Why did Russia interfere in the 2005 Ukrainian Presidential election?

Ukraine is Russia's largest European neighbour. Regardless of their common history, Ukrainian domestic policies have a significant impact on Russia's perceived interest. Parts of Ukraine have been under Russian rule sine the 17th century. Eastern parts of Ukraine had been continually subjected to dominance from the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. Western Ukraine did not join the Soviet Union until 1939. The country has a history of fragmentation that continues to this day, this is exasperated Russia's continued desire to meddle in the domestic affairs of former republics of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union dissolved in in 1991, Ukraine received their independence but there was no great change in policy. Former members of the Communist Party managed to remain power without much difficulty. Opposition parties found it difficult to break their stranglehold on power. In the late Soviet era the Communist Party of Ukraine began to accumulate vast sums of sums of cash.[1] Much of this cash disappeared when the Communist Party disbanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However much of this money was reinvested to ensure the same people form the Communist Party stayed in power. Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 2004. he had previously been Prime Minister without much note. However he won the election against incumbent Leonid Kravchuk with 52% of the vote.[2] Due to his election as a democrat there was no focus on any potential authoritarian tendencies he may have had, rather, the main concern during the election was that Kuchma might be too pro-Russian. Throughout his time as President, Kuchma repeatedly increased the powers of the president while weakening other democratic institutions; “The Law on Power”, passed in July 1995, put the office of the prime minister and the Cabinet of Ministers under the control of the president and in 1996 Kuchma went outside the existing legal framwork to ensure a new constitution was passed that would solify the gains he had made in “The Law on Power”. The 1999 Ukrainian presidential election for the first time had Russiand playing a role. Russian election advisers, or political technologists, arrived and provided assistance to Kuchma's campaign. The state was used to control media networks. This all led to Kuchma winning the vote with a 56% majority.[3] The 2000 Referendum to increase the powers of the president received widespread support, as a result of the popular support the legislature was legally required to pass all measures that were voted on in the referendum. The referendum allowed the president to dissolve the legislature, reduce the number of seats and limiting legislative immunity for members.[4] The other major event during Kuchma's time as President was the disappearance of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. This incident represented the beginning of the end for Kuchma, especially after the release of the “Melnychencko Tapes” that had Kuchma and advisers implicating themselves in the murder. This led to two things; for the first time as an independent country, Ukraine's opposition forces were able to put aside their differences and mount a concerted campaign to plot the removal of Kuchma, secondly, the Kuchma's decreasing popularity culminated in the Orange Revolution.[5] The Orange Revolution can be seen as a watershed moment is post-Soviet affairs. Not, as a democratic revolution as many had predicted, but as a rejection of Russian interference in the domestic affairs of an independent country. As a democratic revolution the events that followed the election of Viktor Yuschenko have surely disappointed as the country has been bogged down in a seemingly unending series of political crises. Russian interference is the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election is undoubted. At first the glance the motivations seems obvious; to ensure Ukraine remains in Russia's sphere of influence and to maintain Ukrainian links for oil and gas pipelines. A closer examination of Russian political events before and after the Ukrainian election give rise to another scenario. Russia, realising the the authoritarian policies of Kuchma were becoming increasingly unpopular was worried a popular political revolution might sweep the country, similar to the Revoltuion of Roses that had occurred in 2003 in Georgia or a worst case scenario, a situation akin to the mass demonstrations that led to the downfall and eventually extradition of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Since the ascendancy of Vladimir Putin into the office of presidency, Russia has embarked on a policy of “managed democracy”. Worried that a popular uprising may occur in Russia, authorities manipulated the Ukrainian election by throwing their support behind the more conservative candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, and providing expertise and political assistance to his campaign. When these efforts failed Russia looked at the factors that led to the success of the Orange Revolution and tried to insulate themselves form a similar situation. The Ukrainian presidential election had a large number of candidates that created some chaos, foreign Non-Governmental Organizations were active in the country prior to the election and during the ensuing demonstrations and the youth played a large role in the opposition. After the Orange Revolution, Russia took steps to ensure a similar scenario did not occur. They reduced election competitiveness, restricted the functions of NGOs and the Kremlin created their own homegrown youth movement to counteract any potential opposition youth movement.
Russia's Managed Democracy Russia's managed democracy did not come about as a result of the Orange Revolution, it simply forced them to enact measures to ensure the longevity of this policy. In order to investigate why Russia interfered in Ukraine's election it would be instrumental to investigate the history of Russia's managed democracy, its motivations and future. Managed democracies fall somewhere between liberal democracies and dictatorships on the political spectrum. They retain many of the features of of liberal democracies; democratic freedoms, rule of law, free and open elections, however they place an emphasis on political stability over change. Also, the extent to which people are able to enjoy the trappings of liberal democracies is always open to interpretation and debate. The genesis of managed democracy was borne out of the chaos of the Yeltsin era. Much of this era was characterized with the state being in near paralysis. In the fall of 1993 President Yeltsin dissolved Parliament shortly before they were supposed to meet to lower the threshold needed to pass legislation. This would have made it easier to impeach the President. This resulted in a mini rebellion and Yeltsin used the military to launch shells at the Parliament building. In the 1996 Presidential election Yeltsin exploited the advantages of incumbency by using the state media to his advantage and making use of funds from wealthy oligarchs who had acquired their riches under his privatization program. He was able to win the election with 53% of the vote.[6] At this point managed democracy was a concept in its infant stages and had to be articulated into official policy. Vladimir Putin was appointed to the presidency December 31 1999 when Boris Yeltsin resigned. Under Yeltsin there was a gradual slide towards a more powerful executive, however he did not execute total control over the state. Shortly after becoming President in 2000, Putin created seven districts to oversee the governments of a set of regions, each with a presidential representative. These representatives were appointed by the president and in charge of making sure all laws fell within federal guidelines. In 2004, partially in response to the Beslan terrorist incident, Putin enacted legislation eliminating the direct election of governors. The new system has the president submitting the name of a candidate for governor to the regional legislature which then approves it. For the 2003 parliamentary elections, Putin supported the creation of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia. This party ended up winning two-thirds of the seats in the Russian Duma. The success of the party was due to legislation in enacted in July 2003 regarding political parties. The legislation had strict requirements that showed the party had the support and funding necessary to be competitive in an election. Parties needed at 10 000 members with at least 100 members in 45 of the regions, every two years the party would have to reregister and if over the course of five years a party did not participate in an election it would be deregistered. Essentially this law was designed to weaken the liberal-democratic parties which were small but numerous.[7] The actions undertaken by Yeltsin and Putin show that Russia was already on its way to creating a super-presidential system prior to the Orange Revolution. Boris Yeltsin had intervened to ensure the stability of the state and dissolved the Duma in 1993. Putin, to streamline the political party process enacted legislation that ensured only parties that already had widespread support would be able to survive. This legislation also made it difficult for new political parties to emerge as they would need an already established grassroots network. The Orange Revolution showed that Russia's managed democracy system could be placed under threat. The influence of foreign NGOs and a strong youth movement led Russia to take domestic policy actions to reduce their threaten to a managed democratic state.
Russia's Interference in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Election The manner of Russia's involvement in Ukraine's 2004 Presidential election is a matter for debate. Exclusive support for Yuschenko was simply not an option for Russia, thus they had two options; take a conservative footing and be neutral during the election or solely back Yanukovich. Russia was coming off a presidential election in March of that year. Putin had won a significant victory and there was a belief that similar methods could be employed to ensure victory in Ukraine.[8] Any debate on whether to support Yanukovich ended when he began making public overtures to Russia by declaring that he would make Russian an official second language (something that would require an amendment to the constitution). Through use of political technologists and Putin's high profile visits to the country, Russia was able to play a role in the election. Shortly after the run-off election between Yuschenko and Yanukovich, which Yanukovich was declared the winner, audiotapes recorded by the Ukrainian Security Service emerged that detailed how there two teams supporting Yanukovich's campaign. There was the official campaign team, headed by Serhiy Tyhipko, head of the national bank, which promoted Yanukovich's policies and presented a largely positive campaign. The second team was not publicized and was accused of trying to win the election through subversive means. This shadow campaign dealt with money that would have put the official team above the spending limit, it also dealt with the negative campaigning and the coordination of state media and resources against Yuschenko.[9] There were several teams of Russian political technologists in the country during the election and they were allegedly organized and paid by the Kremlin.[10] From this it seems clear that Russia played a role from strategic perspective by providing people to help run the campaign. It is especially strking the roles they filled primarily dealt with subversive tactics to sway the election in Yanukovich's favour. One of the tactics employed by the shadow campaign was to hire candidates to run in the election. These candidates claimed to be aligned with Yuschenko and his party. However these candidates would run inflammatory campaign ads that would be unpopular with Eastern Ukrainians. Four candidates were chosen and had their campaign paid for by Yanukovich's campaign. Roman Kozak, Dmytro Korchynskyi, Andrii Chornovil and Bohdan Boiko ran constant ads on East Ukrainian television in the hopes of persuading viewers they were a threat and would turn their back on Russia. Their ads would be run just before Yuschenko's in order to damn him by association. Kozak spent the third highest total on television advertising. In total the four won just 0.35% of the vote.[11] Despite the lack of success the intention was clear, it is possible to dirupt a campaign when there are too many voices, especially when they all claim to be from the same ideological base. In the campaign there was also interference from elites. Putin's many visits to Ukraine during the election campaign believing popularity was an asset. He sat with Yanukovich during a military parade in Kiev on the eve of the first round of voting. He also hosted a call in television show a few days before the first round of voting that was broadcast on three national television stations and received over 80 000 questions.[12] Further, Putin was the first national leader to ofter congratulations to Yanukovich for his victory. However, his statement was premature as he offered his support before the official results had been released. At that point exit polling from the OSCE had show that Yuschenko was the winner.[13] Russia`s involvement by sending and paying political technologists to work for Yanukovich and Putin`s direct involvement in the the campaign shows a clear preference for a candidate that would seek closer relations with Russia. If Ukraine were to have closer relations with Russia it would make them less likely to emerge as a strong democracy which would not be in Russia`s interests.
Factors that led to the Orange Revolution The factors that led to the Orange Revolution are not unique to Ukraine. Similar “revolutions” had already occurred in Serbia and Georgia were similar elements contributed. There was a clear progression that more of these “revolutions” were taking place and similar factors were contributing to them. The Orange Revolution, led by the opposition force of Viktor Yuschenko and Yulia Tymoschenko, would not have occurred without the aid of foreign NGOs and empowerment of local youth movements. In Georgia the youth group Kmara played a large role in helping to monitor election, mobilizing civil society and encouraging general strikes to weaken the ruling elites.[14] This trend continued into Ukraine and how the mobilization of their largest youth group, Pora helped unify the opposition. There is clear evidence that in Georgia Western NGOs played a role in aiding the opposition. There is some speculation as the extent NGOs aided the Rose Revolution but the fact remains that foreign intervention played a part.[15] In Ukraine NGOs were prominent as well and a more direct linkage can be made as to their effect on the outcome of the Orange Revolution. The mobilization and radicalization of youth in Ukraine did not happen overnight. It was a process that took hold out of frustration at the corruption of the Kuchma regime. Since his election as president people had seen the power of the executive increase and the powers of regional representatives decrease. The beginnings of Ukraine's dominant youth organization Pora was formed in 2001 in opposition to Kuchma. This was shortly after audiotapes were released that implicated Kuchma the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze. The groups “Ukraine Without Kuchma” and “For Truth” were unsuccessful in their attempt to ouster Kuchma out of power or weaken his position in the 2001 parliamentary elections. The leadership was able to learn from its mistakes and form new tactics. Many of the activists travelled to the US on scholarships to the Muskie School of Public Service in Maine.[16] The group Pora first emerged as part of the campaign on March 29 2004. They did not overtly support Yuschenko, simply they were an oppositionist group determined to topple the old regime. Their first message was against Kuchma. They launched a campaign entitled “What is Kuchmizm?” and began comparing Kuchma to poverty and banditry.[17] The organization was guided by three guiding principles; first, they adopted an ideological approach from American academic Gene Sharp who is known for his writings on non-violent struggle. Pora used his book From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. Pora adopted two main concepts from the book; engaging in psychological warfare by attempting to change mindsets of the public[18] and by engaging the weak points of the regime.[19] The second principle was to use “situationalist” tactics which was essentially a manifestation of how they would implement the tactics adopted from Sharp. This led to them using satire and mocking authorities. This can be evidenced in their “What is Kuchmizm” campaign. They also used this strategy dispel the fear of repression against people that participated in the organization.[20] the third and final principle that guided Pora was to create a network of local NGOs that would be responsible for different parts of the campaign. An NGO known as Znaiu (“I Know”) ha dloose ties to Pora but avoided any political campaigning. The group won a $650 000 grant from the US-Ukraine Foundation ( they received a further $350 000 in preparation for the December 26 run-off) and $50 000 from Freedom House.[21] The money paid for twelve thousand copies of the Sharp book to be published.[22] Some have disputed the effectiveness of Pora before the protest campaign began. However the regime considered Pora enough of a threat to take action against it. Authorities raided Pora's Kiev office claiming they had found explosives and detonators evcen though Pora members video taped the police leaving the building empty handed.[23] The demographic conditions for a successful youth movement are essential if change is to materialize. Georgia, and Yugoslavia before it, had those conditions. The success of Pora would not have occurred if the youth in Ukraine did not want democratic change. Before the Orange Revolution protests led by youth generated against Kuchma resulted in 20 000-50 000 protesters.[24] During the 1990s both Russians and Ukrainians were unhappy with the Democratic failings in their respective countries, lack of civil society and low standard of living. Theses people had similar problems yet they attributed the cause to different things. Russians believed democracy was the problem while Ukrainians believed lack of democracy was the root cause.[25] The divergent attitudes toward democracy can explain why Russia was worried about youth activism could become a problem for them. Ukraine was always likely to have a strong youth movement and the resulting impact of Pora is evident. In Ukraine, those under thirty were three time more likely to join the Orange Revolution than other age groups.[26] The other major factor in the elections was the influence of foreign NGOs. The involvement of foreign NGOs is not a problem, so long as the remain neutral and are not funded by governments. In Ukraine, both these things happened. Western NGOs that were involved were exclusively pro-Yuschenko and some received funds from the American federal government or some of their leaders were prominent politicians. Russian saw this and after the Orange Revolution took steps to ensure NGOs would not have a similar impact on its elections. Western governments did not directly involve themselves in the campaign and election. Instead, they assisted by giving money to NGOs through USAID, their program that dispenses aid. Less than a year after the Orange Revolution the US Agency for International Development published an issue of their magazine entitled Democracy Rising which detailed their role in the “coloured” revolution that have occurred across Eastern Europe. There is nothing especially damning in the issue detailing their role in the Orange Revolution. Rather, there seems to be a consistent tone that America is willing to intervene in sovereign states and promote values that the ruling authorities might not wish promoted.[27] It is understandable that Russia would not appreciate if such programs were implemented in their country. The National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, the international aid organizations with loose affiliations to the two national parties in America donated money to Ukrainian NGOs that were apart of the opposition. The National Democratic Institute sent an election observer team to Ukraine to monitor the second round of voting on November 21. The chairman of the International Republican Institute during the 2004 election was Republican Senator John McCain. The institute trained thousands of political party activists.[28] It is unlikely that any of these activists were part of the establishment or worked for Yanukovich's campaign. When USAID is involved the initiatives they try to promote are based on Western liberal model. This model is not compatible with Russia's goals. As a result they will try to resist interventions by NGOs that try to implement ideologies that might threaten their own. Further, when the NGOs have links to the government through party affiliations it can cause Russia even greater concern.
Russian action to preserve managed democracy Russia has taken the lessons learnt from the Orange Revolution and applied them domestically. They have enacted or enhanced existing legislation to insulate themselves from a “coloured revolution”. Russia's policy of “managed democracy” was already well under way before Putin took office. Under Putin's presidency there has been a more systematic approach to how “managed democracy” was to be achieved. The mobilization of youth was vital to the success of the Orange Revolution. The Kremlin developed a strategy that would ensure the politically active young people of Russia would be loyal to them by creating the youth organization Nashi. The Kremlin recognized the importance of NGOs to the Orange Revolution. They had provided money and knowledge to opposition groups. The Kremlin is not opposed to an active civil society, however they want it to be on their terms. Subsequently they enacted laws that made it difficult for foreign NGOs to function. During the Ukrainian election Russia tried to exploit the allowance for a large number of candidates to run by funding the campaign of several ultra-nationalists that falsely claimed to be allied with Yuschenko. Russia had already enacted measure to streamline the party-system. However, after the Orange Revolution further measures were taken to reduce the number of parties that would be able to run in an election. The success of the Ukrainian group Pora was due to the previous victory by the Georgian group, Kmara, which built on the achievements of the Serbian group Otpor. Recognizing that youth mobilization was a powerful force, the Kremlin preempt youth radicalization by empowering Nashi. The group would serve the dual purpose as a tool for the Kremlin but also prevent the radicalization of Russia's youth and reduce the likelihood of their joining opposition forces. Nashi was formed Mar 1 2005. Not created by the Kremlin, Nashi quickly rose to to prominence and by May 30th its leaders had met with President Putin. It is very much a political organization. One of the goals for its members is to integrate themselves into the political elite and work towards political modernization.[29] Nashi also includes social elements. The events that draw biggest attention are the national rallies and camps they hold, but the with chapters in twenty-two cities, Nashi is able to encourage voluntarism and other social conscious activities. Nashi has become infamous for its annual summer camps. The camps seem to be run as a giant propaganda operation. At the most recent camp in July 2008, Estonia was the primary target of ridicule from attendees. During the year Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves suggested that Russia was not democratic and had been feuding with Moscow over Soviet occupation of the country after World War Two. During the camp Nashi activists kept a pig and named it Ilves.[30] Also, throughout much of 2006, the United Kingdom's ambassador to Russia, Anthony Brenton, had many of his public speeches and picketed the embassy and his residence.[31] The treatment came in response to his attending an opposition conference earlier that years. The link between the state and Nashi draws into focus when the involvement of Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Aide to the President, is brought into the picture. He has been linked with Nashi since its inception and had previously worked with predecessor Moving Together. In an interview with Business Week in 2002 he stated “The government needs the support of the streets, too”.[32] It is clear even at this early time, that he viewed a grassroots campaign as being necessary. How such a campaign would manifest itself only began to emerge during the Orange Revolution and shortly thereafter. The other fron that Surkov worked, not directly related to Nashi was the utility of rock bands in a revolution. In a hotel room in April 2005, just as Nashi's manifesto was to be published, Surkov met with seven rock bands and asked them to decline to play should a hypothetical Orange Revolution-scenario should occur in Russia. Several of the bands that met Surkov wound up playing in Nashi's first camp that summer.[33] Nashi's close ties with the state serves a dual purpose; it allows the state to promote their message to an audience that is willing to receive and share it with others while the organizations benefits because they are granted prestige. Nashi is largely dependent on the Kremlin for its continued existence. It boasts up to 120 000 members and relies on a myriad of government owned companies for funding.[34] if the Kremlin chose to go in a different direction or support a new group then Nashi would be out in the cold and be largely irrelevant on the Russian political scene. During the Ukrainian election campaign the Yanukovich campaign tried to exploit the chaotic process and large number of candidates that were part of the field. Although this attempt failed, it shows how a powerful actor can manipulate the electoral process. In 2001 the Kremlin had already taken steps to sort out the turbulent multi-party system by introducing a law that made it more difficult for political parties to register. The legislation tightened even further in 2004 and made it almost impossible for parties with wide ranging support but not enough in concentrated regions to register. If a party wishes to register it must have regional chapters in at least half the subjects in Russia, each of these chapters need at least five hundred members while other chapters need at least 250 members and a party needs at least 10 000 members nationally. In order to continue to have the right to compete in elections parties must run candidates in federal, a party needed to receive at least 5% of the national vote in order to occupy its seats regional or local election once every five years. Much of these rules make sense, it encourages parties to plan for the long-term and does not allow for ad-hoc parties to be formed. However in 2004 the requirements for political parties was increased. The minimal number of members was increased to 50 000 and parties needed chapters in two thirds rather than half the country's regions. Also, during elections parties were not allowed to form coalitions and the electoral threshold was increased to 7%. This strategy will keep Putin's United Russia in powers. The lack of electoral blocks will make it impossible for opposition parties to break their stranglehold on power.[35] There was little justification for the increased restrictions on political party registration. Another change was that parties must submit their programme, their charter, the minutes of their founding conference and contact information. There are relatively few grounds a party could be rejected based on their founding documents, other than an anti-system provision.[36] However, since this information is submitted to the Ministry of Justice, where many of the top officials would be appointed by the president, there is the potential that parties could be rejected for political reasons even if they conform to the laws. The Orange Revolution could not have happened unless opposition groups had been able to receive monetary support and training from NGOs. Many of the NGOs that provided this were Ukrainian based. However foreign organization provided money to some of these NGOs and provided direct training to people who were a part of the opposition. Russia has never been opposed to a vibrant civil society however they seek to administrate civil society so it is in line with their national goals.[37] Russia's first attempt at manging civil society began in the creation of the Civic Forum in 2001. The initiative immediately drew criticism from NGOs as it would place them all under an official umbrella and they would lose their autonomy. Putin acquiesced and the Civic Forum became a type of conference on how to further develop Russian civil society and obtained a fairly complete list of NGOs. [38] This was a small victory for NGOs as they were able to prevent government control. At this point the Kremlin and NGOs had reached an understanding; NGOs knew the government was keeping a close eye on them but there was a potential to develop close working relationship with the bureaucracy which would greatly increase the effectiveness of the organizations. Things began to change in 2006 with legislation requiring NGOs to register with the Ministry of Justice. The draft legislation banned subsidiaries of international NGOs and required notification of ad hoc groups being formed, however after protest these parts were dropped. Despite this the, law grants officials wide discretionary powers and restricts right to association and right to privacy of NGOs and their members. The legislation requires NGOs to fill out approximately one hundred pages of documentation, in depth personal information is required on each founder and its members. If a founder has deceased a death certificate is require. This amount of documentation is overly cumbersome for NGOs, especially smaller ones that are not equipped to fill out massive amounts of paperwork.[39] NGOs have been discredited in the media by government officials; for being fronts for foreign spies, interfering in Russia's domestic affairs and causing political upheaval.[40] On October 19 2006, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Danish Refugee Council and two branches of Donters Without Borders were forced to stop working temporarily for failing to meet the registration requirements .The law outlaws foreign and anonymous donations, only Russian residents are allowed to be members of NGOs and the government is allowed to review all private documents an organization may possess.[41] This law has come after the Orange Revolution and shows that Russia wants to keep tight control on civil society. The provision on foreign donations is especially intriguing as it seems to directly relate to the role NGOs played in Ukraine and how they were funded. This law is significant because it formalizes what had been an ongoing campaign by the government to discredit NGOs. Due to the ongoing campaign NGOs had a poor reputation in the eyes of the public. Thus, they had little leverage in the media or with the public to launch a campaign against the law. NGOs had to decide whether it was worth the risk to their rights of association and privacy to continue to work in Russia.

Conclusion Russia tried to influence the Ukrainian election and showed a clear preference towards Yanolovich. Yanukovich did not threaten the established order and was friendly to Russia. He was seen as the successor to Kuchma and made overtures to Russia by promising to make Russian an official language. Russia’s policy have a managed democracy would have been under threat if their largest European neighbour would have started to move away from their close relationship. The factors that contributed to the Orange Revolution becoming a reality could have come to Russia. Russia took steps to ensure such events could not occur within their borders. The chaotic nature of the Ukrainian election system allowed numerous candidates to run. This was exploited by the introduction of phoney candidates by the Yanukovich campaign. The shadow campaign of Yanukovich, which was partially funded by the Kremlin, was responsible for this part of the campaign. Russia had already taken measures to reduce he number of political parties contesting parliamentary elecions. In 2004 they took even further measure to weaken political parties that didn’t have broad based support by banning the formation of coalitions to contest elections. The success of youth organizations in mobilizing support for the opposition was a powerful statement. Russia helped create and fund the youth organization Nashi to enlist support for the Kremlin. The organization is prestigious due to its close association with the Kremlin. The Kremlin benefits form the organization by using it for propaganda and indoctrinating youth. The popularity of such a group makes it difficult for an opposition youth group to take traction. NGOs helped fund opposition groups and gave training to activists. Russia’s 2006 law on NGOs is extremely restrictive and makes in difficult for an active civil society to take hold. The details required by the government make it hard for smaller NGOs to function and does not allow for funding from foreign donors. The Orange Revolution had NGOs receiving money from foreign agencies. Groups from the United States were the most prominent including the aid agencies for the Democratic and Republican Parties. The Kremlin has taken steps to ensure their policy of managed democracy in not interrupted. The single biggest threat has been the prospect of a coloured revolution. Georgia and Ukraine have both had an active opposition that has been able to topple the old guard. Russian authorities enacted or strengthened already existing legislation to ensure opposition groups were weakened.
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[1] Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, (New Haven, CN, Yale University Press, 2005). 32
[2] “Ukraine 2004 Presidential Election,” Centre on Demcratic Performance: Election Results Archive December 10 2001 accessed March 26 2009.
[3] “Ukraine 199 Presidential Election,” Election Guide, accessed March 26 1999.
[4] Venice Commission, Constitutional Referendum in Ukraine, (Venice: March 31 2000) accessed from .
[5] Paul D'Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Desihn, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). 93
[6] “Russia: Presidential election 1996,” Electoral Geograohy 2.0 accessed March 26 2009.
[7] Lilia Shevtsova, Putin's Russia, trans. Antonnia W. Bouis (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 129
[8] Wilson. 94
[9] Taras Kuzio, “Yanukovich-Gate Unfolds After Ukrainian Elections,” Eurasia Daily Monitor December 2 2004 accessed March 26 2009.
[10] Alexander Etkind and Andrei Scherbak, “The Double Monopoly and its Technologists: The Russian Preemptive Counterrevolution,” Demokratizatsiya (16:03 229-239). 234
[11] Wilson .91
[12] Ibid. 94
[13] Sabra Ayres, “Opposition Candidate Takes Oath Of Office Despite Official Results Showing He Has Lost,” Cox News Service November 23 2004: International News.
[14] Taras Kuzio, “Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave,” Demokratizatsiya (16:01 91-109). 106
[15] Ibid. 108
[16] Wilson. 74
[17] Ibid.
[18] Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation, (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2003). 26
[19] Ibid. 22-24
[20] Wilson. 75
[21] Peter Byrne, “Q&A: Dmytro Potekhin,” Kyiv Post (24 February 2005) accessed March 27 2009.
[22] Wilson. 75-76
[23] Ibid.
[24] Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine is Not Russia: Comparing Youth Political Activism,” SAIS Review (26:02 67-83). 71
[25] Ibid 71
[26] Ibid.
[27] U.S. Agency for International Development, Rising Democracy: Grassroots Revolution (Washington D.C.: Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, September 2005).
[28] “Preliminary Statement of the International Republican Institute (IRI) on the October 31, 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Election” International Republican Institute November 1 2004 accessed March 27 2009.
[29] Douglas Robert Buchacek, “NASHA Pravda, NASHE Delo: The Mobilization of the Nashi Generation in Contemporary Russia,” diss., University of North Carolin at Chapel Hill, 2006, Carolina Papers on Democracy and Human Rights No. 07 (Chapel Hill: Carolina Papers, 2006). 3
[30] Luke Harding, “Welcome to Putin's Summer Camp...,” The Guardian 24 July 2008 accessed March 28 2009.
[31] “Russian youth 'hound UK envoy'” BBC News 8 December 2006 accessed March 28 2009.
[32] “A Talk With Putin's Inside Man,” Business Week 21 October 2002 accessed march 28 2009.
[33] Buchacek. 59
[34] Harding.
[35] Vladimir Gel'man, “From 'Feckless Pluralism' to 'Dominant Power Politics'? The Transformation of Russia's Party System,” Democratization (13:04 545-561). 557
[36] Hans Iversloot and Ruben Verheul, “Managing Democracy: Political Parties and the State in Russia,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (22:03 383-405). 389
[37] Harley Balzer, “Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin's Emerging Regime,” Post-Soviet Affairs (19:03 189-227). 191
[38] Ibid. 207

[39] Alison Kamhi, “The Russian NGO Law: Potential Conflicts with International, National and Foreign Legislation,” International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law (9:01 34-57) 35.
[40] Josh Machleder, “Contextual and Legislative Analysis of the Russian Law on NGOs,” draft from INDEM Foundation accessed from on March 28 2009.
[41] Kamhi. 35-37