Being-for-itself, Being-in-itself, and Being-for-others: Sartre's Modes of Being

I am therefore I think; Sartre's modes of being can be viewed as an extension to Descartes' famous aphorism. The three modes of being affirm that man has to exist first before he can begin to question his essence. There would be no point in ascribing meaning to life or one's existence if one does not realize that acknowledging one's existence precedes every other meaningful quest in life (Descartes & Weissman, 1996, p. 3). The three modes of being also suggestively point to the fact that, amidst our increasingly controlled and regulated universe, there exist free will amongst each individual provided they acknowledge that their existence comes before their individual essence. This challenges earlier notions of viewing the human condition as a single entity in isolation of its social context.
Sartre acknowledges that human existence is intertwined and embedded in social the contexts one happens to exist in. The three modes of being are thus used to explain this dynamic existence in a sense that Sartre establishes the foundations of existentialism from them. Being-in-itself and being-for-itself are the primary modes of being that describes human consciousness. Being-for-others is a dynamic dimension used to explain our acknowledgment that we exist in a world with others and describes our varied approaches towards how we choose to encounter the 'others' in the world. The primary modes of being and the interpersonal dimension of being together provide for the concept of radical dualism that Sartre uses to explore the dynamics of existence (Sartre, 1956, p. 330-333).
The existence of others constantly bombards an individual both in mind and body as he/she lives in the world. Radical dualism as described by Sartre evinces the fact that human beings have established that their relations to other human beings is of paramount importance to their existence. However, Sartre acknowledges that this innocent realization is also the root of ourselves losing control of our own existence to others. Interaction with the existence of other people in the world is an important means that individuals have in obtaining knowledge about themselves (Richmond, 2007, p. 81). If one was to be considered living in isolation from everybody else, it would be nearly impossible to ascertain that one knows and understands oneself. Existential essence is tied to both acknowledging ones existence first then realizing that the existence of other individuals helps one understand the mysteries involved in one's self.
Sartre explains that, contrary to popular belief and opinions, the existence of others cannot be simply viewed as the existence of an 'object''; that is, others existence cannot be simply put off as to have no significant influence in the existence of an individual. Figuring out the world in which others live in is equally as important as figuring out one's world in the quest to better understand one's existence. In actuality, being-in-itself and being-for-itself are subjective. The existence of other individuals is both for their own sakes and for the sake of others just as the existence of an individual is both for his/her own sake (primarily) and for the sake of others. Consequently, 'the look' is used by individuals in relations with others to reduce the existence of other people in their social contexts to the existence of an object in their own world (Svenaeus, 2009, p. 56).
Objectivity and subjectivity can thus be said to play an important role in delineating complex interplays involved in understanding the two primary modes of being and how they influence being-for-others. This is evident in Sartre's conclusion where he asserts that conflict defines most of our primary and core relationships with others. As pessimistic as this view appears, it is common practice in the world to note that most of our important relationships arise from conflict, are sustained by conflict, and it takes conflict to end the unimportant ones and begin new relationships (Spinelli, 2007, p. 4). The existence of other people is both 'heaven' and 'hell' to the existence of an individual. Depending on the context, it can elevate one to higher heights of knowledge where one finds a balance between comprehending one's existence and that of others or it can lead to confusion that is characteristic of individuals finding essence in their lives before acknowledging their own existence.
Being-in-itself with regard to the ontology of human beings is without lack and full of itself. An individual seeks this state of being for the sole purpose of comprehending one's consciousness and admitting its changeless nature (Wegerif, 2008, p. 358). Being-for-itself is characterized by the nature and effect of being a 'human being'. The societal norms and practices and what is expected of individuals in their varied social contexts form part of being-for-itself. In this state an individual is considered to only think of one's own existence, be fully aware of one's existence, and ultimately have a relation with oneself. I may be existing in the world as a conscious being but I am also surrounded by other conscious beings. I can thus outrightly state that I am an embodied consciousness and my body is fundamentally my ultimate structure of being for myself.
My body's physical presence is the only aspect of my existence that is physically perceived by others. So in my encounters with others, I am both a being-for-itself (to myself) and a being-to-itself (to others). In a similar manner, it is always my primal instinct to characterize other's encounter with my physical body as first being for themselves before being to other selves. My body and the bodies of everyone else I encounter are barriers to each one of us understanding each other's consciousness. This limitation towards attaining each other's consciousness makes us perceive our encounters as mere encounter of 'objects' whereas we instinctively know that, to ourselves, we are more than that. The general realization is that we may perceive ourselves as special kind of objects to each other but no kind of object to our own selves. From this point of view, I agree to the premise that even though I may appear to be fully aware of my body through my experiences with both its physical and internal nature, there also exists an objective side to it which I share with the rest of the world.
This objective side in not purely mine and the world in which it exists in is not purely my own. Being-for-itself also brings out the duality of consciousness. An individual is conscious of his existence which can be characterized as attaining consciousness of one's being. However, consciousness can never attain being on itself (Zahavi, 2006, p. 81). Sartre proposes that the two primary modes of being are used in consciousness to create a world that is different from the physical world that characterizes an individual's social context. This newly created world is then acted upon by consciousness whereby individuals now derive meaning to various phenomena in their environment. This premise fortifies the realization that, at any moment in time, I am a free being capable of ascribing meaning to different aspects of my existence as they appeal to my consciousness.
However, in the event that another individual in introduced into my world, my capability and freedom to ascribe meaning to phenomena in my life is significantly influenced by the existence of the other being. In essence, human beings have free will to decide which course different events in their lives should take. The fact that it is commonly conjectured that there exist no free will and that things happen as fate would have them happen is a clear indication of how the existence of others affects our ability to perceive and use free will (Busch, 2008, p. 36). We are overly concerned with the existence of other people just as we are overly concerned of our own. The intersections of our own private worlds with the worlds immediately after greatly hinder our ability to comprehend our own free will and that of others.
I lose control over my own being in the quest to acknowledge the being of others. Acknowledging my own existence before questing to find my essence or acknowledging the existence of others is thus of utmost importance. The three modes of being when clearly scrutinized establishes that we have free will in our own existence but limited to our comprehension of our interactions with other people's worlds. While I may claim to live life from the inside and projecting everything else to the outside, I am an object of evaluation in other people's worlds and they seek to understand their worlds and themselves better through me. This confluence of worlds reduces my power to act as a free subject thereby disrupting and decentralising my free will.

References
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Sartre, J. P. (1956). Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 330.
Spinelli, E. (2007). Hell is other people: A Sartrean view of conflict resolution. International Journal of Existential Psychology and Psychotherapy, 1(3), 1-6
Svenaeus, F. (2009). The phenomenology of falling ill: An explication, critique and improvement of Sartre’s theory of embodiment and alienation. Human Studies, 32(1), 53-66.
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Zahavi, D. (2006). Intersubjectivity in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Alter,10(265), 81.