* * In John Locke’s The Casual Theory of Perception the idea of perception versus what is real is examined and analyzed in great detail. The main focus of this writing is that there is an outside world (made up of real and wholesome objects), and there are ideas about the world (perceptions produced in us by the objects). This main focus is repeated and explained in multiple aspects and ways within Locke’s writing. Going into detail, Locke feels, or rather feels that he knows, that there are three sorts of qualities to be considered in respects to bodies (physical objects). Firstly, there are Primary qualities – otherwise known as real or original qualities - which include certain physical properties such as bulk, size, figure, number, situation, and motion. The reason Locke calls these real or original is because these properties are there regardless of our perceptions and regardless of if we are there. These characteristics are within the object itself, independent of our existence. An example of this would be a boulder. The boulder is made out of elements and has a large bulkiness in the shape of a cylinder. While we can see this, it is an inherent part of the boulder, and will not change based on our experiences around the boulder. Secondly, there are primary qualities – otherwise known as sensible qualities – which include the characteristics of color, taste, smell, and sound. These are all the qualities given off by an object but not intrinsically coming from within or part of that object. According to Lock, these qualities produce in us the different ideas we have of the object. An example of sensible qualities, which Lock uses on page 219, is the example of a fire. When one thinks of a fire, they may think of a warm color such as red, or just the plain thought that a firs is warm or hot. Both of these statements are not only just ideas about the object, but are ideas produced by that object and projected onto us. This leads to the next quality of an objects ability to change. Thirdly, is the power in any and all bodies, by way of primary qualities, that is, to make a change to its bulk, size, texture, etc. which makes the object produce different ideas towards us, changing our senses to that object. These changes are called powers. In Summary with John Locke’s main points, it is clear to say that “ the knowledge of existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation” (Locke 220). A last thought that Locke points out is that this whole principle of thought is reliant upon our confidences that our faculties do not deceive us, and that if we are FULLY confident in our senses, than we are fully capable of concerning the existence of material beings.

* In Frank Jackson’s essay, “The Qualia Problem”, the term Qualia is discussed and analyzed in great detail. Jackson goes on to interpret a qualia as a non-physical entity or a phenomenal feature that goes along with different senses like sight, taste, hearing, and other bodily sensations. But it is not what qualia is that is most important within the text, but what it is not, which is the physical aspect and knowledge of our senses. Jackson goes on to describe in detail how it is that certain sensations can not be described or learned though purely physical information. One of Jackson’s main and most simple ways of describing this statement is through the assumption, “ Nothing you could tell of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose” (315). This quote opens up the whole argument, forcing each reader to really ponder if they are in fact able to explain the smell of a rose. Within the essay Jackson uses a long and detailed example of a man, Fred, who is extraordinary in his ability to distinguish colors on an even more in-depth and differential level than the normal human. When Fred is given a batch of tomatoes, some more ripe than others, and asked to separate them, he sees red as two different colors, red1 and red2. Jackson firmly verifies that Fred can truly see at least one more color that we can. The use of this example stirs up many questions such as “what is the new color or colors like?” (316). The main way Jackson addresses this question is by saying that no amount of physical information about Fred’s brain and optical system tells us the answer to this question. A qualia is a raw feel, an aspect left out of the physical story. We have means of getting all the physical information about Fred and his unique sight, such as brain information and visual data, however, with all this physical information, we still do NOT know everything about Fred and his sight. Once this example is discussed, Jackson goes on to clarify that qualia is not just dealing with sight, but the rest of the senses as well such as hearing and tasting. A seemingly repeated statement of Jackson is that there really is no good reason for refusing qualia. “Qualia are a by-product of certain brain processes that are highly conducive to survival” (318). Jackson makes it known towards the end of his writing that the arguments given against qualia, however reasonable, are merely there to pacify the intuition of dualists and don’t clearly explain anything. He also points out that the argument, “ we do not and cannot understand the how and why of them”, is really no objection at all to the hypothesis of qualia, just simply a true statement (318). In summary, Jackson has the simple notion that there are things that can not be understood or described through physical means, epiphenomenal qualia, and that there is a good chance these are simply things that we need to accept fall outside of our range of comprehension.