CRITIQUING THEODICES: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

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A Paper

Submitted to Prof. Scott Henderson

Luther Rice University

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In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the Course

TH 536 – Seminar in Apologetics

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By

Mark Reid

JC 1866

August 24, 2012

OUTLINE

I. INTRODUCTION II. EVALUATING THE TYPES OF EVIL III. ATHEISTIC AND SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT IV. FREE-WILL THEODICY V. POSSIBLE WORLDS VI. THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH VII. CONCLUSION VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

Evil is a universal problem with many categories. Philosophers like David Hume and Alvin Plantinga have attempted to explain the presence of evil despite there being a God. One can choose from many theodicies on moral and natural evil. Lately work has shifted to the notion of gratuitous evil. If gratuitous evils exist, is God morally responsible? Gratuitous evil and natural evil appears to bring the most plausible charge that something malevolent has occurred. This paper will critique various arguments concerning evil. Biblical Theology will show that the arguments are missing a key to understanding evil.

EVALUATING THE TYPES OF EVIL The complexity involved in addressing evil persuades us to define what is meant by natural and moral evil. It is noted, by Steven Layman, that the distinction between natural and moral evil is not always sharp. It is Erickson who provides very distinctive definitions. Natural evil are the destructive forces of nature. Forces of nature such as earthquakes and hurricanes are out of the control of man, and due to the resulting suffering are deemed evil. Moral evils are those evils committed by free moral agents. Moral and natural evil are at time corollary. Layman suggests that among the losses of natural evil is the loss of moral agency. For example a child is born with a mental handicap and cannot reason. Layman though, does not take into account the nature of sin. Biblical theology teaches that sin affects the human in such a way that disease and imperfections are inevitable. Erickson suggests that the curse (implemented due to the fall of man) “included a whole host of ills that would lead to death.” This should lead us to conclude that disease, birth defects, and the like should not be listed as natural evils. The focus will be on natural evils that seem to have no connection with moral evils. There are those who question the goodness of God in light of suffering caused by such calamities as hurricanes and earthquakes. Luke Gelinas, a skeptic, agrees. Gelinas does not see the theist having any convincing defense for natural evil. Gelinas is not alone. Skeptics and atheists have long charged there is a contradiction with the presence of evil and an all powerful and good God.

ATHEISTIC AND SKEPTICAL ARGUMENTS Epicurus is one of the first to wrestle with the contradiction. He postulated that God is either unwilling or unable to prevent evil. William Rowe, self described friendly-atheist, has written much on the problem of evil. His argument is in response to the often held ‘greater-good’ theodicy. Rowe believed it is reasonable that if suffering and evil can occur without their being any ‘greater-good’ to account for, then there must not be a God. Rowe’s argument first points out that “pointless evils” exist. Second, if God exists then “pointless evils” should not exist. Third, since “pointless evils exist” God does not exist. He observes that humans endure suffering without the awareness of God, which should question how any ‘greater-good’ can come from such evils. He adds that reason and science have replaced faith. God no longer plays a role in understanding the world. Rowe quips “For surely, if there were a God he would wish to provide us with strong reason to think that he exists, given that the horrendous evils of our world, both natural and moral, seem to provide us with reason to doubt his existence.” For Rowe and many other skeptics, there is something wrong with our world. It is the observation that a good God and gratuitous evils do not make sense. The theologian should agree, and point to the fact of the fall in the Garden of Eden. The apostle Paul would answer that God had made himself evident in His creation, and man is without an excuse (Rom. 1:18-20). Interestingly, Rowe closes by acknowledging the reasonableness of faith of the Christians. He falls short in connecting the biblical theology of the Christians to present world. Gelinas, noted earlier, questions another aspect of the greater-good theodicy. He (as well as Rowe) refutes what is known as skeptical theism. Skeptical theists remark that man can not know whether any good can come from evil. Man, for the skeptical theist, is finite and cannot fully know the reasons God allows certain evils. Gelinas also addresses John Hick’s Soul-Making theodicy. Hick’s Soul-Making defense for evil recognizes the epistemic distance of man and God. The argument goes on to show that adversities, like natural evils, are necessary for soul-making. Gelinas refutes this by pointing out like naturals evils go unnoticed at times and call forth no “virtuous” response. He observes that the Soul-making theodicy is most logical in addressing moral evils, and reasons that natural evils are not needed for soul-making. He concludes that it would be better that theism demonstrates a “better world” where natural laws do not act as natural evils. The argument of the atheist does not factor in Biblical theology’s understanding of sin. The skeptic’s argument plays a “mystery” card which side-steps the atheist’s challenge. Both arguments do little in making man culpable for evil, much less natural evil. The natural laws in our world continue despite any resistance on our part. Did God have a plan with these natural laws? Richard Swinburne (like Hick) believes God does have a purpose for these natural laws.

FREE-WILL THEODICY Swinburne sets out to defend a ‘free-will theodicy’ that explains the existence of natural evil. He observes that man is given free-will to share in the creative work of God. He then goes on to say that free-will defense for moral evil works only if one can also explain where natural evil fits. He explains the relationship, arguing the natural evils are necessary for the knowledge that mans needs to carry out moral evils. Rowe asserts that if God limits the harm men can do, he then limits their “destiny.” In his understanding, God allows evils so that man can have significant choice of “destiny.” It is not clear what Swinburne means by “destiny.” It is either man’s freedom to know God or to grow in obedience to God’s will. Rowe goes on to argue that since men gain knowledge by induction, then they need to have natural evil in order to gain this knowledge. Few have found this argument reliable. Eleonore Stump observes that along with Swinburne’s argument there is a necessary first occasion to model this knowledge. Swinburne strongly asserts that there must be a first instance of an evil in order for one to carry out or to imitate evil. It seems that Swinburne asserts that we learn evil from outside sources. This is contrary to Biblical theology’s understanding that evil comes from within man (Matt.15:19; Mk. 7:20-22). Stump argues further, “It is false that men can have knowledge of the consequences of their actions only by induction on the basis of past experiences.” Swinburne has been arguing that natural evils are necessary for free-moral agent conditioning and entails moral evils. Stump questions the value of this knowledge, affirming that men can gain knowledge of certain evil apart from observing the consequences. In light of this conversation, natural evils are purposed to provide us with the consequences of evil. Neither Swinburne nor Stump convincingly explains why natural evils exist in the first place. Swinburne convinces the reader that man can learn to do evil from natural evil, but this is not convincing as to why God would purpose the world in such a way. It is observed that one does not have to teach a three year old to lie or not follow directions. In fact parenting is partly about teaching a child to be good. Evil, it seems, does not have to be learned. Man has been given the freedom of choice, this is obvious. Overall Swinburne’s argument from free-will seeks to only justify God’s permitting of evil. The argument though does not line up with theology that recognizes evil comes from within. This negates Swinburne’s position that natural evil is necessary for man to have significant choice between good and evil. Others have postulated a solution. In this world, where there is free-will, the best possible world? ‘Possible Worlds’ theories have been postulated to help explain why natural evils exist and provide defense that this world or another is a better one.

POSSIBLE WORLDS Possible worlds are usually presented in an attempt either to justify natural evil (or laws) of this present world or demonstrate the possibility of better worlds where there is less evil and just as much good. Nick Trakakis critiques several attempts of theists to explain natural evil, and weaves in his own “Twin Earth” scenario. Trakakis “Twin Earth” is placed in a universe called Eden. This world is similar in make-up to earth as we know it. ‘Twin Earth’ only experiences moral evil, not naturally occurring disasters. This world, Trakakis suggests, would likely have less evil than the world we know presently. He examines the other worlds presented by others, including Swinburne. Postulating possible worlds presents a problem in the conversation. For one, a ‘possible world’ is clearly subjective. Second, as Peter Van Inwagen observes, our own world provides the only model we have for designing a ‘possible world.’ It is true one can describe a world, like Trakakis, were there is not natural evil. This world though is based on his human reasoning and modeled from the natural laws already existing. The universe we live in has been finely tuned. Inwagon notes, as have others, that the slightest change in the processes of nature would “render no life.” Paul Copan adds that natural events, such as earthquakes and tornadoes, are necessary for the benefit of creation. Copan further notes that effects of natural laws help make human freedom possible. One of his examples is fire, which can give warmth and help in the crafting of tools. Fire though can also burn, leaving the possibility of fire to be uses as ‘evil.’ Furthermore, it seems that man is limited somewhat in formulating better worlds. Each man’s world might throw out natural evils, but does that make it a better world? Perhaps this is the only possible world. Dr. Bruce Little convincingly argues that our present world is necessarily set to provide the best opportunity of freedom for man in choosing both good and evil. He begins by acknowledging that gratuitous evils exist, specifically in the case of free-moral agents. Little’s argument centers on the act of free-moral agents, but this is helpful in understanding the existence of evil. He explains that God “would actually be immoral if he interfered with the free moral acts of His free moral agents in preventing certain evils.” Copan would agree, adding that if God eliminated the consequences of evil choices, he would be a deceiver by allowing us to live in an illusory world. Little’s critique finds that a ‘greater-good’ theodicy only complicates the issue of evil. Little calls his defense a ‘Creation-Order Theodicy,’ of which he relies on the creation account and the implication of the fall. ‘Possible Worlds’ is merely subjective, attempting to rationalize God’s reason for allowing this world. If God though is good, then everything he creates is good. In light of this, evil is not a result of God’s doing, but is something from outside His will. Biblical theology will provide the explanatory power necessary in explain the why of evil and suggests that the term ‘natural evil’ is erroneous.

THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH The battle line of the problem of evil is drawn as to whether a good God and evil can coexist. Biblical theology affirms God and evil can coexist in light of the creation account. Genesis 1-3 provides us with detail as to God’s creativity and original intent. Seven times, throughout a six day creation account, God calls what he has made good. Creativity is shown throughout the account as details of the sky, water, and land take shape. The climax of creation comes with the creation of man (Gen. 2:4-25). It is implied that God desired a free relationship with man, where man would willingly worship God (Gen. 1:26-27). McDonald remarks on the creation, observing that God’s sole purpose was to multiply His own goodness. God’s creation of man is directly linked to His goodness. The creation account does not end with the goodness of creation; it ends with the fall of man (Gen. 3). Man is given the choice to obey God willingly (2:15-17). Adam and Eve had the choice to obey or not. God desires genuine worship, and genuine worship comes from a willing worshipper. Apart of man’s worship is in his relationship with God, which entails obedience. God does not desire forced obedience or worship, thus the opportunity to choose is necessary to glorify God fully. Little writes that man is limited in choice by creative boundaries, within a created order. This freedom is not a libertarian freedom, but a freedom within the boundaries of God’s created order. Man willingly obeys and worships. The alternative is that man decides to go his own way. Men choose from the beginning (in Adam) not to worship God (Gen. 3:6-8). In this moment, the relationship and presence of God was broken (Gen. 3:8-11). This McDonald affirms that the problem of evil is really a problem of what men have become as fallen creatures. Since man is not choosing the goodness of God, he is choosing the void of goodness. The void of goodness is evil. The corruption of creation effected man with sin, which opens the door to death and all it entails (Gen. 3:19). Erickson observes that pre-fall Adam and Eve were truly and fully human, not yet corrupted or dealing with the effects of sin. Sin has taken a hold of humanity for many years, this we see its results in various birth malfunctions, disease, and ultimately certain death. The result of the fall has wider implications. The moral choice of man affects not only humanity, but the creation that he was placed in. Miller also assumes that death and pain are simply apart of original creation. Since Miller starts with this assumption, one easily discerns how the problem of evil persists.

CONCLUSION The Common weakness in all of these arguments is the lack of filtering through Biblical theology. The Bible clearly teaches there is corruption in this world. It also teaches there is a good God. This paper opened with clarifying what is meant by natural and moral evils. This followed by a critique of various arguments concerning the problem of evil. Natural Evil seems to give the most charge that God, not man is responsible. Rowe’s argument suggests that since gratuitous evil exist, so God must not exist. Rowe only acknowledges the theist’s reasoning, but never filters his argument through it. Swinburne suggests that evil is necessary for man to have true freedom of choice, or what he calls “destiny.” His assertion though indicates that evil is an outside force. In some cases evils (such as fallen angels) perhaps do tempt man to evil. Biblical theology finds that evil comes from within, a void of goodness. We continued and examined possible worlds. We explored in particular a world where natural evil, like Trakakis ‘Twin Earth’ do not exist. Discussions on possible worlds appear weak in light of man’s understanding of the world he observes presently. Bruce Little’s understanding that this world is the best world for the best freedom supposes a world for the opportunity of both good and evil. Biblical theology only strengthens this argument when we begin by observing original creation. Everything god creates was good. God allowed freedom, because He desires a willing relationship. Man chose against God’s will, and the result is the corruption of man. Nature is also corrupted by the fall, and this acts out contrary to its original intent. We know little, if any, of what Eden would be life apart from this fall. Man’s reasoning and perception is skewed. It is reasonable then that one would deem a hurricane as ‘evil.’ Evil is an inconvenience to one’s well-fare. This is especially true when we do not understand the reason why of evil. It is my conviction that Biblical theology holds the best answer to the question, why? The problem of evil opens the discussion on common ground. Rowe is right, the believer has reasonable faith. Romans 8:28 tells the believer that God has worked all things for good. It is God’s good, not man’s view of good. The work Paul is speaking of begins with the work of Jesus. God did not leave man to his choice. He got involved by sending Jesus to share in out suffering and death (Heb. 2:9-11; 14-15). This is expanded by Paul in regards to creation. Creation, he says is eagerly awaiting the completion of this redemption (Rom. 8:19). The believer then has hope in the face of so called evils.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Caner, Ergun and Hindson, Ed. General Editors. The Popular
Encyclopedia of Apologetics. Eugence, OR. Harvest House Publishers, 2008.

Copan, Paul. That’s Just Your Interpretation: Responding Skeptics Who Challenge Your Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2001.

Erickson, Millard J. Christian Theology. 2nd Edition. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1998.

Gelinas, Luke. “The Problem of Natural Evil I: General Theistic Replies.” Philosophy Compass 4, no. 3 (2009): 531-559

Layman, Stephen C. “Natural Evil: The Comparative Response.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54, no. 1 (August 1, 2003): 1-31

Little, Bruce Alva. “A Critical Analysis of Contemporary ‘Greater-Good’ Theodicies with Special Attention Give to Gratuitous Evil.” Ph.D. diss., Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (2000). In Dissertations & Theses: Full Test [database on-line]; available from http://www.proqust.com (accessed August 12, 2012).

MacDonald Jr, Paul A. “God Incarnate and the Defeat of Evil,” Modern Theology 25, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 159-185.

Miller, Keith B. “And God saw that it was good: Death and Pain in the Created Order.” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 63, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 85-94.

Rowe, William L. “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 79-92.

Stump, Eleonore. “Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14, no. 1 (1983): 49-58.

Swinburne, Richard. “Natural Evil.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Oct. 1978): 295-301.

Trakakis, Nick. “Is Theism Capable of Accounting for any Natural Evil at All?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57, no. 2 (2005): 35-66.
Van Inwagen, Peter. “The Problem of Evil, The Problem of Air, and The Problem of Silence.” Philosophical Perspectives, 5 (1991): 135-165.

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[ 1 ]. Stephen C. Layman, “Natural Evil: The Comparative Response, “International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54, no. 1, (August 1, 2003): 11.
[ 2 ]. Millard Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), 437.
[ 3 ]. Layman, 11.
[ 4 ]. Erickson, 630.
[ 5 ]. Luke Gelinas, The Problem of Natural Evil I: General Theistic Replies,” Philosophy Compass 4, no. 3 (2009): 534.
[ 6 ]. Edward N. Martin, Evil, Problem of, The Popular Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Ed Hindson, Ergun Caner, gen. editors, (Eugene, OR: Harvest House Publishers, 2008), 211.
[ 7 ]. William L. Rowe, “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59, no 2 (April 1, 2006): 80.
[ 8 ]. Rowe, 80.
[ 9 ]. Ibid, 87.
[ 10 ]. Ibid, 88.
[ 11 ]. Ibid, 90.
[ 12 ]. Gelinas, 538; Rowe, 82-83
[ 13 ]. Ibid, 543.
[ 14 ]. Ibid, 544.
[ 15 ]. Ibid, 544.
[ 16 ]. Ibid, 547-548.
[ 17 ]. Richard Swinburne, “Natural Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Oct. 1978): 295.
[ 18 ]. Swinburne, 296.
[ 19 ]. Ibid, 296.
[ 20 ]. Eleonore Stump, “Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14, no.1 (1983); 51.
[ 21 ]. Swinburne, 299.
[ 22 ]. Stump, 52.
[ 23 ]. Stump, 54.
[ 24 ]. Nick Trakakis, “Is Theism Capable of Accounting for any Natural Evil at All?” International Journal for Philosophers of Religion, no. 57 (2005): 38.
[ 25 ]. Trakakis, 39.
[ 26 ]. Ibid, 41-50
[ 27 ]. Peter Van Inwagen, “The Problem of Evil, The Problem of Air, and The Problem of Silence,” Philosophical Perspectives, 5 (1991): 146.
[ 28 ]. Inwagen, 147; Layman, 12.
[ 29 ]. Paul Copan, That’s Just Your Interpretation: Responding to Skeptics Who Challenge Your Faith, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2001), 98.
[ 30 ]. Copan, 98.
[ 31 ]. Bruce Alva Little, “A Critical Analysis of Contemporary ‘Great-Good’ Theodicies with Special Attention Give to Gratuitous Evil,” (Ph.D. diss., Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2000), 219.
[ 32 ]. Little, 219.
[ 33 ]. Copan, 97.
[ 34 ]. Little, 234.
[ 35 ]. Paul A. McDonald Jr, “God Incarnate and the Defeat of Evil,” Modern Theology 25, no.2 (April 1, 2009): 169.
[ 36 ]. Little, 280.
[ 37 ]. McDonald Jr, 170.
[ 38 ]. Erickson, 518; 723.
[ 39 ]. Miller, 92.