Evidence

To what extent has the use of technology in evidence altered our understanding of adversarialism?

What is adversarialism? The adversarial system is the two-sided structure under which criminal trial courts in the UK operate. There are four prominent structural features of the English adversarial system. Firstly, the parties dominate the conduct of proceedings with the judge playing a relatively passive role. Secondly, the parties are free to choose the terrain on which to fight out their legal battles and to select their forensic weapons. Thirdly, Trials are continuous, oral and public events. Fourthly, the imbalance of power between the state and the accused is ameliorated by rules and principles reducing inequality of arms. High level definitions or at least descriptions of the adversarial system abound such as that of Lord Denning in Jones v The National Coal Board.They are all to the effect that the judge is a passive and neutral umpire who cannot descend into the arena for fear of having his or her judgement clouded. The adversarial system is said to be the most efficient means of arriving at approximate truth because it harnesses the power of self-interest on each side to unearth the best evidence. Similarly the best legal arguments are thought to emerge from the clash of advocate’s submission on the law. A classic quotation is that of Lord Eldon in Ex Parte Lloyd that ‘truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.’ This follows from the notion that dispute resolution ‘achieving justice’ is the overriding objective of adversarial adjudication. How does the incorporation of science affect our understanding of adversarialism?
Adversarial proceedings can be thought of as a kind of formal debate in which the prosecution urges that it can prove the defendant's guilt and the defence either contests the prosecution hypothesis or confirms it with a guilty plea. The prosecution has the upper hand from the start because it devises the terms of the debate in the early stages of an investigation. The incorporation of science into the case for the prosecution must therefore provide the starting point for our analysis. The prosecution builds up an evidential picture through a series of stages, at each stage taking decisions which influence its final form. A typical sequence involves most of the following steps, the decision to utilize scientific assistance; locating an appropriate expert; the submission of exhibits to a laboratory for analysis; instructing the expert; conducting the scientific tests; report writing; the pre-trial influence of the defendant's legal and scientific advisers; pre-trial conferences; and the trial. Thus, scientific evidence is woven into the prosecution case, scrutinized and possibly challenged by the defence, and finally evaluated by the court. Thus, the ‘upper hand’ which the prosecution gains, causes a break from our understanding of adversarialism, as the most ‘efficient means of arriving at the approximate truth.’ It distorts the balance, now, the prosecution has more to work with against the defence.
Furthermore, Professor Roberts notes that scientific evidence has five principal limitations: “science never tells the whole story; forensic science is not pure science; some purported ‘science’ is not scientific; some purported ‘experts’ are not experts; and science has to be presented to, and be evaluated by, non-scientists.” Lord Justice Steyn in R. v. Clarke said “it would be entirely wrong to deny to the law of evidence the advantages to be gained from new techniques and new advances in science.” English law has thus proceeded case by case, scientific technique by scientific technique, even with vital forensic tests such as fingerprinting and DNA profiling. The development of forensic techniques in recent years has meant that “science has made the breakthrough into ‘normal’ policing” within the United Kingdom.
Thus, there is not only the question of the imbalance of resources which the prosecution uses against the defence but there is also the question of how authentic these resources are. Are they staying true to the definition of the adversarial system as ‘the most efficient means of arriving at the approximate truth.’ Does the adversarial trial provide the court with a fair, balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of forensic science evidence? Although English criminal procedure could be said to encourage such an approach it should not be forgotten that adversarialism is subject to the rules of evidence and procedure which embody certain ethical standards.
In response, the courts have put in place a number of procedures in order to ensure that scientific evidence is used safely these procedures look at the reliability, admissibility and probative value of the evidence.
How reliable is the evidence?
Forensic evidence can easily be tampered with which affects their reliability. Knowledge is manufactured; cynically ‘technology is also creative’ and can produce knowledge. The House of Lords in the ‘Select Committee on Science and Technology: Fifth Report’ considered the use of Digital Images as Evidence. They raised important questions what differentiates a justifiable enhancement of an image from tampering? Can the law regulate this difference? Since Digital images are more easily altered than analogue. In much the same way as a word processor can alter a text-document. The sequence of a movie can also be altered. Shadows can be subtracted or altered. A clock face may be disguised, so that visual clues that might otherwise corroborate claims about the time a photo was taken may be disguised. Scientific knowledge can only go so far it will always need something to disprove the unquantifiable. How will the adversarial structure approach these questions? In Daubert v Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals the courts admitted that they would have to screen scientific testimony in order to assess the reliability.
What is the probative value of the evidence? In addition, Courts have discretion to exclude evidence that has doubtful probative value. It is important to be clear that we are not questioning the reliability of the factual evidence which was obtained through the use of technology rather we are questioning the process of obtaining that fact. Thus, the person adducing a recording as evidence must describe its provenance and history so as to satisfy the court that the image is authentic. Evidential issues that might arise: Proving authentication is one thing. The court will need to attribute weight to it. For example, if the quality of the image is poor or if management procedures aren’t all correct.
Is the evidence admissible?
Furthermore evidence might not be admissible if the court considers the fact to not be the original. Thus evidence which is obtained using technology means that the ‘maker of the statement or videos brought to court need to be cross examined. R v Buckley considered the admissibility of Fingerprint evidence and in R v Castleton; a conviction was upheld which depended solely on identification by fingerprints. In Melendez- Diaz v Massachussets Writing for the majority Justice Scalia recognized that the opportunity to cross examine lab technicians and similar experts undertaking preparatory work for their colleagues was no mere formality, since so called ‘neutral scientific testing’ may not, in reality be quite as neutral or reliable as one might assume ‘Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation…… A forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure or have an incentive to alter the evidence in a manner favourable to the prosecution.’ However, if one can prove there is no human intervention on the evidence, For example ‘archaic’ icons like shride or trim ,not made from human intervention but only from the divine image, then the courts are ready to take on this evidence without going through the burden of cross examining them.
Thus one can see the recognition of the courts of the risk of incorporating the use of technology in evidence into the adversarial system and the hope of the courts that these procedures will keep the prosecution in check and keep the balance of the adversarial system.
Is this enough? How compelling is technology?
Still, the compelling of technology is hard to argue against a DNA profile. Since, on the one hand, the potency of forensic science is underlined by the fantastic odds against misidentification with which expert witnesses are able to impress the jury; on the other hand, the increasing concern provoked by the utilization of DNA technology highlights the vulnerability of lawyers and lay triers of fact when faced with evidence which they may not be competent to evaluate. This highlights the idea that there is no such thing as a pure objective piece of evidence this is the difference between divine judgement and human judgement which always goes according to probability.
There are those that will argue that the use of technology in evidence is not all that dangerous and is in fact more reliable than the lack of it. It is historically given in the shift from orality to print that technology aids proof since oral cultures have no archive. The court can’t look things up and it relies upon ephemeral sound. Sensations take place in a time always past. They are never contemporary. Print fixes moments it reduces them to archives, the word becomes much more analysable that can be indexed retrieved and examined and cross-examined.Print and photographic memory, on the other hand, conserves a faithful memory. R v Cook and R v Constantinou it was held the Courts should take cognisance of the fact that mechanical reproduction replaces human efforts. The means of recording information are irrelevant. Indeed recording devices are seen to be more reliable than oral evidence prone to lapses in memory and potential for perjury. A causal link is assumed, between the event, or the object, and the mechanically or digitally reproduced image and science is deemed much more objective. Thus digital images can when used correctly provide a much more efficient way of taking, processing and storing images than analogue film could. For example traffic enforcement cameras. In addition, because, digital images can be linked straight to an image databank stored on computers, identification of owners, and vehicles could be done immediately. “The ultimate in automation is for the computer to print out a Notice of Intention to Prosecute and send it out to the offender without human intervention.’ Secondly documents and forms can be scanned digitally and stored. This minimises paper based processing. Scanning is conducted in securely managed environments. Alterations can be made but only in the form of overlays to an image. Thirdly, it is much better for covert surveillance. Because they don’t store film, digital cameras are smaller and “can be disguised in “anything from mirrors and pictures to smoke detectors and clocks.” Lastly images may be enhanced in order to make them clearer.
New medical and scientific techniques are constantly being developed and adapted to forensic purposes. Forensic science makes an important and ever expanding contribution to the investigation of crime and the successful prosecution of offenders. It is no exaggeration to regard DNA technology as the most revolutionary contribution to criminal investigation and forensic proof since the introduction of fingerprinting a century earlier.
The use of technology in evidence v miscarriages of justice? The longstanding relationship between law and science, like any partnership of enduring value is infused with a certain creative tension. Thus, despite these measures which are taken by the courts in order to ensure that forensic evidence is used appropriately there have been some notorious miscarriages of justice which illustrate the grave consequences which can attend over-reliance on apparently powerful scientific evidence. Some of these high profile miscarriages of justice came to light in the late 1980’s and went so far as to precipitate A Royal Commission to consider root and branch reform of the criminal justice system. The problems centralized around the use of ‘expert evidence’ in these trials. In R. v Charles CA it was held if evidence falls below the national standard, expert evidence should be called in but only in rare and exceptional cases. As Clive Walker and Kathryn Campbell put it, ‘the problem of miscarriages of justice, has persisted, since contemporary developments in sciences, particularly forensic sciences, have resulted in an increase in appearances by experts before the courts and a growing pressure to seek out forensic evidence.’ More recently forensic science has featured in the convictions and subsequent exonerations of Sally Clark, Angela Cunnings Sion Jenkins Birmingham Six,Maguire Seven and Judith Ward
Expert witnesses part of the adversarial system?
Sally Clark was a British solicitor who became the victim of an infamous miscarriage of justice when she was wrongly convicted of the murder of two of her sons. Her prosecution was controversial due to statistical evidence presented by paediatrician and ‘expert witness’ Professor Sir Roy Meadow, who testified that the chance of two children from an affluent family suffering sudden infant death syndrome was 1 in 73 million, which was arrived at by squaring 1 in 8500 for likelihood of a cot death in similar circumstance. Despite the attempts made by her husband and her many supporters, through legal and extra curial channels to secure her release the Court of Appeal still held ‘there was an overwhelming case against the appellant at trial and if there had been an error in relation to the statistics at trial we are satisfied that the jury would have still convicted on each count.’
Her conviction was overturned in a second appeal in 2003 and the perils of statistical evidence were highlighted. The Court of Appeal intimated that allowing statistical evidence to go to the jury in that naked form might have constituted an independent ground for allowing the appeal. ‘It may have had a major effect on their thinking notwithstanding the attempts by the trial judge to down play it.’ The Royal Statistical Society later issued a public statement expressing its concern at the "misuse of statistics in the courts" and arguing that there was "no statistical basis" for Meadow's claim. Professor David who came to the case with a completely independent stance said ‘It is not my practice to refer to additional results in my post mortem unless they are relevant to the cause of death, as the specimens were referred to another consultant.’ The court did not consider this approach acceptable since it opposes one of the fundamental rules of the adversarial criminal justice system. It is in effect, the expert trying the case and deciding what relevant evidence is, not the court. To state the obvious it is courts, not experts, who should try cases. It was only when his conclusions were favourable to the defence that they sought to rely on his evidence and Clark was released. Thus, the value of an expert free from any influence cannot be discounted.
Similarly Angela Cannings was convicted of the murder of her two sons. Professor Sir Roy Meadow appeared again as the ‘expert’ in this case. He based his calculations on the likelihood of a second cot death being the same as the likelihood of a first. He also asserted that as the children were previously in good health, this made crib death implausible. Only after a BBC "Real Story" investigation and a statement by Professor Michael Patton, a clinical geneticist at St George's Hospital Medical School who told the BBC that a genetic inheritance was the most likely explanation for the crib deaths in the family was this conviction overturned. However according to Carole McCartney ‘The extent to which experts discuss case details turns on the nature of their professional and personal relationships and on individual work styles, but elements of an inquisitorial approach to scientific investigation are easy to discern, notwithstanding the adversarial posture of our criminal process.’ Lord Justice Judge, deputy Lord Chief Justice, referred to the “abhorrent” prospect that mothers may have been wrongly jailed for killing their babies.
Statistical evidence allowed in an adversarial system?
Both these cases raise the questions; How should forensic scientists and other expert witnesses present their evidence in court? What kinds and quality of data can experts properly draw on in formulating their conclusions? In an important recent decision in R. v T the Court of Appeal revisited these perennial questions, with the complicating twist that the evidence in question incorporated quantified probabilities, not all of which were based on statistical data. Recalling the sceptical tenor of previous judgments addressing the role of probability in the evaluation of scientific evidence, the Court of Appeal in R. v T condemned the expert's methodology and served notice that it should not be repeated in future, a ruling which rapidly reverberated around the forensic science community causing consternation, and even dismay, amongst many seasoned practitioners. The figures quoted in court, and repeated during the trial judge's summing up, were seemingly less favourable to the defence because they emphasised the comparative rarity of the accused's size II Nike trainers as a percentage of All shoes distributed in the country. The Court of Appeal was understandably concerned that the jury might have relied on figures potentially exaggerating the strength of the prosecution's case. More generally, the court felt that, albeit without personal fault, the expert in R. v Thad adopted a reporting protocol which obscured the basis on which he had formed his conclusions. "it is simply wrong in principle", fumed the court, "for an expert to fail to set out the way in which he has reached his conclusion in his report"." There was, in other words, an elementary and catastrophic failure of transparency, entirely at odds with the legal requirement that expert reports must spell out the "details of any literature or other information which the expert has relied on in making the report": Thus clearly one can see the effort of the courts to create a safer system of justice since the notorious miscarriages of justice of the cases outlined above.
Forensic mistake?
Other examples of miscarriages of justice include Sion Jenkins who was convicted of murder based on, forensic evidence of ‘a fine mist of blood on Jenkins' jacket.’ Trial judge Mr Justice Gage found this evidence "compelling." It was only after new tests were carried out by breathing expert Professor David Denison which showed the victim could have inaudibly breathed out the mist, after she was dead. Was this a forensic mistake? One of the “Guildford Four,” Carole Richardson, was convicted of murder for a public housing bombing in 1974. Aside from the egregious errors made regarding the evidence used in this case, medication was administered to Richardson while she was in custody, without regard for the influence of other drugs she may have been taking, thereby possibly tainting her statements to the police. As a final example, Enghin Raghip was convicted of murdering a police officer in 1985, following the Broadwater Farm disturbances. Raghip confessed to the crime after being subject to a number of days of interrogation by the police. The Forensic Medical Examiner had earlier pronounced him fit to be detained. Raghip’s conviction was eventually overturned in 1991 on the basis of the misdiagnosis of his mental capacity.
As these cases illustrate, errors can and do occur, particularly when Forensic Medical Examiners do not respect the limits of their expertise, and especially when they are confronted with the ethical choices inherent in the many interlocking dualisms they must face: medical vs. legal by ‘applying medical expertise within a legal context’; therapeutic vs. forensic by ‘acting as provider of medical care and as gatherer of evidence’ and independent practitioner vs. employee of the police.
Despite the efforts of the court in R v T to limit the use of statistical evidence, strictly speaking, the ruling here is limited to expert evidence of footwear marks. The Court of Appeal explicitly accepted the use of probabilistic calculations in relation to DNA profiling evidence (and "possibly other areas in which there is a firm statistical base"
Are there enough mechanisms in place to prevent ‘fake experts?’
Thus ‘experts’ practice and the lack of mechanisms to prevent their continued use by the legal professions still proposes a problem in the adversarial system. How do the courts determine expertise? The usual guide has been academic qualifications and experience but there are records of some ‘forensic scientists’ falsifying academic qualifications and experience. Expertise of some of these private practitioners has been looked up upon, as being less than satisfactory in the expertise they claim to demonstrate and some especially in the US have been identified as complete charlatans. In addition failure to define the area of competence of an expert is another problem, because evidence has been presented to the courts, by an expert witness that was outside their area of competence. While this should not happen, even the more experienced scientific/medical witness can sometimes be coerced into making unsubstantiated comments when under pressure from skilled counsel. Therefore in order to deal with this problem The Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP) was established in 1999 to give the courts a single point of reference on the competence of forensic practitioners. The overriding aim of the CRFP is "to promote public confidence in forensic practice in the UK". It will achieve this through publication of a register of currently competent forensic practitioners; ensuring that registered practitioners stay up to date and maintain competence; and disciplining registered practitioners who do not meet the required standards. The CFRP register has been welcomed by many as an important step towards a quality control system that ensures that those who present themselves as expert witnesses are competent to fulfil that role. The Prime Minister has said: "Ensuring high standards of professional competence of those experts called to give evidence is crucial to the credibility of the judicial system and the Register is a tool that can do much to underpin that credibility"
Despite all this support various people have identified problems and limitations with the Register as it stands. It has, for example, been asserted that now discredited expert witnesses, including perhaps Professor Meadow, would have had no difficulty in obtaining CRFP registration. Andrew Keogh from Tuckers Solicitors recently criticised the fact that "there is nothing within CRFP that is committed to a remit of evidence-based practice", and suggested that "it would be of more benefit to the criminal justice system if a comprehensive process of research, evaluation and peer review took place on a rolling basis."
Is it appropriate for lawyers to be involved when they are not ‘experts’ in science?
Another problem highlighted in the above cases is despite the rigor of examination and cross examination is meant to illicit any of the short comings in the scientists ability, is it sufficient when it is recognized that lawyers don’t have wide, if any, scientific knowledge? Larger laboratories will have quality management systems in place and lawyers could test compliance with such standards but do lawyers know what such standards are? In addition the courts have another hurdle to surmount which relates to the presentation of evidence arising from new technologies that have not been previously brought before the court. How does the court judge what is acceptable as evidence? Do the Judges have the skills and knowledge to make such judgements even with the assistance of scientific advisors? The debate must continue?
Moving towards an inquisitorial approach?
This raises the question do these same problems exist in the inquisitorial system of justice which claims to be a seeker after the truth unlike the adversarial system which is often portrayed as a contest between rival views neither of whom is concerned with the truth? However, one can argue, in an inquisitorial system a ‘forensic scientist’ will still be consulted by the accused the only difference being the courts appointing their own expert. Thus, the problem is no different from that of experts in the adversarial system of justice. Yet, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice expressed some enthusiasm for aspects of inquisitorial procedure, especially in relation to forensic science evidence, stating that 'our recommendations can fairly be interpreted as seeking to move the system in an inquisitorial direction or at least as seeking to minimize the danger of adversarial practices being taken too far. Since In the inquisitorial system, the investigative magistrates delegate some of his powers and the scientist can investigate a scientific question in a way that he sees fit. There is no pressure to take either the prosecutors view or the defendants view. The independence is usually total within the law and guarantees impartiality. This is an advantage for the forensic scientist.
This debate will continue but most also take into account the decision by the ECHR that the accused must have ‘equality of arms’ to the prosecuting authorities in relation to their own forensic analyses. This decision must surely lead to an adversarial process. Zander emphasized the dangers of an unchecked general drift towards a more inquisitorial criminal procedure in his strident 'Note of Dissent' to the Royal Commission report: 'Defence disclosure is designed to be helpful to the prosecution and, more generally, to the system. But it is not the job of the defendant to be helpful either to the prosecution or to the system. His task, if he chooses to put the prosecution to the proof, is simply to defend himself. Rules requiring advance disclosure of alibis and expert evidence are reasonable exceptions to this general principle. But ... it is wrong to require the defendant to be helpful by giving advance notice of his defence and to penalise him by adverse comment if he fails to do so' However, some defence lawyer interviewees understood adversarial criminal procedure as placing them under a duty to adopt such tactics where there was little else to be said in favour of their client. Adversarialism certainly entails that the evidence adduced by both sides should be subjected to rigorous testing in cross-examination, but a cynical determination to confuse and bewilder has never been legitimate. Experts were sensitive about this issue. Time and again they emphasized that they would have no truck with the generation of red herrings and the great majority were at best suspicious of the adversarial norms which permeate lawyers' professional practice. They acknowledged that it is the lawyers who ultimately decide how cases will be run and how scientific investigations will be exploited. So experts can refuse to be active participants in the development of confusion strategies but they cannot avoid lawyers manipulating their evidence to these ends if the lawyers so choose. The conflict-confusion approach to forensic science evidence reminds us that there are tensions which criss-cross the traditional adversarial divide between prosecution and defence, tensions which are rooted in the disjunction between forensic techniques and the canons of scientific enquiry.
There are lessons to be learned in the Sally Clark and other cases for all those who assist the courts as investigators, experts, or advocates. Justice requires meticulous preparation, comprehensive note taking, opinions soundly based in recorded/ reproducible fact, sharing of data between experts, valid scientific deductions and a willingness to think again as data emerges or re-emerges. Also scientific evidence and opinion evidence should be presented in court objectively and not emotively. Opinion evidence should be testable, not ex cathedra. That requires the information on which the opinion is based to be shared.
It is vital to retain a sense of proportion the benefits of scientific, medical and other expert evidence are manifest. Clearly, ‘when exculpatory evidence is not disclosed to the defence, or experts are found to have overstated the strength of their evidence, forensic science and its practitioners are the villains of the piece. (’In addition we now have a greater understanding of the aim of the adversarial system that trials should be ‘public event,’ In order that they can expose the evidential basis of criminal convictions to a modicum of critical scrutiny. As one can see in the earlier cases how it was found out that miscarriage of justice had taken places as a result of the media or other people drawing attention to other factors and showing the likelihood of their being a ‘forensic mistake.’)
Is the use of forensic evidence exaggerated?
One can argue that the use of forensic evidence in criminal trials is actually a lot less used when we look at facts or cases. Investigators do not investigate crime in a way the public is often encouraged to believe. In terms of detections, Coupe and Griffiths’ study of burglary investigations in England revealed that forensic techniques were used in 17 per cent of detected burglaries. However, more recent UK studies point to forensics contributing to a greater proportion of volume crime detections. Analysis undertaken by Burrows, Hopkins suggests forensic evidence is the main source of evidence in securing around one quarter of primary detections of volume crimes. Increasingly common portrayals of DNA as being able to solve crimes almost instantaneously, beyond any doubt, even from ‘beyond the grave’, may overstate the degree to which DNA currently assists in criminal investigations.
The use of technology in evidence at criminal proceedings still has a future?
It is clear that generally speaking scientific evidence compares very favourably against the known infirmities of confessions, eyewitness identifications and other comparatively equivocal forms of evidence, which still nonetheless routinely supply the principal evidential pillar supporting a criminal conviction. However, the problems with expert evidence tend to materialize when people are seduced into thinking that science is an evidentiary panacea devoid of blind spots, limitations or special demands of its own. The implication of scientific evidence in so many notorious miscarriages of justice ought to serve as a dramatic reminder of what can, and sometimes does, go wrong when courts are taken in by flaky expertise or place too much faith in the wrong kinds of science. In order to maintain scientific objectivity, forensic science practitioners have to rise above the adversarial nature of the trial process. They have to be true to their science. This is especially difficult when their conclusion conflict with the law enforcement view of the case. Keeping a firewall between forensic science and criminal prosecution is vital but difficult. It is easy to understand, for example, how a forensic pathologist in a medical examiner’s office might feel as if he is part of a law enforcement team, particularly in emotional cases, such as those involving suspected infanticide or child abuse. Despite the issues with this system it is clear that forensic science has a future. In practice it has become pivotal in its role in supporting criminal justice systems throughout the world. How forensic science is validated and integrated into criminal justice systems is still open to debate. As science develops newer methods will be added to the battery of tools available to support the justice systems but who will judge on the correctness and acceptability of such techniques has still to be decided by legal bodies.

Bibliography
Cases
Adams (No.!) [1996]2 Cr. App. R. 467 CA (Crim Div); [1996] Crim. L.R. 898; Adams (]Vo.2) [1998]1 Cr. App.R. 377 CA (Crim Div).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2551 (2009)
R v Angela Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725-
R v Anne Maguire and others (1992) 94 Cr App R 133.
R v Buckley (1999) 163 JP 561
R v Castleton (1906) 3 Cr App R 74,
R v Charles CA (1976) 68 Cr App
R. v Clark, [2003] EWCA Crim 1020,
R. v. Clarke [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 425 at p. 430.
R v Cook [1987] 1 All ER 1049,
R v Constantinou (1989) 91 Cr App R 74, CA
R v Jenkins (Sion David) [2004] EWCA Crim 2047:
R v Mcllkenny, Hil, Power; Walker, Hunter and Callaghan (1991) 93 Cr App R 287.
R v Sally Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020
R. v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439; [2011]1 Cr. App. R. 9.
R v Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R 1.
Statutes
Criminal Procedure Rules 20 I 0 r.33.3. Articles Burrows, Hopkins (2005) Carole McCartney, Forensic Identification and Criminal Justice (Willan, Cullompton, 2006) p.
Carole McCartney ‘ The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 175.] Coupe and Griffiths’ (1996) ‘Fifty Years of Forensic Science: A commentary’ Dr. Niamh Nic Daeid (Wiley; (May 18, 2010)
Kathryn Campbell and Clive Walker* Medical mistakes and miscarriages of justice: Perspectives on the experiences in England and Wales
Paul Roberts, “Science, experts, and criminal justice” in Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson (eds.), The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002)
Paul Roberts ‘Science in the Criminal Process’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter,OUP, 1994), pp. 469-506
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Select Committee appointed to consider Science and Technology. Fifth Report ‘Digital Images as Evidence (3 February 1998)’

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[ 1 ]. Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman ‘Criminal Evidence: Second Edition ‘ OUP
[ 2 ]. Jones v National Coal Board [1957] CA.
[ 3 ]. Bank v White; ex parte Lloyd's [1999] VSC 262
[ 4 ]. CrimPR 2010 Rule 1.1
[ 5 ]. Paul Roberts, “Science, experts, and criminal justice” in Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson
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[ 10 ]. R v Buckley (1999) 163 JP 561
[ 11 ]. R v Castleton (1906) 3 Cr App R 74,
[ 12 ]. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2551 (2009)
[ 13 ]. Paul Roberts, “Science, experts, and criminal justice” in Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson
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[ 14 ]. R v Cook [1987] 1 All ER 1049,
[ 15 ]. R v Constantinou (1989) 91 Cr App R 74, CA
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[ 17 ]. R v Charles CA (1976) 68 Cr App
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[ 19 ]. R. v Clark, [2003] EWCA Crim 1020,
[ 20 ]. R v Angela Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725-
[ 21 ]. R v Jenkins (Sion David) [2004] EWCA Crim 2047:
[ 22 ]. R v Mcllkenny, Hil, Power; Walker, Hunter and Callaghan (1991) 93 Cr App R 287.
[ 23 ]. R v Anne Maguire and others (1992) 94 Cr App R 133.
[ 24 ]. R v Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R 1.
[ 25 ]. R. v Clark, [2003] EWCA Crim 1020,
[ 26 ]. R v Sally Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020
[ 27 ]. R v Angela Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725-
[ 28 ]. Carole McCartney ‘ The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 175.]
[ 29 ]. R. v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439; [2011]1 Cr. App. R. 9.
[ 30 ]. Adams (No.!) [1996]2 Cr. App. R. 467 CA (Crim Div); [1996] Crim. L.R. 898; Adams (]Vo.2) [1998]1 Cr. App.
R. 377 CA (Crim Div).
[ 31 ]. R. v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439; [2011]1 Cr. App. R. 9.
[ 32 ]. R. v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439; [2011]1 Cr. App. R. 9.
[ 33 ]. Criminal Procedure Rules 20 I 0 r.33.3.
[ 34 ]. R v Jenkins (Sion David) [2004] EWCA Crim 2047:
[ 36 ]. R. V T [201 0] EWCA Crim 2439 at [90].
[ 37 ]. R. V T [201 0] EWCA Crim 2439 at [90].
[ 38 ]. Letter from the Prime Minister to Judge Anthony Thorp
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[ 40 ]. ‘Fifty Years of Forensic Science: A commentary’ Dr. Niamh Nic Daeid
[ 41 ]. Paul Roberts ‘Science in the Criminal Process’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter,OUP, 1994), pp. 469-506
[ 42 ]. Sarah Anne Bradbury and Andy Feist The Use of Forensic Science in Volume Crime Investigations A Review of the Research Literature, Home Office Online Report 43/05.
[ 43 ]. Coupe and Griffiths’ (1996)
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[ 45 ]. Burrows, Hopkins (2005)
[ 46 ]. Carole McCartney ‘ The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 175.]