1. Hall and Fischer both made statements that exhibited overconfidence. These beliefs lead to an autocratic leadership style which was initially exhibited both by Hall and Fischer. They provided clear expectations to their clients for what needed to be done, when it should be done, and how it should be done. (Bolden, Gosling, etc. 2003). There was a clear division between the leader and the followers. Due to this leadership, Boukreev, Krakauer and several other climbers worried about the success of the teams abilities and the trust they had in one another yet they all remained confident in their own abilities (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). “Overly positive beliefs in abilities can hinder sound decision making”(Gino 2013). The teams did not freely discuss concerns, challenge beliefs or review errors. Yet, many clients did not have trust in the decisions set by Hall and Fischer - Fischer’s physical condition, too few radios, Boukreev not using supplemental oxygen, Fischer leaving his clients to return a sick one to base, and persisting up the mountain when others were descending down due to weather conditions. “If team leaders are too confident in their own knowledge, they may be reluctant to listen to the opinions of the team members, even when they would lead to better outcomes for all” (Gino 2013). Fischer and Hall also neglected to depend on their professional judgments, their intuition and hunches when several clients lacked the experience in high altitudes and suffered medical setbacks. Hall and Fischer then found themselves using a persuasive leadership style. They possessed all the information on which the decisions were based and at the same time tried to sell the team that the decisions were good ones and that ascending the summit was going to be possible (Bolden, Gosling, etc. 2003). They verbalized a vague “turnaround time” even though they stressed the importance of sticking to the hard deadline. They were using their “left brain which controls the conscious, rational, and logical” decision but when push came to shove and the time came to turn around they relied on the “right brain for the subconscious, intuitive and emotional” decision (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). Getting that close to the goal was difficult to walk away from and they relied on previous rules and patterns returning to autocratic leaders. Their gut decision was wrong because they overestimated their abilities due to cognitive biases (Hayashi 2001).

2. The confirmation trap - Hall and Fischer set out on individual excursions with their clients. They were on similar time schedules for acclimation routes and to set out to reach the summit. When they reached Camp IV, they encountered windy conditions. It appeared at this point in time they fell into the confirmation trap. Boukreev, Fischer’s guide, consulted Hall stating, “What are we going to do? I’m sure the weather is clearly not good enough for assaulting the summit” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). Fischer and Hall then sought out confirmation from each other as they were both unfortunate in a similar situation - the weather was working against them. “Hall and Fischer knew that individuals would find it difficult to turn around after coming so far and expending such effort” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). They were influenced by the “sunk cost” bias in their decision making (McAfee, Mialian, and Mialon). They joined forces and announced their decision to proceed to the summit. They felt comfort in each other but it was self delusional. “Hall was eager to prove that the prior years failure was due to nature rather than his guiding abilities” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). Fischer’s motivation was “If he can do it, I can do it” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). The bias was a one sided decision not taking into account the weather conditions, the lack of experience of the clients and the reservations that the clients expressed. “Decision makers ‘forego the best solution in favor of one that is acceptable or reasonable’” (Gary 1998). Hall and Fischer neglected to search for the disconfirmatory evidence that was clearly presented to them. “The two expeditions encountered a climber headed down the mountain after turning back just one hour shy of the summit” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). In addition, Breashears and the IMAX movie expedition chose to turn around. Knowing that the weather presumably would be more severe when they reached the summit, they should have turned their clients around.

Presumed associations - Hall and Fischer overestimated the probabilities of two events co-occurring based on the number of similar associations that are easily recalled from experience (Gary 1998). That is, if they make the push to the summit in May, then they will avoid the strong jet streams in April and the monsoon season later in the spring (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). “For the past five years, this timing had worked remarkably well, climbers enjoyed calm weather at the summit during each climbing season” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). Hall and Fishcer reached Base Camp in late April. They made the decision to wait one week before beginning their push to the summit based on this knowledge (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). At the same time, it was known that climbers could experience much harsher conditions. “There were three consecutive seasons when no one climbed the mountain because of the ferocious winds” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). “An event that evokes emotion and is vivid, easily imagined and specific will be more available from memory than will an event that is unemotional in nature, difficult to imagine or vague (Gary 1998). In 1995, Hall had to turn his clients around due to the deep snow falls just shy of the summit and this year he was eager to prove his guiding abilities. This emotional event biased his judgement and lead to a poor leadership decision. The challenging weather should not have come to a surprise to Hall. Fischer believed that with his guiding abilities he was “going to make the right choices.” He felt that when accidents happened, it was always human error (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). It took Fischer four attempts to reach the summit so he clearly should knew his limitations and changing weather conditions. “Recognition was important to him. He ached for it” (Roberto and Cariaggia 2003). This was his first guided excursion to the summit and his emotional ties to “gaining respect from his peers” biased his decision. It is impossible to determine if they decided not to wait, would they have had the same outcome. They were purely basing their decision on experience.

Overconfidence - The overconfidence bias was clearly illustrated as impeding Hall and Fischer’s judgement. Hall had successfully guided 39 clients to the summit of Everest (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). He believed he could “get almost anyone reasonably fit to the summit” and his record proved it. He felt very confident in his abilities stating “with so many incompetent people on the mountain, I think it’s pretty unlikely that we’ll get through this season without something bad happening up high,” inferring it wouldn’t be him. (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). Therefore, he knew that risk was involved in this years excursion. Hall built his business on his expertise, advertising “100% Success!”(Roberto and Carioggia 2003). “Successful managers (in this case a leader) gain power by building a reputation of “experts” in certain matters” (Kotter 1997). Given his achievements and visibility of his achievements, he gained power and Fischer noted this. “An associate described Fischer’s motivation for guiding Everest, ‘I think that he looked at Rob Hall’s success and thought...’If he can do it, I can do it’” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). Fischer himself was confident in his abilities stating “Experience is overrated. It’s not the altitude that’s important, it’s your attitude..We’ve got the big E figured out. I believe 100% that I’m coming back” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003). This belief in ones abilities overshadowed the decision making processes on summit day and clouded the judgement of both Hall and Fischer. To add to this, the climbers also exhibited overconfidence which Krakauer referred to as “clinically delusional” (Roberto and Carioggia 2003).