Initial CFLCC CDR’s Planning Guidance

Problem Framing:

Ahurastan was formed as a result of Azeri nationalism and Iranian weakness. We know they have significant military capabilities, but lack access to natural resources in order to generate wealth that would help to secure their boundaries. They are surrounded by enemies, and largely lack international legitimacy. They perceive Azerbaijani weakness and desire their oil resources, as well as access to the southern tribes that would enable a “greater” Azeri nation to develop and grow over time. They are natural allies of SAPP/SAPA, and would use them much as the NVA used the Viet Cong in order to facilitate their political goals in the region.

Their strengths are their strategic missile capabilities, ethnic ties, their ability to coordinate insurgency in Azerbaijan; and most important, their offensive military proximity to their objectives in the KURA basin. Their weaknesses include their sustainment ability and extended LOCs, and they don’t have significant bridging capabilities. They also know that time is limited to achieve their regional goals, and recognize that US/coalition reinforcement of Azerbaijan may limit their strategic aims. This is why the JTF commander thinks they will likely seize the oilfields and sue for peace on their terms rather than an all out attack to seize Baku.

Our strengths include coalition support and a better strategic communications posture, our power projection capabilities, and overall joint fires. Our significant weaknesses include the extended LOCs from our current APODs/SPODs through Georgia along one route into Azerbaijan; and more importantly, our operational reach is limited vis a vis Ahurastan. We also need to be concerned with the possibility of CBRNE.

We know that Azerbaijan does not have the capability to prevent the Ahuris from seizing the oilfields without significant coalition support. The JTF objectives include: Ahurastan defeated; the border restored; economic infrastructure preserved – in particular their oil production facilities; and the government preserved.

Based on what we know, the two key factors influencing our operational design are time and distance. We have limited time to rapidly reinforce the Azerbaijanis before Ahurastan can generate the offensive capability to seize the KURA river basin and hunker down for a negotiated settlement. Based on the current friendly dispositions, and Ahurastani objectives, I see the key terrain as the Yevlakh – Myusyuslyu area that secures critical LOCs and our link between TAAs in Georgia and Azerbaijan; and the Alyat – Ali Bayramly area that backstops Azeri forces and denies key approaches to Baku. These two critical pieces of terrain are directly tied to the coalition’s operational reach problem – we are a long way from our SPODs/APODs in either case, but more critically from the blocking positions north of the KURA. I also see our need to provide operational fires to the Azeri’s to support their Phase II defense plan. This will be a critical point for the coalition to be able to seize the initiative.

I fully realize that Ahurastan may attack before we get significant forces into the region. The JTF commander also identified this problem, and he is currently conducting a detailed branch plan to address an early attack. We have some of our planners there to assist, and your JPG will also provide an execution plan for this contingency, but for now I want you to focus on developing a campaign design based on our ability to generate enough combat power to execute the JTFs current plan.