What are the global ‘North’ and ‘South’ and why they are increasingly unrelated to geographical locations?
Like many other concepts within the social sciences, globalisation is a highly debated and controversial issue with a diversity of opinions ranging across a broad spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, there are those who view globalisation as the source of many of the major social problems currently affecting developing countries. At the other, are those who view it as a process that will dissolve boundaries between nations and promote global unification. Similarly, definitions of the terms ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ are just as varied with the term ‘globalisation’ also carrying many different and often contrasting meanings.
According to Modelski, Devezas and Thompson (2008, p.13), globalisation is not a new concept but rather, diachronic, or ‘a process in time’. The authors viewed globalisation as a historical process, the understanding of which required tracing it far back into the past (Modelski et al. 2008, p. 13). However, Heywood (2007, p. 143) suggests, that because globalisation refers to such a wide range of things, e.g. policies, strategies, processes or an ideology, it may be concluded ‘slippery and elusive’ understanding of globalisation arises from its involvement in so many different areas of academia and the extensive and continuing discussion therein surrounding its properties.
Regardless of different views on the definition and scope of globalisation, ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ have more specific criteria, although these meanings have also changed over time.
The divide between ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ is broadly considered an economic, social and political division. In modern political literature, ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ classifications are usually attributed by the Human Development Index (HDI), which are published by the United Nations (UNDP 2005, pp. 21-24). The ‘Global North’ designation refers to countries with HDI above 0.8 with most, but not all of these countries located in the northern hemisphere (UNDP 2005, p. 212). Global South refers to the countries of the rest of the world. These countries are then divided into two further groups by the United Nations’ Human Development Index as: Medium Human Development (MHD, i.e. countries with HDI lower than 0.8 and above 0.5), and Low Human Development (LHD, or countries with HDI lower than 0.5) (UNDP 2005, pp. 212-213). Most of the countries in these latter groups are located in southern hemisphere.
In scholarly literature, the term ‘Global South’ is often used interchangeably with the words ‘developing countries’ and the term ‘Global North’ with ‘developed countries’. For the purpose of visualisation, Global North includes Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Israel, Macau, the United States and all of Europe, including Russia (Reuveny & Thomson 2008, p. 361). Global South includes Asia (with the exception of Japan, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), Central America, South America, Mexico, Africa and the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) (Reuveny & Thomson 2008, pp. 361-362).
An earlier classification system categorised the world into three stages of development. Highly industrialised countries, mostly located in Western Europe, North America and Japan were called ‘First World’ with free-market economies and democratic forms of government as their main characteristics (Kiely & Marfleet 1998, pp. 49-53). These countries were also known as developed, industrialised and free-market economies.
‘Second World’ referred to the centrally planned communist countries, although the use of this term declined after the collapse of Soviet Union (Lewellen 2002, p. 192). Countries such as China, Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea remain however, communist states with central government oriented economies.
The designation ‘Third World’ was originally used to describe non-aligned States that avoided buying into the Cold War between the USSR and USA (Lewellen 2002, p. 206). Countries such as India, Indonesia, Egypt and Yugoslavia were the leaders of these non-aligned states. Presently, the term is generally used to describe countries that are not part of the First or Second world and includes the undeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Recently, the term ‘under-developed’, perceived by many as derogatory, was substituted with the term ‘developing countries’. However, these words were not precise enough because all countries, including the ‘First World’, are developing in one form or another. The term Global South is now being used increasingly to refer to countries with low Human Development Indices (LDI = <0.8 HDI) (UNDP 2005, pp. 212). Most former colonies of Europe are located in this category and many of them are also situated in the southern hemisphere.
In addition to the above-mentioned ‘First’, ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ worlds, the term ‘Fourth World’, is now often used to describe the estimated 6000 groups of indigenous peoples scattered across the globe (Lewellen 2002, p. 206). The total population of these groups is estimated to be between 300 to 600 million and typically represent the poorest of the poor in the countries they inhabit and are often further disadvantaged by racist and discriminatory policies enacted by those countries (Lewellen 2002, pp. 207-208). Kegley and Blanton (2011, p. 237) observed that, ‘...between 1900 and 1987 about 130 million indigenous people were slaughtered by state-sponsored genocide in their own countries’.
Geopolitics is an idea conceptualised by Swedish political geographer Rudolf Kjellen during the last decade of the 19th century (Jones 2006, p. 90). It explains the development of states and societies on a regional and global scale and studies the links between geography and politics. It is mostly a body of thought describing the relative importance, and the misfortune, of geographic location in the global domination of power. Geopolitics is currently a central concept in debates about the nature of military globalisation, colonisation and imperialism. One of the major theories in this debate relates geopolitics directly to globalisation and is attributed to Ash Amin (cited in Jones 2006, pp. 26- 27). Ash Amin. The professor Amin (cited in Jones 2006, pp. 26-27) argued that early globalisation theories were inadequate to explain the impact of geopolitics on local economies. Amin (cited in Jones 2006, p. 27) precisely argued that because of a ‘complex set of historical factors and the socio-cultural embeddedness of economic activity’, the success or failure of an economy in any region should not be attributed to geopolitics alone. The study of the distance between ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ must not be limited simply to geographical distance.
North-South inequality is a multi-layered and complex issue exposing the deepest layers of global politics and society. This inequality is manifested not only in differences between wealth and ownership, but also in the manner it affects power, culture and perceptions. It is perhaps ironic that perceptions of inequality among the middle class of the ‘Global South’ relate profoundly to their specific world image and perceptions of themselves and others. Clearly however, as Pieterse (2004, p. 108) observed, there are elements of ‘Global South’ in the North and of ‘Global North’ in the South and privilege and poverty are no longer divided neatly along geographical lines. Globalisation is portrayed as an unavoidable and irreversible process that is constantly reshaping global society. According to this view, globalisation is the direct result of technological developments, with the revolution in telecommunications in particular paving the way for the establishment of a innovative, global, financial system. However, this view has been criticised by many scholars. The truth is that technological change has only facilitated the globalisation process. Expansion of the markets during the last decades of the 20th century specifically after 1970 ), to countries in the ‘Third World’ - and since 1989 to Eastern Europe - has been a far more important element in the process of globalisation (Lewellen 2002, pp. 27-28). Additionally, the development of a global labour market is a vital element in the globalisation process (Went 2000, p. 53).
Whether globalisation has a positive or a negative effect on the societies in the globe has been debated by many academics and political figures. Scholars have named three main schools of thought in the globalisation debate: the Globalists, the Sceptics, and the Transformationalists (Held et al. 1999, p. 2). The globalists argue that globalisation is a new historical convergence, the Sceptics refuse to accept globalisation as factual and consider it a myth and the Transformationalists combine both schools of thought and study the issue of globalisation as an event that is unfinished and remains a work-in-progress. According to Held et al. (1999, pp. 3-7), Transformationists also view contemporary economics as an ongoing transformation. Thus, the Globalists and the Sceptics are situated at opposite ends of the spectrum while the transformationalists attempt to develop the middle ground between the two poles (Glenn 2007, p. 34).
Global inequality is the result of a complicated and complex set of circumstances that need to be studied in their historical context. The widest differences between the world’s poor majority and its oppositely wealthy and privileged minority, are echoed loudly in the media. Pieterse (2004, p. 107) suggests these differences are often influenced by a form of ‘collective understanding’ and that this can also affect studies in the social sciences. Similarly to any topic in the social sciences, discourse informs every approach to the subject of Globalisation. It is not possible to avoid discourse in the study of ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ relations. Nor is it possible to avoid discourse in the study of globalisation and inequality. Discourse is embedded into this discussion whether we like it, or not. Concepts representing ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’ have also been so constructed by a succession of imperial projects, so that from our ‘superior viewpoint’, as Stuart Hall (2002, p. 61) put it, ‘... we see everything differently (and), if we use the discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’ we will necessarily find ourselves speaking from a position that holds that the West is a superior civilisation’.
Influenced by the post-structuralist theories of Michel Foucault, Edward Said (cited in Mazrui 2005, pp. 68-75) in his notable work, ‘Orientalism’, provided an extensive study on the importance of the effects of an ‘Otherness’ discourse and effectively traced the ‘invention of the orient’ back to the West’s quest for the ‘other’.
Discourse serves multiple purposes, not necessarily in logical ways. Pieterse (2004, p. 113) explained the strong effect of discourse in a western approach towards Global South: ‘To naturalise and justify this spectacular imbalance, discourses such as Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ argue that the ‘other’ are backward and mired in history...and might catch up, without mentioning that global catching up is an ecological impossibility’. Pieterse (2004, p. 113) argued that a general set of discourses be used in addressing the multi-layered, complex issue and suggested that specific accounts splitting the rest of the world from the viewpoint of the West were ‘ethnicity’ and ‘fundamentalism’. The author viewed a dynamic and factual understanding of ‘ethnic politics’ that lay in engaging the ‘hidden economics of armed conflicts’, and the deep political economy of violence (Pieterse 2004, p. 114).
Pieterse (2004, p. 177) uses the case of genocide in Rwanda to demonstrate his point, explaining that although it was often described as, ‘just another ethnic conflict in the west’, the genocide of Rwandans was not, in fact a genuine ‘ethnic conflict’. Counter to this, Pieterse (2004, pp. 177-178) suggests that the genocide in Rwanda was primarily brought about by political conflict.
This is just another example of how discourse inspires generalisations. Pieterse (2004, p. 114) concludes that, ‘... civilised people have nationalism while the ‘Other’ indulges in ethnicity’.
The easiest way to purify and justify is by blaming ‘Global South’ that they are ‘out of history’. However, the common denominator in all these accounts, suggests that the world is deeply divided along vastly divergent lines, even as it undergoes globalisation. It is also notable that many representations of world politics are depicted by the ‘Two Worlds’ idea.
Although ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ refer to geographical locations, there is in fact a line that divides the world unequally. Referring to physical location is another implication of the unequal distribution of wealth, health and infrastructure. The terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ historically represent a mindset inherited from colonial and post-colonial eras, whereby Europe was located in the North and Africa in the South (Kiely & Marfleet, 1998, pp. 37-39). In the modern era, while some ‘Global North’ countries are currently located in ‘Global South’, the same colonial/post-colonial mindset keeps these terms alive. Although the United Nations no longer uses the term and has replaced it with ‘High Human Development’ (HHD), ‘Medium Human Development’ (MHD), and Low Human Development (LHD), the inherited inequality from the past is still geographically located between ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ (UNDP 2005, p. 212).
Global inequality refers to the disproportionate distribution of a commodity to which the world ascribes a certain value. The question of whether global inequality is rising or declining is hotly debated among globalisation scholars, academics, international agencies, political activists and many others with all sides agreeing that the ‘problem of global inequality has become one of the most pressing and contentious issue on the global agenda’ (Held et al. 1999, p. 27). Some consider capitalism to be the reason behind uneven development of countries. In this view, the competitive process of capital accumulation does not necessarily lead to equilibrium, but rather to a more often uneven development (Kiely 2009, p. 134). Better technology, improved platforms and enhanced frameworks in the ‘Global North’ prepare the economic climate for a boost in development. Conversely, the lack of infrastructure and the absence of powerful political institutions and social organisations prevents the ‘Global South’ from competing in the race to produce more goods and secure their country’s financial markets and job opportunities. Development in the Third world is significantly slower than that in either the First or Second worlds because of low productivity. Shaikh (1996, p. 76) effectively summarises this view in saying, ‘... it is only by raising both the level and the growth rate of productivity that a country can, in the long run, prosper in international trade… [This] will not happen by itself, through the magic of the trade’, author writes, arguing that ‘uneven development’ is a feature at the core of a capitalist world economy.
Shaikh (1996, p. 76) also points out that capital does not move from one place to another automatically. To the contrary, Shaikh (1996, p. 76) believes that capital is attracted to existing places with established frameworks and stable, safe environments. This idea expounds on theories postulated by Marxist scholars on international politics and economics (O'Brien & Williams 2010, pp. 25-26). Unlike Liberals, Marxists consider market relations between employers and employees to be inherently and fundamentally unfair. They feel that under capitalism, workers are denied a fair salary because capitalist employers will pay workers less than their labour is worth. Accordingly, from this standpoint, economic relations can become unstable and potentially create conflicts (O'Brien & Williams 2010, pp. 25-26).
Critics and defenders alike of globalisation, have widely contrasting and strongly articulated viewpoints on the issue. Glenn Firebaugh & Brian Goesling (2007, p. 549) refer to a debate on the issue in which Robert Wade wrote in The Economists that, ‘... new evidence suggests global inequality is worsening rapidly’. The article then raises a further, controversial argument among scholars by questioning a number of empirical studies. Using improved methods and newly available data; it concluded that the level of income inequality in the world has been declining at least since 1980 (Firebaugh & Goesling 2007, pp. 549-550). Other studies went even further, arguing that if global inequality has expanded beyond income to include measures such as life expectancy, the reduction in global inequality began well before 1980 (Firebaugh & Goesling 2007, pp. 550-552).
Factors such as health, education and income are now often taken into consideration when assessing inequality in the world. There are many contrasting viewpoints and school of thought however about whether globalisation affects inequality. Glenn Firebaugh and Brian Goesling (2007, p. 552) classify these schools of thought into two very broad categories: inequality-boosting arguments that globalisation is worsening global inequality, and inequality-compressing arguments that globalisation is actually decreasing the global inequality.
Supporters of the idea that globalisation is boosting global inequality believe that economic globalisation boosts global inequality by boosting world productivity. Consequently, this will create greater world surplus and subsequently increase global income inequality. An increase in world surplus is based on ‘The Lenski Principle’, described in the book, ‘Power and Privilege’ by this author. Lenski (cited in Firebaugh and Goesling 2007, p. 552) noted that very poor sections of societies have relatively low levels of inequality because there is little surplus for the elites to appropriate. Firebaugh and Goesling (2007, p. 568) also observed that, ‘... as societies become richer, however, there is more surplus for the elites to appropriate so that up to a point income inequality rises with economic growth’.
The argument by those who believe globalisation compresses global inequality can be encapsulated by the following. Globalisation causes the faster spread of technologies to poorer regions creating economic growth in these regions, which in turn reduces global income inequality. Globalisation provides the required infrastructure to boost productivity around the world but, as mentioned earlier, this idea may be flawed as the flow of capital from ‘Global North’ to ‘Global South’ does not happen automatically (Shaikh 1996, p. 76). Capital tends to stay in the safer and more secure places of the world where it can be provided with the required frameworks for growth. Followers of this argument see the process of spreading technologies into the third world as ‘historically dependent’. In the early stages of industrialisation, the dominant spread pattern was ‘likely to be from rich regions to other rich regions. If this is so, then uneven regional growth rates ‘favour the rich, resulting in greater global income inequality’ (Firebaugh & Goesling 2007, p. 553).
It is important to note that inequality existing in ‘Global South’ countries should not be considered the cause of global inequality. Inequality between countries remains a far more important component of total global inequality than inequality within countries. As Applebaum and Robinson (2005, p. 36) argue, ‘... recent studies of world income inequality have shown the percentage of total world inequality accounted for by inter-country inequality in the 1990s to be somewhere between a high of 86 precent and a low of 68 precent’. However, authors attempted to conclude that intra-country inequality has increased even more than inter-country inequality and that polarisation between ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’, according to them, is still a major component of Global North/Global South inequality.
In conclusion, it can be noted that the meaning and implication of the terms ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ have changed significantly over the last decades, with currently accepted classifications based on the Human Development Index published by the United Nations.
The issue of North-South inequality however, continues to be a multi-layered and complex, global conundrum that must, of necessity, be studied in its historical context. Scholars must also beware the underlying discourse that inevitably informs the Global North’s study of inequality in the Global South – the discourse of western superiority and the spectre of the ‘Other’. This discourse is deeply rooted in the colonial and post-colonial periods of many countries in the Global North and stems from the colonisation of the Global South by predominantly European countries from the Global North. Regardless of the effect of this discourse, all accounts suggest that the world is deeply divided, along deeply incongruent lines even while it is simultaneously undergoing the tumultuous process of globalisation.

References
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