1. Multinational Corporations(MNCs) 1) Definition: firms that engage in some form of international business. 2) The goals of MNCs: maximizing the value of the MNCs and shareholder wealth. 2. Agency problems 1) Agency problems: The conflict of goals between a firm’s managers and shareholders is often referred to as the agency problem. 2) Agency costs are normally larger than for purely domestic firms for several reasons (1) MNCs with subsidiaries scattered around the world
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the shareholder-principal conflict with manager-agents known as the principal-agent problem. To mitigate agency problems between senior executives and shareholders, should the compensation committee of the board devote more to executive salary and bonus (cash compensation) or more to long-term incentives? Why? What role does each type of pay play in motivating managers? There are several dimensions to the principal-agent conflict. Principal-Agent Relationships exist whenever one person or party
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Chapter 10 - Incentive Conflicts And Contracts CHAPTER 10 INCENTIVE CONFLICTS AND CONTRACTS CHAPTER SUMMARY This chapter provides an overview of incentive conflicts and contracting within firms. It begins by defining the firm as a focal point for a set of contracts. It then discusses the many incentive conflicts that exist between the parties that make up the firm. The role of contracts in reducing these conflicts is examined. The importance of asymmetric information in limiting the ability to
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they will not use the shareholder wealth model to consider things. 7. Explain what is meant by agency relationships and agency costs. An agency relationship occurs when one or more individuals (the principals) hire another individual (the agent) to perform a service on behalf of the principals. Two of the most important agency relationships in finance
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heterogeneity and opacity. * India has agency type 2 problems; few studies are available addressing type 2 problem and variables to measure this. * Opacity and complexity creates Information asymmetry and tunneling respectively between different agents and thus have implications upon firm performance. * Agency costs (type 2) also affects firm performance. Changes in Ownership Structure (Complex and concentrated) Changes in Ownership Structure (Complex and concentrated) Agency cost type
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Q13-7. What is a debenture? Why do you think that this is the most common form of corporate bond in the United States? Is it is much less commonly used elsewhere? A13-7. Corporations issue bonds to raise money to expand their businesses, cover operating costs, or finance corporate takeovers or reorganizations. Corporate bonds are debt obligations issued by corporations. Corporate bonds may be either secured or unsecured. Debentures are unsecured bonds, which means that bondholders have nothing
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Trade: Uncertainty Avoidance* Gert Jan Hofstede Wageningen University gertjan.hofstede@wur.nl Catholijn M. Jonker Delft University of Technology c.m.jonker@tudelft.nl Tim Verwaart LEI Wageningen UR tim.verwaart@wur.nl Keywords: trade, culture, agents, uncertainty avoidance, negotiation Abstract A model is presented of the way that our cultural attitude towards the unknown influences the decisions we make in trade. Uncertainty avoidance is one of Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions. The paper presents
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The Post-Issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms Overview of the article As there were still few attempts to measure operating performance of IPO firms at that time, Jain and Kini (1994) wrote this article in a bid to focus on this particular issue by study on the IPO firms during 1976-1988. They investigate the change in operating performance of firms after going public through IPOs which they find that IPO firms show a decline in post-issue operating performance. The main reasons that explain
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International Journal of Business and Management; Vol. 10, No. 1; 2015 ISSN 1833-3850 E-ISSN 1833-8119 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education The Agency Problem: Measures for Its Overcoming Meri Boshkoska1 1 Faculty Economics-Prilep, Republic of Macedonia Correspondence: Meri Boshkoska, Faculty of Economics-Prilep, Republic of Macedonia. E-mail: meribb@yahoo.com Received: September 19, 2014 Accepted: November 4, 2014 Online Published: December 20, 2014 doi:10
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Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure Michael C. Jensen Harvard Business School MJensen@hbs.edu And William H. Meckling University of Rochester Abstract This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of the agency
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