focus only on elective outcome, expressed in terms of voter turnout or whether studies should also look to measures such variables as partisan commitment and take a more normative position.
Nevertheless, negative or attack adverts continue to be seen as a valuable tool of electoral manipulation as they have been found to be “effective” in being remembered, but “ineffective” in causing a boomerang effect. But if the ‘“success” of an ad is defined as recognition memory, then negative advertising increases both the accuracy and speed of visual recognition.’ Whether unethical or unfair, these adverts have stimulated debate; they have made the electorate more aware of the campaign, highlighted important issues on the agenda, emphasized key differences between candidates and added a sense of spectacle and relevance to a notoriously dejected focus. Where risk of backlash must be taken into account, ‘the risk is perceived as acceptable, given the fact that over time voters tend to forget the origins of political messages while retaining their content,’ and overall evidence has proven them effective in achieving their means.

Bibliography:

Ansolabehere S., S. Iyengar, A. Simon and N. Valentino (1994). Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate? American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 4, pp. 829-838.

Bartels L. M and L. Vavreck, (2003), Campaign Reform: Insights and Evidence. Michigan: University of Michigan Press

Finkel S. E. and J. G. Geer (1998). A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 573-595

Garramone G. M., C. K. Atkin, B. E. Pinkleton and R. T. Cole (1990). Effects of Negative Political Advertising on the Political Process. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, vol. 34, issue 3, pp. 299-311

Johnson-Cartee K. S. and G. A. Copeland (1991). Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates

Kaid L. L. (1999) Political Advertising: A Summary of Research Findings. In B. I. Newman (ed.) Handbook of political marketing. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 423-438

Kavanagh D. (1995). Election Campaigning: The New Marketing of Politics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers

Kolovos I. and P. Harris. Does Negative Advertising Work? Available at: http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10523/1451/negative_advertising.pdf (Accessed 28/03/13)

Mutz D, C., P. M. Sniderman and R. A. Brod, (1996).Political Persuasion and Attitude Change. USA, University of Michigan Press

Pfau M and H, C Kenski (1990), Attack Politics. New York: Praeger Publishers

Pinkleton B. E., N-H Um and E. Weintraub Austin (2002). An Exploration of the Effects of Negative Political Advertising on Political Decision Making. Journal of Advertising, vol. 31, no. 1, 13- 25

Richardson, G. W. Jr, (2001) Looking for meaning in all the wrong places: Why Negative Advertising is a suspect category. Journal of Communication, vol. 51, issue 4, pp 775-799.

Richardson, G. W. Jr, (2003) Pulp Politics: How Political Advertising tells the stories of American Politics. Oxford: Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Tuman J, S (2008). Political Communication in American Campaigns. London: Sage Publications, Inc.

Wattenberg M. P. and C. L. Brians (1999) Negative Political Advertising: Demobilizer or Mobilizer? American Political Science Review, vol. 93, no. 4, pp. 891-89.

--------------------------------------------
[ 1 ]. Cited in Richardson Jr G. W (2003), 61.
[ 2 ]. Johnson-Cartee K. S. and G. A. Copeland (1991), 25.
[ 3 ]. Pfau M and H, C Kenski (1990), 1.
[ 4 ]. Tuman J, S (2008), 233.
[ 5 ]. Ansolabehere S, et al. (1994).
[ 6 ]. Richardson Jr G. W (2003), 65-66.
[ 7 ]. Kavanagh D. (1995), 160.
[ 8 ]. Bartels L. M and L. Vavreck, (2003), 93.
[ 9 ]. Johnson-Cartee K. S. and G. A. Copeland (1991), 15.
[ 10 ]. Richardson, G. W. Jr, (2001), 780.
[ 11 ]. Ibid 782
[ 12 ]. Wattenberg M. P. and C. L. Brians (1999)
[ 13 ]. Garramone G. M. et al (1990), 301.
[ 14 ]. Kaid L. L. (1999), 172.
[ 15 ]. Finkel S. E. and J. G. Geer (1998),
[ 16 ]. Ibid, 577.
[ 17 ]. Ansolabehere S, et al. (1994), 835.
[ 18 ]. Ibid.
[ 19 ]. Ibid, 829.
[ 20 ]. Ibid, 834.
[ 21 ]. Ibid, 834.
[ 22 ]. Pinkleton B. E, et al. (2002), 14
[ 23 ]. Ibid, 24.
[ 24 ]. Mutz D. P. et al. (1996), 103.
[ 25 ]. Kolovos I. and P. Harris. Does Negative Advertising Work? 10.
[ 26 ]. Pfau M and H, C Kenski (1990), 158.