Saudi Arabia is a medium political risk country. Saudi Arabia is the No. 1 oil exporter, underpins U.S. security policy in the Middle East and holds great sway over the world's 1.6 billion Muslims through its guardianship of Islam's two holiest sites.
The first political risk facing is the succession. King Abdullah turns 90 this year and his heir, half-brother Crown Prince Salman, turns 77. In February he named his youngest half-brother, Prince Muqrin, 70, as second deputy premier, a role often seen as making its holder second-in-line to rule. However, it is not certain that Muqrin will one day become king and the ruling al-Saud family is preparing for the moment when the line of brothers born to its founder Ibn Saud is exhausted and power must move to the next generation. By appointing Ibn Saud's grandsons to new roles, including interior minister and governor of Riyadh province, in recent months, Abdullah has already started the gradual transfer of power to younger princes.
The second political risk is the domestic strains. King Abdullah has advanced some economic and social reforms to address youth unemployment, corruption and a lack of housing but offered no big political reforms. Riyadh plans to spend a record $219 billion on welfare and infrastructure in 2013. Tensions smoulder between those who want more social change, such as bringing more women into the workplace, and powerful conservatives who condemn such reforms as un-Islamic. Clerics have protested against the appointment of women to the advisory Shura Council and judicial reforms.
The third political risk is the regional tensions. The aftermath of 2011's Arab uprisings has undermined old Saudi allies and destabilised the region against a backdrop of Riyadh's over-arching rivalry with Shi'ite Muslim power Iran. Riyadh has joined regional Sunni Muslim powers to aid rebels fighting to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Iran, but fears Tehran is stirring unrest in Shi'ite-majority Bahrain, whose rulers are close to Riyadh. Iran denies this.
The fourth political risk is the SHI’ITE minority. Anti-government protests among minority Saudi Shi'ites have resulted in the deaths of 16 demonstrators and one policeman in shooting incidents in Qatif district since early 2011. Shi'ites complain of entrenched discrimination, which Riyadh denies. Older, more moderate Shi'ite leaders say they fear violence may radicalise youths and discourage a path of dialogue.
The last political risk is the islamist militancy. Al Qaeda remains a significant security concern. The Saudis crushed an armed militant campaign in 2003-6, but many al Qaeda operatives then joined their counterparts in neighbouring Yemen. Riyadh fears turbulence in Yemen may allow al Qaeda to flourish there. The goals of Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) include ousting the Saudi royal family.
Bangladesh is a high political risk country. This past year Bangladesh overcame a near failing of their government, as a number of political issues threatened to tear the seams of an already stretched nation. In addition to governmental short comings, other political issue run rampant in Bangladesh.

The first political risk in Bangladesh is the violence. 2013 Bangladesh violence started on February 28, 2013 after the announcement of death sentence of Delwar Hossain Sayidee, a leader of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami , who was accused of murder, arson, looting, rape, and forcefully converting non-muslim people to muslims during the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971. European diplomats say as many as 50 people were killed in the capital as security forces cracked down on members of an extreme Islamist group, Hefajat-e-Islam. Many more were killed elsewhere. Odhikar, a reputable human-rights outfit, reports that some hundreds of people died during a “killing spree” by a force of 10,000 made up of police, paramilitaries and armed men from the ruling Awami League. Bodies were strewn about the streets of Dhaka’s commercial district. Deadly clashes took place elsewhere, such as at Narayanganj, south of the capital, where 20 people were reported killed. The coming months look turbulent. A war-crimes tribunal will continue issuing verdicts on trials of Islamist hardliners, nearly all of them leaders of Jamaat, over atrocities committed during the 1971 war of independence from Pakistan. One guilty verdict in February led to violent protests and the deaths of at least 67. On May 9th the tribunal sentenced Jamaat’s deputy head, Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, to death for crimes against humanity. Bangladesh will brace for more bloodshed.
The second political risk is the religion. Religious influences in Bangladesh politics were seem to be serious. When Bangladesh gained independence from the Islamic nation of Pakistan, the nation supported a secular view on politics, focusing more on social liberties than religious fundamentalism. However, Bangladesh citizens are largely Muslim and since the signing of the constitution, laws have been enacted that encourage Islamic viewpoints.
Following the Indian partition of 1947, the Islamic nation of Pakistan consisted of modern day Pakistan and Bangladesh. The boundary lines were drawn this way because of the large populations of Islamic citizens. When Pakistan began pushing Muslim policy, such as naming Urdu the national language, Bangladesh citizens fought to retain their cultural identity. Islamic politics did not suit the future Bangladesh nation and they soon after pushed for their independence.
The third political risk is the child labor laws. The world community criticized the nature of child labor laws in Bangladesh over the past fifteen years but statistically, the percentage of children in the workforce remains high. Due to a combination of poverty and persistent social aloofness to the necessity of stringent child labor laws, this trend will likely continue. Although several labor laws and federal agencies exist predicated on the elimination of children from the workforce, many families require the extra income while poverty-stricken regions of Bangladesh have little to offer in terms of education and skilled job training. During the 1990s estimations of children in the Bangladesh workforce ranged from a couple million, upwards to 20 million, of children working in low-paying factory jobs.