Does theory of mind develop gradually or is there a radical conceptual shift between the ages of 3 and 4 years? Explain how research evidence supports your views.
From an evolutionary perspective, the complex and highly functional psychological abilities can be seen as a product of a continuous adaptation process. Well-developed mental skills form the basis of humans complex and advanced mental functioning, both interpersonal and intrapsychologically. One of these advanced mental abilities is the capability to attribute emotions, intentions and knowledge within yourself and others (Flavell, 2004). This is a form of social cognition or a mental understanding that within developmental psychology is termed “Theory of Mind”. It is often said that children start to develop a “Theory of Mind” at the age between 3 to 5 years (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), but scientists have always had different views and opinions about when and how Theory of Mind develops. Some researchers believe that this development happens gradually, while others believe there is a conceptual shift between the ages of 3 and 4. I will in this essay evaluate and discuss the different viewpoints with the support of previous research evidence.

Within the theory of mind approach, the ability to attribute mental states to others is considered evidence for children having developed a psychological understanding of the mind as representational – that is, they have realised that what is in the mind is only a representation of reality and not necessarily an accurate truth. This sophisticated perception means that the child understands that there is a difference between an object and the idea of the object. In other words, they have learned to distinguish between reality and mentality (Schaffer, 1996, p. 184). Before this ability is developed, the child is dominated by their own perspective to such an extent that it is hard to understand that others may perceive reality in a different way. Piaget described this form of restriction in a child’s mind as egocentricity. He believed that the cognitive development mainly engages a long process of increasing decentration, so that the child can gradually acquire skills in discriminating their individual perspectives from others.

A lot of research has involved investigating what time it is reasonable to assume that a child has developed a Theory of Mind. Wimmer and Perner designed in 1983 a test situation, which made it possible to accurately measure whether a child had undergone the cognitive restructuring required to obtain a Theory of Mind – a so-called “false belief task”. A typical false belief task involves a boy named Maxi who puts a chocolate on place A. While he is out playing, the chocolate is moved from place A to place B. The participant then gets asked where the boy will look for the chocolate when he returns. Most three year olds answered that Maxi would look at location B, where they knew that the chocolate was placed, and not at place A where Maxi last saw it. However, most four year olds answered correctly on the task. Wimmer and Perner concluded that children negotiate a conceptual shift at the age of four, which allows them to acknowledge false belief.

Gopnik and Astingtion (1988) discovered that children below four years of age couldn’t access their own states of belief, nor others. In their study children were shown a Smarties-tube and asked what they believed was inside. After the children obviously replied Smarties, the researchers opened the lid and revealed surprisingly that a set of pencils were inside. Subsequently, the researcher put the lid back on and asked ‘When you first saw the Smarties-tube, what did you think was inside?’ Most children below four years reported their recent belief and said ‘pencils’. In comparison, most 4 years old children reported the correct answer and said ‘Smarties’. The traditional conclusion is that younger children have not yet developed sufficient theory of mind to realise that other people may lack the knowledge or believe that does not match reality (Gopnik, 1993).

Piaget believed that egocentricity is a feature only found in children. The absence of a theory of mind has been described as a cognitive limitation that expires within a certain age through a qualitative restructuring. This representation implies a categorical view of theory of mind; that means that this ability is something you either have or do not have. Such a view is reflected in the operationalization of theory of mind. Measurements of the traditional false belief tasks give a typical “pass” or “fail” outcome. Wimmer and perner’s (1983) task causes such an either-or approach. Several researchers argue that only when a child passes such a task, it can be credited with a theory of mind (Mitchell, 1996). Another possibility is, however, to conceptualise theory of mind as a dimensional capability. Flavell (1990) suggested that a child’s skills can be divided into two levels, where the child on the first level realises that others can experience reality in a different way that the child itself. On the second level, the child begins to develop a number of complex strategies to figure out what the other person is experiencing. In other words, the potential of development is in the child’s increasing knowledge of how mental representations are communicated in the form of, for example, facial expressions and verbal statements.

A new wave of studies based on observations of toddlers’ use of their eyes and how they help others have, in a fundamental way, altered our viewpoint of children’s early understanding of other people. According to Berk (2009) the child discovers early that people have their own intentions, thoughts and feelings. Traditional tasks of Maxi and Smarties type require cognitive and linguistic skills that go beyond the actual ability to understand what other people know, and therefore give the wrong impression of children’s understanding. Thus, researchers have attempted to identify methods suitable for detecting an implicit understanding of mind. Onishi and Ballargeon (2005) showed 15-month-old’s a woman placing a toy watermelon in a yellow or green box. The toy was then moved, for some of the children when the woman was watching, for others while she was not. The children looked longer at the woman when she put her hand in the empty box when she actually had observed that the watermelon had been moved. They also looked longer at the woman when she put her hand into the box where the toy was when she had not observed the toy being moved. Onishi and Baillargeon claims that the children are acting surprised because the woman acted in a way the children did not expect as she harboured a false belief. These results suggest that infants as young as 15 months old are to some extent able to understand the behaviour of others.

Today it is more common to use tests were several varieties of false belief tasks are included, so that average scores will be achieved instead of merely “pass” or “fail” results. With a dimensional conceptualisation may “pass” on a false belief task only be a first sign of the child’s understanding of mental phenomenons (Flavell, 1999). The ability to “read” others will continue to develop throughout life. For me, it gives more meaning to have a development that describes continuity in in children’s ability to attribute mental states to others instead of a categorical view where children go from being completely unaware until a sudden understanding of mental phenomenons. These new waves of studies based on children’s use of their eyes have in a fundamental way altered the viewpoint of children’s early understanding of other people. Toddlers know more about other people’s actions than previously thought, but it is still uncertain how much children actually know about other people’s thinking process. Moreover, it is by no means clear how to explain the studies, and there is no theory that fully integrates the results of all the new experiments (Low and Wang, 2011). Any theory of the development of theory of mind must be able to explain both the use of children’s gazes or expressions and the fact the older children also have problems solving tasks that require theory of mind. The main aspect of explanation lays between an innate knowledge and a gradual development of theory of mind.

Perner and Ruffman (2005) argue that toddlers’ reactions to tasks are based upon behavioural rules, which are a part of children’s early cognitive repertoire. According to Sodian and Thoermer (2010) toddlers use behavioural rules and procedures to solve tasks, and develop a theory of mind gradually through taking into account additional behavioural ideas. Low and Wang (2011) believe that the results can be explained both from a mentalist theory, behavioural rules, and that none of the experiments conducted, are able to distinguish between the two explanations.

In conclusion, it is certain that the evidence concerning Theory of Mind is very varied. A number of researchers have argued that a theory of mind can be considered as a singular ability or skill, but that it must be differentiated amongst several skills, which are either socially or cognitively embedded. According to Cassidy et al. (2003), theory of mind is equal to a “psychological understanding”, which creates knowledge consisting of two different qualities: an understanding of the mind (cognitive states such as desires and assumptions) and an understanding of emotions (emotional sensitivity towards others). It is inappropriate to assume that a theory of mind is something a child either has or does not have. Children are different in terms of how well they work together with other children, and I believe it is reasonable to assume that this may be related to individual differences in the understanding of other people’s minds. For me, it makes more sense to consider a child’s theory of mind to a greater extent as a product of development, where social experiences at a young age interact with biological and cognitive processes, so that the child gradually becomes able to form representations of others’ mental states.

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