What is Statutory Interpretations?
Statutory Interpretations is the process by which Judges interpret Acts of Parliament. 75% of cases heard by the House of Lords are concerned with statutory interpretation. Statutory Interpretation is the process of reading and applying statutory laws, and judges trying to find out the intention of parliament when passing the law. Sometimes the words of a statute have a plain and straightforward meaning. But in most cases, there is some ambiguity (can be interpreted in more than one way) or vagueness (unclear) in the words of the statute that must be resolved by the judge. An example of where the language was unclear can be seen in the case of Twining v Myers (1982), where court has to decide whether roller skates amounted to a ‘vehicle’. There may be other cases where the meaning of words change over time, for example the Offences Against a Persons Act 1861 uses the word “malicious” and “grievous” which either would not be used in this modern day and time, or if used have different meanings to which was intended when the Drafts Man of the act write it. Other means of when Statutory interpretations would be needed is when Drafting errors are present in the bill, this happens mostly when bills are rushed in times of emergency.
Problems of interpreting statutes?
The problems with interpreting statues is that Judges have to decide what parliament meant by a particular piece of legislation. In most cases judges correctly judge of what the intentions of parliament was at the time of passing the law and whether it still applies in the present time. However, as you with all methods there are disadvantages. Judges can often miss-interpret the act or legislation. Other factors which may arise as a problem is their ruling must abide with the Human Rights Act and European Law. This may lead to laws not being applied by which parliament intended as it contradicts higher laws which may not have been present at the time of the passing of legislation.
How judges deal with problems of statutory interpretation? i. Presumptions
A judge begins by assuming certain things. These will be taken to be true unless a good argument is given to demonstrate that the presumption should not apply. These presumptions are: • That the law has not been changed – unless the act shows a clear intention to change it; • That mens rea is required in criminal cases; • That parliament has not changed the law ‘retrospectively’ (that the stature does not affect past acts, to make illegal something that was legal at the time it was done). ii. Presumptions of language: • Ejusdem generis (of the same kind) – general words following particular words are of the same class: (for example, ‘tradesman, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever’ will only cover person of a similar type). In the case of Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (1899), the words ‘other place’ were held to mean ‘other indoor place’ because the list referred to a ‘house, office, room or other place’ and the ‘house’, ’office’ and ‘room’ are all indoors. • Noscitur a socis (known by the company it keeps) – words derive their meaning from the other words surrounding them (which means words are generally interpreted in the context of the Section and the Act as a whole). i.e. ‘floors,’ in the expression ‘floors, steps, stairs, passages and gangways’ was interpreted to cover floor along which persons walked as opposed to any storage space. • Expression unius est exclusion alterius (the expression of one excludes others) – the express reference of one member of a class may exclude other members of the class not so expressed (for example the express reference to ‘coal mines’ may exclude reference to other types of mine.)
Literal Rule
The literal rule requires the judge to give the word or phrase its natural, ordinary or dictionary meaning, even if this appears to be contrary to the intentions of parliament. As Lord Reidsaid in Pinner v Everett (1969):
“In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, the first question to ask is always what is the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute.”
In the case of Whiteley v Chappell (1868) an Act made it offence to impersonate ‘any person entitled to vote at an election.’ The defendant attempted to vote in the name of a decreased person, but the court held no offence had been committed because when ‘any person entitled to vote’ is interpreted literally, it does not include dead people.
Another example is in the case of Fisher v Bell (1961). In this case the defendant displayed flick knives in his shop window. He was charged under The Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (1959). The act made it an offence to ‘sell or offer for sale’ an offensive weapon. In contract law the display of goods in a shop window is not an offer for sale but an invitation to treat; the display of goods thus invites the customer to make an offer to buy the goods. The court found the defendant not guilty despite the obvious aim of the Act being to prevent such behavior.
Golden Rule
This rule allows the court to look at the literal meaning of a word or phrase, but then avoid using a literal interpretation which would lead to absurd result. There are two approaches taken while applying the golden rule, these being the narrow approach and the broad approach.
So under the golden rule, the court takes the literal approach unless it results in great absurdity, inconvenience, or inconsistency, and then it modifies the meaning, within the context of the statute, just as far as is necessary to avoid the absurdity.
The River Wear Commissioners v Anderson (1877)
“we are to take the whole of the statute together and construe it altogether, giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity, or inconvenience, so great as to convince the court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification, and to justify the court in putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the court thinks the words will bear.’
An example of narrow approach can be seen in the case of Allen (1872). In this case the defendant married for a second time. He was charged under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which states it is an offence to marry again without the previous marriage being ended by a divorce. Allen argued that is was not possible to be legally married twice, so he could not have committed an offence. This interpretation of the word ‘marry’ would mean that the offence is impossible to commit. The court had to decide whether ‘marry’ means to become legally married to another person, or whether it means to go through a ceremony of marriage. To avoid an absurd result the court adopted the second meaning and held Allen was guilty under the Act.
In the case of Re: Sigsworth (1935), a person who had murdered his mother was allowed to benefit from the proceeds of her estate, when she died without leaving a will. If statutory law had been interpreted literally, the son would have formed the ‘issue’ of the dead woman, and have been able to claim her money. The court felt that they had to modify this, within the context of the statute, on grounds of public policy, to prevent the murderer benefiting from the fruits of his crime.
An example of Broad approach can be seen in the case of Adler v George (1964) the defendant was charged under the Official Secrets Act 1920 with obstructing a member of armed forces ‘in the vicinity of a prohibited place.’ The defendant argued that he was actually in the prohibited place, not in the vicinity of it, that is, near to it. Had the court applied this literal interpretation of the phrase the defendant would not have been guilty. The court therefore interpreted the phrase ‘in the vicinity of’ to include ‘in’ a prohibited place to avoid absurd result.
Mischief Rule
The mischief rule is applied to find out what Parliament meant. It is a contextual method of interpreting statutes, and looks for the wrong, or mischief, which the stature was trying to correct. The statute is then interpreted in the light of this. The rule is an old rule, based on the Heydon’s Case (1584) in which certain steps were indentified as a way to interpretation. It was said that judges should: • Consider what the law was before the Act was passed; • Identify what was wrong with that law; • Decide how Parliament intended to improve the law through the statute in question; • Apply that finding to the case before the court.
Broadly speaking, therefore, the rule requires that where an Act has been passed to remedy a weakness or defect in the law, the interpretation which will correct that weakness or defect is the one to be adopted.
An example of where the mischief can be seen in the case of Smith v Hughes (1960). Some prostitutes were accused of soliciting, contrary to the Street Offences Act 1958 which made it offence to ‘solicit in a street…for the purpose of prostitution’. The defendant, along with other prostitutes, sat on a balcony, or inside a building tapping on the window, to attract the attention of men in the street. Interpreted literally, there would therefore be no offence. Applying the mischief rule, it did not matter that the women were not themselves in the street, as they were still soliciting men in the street, which was what the Act was designed to prevent. They were therefore found guilty. Lord parker said, ‘Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets…I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone’.
Purposive Approach
The purposive approach focuses on what Parliament intended when passing the new law. The purposive approach is a modern version of the mischief approach.
In Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Harts (1993) Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: “the fine distinction between looking for the mischief and looking for the intention in using words to provide the remedy are technical and inappropriate.'
The purposive approach: the court looks at the purpose of the statute and interprets the words to bring about that purpose.
An example of purposive approach can be seen in the case of Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Harts (1993) where the issue was how to interpret s63 of the Finance Act 1976. Teachers at an independent school for boys were having their children educated at the school for a fifth of the price charged to the public. This was a taxable benefit based on the ‘cash equivalent’ could be interpreted to mean either the additional cost of providing the concession to the teachers or the average cost of providing the concession to the teachers or the average cost of providing the tuition to the public and the teachers. The House of Lords referred to statements made by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury during the committee stage which revealed that the intention of Parliament to tax employees on the basis of the additional cost to the employer of providing the concession.
Another example can be seen in the case of Jones v Tower Boot Co. (1997). In this case the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the physical and verbal abuse of a young black worker by his workmates fell within ‘the course of employment’ under s32 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The employer had argued that these actions fell outside the course of the workmate’s employment, because such behavior was not part of their job. The Employment Appeal Tribunal could not therefore be held responsible to the young black worker for his workmate’s behaviour. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal using the purposive approach to interpret s32. Parliament’s intention when enacting the Race Relations Act was to eliminate discrimination in the workplace and this would not be achieved by applying a narrow construction to the wording.
The purposive approach provides scope for judicial law-making because the judge is allowed to decide what he/she thinks Parliament intended the Act to say rather than what the Act actually says.
As legislation has increased in length and scope; the great majority of legal cases now concern some aspect of statutory interpretation. In practice, it is impossible to draft a statute which covers all eventualities and is free from conflict about its application.

In order to assist judges in determining the meaning of law, ‘rules’ of statutory interpretation have developed through the courts. It is difficult to ascertain the exact intention of Parliament at the time a particular statute was passed, and climate changes may affect this retrospectively. The process of statutory interpretation is creative – the judges themselves develop the law according to their own understanding and interpretive priorities.

1978 – Parliament passed the Interpretation Act – defines ‘he’ as ‘he and she’ etc.

Problems with the Law

• Dangerous Dogs Act 1995 – broad terms used which are not fully defined • College of Nursing v DHSS (1981) over the Abortion Act 1967– technological developments can outdate legislation • Cheesman v DPP (1990) – changes in language (‘passenger’)
The traditional approach is known as the literal rule. This was described by the Lord Chancellor of 1951 - Lord Simonds – as, “a duty of the court to interpret the words that the legislature has used… the power and the duty of the court to travel outside them… is strictly limited.” Therefore, the risk of undermining Parliamentary sovereignty is reduced. Zander described the literal rule as “mechanical, divorced from the realities of the use of language.”

The Literal Rule

• CHAPPELL & WHITELEY (1868) – impersonating a dead person is not impersonating a person entitled to vote • R v HARRIS (1836) – ‘stab, cut or wound’ does not involve use of teeth • LONDON RAILWAY Co v BERRIMAN (1946) – ‘relaying and repairing’ does not include maintenance
The literal rule may fail to express the intention of Parliament. Therefore, the golden rule developed. This states that where the application of the literal rule leads to a manifest absurdity, the judges should adapt the language of the statute in order to produce a sensible outcome. This approach caters for the need that a circumstance may arise which Parliament failed to see or expect – it is more realistic than the literal rule. However, like the literal rule, the golden rule still prioritises what Parliament said rather than what it may have meant. Very rarely do words only have one possible meaning.

The Golden Rule

• ADLER v GEORGE (1964) – ‘in the vicinity of’ can be read as ‘in’ • R v ALLEN (1872) – ‘married’ can be read as ‘having gone through a ceremony of marriage’ • Re SIGSWORTH (1935) – a son who had murdered his mother could not benefit from her will
Therefore, a third approach has developed – the mischief rule. This seeks to give expression to the full intention of Parliament – by identifying the ‘mischief’ which the legislation sought to remedy or the purpose it was intended to fulfil. This purposive approach states that, in order for judges to accurately apply the law, they must be able to understand what Parliament’s intentions were.

The Mischief Rule

• HEYDON’S CASE (1584) – established the rule • SMITH v HUGHES 1960) – prostitutes who loitered on window balconies argued the were innocent because it wasn’t on a ‘street’ – they were found guilty • ROYAL COLLEGE OF NURSING v DHSS (1981) – technology now allowed that nurses could be included as ‘registered medical practitioners’ and therefore could carry out abortions
In Pepper v Hart (1993), Lord Griffiths said that, “The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation”.

An example of this approach can be seen in the case of R v Smith (2001). In this case the House of Lords had to consider the Criminal Justice Act 1988 relating to the confiscation of proceeds of crime. The defendant had smuggled cigarettes that had been intercepted by Customs. The Act stated that an offence had been committed if the defendant had gained a ‘pecuniary advantage’ – and the Court of Appeal decided that because the goods had been seized no profit had been made – and therefore no advantage. The House of Lords disagreed, and said that under the purposive approach, the intention to gain an advantage was the same as actually doing it. One of the Lords stated that the function of Customs is to intercept such goods; and so it would be absurd to not punish the defendant.

The use of a purposive approach in the English Legal System has grown, as it is often the method adopted by the European Court of Justice. (College of Nursing case 1981)

Internal Aids - the statute in its entirety, the short title, the long title, marginal notes, section headings, schedules, preamble. Since 1998 Bills have been published with much fuller explanatory notes.

External Aids - Since Black-Clawson (1975) the courts have been able to consider White Papers for the purpose of identifying the mischief.

Since Pepper v Hart (1993), the courts can consider Hansard where there is ambiguity in the legislation or where it clearly indicates the mischief. The previous reluctance to consult it was based on s.9 Bill of Rights 1689, which prohibits the courts from using anything said in Parliament in order to preserve its authority and protect MPs. In 1993, the House of Lords decided by a 6 to 1 majority to reverse this rule and allow Ministerial statements to be referred to where there is ambiguity or feeling that it would explain the ‘mischief’. Lord Browne-Wilkinson said that it was wrong for the court to ‘blind’ itself to a clear indication of Parliament’s intention.

(However, in a study of 6 cases in which Hansard was referred to, the references very rarely helped to solve ambiguity).

Since 1998 Bills have been published with more explanatory notes; which explain the background to the statute, summarise its provisions and explain its context.

S.3 of the HRA 1998 requires judges to interpret legislation ‘in so far as is possible’ in a way that is compatible with the ECHR. In R v Lambert (2002), Lord Hope argued that s.3 could not allow the judiciary to interpret the law in a way which conflicts with the expressed intention of Parliament; and in Poplar Housing (2001) Lord Woolf stresses the need for the courts not to exceed their role.

Rules of Language

1. Esjudem Generis – a word takes its meaning from those around it 2. Expressio Unius – the inclusion of one term excludes others 3. Noscitur a Sociis – a word should be interpreted within context