The Rise and Risk of China

Introduction
Australia has felt the full impact of Chinas “extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy” (Ikenberry 2011, 23) in East Asia. The power transition of China “becoming a formidable global power” (Ikenberry 2011, 26) is of growing importance to Australia’s economic prosperity and security (Shen 2009, 110). But as relative power begins to shift, the latest defence White Paper released last Friday May 3, stated “the relationship between the United States and China, the region’s and the globe’s two most powerful states, will more than any other single factor determine our strategic environment over coming decades” (Probyn and Wright 2013). Drawing upon the Research Thesis of Yi Shen at the University of NSW, the aim of this essay is to examine the repercussions of the US-China strategic rivalry over Taiwan. In the event of conflict, Australia would be forced to side with the US which “has kept Asia peaceful and Australia secure for many decades” (White 2011, 81). Maintaining a military alliance with the US as well as ongoing economic opportunities with China requires stable relations amongst Asian powers by adopting “the logic of concert” (White 2011, 90). As China becomes an ongoing threat to US primacy in Asia, it is in the best interest of Australia to maintain dual relations by the establishment of a new order that ensures regional stability and security throughout Asia.

Clash over Taiwan
Australia’s ability to maintain dual relations with the United States and China in the long-term remain uncertain due to the US-China strategic rivalry over Taiwan (Shen 2009). Political and military tensions in the Taiwan Strait are a result of China seeking to “re-gain its glory and influence as a formidable great power” (Shen 2009, 4) in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained that reunification with Taiwan is a matter of “sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, regime survival and [ruling] legitimacy” (Shen 2009, 52). With the US “containment policy against communism [and] dominant leadership in the region and the international order”, China regards the US as “the key hindrance to the restoration of its great power status” (Shen 2009, 47-56). Shen points out that “a democratic Taiwan is in line with American values, a showcase of the universality of democracy” (2009, 76) and the US seeking to retain regional dominance through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, makes it policy to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” (2009, 60). A multibillion arms package to Taiwan was announced under the Bush Administration in 2001 under the vow that “America would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan” (Bush in Shen 2009, 62). But with the US “determined to avoid entrapment in the Taiwan issue” (Shen 2009, 73), stability in the region depends on the “island being neither permanently separated from nor reunited with China” (Shen 2009, 58). With Chinas “refusal to renounce the use of force to solve the Taiwan issue” (Shen 2009, 69), the US will however be drawn into an undesired conflict in the face of an unprovoked attack. This leads to an ongoing concern over the possibility of a future China-US military confrontation.
The importance of Taiwan to both the US and China has threatening “repercussions for Australia’s foreign policy, national security and economic prosperity” (Shen 2009, 12). As the beneficiary of China’s economic boom, China has become the top trading partner and increasingly pivotal for the Australian economy. But as bilateral relations continue to “broaden and deepen” (Shen 2009, 90), China also challenges Australia’s security alliance with the US. Since the establishment of ANZUS treaty in 1951, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated that it has “enhanced Australia’s strategic position in the Asia Pacific region in an emerging age of great strategic uncertainty” (Shen 2009, 102) . The uncertainty is evident in the precarious and ongoing Taiwan issue, and whether the alliance will “survive against the backdrop of US-China strategic rivalry” (2009, 32) is fundamental to ensure that the US remains Australia’s “ultimate grantor of its security” (Shen 2009, 108).
The 2003 foreign policy White Paper ‘Advancing National Interest’ stated that “Australia has a vital interest in supporting US strategic engagement in East Asia, because of its fundamental contribution to regional stability” (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Shen 2009, 12). Cogan argues that Australia has been “arguably blindly faithful” (2012) to the US, which would inevitably “incur maximum retaliation from China…with catastrophic repercussion for the Australian economy and regional interest” (Shen 2009, 109) in the event of conflict over Taiwan. With the newest defence White Paper including a US aircraft carrier to be based in WA (Probyn and Wright 2013), Cogan reports on “northern and western Australia as a crucial staging ground for potential conflicts with China”, adding that “the city would be a prime nuclear target in any war with China” (Cogan 2012). Chinas “rapid economic growth, military build-up and expanding influence” (Shen 2009, 61) in addition to Australia’s alliance with the US over Taiwan suggests the need for “an alternative that offers the most stable relationships among Asian powers” (White 2011, 90).

A New International Order
John Ikenberry, a Professor of Politics writing from a US realist approach, recognises that “the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic struggle with the United States over global rules and leadership” (2008, 33). Projecting that China will surpass the US in GDP and Defence Expenditures within the decade, Ikenberry argues that Chinas expanding power and influence can be accommodated within the rules and institutions of the dominant Western order (2008). But Professor of Strategic Studies Hugh White, contradicts that “Chinas economic rise will carry more strategic and political weight” (2011, 82), outgrowing the US-led order. To avoid the threat of America competing for leadership in Asia, White seeks to constrain China and ensure Western primacy from a liberalist standpoint in a system historically successful between the great powers of 19th century Europe. Asia can be led in shared regional leadership through a multilateral division of power between America, China, Japan and India (White 2011, 84). This extends from Ikenberrys 2004 article to “envisage a future regional order that involves more multilateral forms of security and political cooperation” (354). But most importantly, a ‘Concert of Asia’ would be serving in Australia’s best interest in the midst of a weakening US global position (White, 2011). Australia wishes to maintain stable relations by not having either the “US withdraw from Asia or compete with China for primacy” (White 2011, 88). A concert system ensures an ongoing US presence in the region in order to “maximise [their] influence in Asia while minimising the risks of conflict” (White 2011, 85). As long as “American power is accepted and welcomed throughout Asia” (White 2011, 82), Australia can best preserve an economic relationship with China and a strategic alliance with the US.

Conclusion
Topics in this essay can be compared to the alternative argument of China not posing a security risk to Australia. Shen concludes his thesis in finding that “China and the US are not destined to clash with each other” (Shen 2009, 111). China still wishes for ‘peaceful unification’ when “return[ing] Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland” (Shen 2009, 54). Additionally, the US seeks to “deter China from challenging its dominance but is determined to avoid unnecessary conflicts” (Shen 2009,111). Ikenberry holds that “the rise of china does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition [because] it is much less likely that China will ever manage to overtake the Western order” (2008, 24-36). In an age where nuclear weapons have led to “war-driven change…abolished as a historical process” (Ikenberry 2008, 31), the US and China also rely on mutually dependent economies and enjoy the benefits as top trading partners (Shen 2009). But Richard Bush, Director of Centre for Northeast Asian Policy Studies still promotes Taiwan as the “only subject where the use of force has been explicitly viewed by both the US and China as a possible tool in resolving the issue” (Shen 2009, 25). And although “Australia will for the foreseeable future be able to retain its favoured dual approach” (Shen 2009, 113), military balance continues to shift in Chinas favour over a subject of national honour. Secondly, an alternative point of view to the concert system is stated best by John Lee from The Australian, “if Australia wants to remain an active, relevant and influential middle power in Asia then spending the next half decade improving our bilateral relationship with countries such as India is much more important and a better use of finite time, resources and energy than the nice-sounding but premature idea of an Asia-Pacific community” (Lee 2009).
This essay summarises that the security of Australia largely depends on a US-China conflict over Taiwan and the establishment of a new international order. Australia would prefer to maintain the status quo, but when not possible, would like to see a new order to accommodate China’s power in a shared regional relationship (White 2011).

References * Cogan, James. 2012. “US report proposes aircraft carrier base in Western Australia.” Accessed May 9, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/08/carr-a03.html * Lee, John. 2009. “Rudd risks irrelevance by failing to court New Delhi.” The Australian, November 6. * Ikenberry, John. G. 2004. “American Hegemony and East Asian order.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58(3): 353-367. * - 2008. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs 87(1): 23-37. * Probyn, Andrew and Wright, Shane. 2013. “Defence build-up keeps China in mind.” The Weekend West, May 4-5. * Shen, Yi. 2009. “The Rise of China and its Impact on Australia’s Relations with the United States.” Master’s thesis, University of New South Wales. * White, Hugh. 2011. “Power shift: rethinking Australia’s place in the Asian century.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65(1): 81-93.